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THE Second Volume, which is now completed, brings down the History of the World to a period earlier than that which was contemplated in the original plan of the work. No candid reader will be surprised that a scheme of such importance should require to be modified by experience: nor will the change be disapproved, if it increases the value of the work. To do justice to the original plan of so treating the better known portions of Ancient History as to make the work complete in itself, and not a mere supplement to separate histories of Greece and Rome,—and at the same time to avoid “the dry baldness of an epitome,”—it has been found necessary to devote a larger space than was originally expected to the history of the classical nations, and of the peoples with whom they came into contact. In this manner, the two volumes now completed will be found to contain (it is believed) as full an account as the general reader can desire of the course of ancient history down to the epoch of the virtual subjection of the civilized world to the Roman Republic, now at the climax of its greatness. It is proposed to complete the Ancient History in the Third Volume, bringing it down to the time of Charlemagne, the true epoch at which the Roman Empire was broken up into the states of Modern Europe. The ordinary division at the Fall of the Western Empire, to which it was at first intended to adhere, falls in the midst of a period of transition; but, by choosing the later epoch, as Dr. Arnold said of the plan of his History of Rome, “We shall have passed through the chaos which followed the

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In consequence of this alteration, the Map of the Roman Empire, given with Part XI., will belong to Volume III.

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BY PHILIP SMITH, B.A.

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
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HISTORY OF THE WORLD

FROM THE

EARLIEST RECORDS TO THE PRESENT TIME.

ANCIENT CARTHAGE



A

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

FROM THE

EARLIEST RECORDS TO THE PRESENT TIME.

BY

PHILIP SMITH, B.A.,

ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DICTIONARIES OF GREEK AND ROMAN
ANTIQUITIES, BIOGRAPHY, AND GEOGRAPHY.

VOL. II.

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FROM THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE ROMAN
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BOOK IV.

THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE AND RISE OF
THE HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP TO THE ACCESSION OF
ANTIOCHUS SOTER, B.C. 359 to B.C. 280.

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CHAPTER XV.

PHILIP OF MACEDON. * B.C. 359 TO B.C. 336.

Λέγεται τι καινόν; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν τι καινότερον ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν
καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν;

"Do you ask, What is the news? What could be greater news than a *Macedonian* making war upon the Athenians, and regulating the affairs of Greece?"—*DEMOSTHENES*.

"That dishonest victory
At Chæronea, fatal to liberty,
Killed with report that old man eloquent."—*MILTON*.

ACCESSION OF PHILIP—HIS FIRST SUCCESSSES—THE MACEDONIAN MONARCHY—EDUCATION AND CHARACTER OF PHILIP—HIS RELATIONS TO ATHENS—CAPTURE OF AMPHIPOLIS AND PYDNA—THE SOCIAL WAR—THE SACRED WAR—THE AMPHICTYONS—PHILIP IN THESSALY—STOPPED AT THERMOPYLÆ BY THE ATHENIANS, SPARTA AND MEGALOPOLIS—DEMOSTHENES—THE FIRST PHILIPPIC—PEACE PARTY AT ATHENS—PHOCION—THE OLYNTHIAN WAR—ÆSCHINES—PEACE BETWEEN ATHENS AND PHILIP—END OF THE SACRED WAR—DEMOSTHENES AND ISOCRATES ON THE PEACE—PROGRESS OF PHILIP—NEW WAR WITH ATHENS—PHILIP IN SCYTHIA—THE LOCRIAN WAR—PHILIP GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONS—CAPTURE OF ELATEA—ALLIANCE OF THEBES AND ATHENS—BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA—DEATH OF ISOCRATES—DEMOSTHENES "ON THE CROWN"—PHILIP GENERAL OF THE GREEKS FOR THE PERSIAN WAR—DEATH OF PHILIP.

FOR the space of nearly a century and a half, from the Ionic revolt to the battle of Mantinea, the whole interest of the world's history has centered in the Greek republics. Having proved the power of liberty to raise the intellectual state of man to its highest pitch, they failed to show how the liberty they had achieved could be made the basis of a permanent constitution or extended to the world at large. Exhausted by their intestine conflicts, they were doomed to follow in the train of a master, who, in the name of the old cause of Hellenic liberty against Persian despotism, founded yet another Asiatic empire, short-lived indeed in itself, but which proved the means of extending Greek civilization to the East. That master was the ruler of a country adjacent to Greece, but hitherto regarded as beyond the Hellenic pale. The military genius of its new and youthful sovereign now first brought its natural resources into full action.

PHILIP II., sometimes called the Great, ascended the throne of Macedonia in B.C. 359. He was the youngest of the three sons

* The allusion is to the death of Isocrates on hearing of the battle of Chæronea. See p. 30.

of Amyntas II. His eldest brother, Alexander II., had been slain, at the age of twenty-three, after a reign of only two years, by Ptolemy Alorites (B.C. 369—367). The second brother, Perdiccas III., who recovered the crown by killing the usurper, fell in battle against the Illyrians, after a reign of five years (B.C. 364—359), having left his infant son, and probably his kingdom, to the guardianship of Philip, when he set out on the campaign. A minority, always intolerable in a rude state, such as Macedonia then was, invited rival claimants for the crown, and gave Philip a fair pretext for seizing it himself. Young as he was, he at once displayed that deep policy which was always a chief source of his success. Of his two competitors, Pausanias was favoured by the king of Thrace, whom Philip gained over by liberal offers: the other, Argæus, was supported by the Athenians, to whom he promised to restore their ancient, and still much regretted, possession of Amphipolis;—in which Perdiccas had placed a Macedonian garrison. Philip made the same offers, and withdrew the garrison; and, having defeated Argæus, he showed great kindness to some Athenian volunteers, who had accompanied the pretender, and sent them back to Athens as envoys of conciliation. These measures were followed by a peace with Athens, and the formal acknowledgment of their right to Amphipolis (B.C. 359).

Having disposed of these rivals, Philip hastened to meet the dangers that threatened Macedonia from the barbarian tribes on the north and west. The upper courses of her rivers were occupied by the Pæonians, a powerful Thracian tribe, long dangerous neighbours, and who were now threatening an invasion. Philip speedily subdued them, but allowed them to remain as his subject allies, under their own kings, whom we find ruling over them down to the time of the Roman conquest. He next advanced against the more formidable Illyrians. As a geographical term, Illyria denotes the country between Mount Pindus and the Mediterranean, from the borders of Epirus on the south, as far north and west as the river Save and the Julian Alps, corresponding to the modern Albania and Bosnia. But, in an ethnic sense, the name describes no compact and united people, but a number of tribes of Thracian race, intermixed with others of Celtic origin, in consequence of that great movement from the west, which we shall have to notice in connection with the history of Rome. It was one result of this movement, that the Illyrian tribes pressed more and more upon their neighbours; and of late a large body of them, under their aged king Bardylis, had occupied a consider-

able portion of Western Macedonia. Against this people Philip marched at the head of 10,000 men; and, in the battle that ensued, he conquered by the tactics which Epaminondas had used at Leuctra and Mantinea. About 7,000 of the Illyrians fell; and Bardylis purchased peace by the sacrifice of all he had conquered in Macedonia, at the same time placing the passes of Pindus in the hands of Philip. These victories made Philip master of the whole country within what may be considered the natural limits of Macedonia, the Cambunian Mountains on the south, Pindus and Bernus on the west, Scardus, Orbelus, and Scœmus on the north, and the Strymon on the east. The last, however, like most rivers, was rather a conventional than a natural boundary; and, beyond it, Thracæ awaited the time when Macedonia should be strong enough to subdue her. Secured, meanwhile, against the dangers that had menaced him from within and without, Philip finally set his nephew's claims aside, but brought him up at his own court, and afterwards married him to his daughter.

The line of Macedonian kings, of whom Philip thus became the representative, claimed an Hellenic descent, though ruling over a non-Hellenic people; and we have already seen that Alexander I. was permitted to contend at the Olympic games on the strength of the proofs he produced of his descent from Temenus, the Heraclid king of Argos.* The claim thus admitted was a pretext ready to be used on any opportunity for interference with the politics of Greece; and the close neighbourhood of Macedonia to the Greek settlements on the Chalcidic peninsula caused her aid to be sought, as we have seen, by the contending parties in the Peloponnesian War. A better effect of the Hellenic pretensions of her kings was the inducement to cultivate Greek civilization. Such was the course taken by Archelaüs, who made his new capital at

* The following is the entire succession of the Macedonian kings, from the foundation of the monarchy to its conquest by the Romans:—(1.) Perdiccas I.; (2.) Argæus; (3.) Philip I.; (4.) Aeropus; (5.) Alcetas; (6.) Amyntas I., about B.C. 540—500; (7.) Alexander I., to about B.C. 454; (8.) Perdiccas II., to B.C. 413; (9.) Archelaus, to B.C. 399; (10.) Orestes and Aeropus, to B.C. 394; (11.) Pausanias, to B.C. 393; (12.) Amyntas II., to B.C. 369; (13.) Alexander II., to B.C. 367; [Ptolemy Alorites, usurper, to B.C. 364]; (14.) Perdiccas III., to B.C. 359; (15.) Philip II., to B.C. 336; (16.) ALEXANDER III., THE GREAT, to B.C. 323; (17.) Philip III., Aridaeus, and Alexander IV., Ægus, to B.C. 315; (18.) Cassander, to B.C. 296; (19.) Philip IV., to B.C. 295; (20.) Demetrius Poliorcetes, to B.C. 287; (21.) Pyrrhus, to B.C. 286; (22.) Lysimachus, to B.C. 280; [various rivals, ending with Pyrrhus again, to B.C. 277]; (23.) Antigonus Gonatas, to B.C. 239; (24.) Demetrius II., to B.C. 229; (25.) Antigonus Doson, to B.C. 220; (26.) Philip V., to B.C. 178; (27.) Perseus, to B.C. 167, the date of the Roman conquest.

Pella the resort of some of the greatest literary men,—such as Euripides, who died there,—and who employed Zeuxis to decorate his palace. The same monarch organized the resources of his kingdom, improved the army, constructed roads, erected fortresses to check the inroads of his barbarian neighbours, and seemed ready to take a decisive part in the affairs of Greece, when his assassination, and the troubles that ensued, postponed the crisis for two more generations. Meanwhile, another point of contact between Macedonia and Greece was occasioned by those relations between Thebes and Thessaly, which we have not considered important enough to narrate. In B.C. 368, Pelopidas, having been successful in his expedition against Alexander of Pheræ, advanced into Macedonia, and decided the contest for the crown between Ptolemy of Alorus and Alexander II. in favour of the latter, who gave, among other hostages, his youthful brother, Philip.

Thus it happened that Philip spent the best years of his youth at Thebes, at the time when Thebes held the supremacy of Greece. His quick parts enabled him to improve the opportunity, which his ambition taught him to value. He acquired such mastery over the Greek language, and studied to such purpose under the masters of rhetoric, as to be able to meet the great orators of that age on their own ground. He heard the philosophers who had heard Socrates, and he is said to have conversed with Plato. If so, he must have had for his fellow-pupil the great Aristotle, whom he afterwards invited to his court to be the tutor of Alexander.* But there were two things that he valued above any literary culture—the lessons in the art of war which he learnt from Epaminondas, and the personal acquaintances which he formed with the leading statesmen of Athens, as well as Thebes. On the tactics of the great Theban general, Philip founded his invention of that irresistible engine of war, the Macedonian phalanx; but he found a surer way to victory in what he learnt of the weaknesses of the Athenian orators. We shall soon see how he corrupted some and cajoled others, while nearly all were prepared to trust the goodwill of the illustrious prince who had lived so familiarly among them. They forgot that the knowledge which a foreign despot may thus acquire of the internal working of a free country is sure to be used, in the long run, for his own

* Aristotle went to Athens in B.C. 367, and heard Plato from the return of the latter from Sicily in B.C. 365 to his death in B.C. 347. He went to the court of Philip in B.C. 342, and was received with honours which prove the king's true respect for philosophy.

purposes, and, when he resolves on an attack, he knows the weak points at which to aim it. Nor was Philip burthened by any scruples of conscience or good faith. Treacherous himself, his only assured confidence seems to have been in the treachery and corruption of others. His saying has passed into a proverb, that he could take any city, the wicket of which would give passage to an ass laden with gold. His Greek education had varnished over, without subduing, the coarseness as well as the cunning of the barbarian; and there were almost daily opportunities for the proverbial appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. But the hostile orator, who perhaps overdraws the picture of his orgies, admits that they never interfered with business. He was as persevering as he was prompt, and his unyielding will was served by an iron constitution. He was generous to his friends, and seldom wanting in clemency to conquered foes.

There can be no doubt that Philip ascended the throne of Macedonia with the direct design of becoming arbiter of the destinies of Greece. His territory lay compact and self-contained across the base of the peninsula, while it touched the sea at the Thermaic Gulf, which received its three great rivers—the Haliacmon, the Lydias, and the Axios. Once master of the Chalcidic peninsula, and of the Greek colonies on the Strymon, he would gain a great accession of maritime power, and soon extend his dominion into Thrace. His first step towards this object gave an earnest of his cunning and duplicity, and no less of the apathy of the free states of Greece. Amphipolis, once so choice an Athenian possession, and so disgracefully lost in the Peloponnesian War, was the key to the Strymon and the Thracian border. Philip had bought off the opposition of the Athenians, as we have seen, by promising to give them the city, of which they had unaccountably neglected to take possession, though a year had elapsed since the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrison, and it had remained independent while Philip was engaged in the Illyrian War. Delivered from his internal enemies, Philip was not the man to forego the advantage which the Athenians had neglected. Towards the end of B.C. 358, he marched against Amphipolis, at the head of the 10,000 troops with which he had gained the victory over the Illyrians, and which became the nucleus of the first standing army known in Europe. The Amphipolitans applied to Athens, offering to surrender their independence rather than fall into the hands of Philip; but the wily prince wrote to the Athenians—he was always powerful as a letter-writer—

assuring them that he was only besieging Amphipolis in order to perform his promise of restoring it to them. Resentment against their refractory colony and blind confidence in Philip's intentions combined to lead the Athenians to a most fatal decision. Well did they deserve the taunt of Demosthenes, when, at a later period, he charged them with being so low in courage and military preparation, that they would not even take Amphipolis if it were offered to them. The city soon fell by treason, and the Olynthians, justly alarmed for themselves, sent an embassy to Athens to propose an alliance. Philip's friends at Athens procured the dismissal of these envoys; but they had not confidence enough in his good faith to expect the surrender of Amphipolis without an equivalent, so they entered into a secret negotiation to give him Pydna, on the Thermaic Gulf, in exchange. Philip, on his part, won over the Olynthians by giving them Potidæa, which belonged to Athens. While the siege of that city was formed, Philip marched to Pydna, which was treacherously surrendered to him. Several citizens, known to be hostile to Macedonia, were put to death; and the Athenian residents were sold as slaves. Philip then refused to give up Amphipolis to the Athenians, since they had not placed Pydna in his hands.

These acts of open hostility are explained by the change which the Athenians had now suffered from a state of high prosperity. They had engaged in a tedious but ultimately successful war for the recovery of the Chersonese from the Thracian king Cersobleptes and the mercenary captain Charidemus. A more important conquest was that of Eubœa, which was wrested from Thebes, chiefly by means of the animated appeals of Timotheus to the Athenians, and the patriotic zeal of certain citizens, who voluntarily assumed the burthen of the trierarchy.* Among these was Demosthenes (B.C. 358). The city was now at the height of her recovered maritime power, when a sudden change once more stripped her of her empire, and with it of the means of resisting Philip. The fair promises, which accompanied the renewal of the confederacy, had been disappointed. Relieved by the victories of Epaminondas from the check of Spartan rivalry, Athens had again yielded to the temptation of administering the common affairs according to her own interests. The system of mercenary forces, invented by Conon, and developed by Iphicrates and Chares, had tempted the citizens to decline active service. This evil, which is con-

* The trierarchy was one of the "liturgies," or public services, which fell upon the citizens of the highest Solonian census. It consisted in fitting out a trireme.

stantly denounced by Demosthenes, sapped the military power of the state, while the allies were outraged by the exactions of the ill-paid mercenaries. Four of the most important of the allies—Byzantium, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes—revolted from Athens, and began the “Social War” (B.C. 358—355). The two latter states were supported by the Carian prince Mausolus, whose wife and sister Artemisia has conferred on his name a renown as lasting as the world by the erection of his magnificent tomb, called the *Mausoleum*.* The Athenians made their first attack on Chios, where the revolted had united their forces; but Chabrias fell while leading his ships into the harbour, and the land force under Chares was compelled to re-embark.

The loss of Chabrias was followed by the retirement of Timotheus and Iphicrates. At the annual account rendered by Athenian officers, they were accused by Chares of corruption. Timotheus, who had made many enemies by his overbearing conduct, was sentenced to a fine of 100 talents, the heaviest, it is said, ever inflicted at Athens: he retired to Chalcis, where he died in B.C. 354. Iphicrates was acquitted, but he was not again employed. Thus the city, in the time of her extreme need, lost her three best generals; and the loss was aggravated by the undisputed military ascendancy which it left in the hands of Chares, a brave, but reckless and selfish leader, chiefly intent on satisfying his mercenaries and enriching himself. Phocion, of whom we have to speak presently, held as yet no prominent command; nor were his the qualities to save the state. But the worst evil of all was the habit into which the Athenians had now fallen of declining to serve in person, while they did not even pay the mercenaries to whom they committed their defence. The result was that, in the next campaign, Chares took service with his mercenaries under the rebel satrap Artabazus, and the Athe-

* The old dynasty of Carian princes, founded at Halicarnassus by Lygdamis, soon after the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, and made famous by the queen Artemisia, who fought at Salamis, ended with the overthrow of her grandson Lygdamis, in the time of Herodotus. The new dynasty was founded, about B.C. 380, by Hecatomnus, who left three sons, Mausolus, Idrieus, Pixodarus, and two daughters, Artemisia and Ada, who were married to their two elder brothers. All five reigned in turn till the conquest by Alexander, when the kingdom lost all its importance. It was ultimately merged in the government of Rhodes. The Mausoleum, which was reckoned one of the seven wonders of the world, was a sort of castle-tomb, surmounted by a pyramid, and crowned at the summit by a statue of the king in a marble quadriga, the work of Pythis. Its other sculptures were executed by Scopas, Bryaxis, Timotheus, and Leochares, all Athenian artists of the highest note. Considerable remains of these sculptures are now in the British Museum.

nians forgave his desertion of his proper post for the sake of the rich reward he earned* (B.C. 356). But Artaxerxes did not so easily forgive the aggression; and his threat, to support the revolted allies with the whole Persian fleet, decided the issue of the war. In the following spring, Athens consented to a peace which secured the independence of her principal allies, and reduced her revenue from their tribute to only forty-five talents (B.C. 355). The Social War left her weak, impoverished, and deprived both of military power and prestige; and, worse than all, its conduct proved how much of her old confidence and energy had gone, even before these losses. In such a condition, she had to meet the aggressions of Philip, which had now become alarming; and it is only by a clear view of this state of affairs, that we can appreciate the moral heroism with which Demosthenes now began to fight the last battles of patriotism.

While the Athenians were occupied in the Social War, Philip was strengthening his position on the Thracian border, not only by his arms, but by gaining the friendship of Olynthus. Potidæa fell about midsummer, B.C. 356, an epoch ever memorable in the annals of Macedonia and the world; for, just at the same time, Philip gained a victory in the chariot-race at Olympia; his general Parmenio won a great battle against the Illyrians; and his wife Olympias* gave birth to his son ALEXANDER, of whose future renown an omen was given in the conflagration of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus by the maniac Herostratus, on the same night. Passing the Strymon, Philip obtained possession of the auriferous region of Mt. Pangæus, where he founded the famous city of Philippi, and derived an immense revenue from an improved working of the gold mines.

Meanwhile the opportunity for his interference in the affairs of all Greece was prepared by the suicidal conflicts of the Greeks themselves. The occasion arose out of the "Sacred War," which began shortly after the Social War. The old enmity between the Thebans and the Phocians had been inflamed by the reluctance of the latter to join the Theban alliance, and some actual hostilities had taken place after the general peace of B.C. 361. The

* Olympias was a daughter of Neoptolemus, prince of the Molossi, in Epirus, who claimed an Aæcid descent. She is conspicuous among the queens who have been notorious in history for violence of temper and vindictive cruelty, and she was addicted to the enthusiastic orgies of the Dionysiac worship. Philip first met her at the mysteries celebrated in the island of Samothrace, and married her in B.C. 359, the year of his accession.

Amphictyonic Council,* of which we have already spoken,* had lately been called forth from its dignified obscurity, to exercise a political influence, and the time had now come, when this great Panhellenic union was destined to give the final blow to Grecian liberty. It must be remembered that the council, constituted of the representatives of the twelve ancient divisions of the Hellenic nation, at a time when that nation had its seat in the north, altogether failed to represent the actual states of historic Greece. Each of the twelve nations, great or small, had alike two votes, and such cities as Sparta and Athens possessed only the fraction of a vote due to them as subdivisions of the Dorian and Ionian nations. A clear majority was commanded by the states of Thessaly and Central Greece, which were now greatly influenced by Thebes, and about to become the mere creatures of Philip. These states, moreover, had many a ground of quarrel with the Phocians.

The Thebans had invoked the sentence of the Amphictyons against Sparta, with little effect, for her seizure of the Cadmean citadel, but against Phocis they had power to carry a sentence into execution. They are said to have found a pretext in the curse pronounced of old on any who should cultivate the devoted plain of Cirrha, but other grounds of accusation are alleged. The imposition of a fine, which it was known the Phocians could not pay, was followed up by a decree that the whole nation should be expelled from their possessions, and their territory devoted for ever, like that of Cirrha, to Apollo. Shut up to the choice between extermination and resistance, the Phocians found an able and unscrupulous leader in Philomelus.† By his advice they revived their old claim to be themselves the guardians of the Delphic temple, citing the verse in which Homer mentions the Phocians as holding the "rocky Pytho," the ancient name of Delphi.‡ Philomelus, with a force of 2,000 men, surprised the temple, destroyed the records of the sentence against the Phocians, raised a fresh body of mercenaries, fortified the temple, and carried on a successful war with the Locrians, who attempted to rescue Delphi. Having extorted from the reluctant priestess a sort of half sanction to his proceedings, and having issued a manifesto promising to respect the treasures of the shrine, Philo-

* Vol. I. chap. xii. p. 328. The last act of the Amphictyons, important enough to be recorded in Greek history, was the execration of Epialtes for his treason at Thermopylae. They are not once mentioned by Thucydides, or in Xenophon's Hellenica.

† Iliad, II. 519.

melus appealed to the states of Greece. Athens, the old ally of Phocis, and Sparta, the bitter enemy of Thebes, almost alone of the leading states espoused his cause; but the former was in the crisis of social war, and the latter had enough to do to hold her ground against her new rivals, Megalopolis and Messene. In fact, the position in which Sparta had been left by the Theban War disabled her from any effective aid to the common cause in the approaching crisis. It was easy for Thebes to organize a confederacy of the northern states against the Phocians; and the danger became so pressing that Philomelus, disregarding his scruples and his pledges, applied the sacred treasures to the payment of mercenaries, and soon gathered a force of 10,000 men. The war now assumed the most savage character; the Thebans, Thessalians, and Locrians put to death all Phocian prisoners as sacrilegious outlaws, and the Phocians retaliated. Success declared at first for Philomelus; but, having become entangled amongst some rocks and woods, he was surrounded by the superior numbers of the enemy, and he only avoided being taken prisoner by a fatal leap over a precipice (B.C. 354). His brother Onomarchus rallied the defeated army, roused the spirit of the Phocians, who with their bad fortune had begun to repent of their sacrilege, and overawing the malcontents by his mercenaries, he was made their despot as well as general. He used the temple treasures more freely than ever, not only to pay his troops, but to bribe the leading men both of friendly and hostile states. He became master of the country as far as Thermopylæ, on the one side; while, on the other, he invaded Bœotia, took Orchomenus, and laid siege to Chæronea, but was repulsed by the whole force of the Thebans (B.C. 353).

The time had now come for the intervention of the Macedonian. Philip had pushed on his advance into Thrace as far as Abdera, with a view to support Cersobleptes against the Athenians in the Chersonese; but his progress had been checked by another Thracian chieftain, Amadocus, as well as by the presence of Chares on the coast, with an Athenian fleet. With his usual activity he marched back to the Gulf of Therma; and laid siege to Methone (B.C. 353). This last remaining possession of the Athenians on the Macedonian coast fell, like Pydna and Potidæa, through their delay in sending the succours that they voted (B.C. 352).^{*} Philip had now recovered the sea-coast of Lower Macedonia, and the way lay open into Thessaly, where his aid was solicited by the Aleuada

* It was at the siege of Methone that Philip lost an eye.

of Larissa against Lycophron, the despot of Pheræ. Lycophron looked for help to Onomarchus, who was glad to find occupation for his numerous mercenaries. A force of 7,000 men, sent into Thessaly under his brother Phayllus, was defeated by Philip, but this disaster was fully repaired by Onomarchus himself, who drove Philip out of Thessaly, beaten in two great battles. Onomarchus now led his victorious army into Bœotia and took Chæronæa; and seemed to be rapidly attaining the position of master of Northern Greece.

Philip had retired into Macedonia, with his army dispirited and mutinous; but his energy soon enabled him to take the field again. Lycophron once more turned for aid to Onomarchus, promising to give him all Thessaly as a dependency of Phocis. With such a prize in view, Onomarchus put forth all his force, and entered Thessaly with an army of 20,000 foot and 500 horse. But Lycophron's cruel abuse of the former victory had united nearly all Thessaly against him, and Philip soon found himself at the head of an infantry as powerful as the enemy's, besides 3,000 of the splendid Thessalian cavalry. He roused the enthusiasm of his followers by assuming the character of an avenger of the Delphic god, and crowns of laurel, gathered in the vale of Tempe, marked his soldiers as the servants of Apollo. One decisive battle made Philip the master of Thessaly and confirmed his loftier pretensions. The army of Onomarchus was annihilated, 6,000 men being slain, 3,000 taken prisoners, and the remainder utterly dispersed. The body of their leader, who fell in the battle, was fixed to a cross; * and all the prisoners were drowned, in punishment of their sacrilege (B.C. 352). The victory was followed by the capitulation of Pheræ, and the expulsion of Lycophron; and the capture of Pagasæ, which the Athenians again failed to relieve in time, gave Philip a naval station on the great gulf which opens into the Eubœan Sea. His character as champion of the Delphic god formed a sufficient pretext for advancing to the relief of the violated sanctuary and so crushing the Phocians in their very citadel. But at last the Athenians were effectually alarmed: the energy of which they were always capable was roused: by ready contributions and personal service, they promptly despatched a force sufficient to defend Thermopylæ; and Philip,

* This is, we believe, the first instance of the use of crucifixion in Greece; and here it is only an exposure of the corpse, not yet a mode of inflicting death. The form of punishment was essentially Oriental. The Romans borrowed it from the Phœnicians of Carthage.

who always knew how to bide his time, turned back without attempting the pass (B.C. 352). Phayllus, the successor of Onomarchus, held almost undiminished power in Phocis, Locris, and Bœotia; using the remaining sacred treasures to recruit his mercenary force, and to distribute presents among his supporters throughout the Greek cities. But this final plunder reached those venerable offerings of ancient kings, which were cherished with keen national pride; as the sacrilege became less scrupulous, the use of its proceeds grew more reckless; and the general indignation was redoubled, when goblets and statues dedicated by Croesus were melted down to enrich the favourites of the despot. Thus, at the very moment when Philip was repulsed from Thermopylæ, the public feeling of Greece was preparing to accept him as a deliverer. Meanwhile he was engaged in consolidating his power nearer home; and he advanced so far into Thrace that his movements were almost unknown, and the Athenians were amused with reports sometimes of his death, sometimes of his illness. But there was one man who would not suffer them to forget that Philip was still alive; and this pause in the Sacred War calls us to observe what was going on in the other parts of Greece.

The new power that had risen in Phocis was viewed with favour both at Athens and Sparta, as a counterpoise to Thebes; and had the two states been capable of a vigorous and united effort, Greece might have had another history. But the thoughts of Sparta were bent on deliverance from the bonds drawn round her by the policy of Epaminondas, and the successes of Onomarchus in Bœotia were welcomed as an opportunity for attacking Megalopolis. On this point the interests of Sparta and of Athens came into collision; and the Athenians had to decide whether they would purchase the Lacedæmonian alliance by the reversal of the recent settlement for making Peloponnesus free, and Sparta incapable of aggression. It was about the winter of B.C. 353—352, when Onomarchus was at the height of his power, that two embassies arrived at Athens; the one from Megalopolis to ask for alliance and support, the other from Sparta to resist the appeal, and to propose a close alliance of Athens with herself and her Peloponnesian allies, to complete the humiliation of Thebes. This view was supported by the large party at Athens who cherished the old traditional hostility towards the Thebans; and the Spartans held out as a bait the recovery of Oropus, an Attic town on the Bœotian frontier, which Thebes had long held. The decision was mainly influenced by Demosthenes, who delivered his speech "For the Megalopolitans," the second,

in order of time, of his extant public orations; the first, "On the Symmories," having been made the year before, on the question of war with Persia. He succeeded in persuading the Athenians that it was their true interest not to strengthen either Sparta or Thebes at the expense of the other, but to uphold Megalopolis and Messene, not only as a check upon Sparta, but as an obstacle to any future attempt on the part of Thebes to interfere again in the Peloponnesus. That this was sound policy, both for the interests of Athens, and for the independence of the Grecian states, there can be no doubt. Its bearing upon the Macedonian danger seems hardly to have been considered, for Philip is not mentioned in the speech. It was not the vote of the Athenians, but the selfish policy of Sparta, in offering her alliance only on such conditions, that left her without influence on the common cause of Greece (B.C. 353). Her persistence in the attack on Megalopolis provoked a league of Thebes, Argos, Sicyon, and Messene, for the defence of the city; and, after several indecisive battles, Sparta was compelled to make peace (B.C. 352).

It would seem, however, that Demosthenes had as yet formed no adequate conception of Philip's power. The events of the following campaign in Thessaly, which, as we have seen, roused the Athenians to the great effort by which they stayed Philip's progress at Thermopylæ, convinced the orator that the safety of Greece was now at stake; and that Athens, standing in the forefront of the danger, must not be satisfied to wait till it was upon them, and then to make efforts as inefficient as they were sudden; but that now, while Philip's absence in Thrace allowed them the opportunity, they must calmly but resolutely make the needful preparations. It was this lesson that he came forward to impress upon the people in the first of those great orations which, named after the king of Macedonia, have caused the title of *Philippics* to be applied, in general, to speeches in which a person is denounced, though in the vast majority of cases the resemblance is only in the name. The delivery of the first Philippic forms the crisis of the orator's public life.

DEMOSTHENES was now about thirty years of age, the probable date of his birth being B.C. 382—381, one year after the birth of Philip. His father, who bore the same name, was possessed of great wealth, and carried on manufactures of swords and beds by means of his slaves. He died when the young Demosthenes was about seven, leaving his two sons and their property to the care of three guardians, men of wealth and station, and relations of his

own. Though they received handsome legacies under his will, these guardians abused their trust; and when Demosthenes reached sixteen, the Athenian age of majority, he received less than two talents out of the fourteen which his father had left. Meanwhile they had kept him, in his father's place, on the roll of the wealthiest class of citizens, and he found himself subject to all the burthens of that position. His remonstrances having proved in vain, he commenced an action against Aphobus, one of his three guardians; and in the exertions which he made to fit himself to plead his cause, his biographers find the source of his greatness as an orator. Other causes contributed to his adoption of public speaking as a profession. A body too weak to bear the hard training of the gymnasium or the toils of war, was to him, as to many other distinguished men, a motive for devotion to intellectual pursuits.

This want of physical hardihood, and of the contempt of danger which often attends it—a quality distinct from the moral courage in which Demosthenes was rarely deficient—followed him through life, always as a hindrance, and sometimes even a disgrace. “It disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech.”* What he might have been, but for this defect, is recorded in the lines which his countrymen inscribed upon his statue:—

“Had thy strength match'd thy soul, Demosthenes,
The Macedonian Ares ne'er had ruled in Greece.”

The time had however come when the statesman, who would hold ascendancy over his fellow-citizens, need no longer combine, like Themistocles and Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades, the powers of the orator and the general. On the one hand, the wider diffusion of the art of public speaking, under the teaching of the Sophists and rhetoricians, and, on the other, improved tactics and the employment of mercenaries, who would only serve certain leaders, had tended to separate the functions of the general and the councillor, and to make each a distinct profession. But neither did Demosthenes narrow his studies to those of the professional rhetorician. While he placed himself under the special tuition of the orator Isæus, and attended the lectures of Isocrates, he heard

Plato, and perused his dialogues with the greatest diligence. But his chief intellectual culture, as his speeches constantly attest, was derived from the history of Thucydides. He well knew the truth of the maxim, which a great soldier of our age has prescribed even for the military profession:—"By reading you will be distinguished; without it, abilities are of little use." He is said to have copied out the entire work of Thucydides eight times with his own hand, and to have re-written it from memory. The attentive reader of his political harangues perpetually hears the echoes of the historian's wisdom in the more harmonious but not less nervous periods of the orator.

The best Athenian critics recognised in his earliest efforts the political principles and the very tone of thought which Thucydides has taken such pains to delineate as those of Pericles. But at first his manner fell far short of his matter; and when some success in his action against Aphobus encouraged him to come forward in the Ecclesia, his repeated failures were marked by general derision. But there were those who were willing to foster the germs of promise which they had the discernment to detect. Eunomus, an aged citizen, who had heard Pericles sixty years before, comforted Demosthenes, as he wandered disconsolate about Piræus, by telling him how his speech reminded him of the great statesman, and assuring him that he only wanted confidence and preparation. "You are too much disheartened," said he, "by the tumult of a popular assembly, and you do not take the pains even to acquire the bodily strength needed for the rostrum." He found another counsellor in the actor Satyrus, who desired him to recite a passage of Sophocles, which the actor then repeated, with a difference of accent that astonished Demosthenes. While he thus learned the source of his defects from advisers, he relied for their cure on self-discipline alone; and never did any man pursue a more resolute course of self-culture. To correct a defect of articulation, which approached to a lisp, he practised speaking with pebbles in his mouth. He found a substitute for the hoarse murmurs of the people in the noise of the waves upon the beach of Phalerum during a storm. The power of his lungs was expanded by running, and by declaiming while walking up-hill. For months together he shut himself up in a subterranean chamber, to practise recitation and composition, and took precautions against interruption from any want of resolution on his own part by shaving his head in so absurd a guise that he could not stir abroad.

The fruit of all this training was soon visible in a style of oratory so perfect, that the severest critics could only find fault with it for being too artificial in manner, and too elaborately prepared in the matter. But the greatest orators in every age, down to the venerable master of the art, who in our own time has been thought worthy to rank with Demosthenes and Cicero, are all agreed that, whatever power may have been occasionally exerted by sudden bursts of unpremeditated eloquence, the most laborious preparation is needed for sure and habitual success. Thus, while no orator has ever surpassed Demosthenes in that vigour which some associate only with extemporaneous speaking, it was the judgment of some of his contemporaries, that the rich matter of his speeches could only be fully enjoyed on reading. This judgment is the more remarkable, as we know that he himself laid the greatest stress on the accessories of oral delivery, especially on "action," which he declared to be the first and second and third essential for an orator. Nor was his labour bestowed, as that of Cicero too often was, chiefly in rounding periods and elaborating ornaments. He has left us, indeed, the most perfect examples of prose rhythm ever embodied in the most effective of human languages; but what above all distinguishes him from the most accomplished of mere rhetoricians, is the direct practical purpose of every word he utters. So long as there was any hope, he never ceased to encourage the Athenians by the consideration that the advantages which had been lost solely by their negligence might yet be recovered by renewed energy and careful preparation, and to show them how such preparation should be made in all its details,—the number of ships and men required, the amount of money needed to support them, and the sources from which it might be provided.

Such was the burthen of the First Philippic, which was delivered while Philip was making progress in Thrace, threatening the possessions of Athens on the Chersonese, and annoying her nearer home by maritime expeditions. His command of the Pagasæan Bay enabled him to send out fleets to ravage the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and even to make a descent at Marathon and plunder the coast of Attica. In November, B.C. 352, the news was brought to Athens, that Philip had emerged from his obscure operations in the interior of Thrace, and had laid siege to Heraeon-Teichos on the Propontis. In sudden alarm, the Athenians voted an armament, to be manned by the citizens, and imposed on themselves a property-tax of sixty talents. Then

came a report of Philip's illness, which was true, and which the wishes of the popular indolence magnified into his death; and all the preparations were suspended. It was during this pause that Demosthenes came forward to insist on the folly alike of despondency and carelessness, and the equal folly of trusting to desultory efforts and ill-paid mercenaries. Philip's military power and reputation had now reached such a height, that Demosthenes confessed the hopelessness of meeting him in the field, but he urges the policy of setting on foot, before the danger became more pressing, a moderate force which might keep him in constant alarm by descents on his coasts, and by carrying help to every point at which disaffection or resistance might break out, as they were sure to do under a tyrannical government. He shows how such a force might be provided, if the people would revert to the old plan of personal service and well-ordered contribution, instead of trusting to that chance, which seemed in fact to do better for them than they did for themselves. All this practical advice is pointed by keen reproofs;—"What does it matter whether Philip is dead or sick, since, should anything befall him, you would soon make yourselves another Philip, if you apply yourselves to business thus?" Yet there was encouragement to be derived from their very remissness, as it left room for them to do better.

The First Philippic was delivered in the spring of B.C. 351, but with so little effect that even the armament already voted was not despatched to the Chersonese till the following autumn, and then on a wretchedly inadequate scale. The reason for this was not merely the general supineness of the Athenians, and the decay of the ancient spirit of self-sacrifice, but there was at Athens a peace party which systematically thwarted the views of Demosthenes. Its chief leaders were the orator Eubulus and the general Phocion, the last of that race of statesmen who led the people both in the field and in the assembly. His unsullied character—the more conspicuous from the venality of other leaders of his party—has too often blinded historians to the evils of his policy; and, like Nicias in both points, his fate has gained for him a sympathy which tends to cloud the judgment. No praise, indeed, can be too high for the personal character of "Phocion the Good." Born about B.C. 402, just twenty years before Demosthenes, he had reached his 85th year when he was put to death on a charge of treason, arising out of the troubles that followed the death of Alexander (B.C. 317). His humble birth was ennobled by the

simplicity of his life; and his hardy constitution was preserved unimpaired by luxury. *Above all, the contrast of his incorruptible probity with the insatiable avarice of other generals and the venality of the orators—among whom even Demosthenes did not escape undeserved suspicion—had such an effect on the sentiment of the Athenians that they gave him a confidence more unreserved than they had ever yielded to Pericles himself. From his first entrance on public life, when he was already of middle age, he held the annual office of chief Strategus (General) * almost without interruption. He was elected no less than forty-five times, without once soliciting the people's choice. His chief military friend and pattern was Chabrias, under whom he distinguished himself at the battle of Naxos (B.C. 376); † but he is not named as holding an important command till B.C. 354 (or B.C. 349), when he led an expedition into Eubœa. His philosophic indifference to the present fame and emoluments of active service led him to find his chief field at Athens, in administrative details, and in the politics of the ecclesia; and his almost constant presence in the city placed a constant check upon the policy of Demosthenes. Phocion's training in the school of Plato and Xenocrates made him intellectually a fit antagonist for the ablest of the orators, and he was the more able to cope with them because he despised all the artifices of popular rhetoric, and extinguished their elaborate periods by a pointed brevity almost laconic. To a friend who found him deep in thought when he had to speak, he said, "I am meditating whether I cannot shorten what I have to say to the Athenians;" and, when Demosthenes saw Phocion rise to reply to him, he used to say—"Here comes the cleaver of my speeches." This plain soldier-like style of speaking carried with it a sort of military force; and it was the testimony of an orator, who was himself a friend of Demosthenes, that Phocion was the more effective speaker. Nor was his influence diminished by that contemptuous sternness and rigour of life which were accepted as signs of his independence. It is said that he was never seen weeping or laughing, or bathing in the public baths. Once, when a speech of his was followed by applause, he turned to a friend and asked, "Have I unawares said something bad?" He made a boast of his opposition to the popular feeling; and he gained that credit for sincerity which is generally yielded to such a temper, and which the spectacle of a general averse to war naturally excited.

* We have already explained the nature of this function, which was a sort of premiership.

† See vol. I. p. 556.

It has been often pleaded that Phocion consulted the true interests of Athens and of Greece by opposing the policy of resistance to Macedonia, when effective resistance was hopeless. But here, as Mr. Grote has shown most conclusively, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the earlier and later years of Phocion's career. "His biographers mislead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chæronea. At that time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized, and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phocion—which might be called prudence, after the accession of Alexander—was ruinously imprudent, as well as dishonourable, during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted, and became more and more in his favour, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that, if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will; upon the question whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit; and, in consequence of that reluctance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phocion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen, and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure—all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay."*

Such were the antagonistic forces by which the fate of Greece

* Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. xi. pp. 388, 9.

was now to be determined: the details of the conflict need only a brief notice. The first great crisis was brought about by the attack of Philip on OLYNTHUS, upon the territory of which he had already begun to make incursions at the date of the First Philippic. The Olynthians, foreseeing the danger, had made peace with Athens about the close of B.C. 352, and in B.C. 350 envoys arrived at Athens bringing the news that Philip had taken one of the thirty-two cities of their confederacy, and asking for an alliance and active aid. Their cause was pleaded by Demosthenes in those brief, but most vigorous harangues, entitled the *Olynthiacs*, all three of which were delivered in the last six months of B.C. 350.* The Athenians made the desired alliance, and promised help; but under the influence of the peace party, they did nothing at first. Their attention was distracted by a war in Eubœa, undertaken against the advice of Demosthenes, who himself served in it as a hoplite (B.C. 349). Their finances were embarrassed; and one great resource, the *Theoric Fund*, for the expenses of the religious festivals, was fenced about by a law making it criminal to propose its application to any other purpose. Demosthenes had hinted, in the *Olynthiacs*, that this money should be made available for the army; a citizen was at length found bold enough to propose its use; and the motion was carried unanimously, though the proposer was indicted and fined (B.C. 348). But even then, though three successive expeditions were sent out to Chalcidice, they effected nothing of importance.

Meanwhile Philip strained every nerve to complete his conquest before the Athenians awoke to the danger. City after city fell before him; till at last the gates of Olynthus were opened by treachery; the city was razed to the ground; the inhabitants were sold as slaves; and the whole Chalcidic peninsula was added to the Macedonian kingdom (B.C. 347). The suppression of thirty-two free Hellenic states, whose confederation had seemed to balance the power of Philip on his frontier, was a political disaster unparalleled since the time of Xerxes; for even the Peace of Antalcidas had left some municipal freedom to the Ionian cities; and the true nature of the new despotism was made visible to the Greeks—to the deep shame of many of themselves—in the gangs of captives of both sexes, who were dragged along their roads, even into Pelopo-

* The order of the *Olynthiacs* in the editions is certainly not that in which they were delivered. Bishop Thirlwall, following Dionysius of Halicarnassus, places them in the order II., III., I. The order adopted by Stüve and Mr. Grote, II., I., III., seems preferable.

ness, to be received by the adherents of Philip with thanks for his generosity; while the conqueror celebrated his victory by splendid games at Dium at the Thessalian frontier.

The indignation at Athens was the more intense, as among the captives sold into slavery there were some of her own citizens, who had been serving as auxiliaries at Olynthus. Besides, the victory of Philip threatened the loss of the Chersonese and the islands that still were hers. Loud complaints were heard against Chares, who was gone no one knew whither. Even Eubulus, and the other orators of the peace party, were energetic in their denunciations of Philip; and the occasion called forth the orator who was destined soon to become Philip's chief supporter, and to be handed down to fame as at once the ablest and bitterest rival of Demosthenes. *ÆSCHINES*, though six years older than Demosthenes, began his professional career much later. His low birth is frequently a point for the sarcasm of Demosthenes; but we have no other authority for attaching any stain of dishonour to his family. In early youth he had assisted his father in teaching boys; he had tried his fortune as an actor with little success; he had been a scribe and reader to some of the Government boards; and he had acted as secretary to the orators Aristophon and Eubulus. When raised to the office of public scribe to the assembly, for which he was qualified by his powerful and melodious voice, he gradually took courage to come forward as an orator, and displayed a great native power of unpremeditated speech. Nature had gifted him with the physical strength which she had denied to Demosthenes, and he had served with distinction as a soldier in the expedition to Phlius, in B.C. 368, at the battle of Mantinea in B.C. 362, and in Eubœa in B.C. 349. The praise he obtained from Phocion on this occasion would naturally bind him more closely to the party with which he was already connected through Eubulus. After the fall of Olynthus, *Æschines* went to Megalopolis, as one of the envoys who were sent throughout Greece to stir up resistance to Philip. In this mission he earned as much distinction by his patriotic spirit as by his eloquence, not sparing the traitors who had sold themselves to the Macedonian, and whose opposition now neutralized his efforts. The Arcadians seem, in fact, to have been too much absorbed in their rivalry with Sparta, to spare a thought for the remoter danger from Philip. The reports of the other envoys were not much more encouraging; and such was the general despondency at Athens, that even Demosthenes acquiesced in the necessity for peace.

The progress of the Sacred War tended to the same point. The lavish expenditure of Pháyllus had nearly exhausted the treasures of Delphi; but Phalæcus, the youthful son of Onomarchus, still carried on the war, though he only kept down a strong opposition among the Phocians themselves by his mercenaries. Once more the Thebans applied to Philip as the champion of the Amphictyons and of Apollo, and a Macedonian army entered Thessaly. The Phocians, in alarm for the safety of Thermopylæ, applied for aid to Athens as well as Sparta; but Phalæcus, who held the pass, insultingly dismissed the forces which the Athenians promptly sent to guard it. Philip hastened to profit by his rashness to secure the neutrality of Athens; and, after preliminary overtures on both sides, the Athenians sent that Embassy of Ten to the Macedonian court at Pella, which became afterwards the occasion of such bitter recriminations between Demosthenes and Æschines, both of whom served upon it, that the truth respecting it cannot be discovered.* All we know is, that Philip gained favour with all the ambassadors by his banquets and personal attentions, and won over some of them by bribes; so that they obtained no terms from him, either for themselves or the Phocians, but vague promises. On the return of the ambassadors to Athens, Demosthenes, whose courage had failed him when he rose to address Philip, expressed entire approval of the conduct of his colleagues, and he entertained the envoys whom Philip sent to Athens to conclude the treaty. But his old distrust was revived by the conduct of Philip in leading about the ambassadors, who were sent again to ratify the treaty, from place to place, while he was preparing for the invasion of Phocis. When the peace was finally made, on Philip's own terms, with the express exclusion of the Phocians, and the ambassadors returned to Athens the second time, Demosthenes protested against their conduct, and charged Æschines as the chief offender. But the people, overjoyed at the thought of peace, passed a vote of thanks to Philip, and summoned the Phocians to surrender Delphi; and, in the following year, Æschines gained an easy victory over Timarchus, who had indicted him for misconduct in the embassy.*

Meanwhile Philip had followed almost on the steps of the

* The details of these mutual recriminations (besides the allusions in other speeches, and especially those "On the Crown") are contained in the speech of Æschines "Against Timarchus," and in those of Demosthenes and Æschines "On the False Embassy." The two latter were not speeches actually delivered, but memorials composed for circulation among the people, in B.C. 343.

departing envoys towards Thermopylæ. On his approach, Phalæcus made terms for himself and his mercenaries. The Phocians, thus left without defence, surrendered all their towns; and their fate was decided by the Amphictyons, whom Philip convoked at Delphi. All their cities were destroyed, except Abæ, and the people were dispersed into villages of not more than fifty houses each. They were condemned to repay, by annual instalments, 10,000 talents, as the value of the plundered treasures of the temple. They were struck out of the list of the Amphictyons; and Thebes was gratified by the same sentence against Sparta.* The two votes of Phocis in the council were given to Philip, who was to share the presidency of the Pythian games with the Thebans and Thessalians; Macedonia was thus recognized as an Hellenic power; and it only remained to yield her the supremacy of Greece (B.C. 346). In this Sacred War, which (like the first, in B.C. 595—585)* had lasted for ten years, the badness of the Phocian cause had done much to invest Philip with the appearance of a champion of right.

His ascendancy over the minds of the Greeks at this epoch is best shown by the speech of Demosthenes "On the Peace," advising acquiescence in the existing state of things; while Isocrates, who had now reached the age of ninety, put forth, in his "Oration to Philip," a formal renunciation of Hellenic independence. Recognizing the conqueror as the chief of Greece, raised up to benefit her like his ancestor Hercules, he invites him to reconcile the differences of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, and to march at the head of their united forces against Asia. Philip at once assumed the character of dictator, by declaring in favour of Messene and Megalopolis, and making an alliance with Argos. But there remained a strong undercurrent of distrust at Athens, which was confirmed by Philip's proceedings in Peloponnesus; and it found expression in the *Second Philippic* (B.C. 344) and succeeding orations of Demosthenes. The peace lasted nominally for six years (B.C. 346—340); but during this whole period, Philip was making new aggressions in various parts of Greece, and especially in Thrace, which the Athenians put forth desultory efforts to counteract; till his attacks upon the Greek cities of the Propontis, and at last his invasion of the Chersonese, led to open war (B.C. 340). The campaign began under the evil auspices which had so long beset the Athenian arms. Chares, who had been sent to the relief of Byzantium and Perinthus,

* See vol. I. p. 329.

began the old exactions from the neighbouring allies; but he was speedily superseded by Phocion, who urged the prosecution of the war in a spirit of true patriotism. He had distinguished himself in the preceding year (B.C. 341) by a successful expedition to counteract the schemes of Philip's partisans in Eubœa, which thus became a new bulwark for Athens, and on this occasion Phocion was heartily engaged in carrying out the policy of Demosthenes. The Athenians, once more roused to effort, sent out an armament of 120 triremes. The distrust of the allies vanished. Phocion was received at Byzantium as a deliverer. The maritime powers of the Ægæan, such as Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, joined in the effort for her relief. Philip was compelled to raise the siege both of Byzantium and Perinthus: he was repulsed in an attack on the Chersonese; and the Bosphorus and Hellespont were again opened to the Athenian corn-ships. Thanks were voted to Athens by Byzantium, Perinthus, and the cities of the Hellespont, while the Athenians conferred the like honour on Demosthenes (B.C. 339).

Thus baffled in the field, Philip fell back, as usual, on the arts of policy. His overtures for peace converted the Byzantines and other maritime states from enemies into neutrals, and left the Athenians to carry on the naval war almost alone; while he sent out fresh cruisers to harass their commerce. Meanwhile he undertook an expedition against a tribe of Scythians, between the Hæmus and the Danube; on his return from which he was defeated by the Thracian Triballi, and severely wounded. This expedition was not improbably planned with a view of giving his partisans in Greece free scope for their intrigues, while he appeared himself to have retired from the scene.

An immediate advance to Thermopylæ would probably have forced Thebes and Athens to unite before it was too late. But even in the hands of Athens alone, the common cause was more hopeful than it had long been. The vigorous efforts of Demosthenes to correct the abuses of the system of trierarchies had placed the navy on a most efficient footing. But all was ruined by the treason of the Philippizing party, who, with Æschines at their head, kindled the new Sacred, or "Locrian War." The town of Cirrha, long since devoted to Apollo, with its territory, in the First Sacred War, was too conveniently situated not to be used as a sea-port; and it had come into the possession of the Locrians of Amphissa, who had been warm opponents of the Phocians during the recent conflict. At a meeting of the Amphictyons at Delphi, in the spring of B.C. 339, Æschines took advantage of an attack on

Athens by a Locrian deputy, to retort on the people of Amphissa the charge of sacrilege for having cultivated the Crissæan plain. The passions of the assembly were so roused by his vehement invectives, that, had day-light been left, the Delphians, with the whole force at the command of the Amphictyons, would have rushed down at once to destroy Cirrha. The resolution was carried into effect on the following day, before the people of Amphissa could muster to the rescue; but they came down in time to drive out the assailants from the ruins of Cirrha, without violating the sacred character of the Amphictyons by inflicting any loss of life. The baffled council resolved to call a full meeting at Thermopylæ, to inflict condign punishment on the Locrians, who had thus added contumacy to sacrilege. The place appointed for the meeting was enough to indicate the purpose both of calling in the aid of Philip and securing for him the possession of the pass.

The deputies returned to their cities; and even at Athens the force of religious sentiment neutralized the warning voice of Demosthenes:—"Æschines, you are bringing war, an Amphictyonic war, into Attica." At length, however, he prevailed in inducing the people to send no delegates to the meeting; and the same course was taken by Thebes. The first proceedings of the council are obscured by the contradictions of Demosthenes and Æschines; but they reassembled at the usual time of the autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ, when the Athenians were again represented by Æschines and others, and the Thebans would also be present of course (September, B.C. 339).^{*} Æschines now came forward as the open advocate of Philip's leadership, and the Macedonian king was invited to lead the forces of the Amphictyons, with his own, for the punishment of the Locrians. Philip, who had now recovered from his wound, opened the campaign without delay by taking Nicæa, a town which helped to command Thermopylæ, and which was now held by the Thebans. His designs became clearer still when, instead of marching upon Amphissa, he fortified the Phocian town of Elatea. He himself now threw off the mask, and invited the Thebans to unite with him in crushing their ancient foe, or at least to grant him a passage through their territory into Attica. Meanwhile the news of the capture of Elatea had reached Athens just as the Prytanes were sitting down to supper; and, while steps were taken in all haste to convene an assembly for the following day, the alarmed

^{*} Their secession applied only to the special meeting.

people began to clear the city as for a siege. In the crowded assembly, which met at the earliest dawn, Demosthenes alone dared to speak. Pointing out the groundlessness of the fear that Philip was acting in concert with Thebes, he urged an immediate alliance between the two cities as the only chance of saving either. His advice was adopted unanimously; and he was sent with other envoys to Thebes, where his eloquence hardly prevailed over the suggestions of old animosity and the new solicitations of Philip. But the alliance once made was as cordial as the danger was pressing; and the part taken by Thebes was resented by Philip with the most revengeful bitterness. He appealed to the Peloponnesian states in his character as champion of Apollo, but seemingly with little effect; while the Athenians and Thebans gained some successes in a winter campaign in Phocis, and began to restore the Phocian cities as a barrier against Philip. The enthusiasm of Athens was expressed by the vote of a golden crown to Demosthenes at the Dionysiac festival (March, B.C. 338).

It seemed as if the policy of the patriot statesman were about to receive the nobler crown of complete success. He laboured hard to enlarge the alliance, and obtained contingents from the Achæans, the Corinthians, and probably the Eubœans and Megarians. But the mutual jealousies of the other Peloponnesian states kept them aloof. Meanwhile Philip marched upon Amphissa, defeated a large body of mercenaries, and executed the decree of the Amphietyons. This victory left him master of Phocis; and, advancing into Bœotia, he met the united Grecian army on the fatal plain of Chæronea. His force consisted of 30,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry; that of the allies is not accurately known, but it was probably inferior in number, and certainly in discipline; nor could the presence of Demosthenes on the field supply the want of an able general. Phocion, whose field of action had so long been at Athens, was now absent on a maritime command, and his place was ill supplied by the united incompetency of the Athenians Lysicles and Chares, and the Theban Theagenes.

On the other side, the Macedonians, a rough and hardy race, admirable as the raw material of soldiers, the Thracians, and the other warlike barbarians under Philip's rule, had been moulded by the incessant training of twenty years into a veteran army, complete in all the branches of horse and foot, heavy and light armed, archers and slingers. Its chief force lay in the renowned phalanx, the depth of which at Chæronea was sixteen men; far

less than the phalanx of Epaminondas at Leuctra and Mantinea ; but this depth was quite sufficient, and the phalanx of Philip owed its great strength to the impenetrable array of long spears which projected from its front. The masterly generalship of Philip was seconded by the fiery courage of ALEXANDER, who, at the age of eighteen, decided the victory by a charge with the phalanx upon the Theban Sacred Band. That devoted body fell to a man in the ranks they occupied, while the Athenians, after a long conflict with Philip in person on the other wing, were broken by the new effort which the king made on hearing of his son's victory, and the rout was complete.

The scene of the battle was long marked by a colossal stone lion which surmounted the tumulus raised over the Theban dead, from the earth of which the monument has lately been disinterred. Its date, the 7th of August, B.C. 338, is the epoch of the extinction of Grecian liberty. The loss of the Thebans and Achæans, who suffered most severely, is not stated : among the dead was the Theban general, Theagenes. The Athenians left 1000 citizens on the field, and 2000 prisoners in the hands of Philip. Both their generals escaped ; but Lysicles suffered death by a judicial sentence. Demosthenes, whom his enemies never ceased to taunt with cowardice for sharing the general flight, survived to rouse the Athenians from their first despair, exhorting them to put the city in a state of defence, and himself contributing three talents to the work. Their confidence was expressed by his selection to pronounce the funeral oration over those slain at Chæronea.

The accounts of Philip's wild orgies in the first joy of his victory may reasonably be suspected ; but, if true, never was "the appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober" made more successfully than by himself. In the consummate prudence of his conduct to the allies, we cannot but trace a mixture of generosity. He seems to have been moved by respect for Athens, as the centre of Hellenic civilization, as well as for her resolute attitude of defence and her still great maritime power. For the present, at all events, he was content to wreak his vengeance upon Thebes, by selling her prisoners as slaves, putting to death several of her leading citizens, banishing others, confiscating their property, setting up an oligarchy of his own adherents, and placing a Macædopian garrison in the Cadmean citadel. The Boeotian cities were liberated, and the frontier town of Oropus restored to Athens, which obtained terms of surprising moderation, and received back her prisoners without ransom. In return, she recog-

nized Philip as the leader of the Hellenic world, a disgrace little short of political extinction. Her fall was not unfitly symbolized by the death of the eldest, and one of the most famous of her citizens. Isocrates, who had been born when the city was at the acmé of her glory under Pericles, and who, only two years before, had celebrated that glory in his great Panathenaic oration, died at the age of ninety-eight, of grief, at hearing of the battle of Chæronea.

But Athens had still the spirit left to honour the orator who bore his grief and assuaged hers. To understand her feelings at this epoch, we must look forward a few years to the contest which has given the world its two great master-pieces of forensic oratory. Rising superior to the prejudice which makes success the only test of merit, the Athenians, after the battle of Chæronea, voted to Demosthenes a golden crown (B.C. 337—336). Several attempts to impeach him had already failed; and Æschines renewed the attack in the form of an indictment against Ctesiphon, the mover of the vote, for proposing an illegal decree; but the trial did not come on till B.C. 330. We need not recount the well-known result; the disgraceful defeat of Æschines; his retirement from Athens; and the memorable tribute which he paid to his rival's surpassing eloquence when he read his speech "On the Crown" to his class of rhetoric at Rhodes. But in that masterpiece of oratory there is one passage which sums up the whole question of the policy of Demosthenes in an apostrophe as true as it is daring:—"It cannot be that you were wrong, Athenians, when you took upon you the peril of the universal freedom and salvation! No! by our forefathers who confronted the danger at Marathon, who stood in their ranks at Plataea, who fought at Salamis!" To such an appeal ill success is no reply.

The lenity of Philip towards Athens was doubtless prompted in part by his ambition to lead the united forces of Greece to the conquest of Persia. At a congress held at Corinth, from which Sparta alone was absent, war was declared against the Great King, and Philip was appointed to conduct it as general of the Greeks. After a triumphant progress through Peloponnesus to enforce the submission of Sparta, and after receiving the adhesion of the western states, Philip returned to Macedonia to complete his preparations. The expedition was delayed during the whole of the next year (B.C. 337) by his domestic dissensions with Olympias and Alexander, consequent upon his marriage with Cleopatra, to which we shall have to recur in the next chapter. In the following

spring his preparations were complete. Some troops had already been sent forward under Parmenio to rouse the Asiatic Greeks; and he only stayed to provide a fresh security for the safety of his kingdom, by the marriage of his daughter to Alexander of Epirus; when, at the wedding festival at *Ægæ*, he fell by the sword of Pausanias, a young Macedonian noble. The assassin is supposed to have been instigated by Olympias, and some have charged Alexander with a share in the crime, but upon no adequate evidence. Philip had only reached the forty-seventh year of his age, and the twenty-seventh of his reign, when he left to his son Alexander the inheritance of his great conquests and his far greater schemes.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER.

B.C. 336 TO B.C. 323.

"And, as I was considering, behold an he goat came from the west on the face of the whole earth, and touched not the ground: and the goat had a notable horn between his eyes. And he came to the ram that had two horns, which I had seen standing before the river, and ran unto him in the fury of his power. And I saw him come close unto the ram, and he was mowed with choler against him, and smote the ram, and brake his two horns: and there was no power in the ram to stand before him, but he cast him down to the ground, and stamped upon him: and there was none that could deliver the ram out of his hand. Therefore the he goat waxed very great. . . . The ram which thou sawest having two horns are the kings of Media and Persia. And the rough goat is the king of Grecia: and the great horn that is between his eyes is the first king."

Daniel, chap. viii. 5-8, 20, 21.

"High on a throne with trophies charged, I viewed
The youth, that all things but himself subdued;
His feet on sceptres and tiaras trod,
And his horn'd head belied the Lybian god."—POPE.

ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER—HIS CHARACTER AND EDUCATION—HIS EARLY PUBLIC LIFE—QUARREL WITH HIS FATHER, AND OUTWARD RECONCILIATION—STATE OF GREECE AT HIS ACCESSION—SECOND CONGRESS OF CORINTH—ALEXANDER AND DIOGENES—CAMPAIGNS IN ILLYRIA AND THRACE—REVOLT OF THEBES AND ATHENS—DESTRUCTION OF THEBES—SUBMISSION OF ATHENS—STATE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE: REBELLIONS AND DISSOLUTION—GREEK MERCENARIES—BAGOAS, MENTOR, AND MEMNON—RECONQUEST OF CYPRUS, PHENICIA, AND EGYPT—ACCESSION OF DARIUS CODOMANNUS—EVENTS PRECEDING THE INVASION—STATE OF FEELING IN GREECE—POLICY OF DEMOSTHENES—TRUE VIEW OF ALEXANDER'S CONQUEST—CONSTITUTION OF THE MACEDONIAN ARMY—ANTIPATER LEFT AS REGENT OF MACEDONIA—SMALL FORCE OF ALEXANDER—HIS DEPARTURE FROM PELLA, AND RENDEZVOUS AT SESTOS—ALEXANDER AT TROY—BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS—CONQUEST OF ASIA MINOR—SIEGE OF HALICARNASSUS—DEATH OF MEMNON—THE GORDIAN KNOT—BATTLE OF ISSUS—CAPTURE OF TYRE AND GAZA—CONQUEST OF EGYPT—VISIT TO THE ORACLE OF AMMON—FOUNDATION OF ALEXANDRIA—ALEXANDER PASSES THE EUPHRATES—BATTLE OF ARBELA—ALEXANDER AT PERSEPOLIS—DEATH OF DARIUS—MARCH INTO HYRCANIA, DRANGIANA, AND BACTRIA—DEATH OF PHILOTAS—ALEXANDER CROSSES THE PAROPAMISUS AND OXUS—REACHES THE JAXARTES—CONQUERS SOGDIANA—MURDER OF OLITUS—MARRIES ROXANA—DEATH OF CALLISTHENES—INVASION OF INDIA—DEFEAT OF PORUS—ALEXANDER IS COMPELLED TO TURN BACK FROM THE HYPHASIS—VOYAGE DOWN THE HYDASPES AND INDUS—VOYAGE OF NEARCHUS TO THE PERSIAN GULF—MARCH THROUGH THE DESERT OF GEDROSIA—RETURN TO SUSA—ALEXANDER MARRIES THE DAUGHTER OF DARIUS—OTHER INTERMARRIAGES WITH PERSIANS—MUTINY OF THE ARMY—DEATH OF HEPHESTION—ALEXANDER AT BABYLON—HIS VAST SCHEMES—HIS DEATH.

ALEXANDER III., of Macedonia, was the first of those conquerors whom men have rewarded for the sufferings they have inflicted, in the pursuit of power and fame, with the title of the GREAT. Born in B.C. 356, he was only in his twentieth year when the murder of his father called him to the throne (B.C. 336); and his dazzling career lasted less than thirteen years. Nature had endowed the young prince with that enthusiastic temper which

deems no end too high to aim at, no difficulty too great to be surmounted. This spirit was inflamed, from his earliest youth, by the influence of Lysimachus, one of his tutors, who imbued his mind with the knowledge of Homer, and with admiration for the heroes of the *Iliad*. Claiming descent, on his father's side from Hercules, on his mother's from Achilles, he took the latter for his own exemplar. And; while he resembled him in that thirst for fame, which Homer has so beautifully depicted as reckless of early death, he inherited from his Epirot mother a fierce, impatient, and ungovernable temper, as disastrous as "the wrath of Achilles" to himself and others. Of Alexander, as well as Philip, it should be borne in mind, that the basis of character was thoroughly barbarian, and this element never ceased to break out through the superficial culture of an elaborate Greek education. To provide such an education for his son had been one of Philip's chiefest cares. The young prince was trained in a discipline of almost Spartan hardihood by his mother's kinsman, Leonidas. All know the proof he gave of his courage and skill in manly exercises by taming the horse Bucephalus, which Philip had bought for thirteen talents, and which no one else at the court dared to mount. This renowned charger carried Alexander through his campaigns in Asia; till, dying in India, he was buried at the town of Bucephala, on the Hydaspes (B.C. 327). But the chief advantage of Alexander's education was the tuition he received from Aristotle during the three best years of youth, from the age of thirteen to that of sixteen. We know nothing certain of the course which the philosopher pursued; but we are told that Alexander threw himself into it with all the energy of his nature, and that he retained the warmest affection for his preceptor. Still we may feel sure that the lessons he most valued were those which developed the heroic spirit of the old Greek poetry. He carried with him, through all his campaigns, a copy of the *Iliad*, corrected by Aristotle; but no similar example is recorded of his fondness for the more peaceful beauties and civil lessons of the *Odyssey*. He is said to have entertained the Athenian ambassadors, when they were feasted by Philip at Pella, with recitations from the Greek poets; and his whole career was marked by a taste for literature, and a splendid patronage of art. But even here the bent of his character was shown in his preference for what was most striking, especially when it flattered himself, like his portrait by Apelles, wielding the thunderbolts of Jove. The lessons of Aristotle probably

contributed to that early maturity of judgment and political knowledge, by which he is said to have astonished certain Persian ambassadors, who arrived at the court during his father's absence, and which he displayed in adjusting the affairs of Greece after Philip's death. As a speaker, he could always express himself in a manner equal to the occasion; and, if he wanted his father's finished eloquence, he was free from the deep dissimulation of which it was so powerful an instrument. In fine, the epithet "superficial," applied just now to his Hellenic culture, was not intended to deny a considerable effect produced upon his mental character, but to signify that it could not reach deep enough to alter that basis of nature, common to his father and himself, which is so well described by Mr. Grote as "the self-will of a barbarian prince, not the *ingenium civile*, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical."* This quality distinguishes him from Pisistratus and Cæsar, and marks the oriental character of his despotism, even before he became an Asiatic sovereign.

Alexander began his public life as early as his sixteenth year, in the capacity of regent during Philip's campaign on the Bosphorus (B.C. 340); and we have seen how he distinguished himself at Chæroneia two years later. The brief interval before Philip's death was marked by a violent quarrel in the royal family, which seemed to endanger Alexander's succession. His mother, Olympias, had so disgusted Philip by her intolerable temper, that he divorced her and married Cleopatra, the niece of his general, Attalus. At the wedding banquet there occurred a scene, thoroughly characteristic of the essential barbarism of the Macedonian court:—

"Natis in usum lætitiæ scyphis
Pugnare Thracum est."

Heated with wine, Attalus called for a toast to the prospect of a legitimate heir to the throne, thus placing Olympias and her offspring on the same footing as Philip's numerous illicit connections. Alexander flung his drinking-cup at Attalus, with the furious cry, "Am I then a bastard?" Philip rushed up to his son with his sword drawn; but, too intoxicated to keep his footing, he fell prostrate on the floor, while Alexander left the hall, exclaiming, "Behold the man who was about to pass from Europe to Asia, but has been overthrown in going from one couch to another."

* Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. xii. p. 2.

Little did he foresee how bitterly the taunt would recoil upon himself by his murder of Clitus.

Olympias withdrew to her brother Alexander in Epirus; and Alexander fled into Illyria. Their prospects were darkened by the birth of a son to Philip and Cleopatra, who received the very significant name of Caranus, the mythical ancestor of the Macedonian kings. The relatives of Cleopatra were promoted, while the friends of Alexander were banished. They appear to have stirred up the Epirots and Illyrians to an invasion of Macedonia. Civil war would have been a fatal hindrance to Philip's schemes of Asiatic conquest. He effected an outward reconciliation; and Olympias and Alexander returned to his court; both, however, still with hostile feelings, and the former with that implacable resentment, to which probably Philip fell a victim.* We have no ground to conjecture what might have been the result to Alexander, had his father lived; but Philip, at the age of forty-seven, might well postpone the question of the succession, and the services of Alexander would be too precious to lose in the meantime.†

The dagger of Pausanias cut through the doubt, and the crown was placed on Alexander's head by his namesake, Alexander of Lyncestis, who owed his life to this good service, when the other conspirators were put to death with Pausanias. Other persons, not implicated in the conspiracy, were despatched as obstacles to be removed out of Alexander's way. Among them was his cousin Amyntas, whom Philip had set aside to seize the throne. The Persian king boasted, whether truly or not, that he had had a share in contriving Philip's murder; and the Athenians, prompted by Demosthenes, made public demonstrations of a joy so exulting, that it was rebuked by Phocion as ungenerous. Demosthenes,

* Cleopatra, the unfortunate cause of the quarrel, was tortured to death with hot irons by the order of Olympias, after her infant had been murdered in her arms; and Olympias dedicated in a temple the dagger which had given Philip the fatal blow.

† It is one of the curious coincidences of history, that in the two monarchies, so much alike in many points, of Macedonia and Russia, Alexander the son of Philip, and Alexander the son of Paul, should have mounted the throne each at a most critical epoch, and each under the suspicion of a share in his father's murder, founded on the well-known legal maxim of "*Cui bono*." But even this ground of suspicion, though strengthened in the ancient example by the previous quarrel and still existing risks, is of little force in the absence of positive evidence. Niebuhr, indeed, declares that "Alexander was no doubt deeply implicated in this murder. A jury would have condemned him as an accomplice. But he was prudent enough to make away with the participators in the conspiracy, who might have betrayed him; . . . and their blood was shed that he might not become known as a parricide."—*Lectures on Ancient History*, Lect. lxi.

who was already in communication with Persia, with the view of impeding Philip's march, used every effort to stir up revolt; and agitation prevailed through all Greece, though no open movement was attempted.

Alexander soon gave proof of how much Demosthenes had underrated his ability. About two months after his father's death, he marched into Thessaly, where he was recognised as the head of the Greek nation, by a public vote, which was confirmed by the Amphictyons at Thermopylæ. He entered Thebes without opposition, and, leaving Athens alone for the present, he passed through the Isthmus into Peloponnesus, where his presence was sufficient to stifle all germs of resistance. By this time Athens was completely overawed. The city had been prepared for a siege, and the country people collected within the walls; but submission was decided on; and Demades, who had negotiated the peace with Philip, was appointed to carry a full apology to Alexander, with the recognition of his headship of Greece, and an adulatory vote of divine honours. Demosthenes declined the dangerous distinction of accompanying him.

Returning to Corinth, Alexander convoked the states of Greece, and demanded the appointment as generalissimo for the Persian War, which had been conferred on his father at the same place. As before, Sparta alone had the courage to stand aloof, under the influence of Agis III., who had succeeded to the throne in the very year of the battle of Chæronea (B.C. 338), and whose attempt to throw off the Macedonian yoke, during Alexander's absence in Asia, came to a disastrous issue, in B.C. 330. The supremacy conferred upon Alexander included, besides the command of the Greek armies abroad, the preservation of the peace, and the settlement of disputes, at home. The Hellenic states were united into a confederacy under his dictatorship; each, however, preserving its freedom and autonomy; and certain articles were drawn up, and ratified by oaths, to secure freedom of commerce and the general peace.

* It was during the congress of Corinth that Alexander had his celebrated interview with Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the Cynic school of philosophy.* True to his principles, Diogenes had refused to mingle with the crowd in which philosophers joined with the rest to congratulate the king, and Alexander was fain to

* * It matters nothing to the spirit of the transaction, whether the interview took place at this time, or on Alexander's return to Corinth in the following year, after the destruction of Thebes.

gratify his curiosity by a visit to the suburb where Diogenes resided. He found him basking in the sun—some say at the mouth of the tub which served him for a kennel—and with affable condescension asked how he could serve him. “By standing out of my sunshine” was the answer, which veiled, under its churlish form, the lesson which sovereigns so often need to learn, that they are not lords over the elements:—

“What though, like commoners of air,
We wander out, we know not where,
But either house or hall :
Yet nature's charms, the hills and woods,
The sweeping vales, and foaming floods,
Are free alike to all.”

Amidst the ridicule of the courtiers at the man who had no favour to ask of a king, Alexander, almost envying his contented independence, turned away with the remark, “If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes.”

With the ensuing spring Alexander found it necessary to take order with the barbarians on his northern frontier, before he could pass over into Asia. Crossing the Hæmus (Balkan), he subdued the Triballi and other Thracians; advanced against the Getæ, and received the submission of the tribes as far as the Danube. Then, turning westward, he crushed a revolt among the Illyrians and Taulantians (B.C. 335).

Meanwhile, the conduct of the Macedonian officers in Greece began to prove that Alexander's government would be a tyranny, and that the recent stipulations would be held in little respect. During the winter of B.C. 336-5, the Athenian orators became bold in their remonstrances, and Demosthenes renewed his correspondence with the Persian king, who sent both money and emissaries into Greece. But hatred of the conqueror was most bitterly felt at Thebes, where the Cadmean citadel was still occupied by a Macedonian garrison. On a report that Alexander had been killed in his northern expedition, the city openly revolted, and Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to support the Thebans. The insurrection was at once crushed by the rapidity of Alexander's movements. Thebes was taken, amidst a fearful massacre; and the Greeks were subjected to the humiliation of passing the sentence, by which the city was razed to the ground. The Cadmea was left to be held as a Macedonian fort; and the people were sold as slaves. The house in which Pindar had lived was alone spared in the destruction of the city:—

"The great Emathian conqueror bid spare
The house of Pindarus, when temple and tower
Went to the ground." *

Alexander is said to have afterwards recognized a punishment from the hand of Dionysus, the patron deity of Thebes, in the drunken fury which drove him to murder Clitus, and in the mutiny of his army in India. A few years after his death, Cassander, the son of Antipater, joined with the Athenians in rebuilding the city (B.C. 316).

This terrible example at once secured the submission of the other states, and caused extreme alarm to the Athenians, who had been culpably remiss in neglecting to send aid to Thebes. A letter soon arrived from Alexander, demanding the surrender of eight orators and two generals, who were named as the chief authors of the resistance, to Philip at Chæronea, and of all the hostile demonstrations since. Among them, of course, was Demosthenes. He urged the people to resist a demand that struck a fatal blow at the free speech on which their whole polity hung; and related the old fable of the wolf requiring the sheep to give up their watch-dogs for the sake of peace. Phocion, only coming forward at the repeated call of the assembly, counselled submission to the irresistible power of Alexander, and called on the Ten to sacrifice themselves for the public safety, a course which he declared he would not have shrunk from had the case been his own. But a more generous spirit moved the assembly, and they dared to send a refusal, though it was by such a reply to a like demand that Thebes had sealed her fate. But they sent their answer in the form of an apology by one and a second embassy; and the influence of Phocion at last prevailed on Alexander to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes. These, with other military leaders, took service among the Greek mercenaries of the Persian king. Phocion's influence was now supreme at Athens; and Alexander had the wisdom to prefer the hold he might thus keep on the city, which he flattered with the title of the second state in Greece, to a conflict which must have been fierce, and perhaps long and even doubtful, considering the maritime power of Athens. On his return to Pella, Alexander visited Delphi, and received the sanction of the oracle to his expedition against Persia (B.C. 335). He never set foot in Greece again; but he left behind him proofs enough of his civil as well as military energy, and partisans sufficiently numerous in the several states,

* Milton's *Sonnet*, "When the assault was intended to the city."

to secure submission during his absence. Sparta alone maintained a sullen independence; and her unavailing effort for liberty, under Agis, is almost the only important event in the history of Greece during the eleven years of Alexander's Asiatic conquests. The events of the last eighteen months had also given ample proof of his ability to lead on to victory the forces, which he spent the winter in finally preparing, and which mustered between Pella and Amphipolis early in the following spring (B.C. 334). A glance must now be thrown to the other side of the Ægean, that we may see in what condition the Persian empire was to receive the coming storm.

We left the history of Persia, at its constitution by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, only adding a brief summary of its subsequent fortunes.* We have since seen how, after the collapse which followed the expedition of Xerxes, the events of the Peloponnesian War revived the power of Persia, under Darius II. Nothus (B.C. 424—405). During the long reign of his successor, Artaxerxes II. Mnemon (B.C. 405—359), the empire seemed to have recovered much of its ancient vigour. The death of the younger Cyrus confirmed his brother's power, though their mother, Parysatis, contrived to avenge his fate by refinements of cruelty known only to orientals. The slave who, at the command of Artaxerxes, had cut off the head and hands of Cyrus, was won by her from the king at dice, and put to death with unutterable tortures; and the queen, Statira, is said to have been despatched by means of food which Parysatis cut for her with a knife poisoned on one side. Such scenes reveal the internal life of the Persian court.

Meanwhile, the league in Greece against Sparta delivered the empire from the invasion of Agesilaus (B.C. 394), and the intrigues of Sparta, on the other hand, enabled Artaxerxes to dictate to Greece the shameful peace of Antalcidas (B.C. 387).† Evagoras, who had recovered the kingdom of Salamis, in Cyprus, from the tyrant who had usurped it (B.C. 410), and had reigned with equal ability and justice, was subdued, after a ten years' war, in B.C. 385. This war was with a Greek on the frontier of the empire, who had only been a subject in name. There were others against rebellious satraps, in which Artaxerxes was less successful. Of these the most remarkable was Datames, the satrap of Cilicia, whom his biographer, Cornelius Nepos, calls the

* Chap. x. vol. I. p. 294. For a complete list of the Persian kings see the note on that page.

† Vol. I. pp. 536, 549.

ablest and bravest of all barbarian generals, except Hamilcar and Hannibal. Driven into rebellion by the intrigues of his enemies at court, he set the example of revolt to other satraps, and was murdered by Mithridates in B.C. 362. Ariobarzanes, the father of this Mithridates, succeeded in establishing the independence of his satrapy of Pontus, which we shall see hereafter as a powerful kingdom, under his son's celebrated namesake.

In the very centre of the empire, there were nations which refused obedience to the great king. The expedition of Cyrus shows us the Cilician prince Syennesis, bearing the same name as his ancestor in the time of Cyaxares,* and seemingly preserving an independence handed down from that period. The neighbouring Pisidians, as well as the Carduchi or Kurds of Mount Zagrus, were at perpetual war with the Persians. The Uxii held possession of the passes between Susa and Persepolis, and the king had to pay them tribute in order to keep open the road between the two capitals. Egypt, as we have seen, preserved its independence from the tenth year of Darius Nothus (B.C. 414), through the whole reign of Artaxerxes, till she was subdued, by the aid of Greek mercenaries, under Artaxerxes III., Ochus (B.C. 353).† In short, the empire was rapidly tending to dissolution when Artaxerxes died, in the same year in which Philip ascended the throne of Macedonia (B.C. 359).

Ochus, who probably obtained the tiara by the murder of his father, secured it by the extirpation of the other members of the royal family, and his court realized the oriental ideal of mingled cruelty and voluptuousness. But his power was preserved from contempt by the energy of Bagoas, his chief eunuch, or, as the Greek writers call him, "chiliarch," and by the aid of his Greek mercenaries. Bagoas equalled Ochus in cruelty, and governed him in everything else; carrying the king about with him on his expeditions, to prevent his exercising any independent authority. In putting down the rebellions of the satraps, Bagoas used the services of the Greek mercenaries. Among the most notorious of these were two brothers, Rhodians, named Mentor and Memnon, who first became conspicuous in the service of Artabazus, the satrap of Phrygia, who married their sister. Artabazus, who had aided in putting down the revolt of Datames, rebelled in B.C. 356, but was defeated by Bagoas, and took refuge with Philip of Macedonia. Memnon fled with him, and Mentor entered the service of Nectanebo II., King of Egypt.

About this time, the oppressor of the Persian governors had driven the Phœnicians to revolt, and Mentor was sent by the King of Egypt to their aid, at the head of a body of mercenaries. Bagoas now urged Ochus to make a great effort to re-conquer Phœnicia and Egypt, and he succeeded in enrolling a body of 10,000 Greek mercenaries. Phocion did not scruple to serve the Persian king, and the Thebans furnished him with a body of troops. The Sidonians, betrayed by their king Tennes, burnt themselves with their city (B.C. 351). The catastrophe is one of the most fearful recorded in history. Forty thousand human beings perished in the flames, and Artaxerxes sold the ruins to speculators in the gold and silver to be dug out from the ashes. Tennes was put to death as soon as his treachery was of no further use. Mentor, who had gone over with Tennes, and entered the service of Ochus, now led back his mercenaries into Egypt as an enemy, and contributed greatly to the conquest of that country. Raised high in the favour of the Persian king by these services, he threatened to become a formidable rival of Bagoas; but their intrigues ended in a mutual understanding, by which they shared the power nominally held by Ochus. Mentor was invested with the satrapy of the maritime coasts of Asia Minor, a new distinction for a Greek; and his influence procured the pardon of Memnon and Artabazus. On his death Memnon succeeded to his power, which promised to be the most serious obstacle to the designs of Alexander (B.C. 336). Bagoas, who two years before had murdered Ochus and all his sons, except the youngest, Arsēs, put him also to death, and placed on the throne the unfortunate DARIUS III. CŌDOMANNUS, who was descended from Darius Nothus only on his mother's side. The ambitious eunuch had planned the removal of this last obstacle between himself and the crown, but his plot was discovered by Darius, and he was compelled to drink the poison he had mixed for the king.

The favourable judgment generally formed of the last sovereign of Persia seems to have been much influenced by sympathy for his misfortunes. He had been brought up in comparative freedom from the emasculating corruption of the court; and he has one great, though negative merit, that no act of cruelty can be laid to his charge. He had already gained reputation as a soldier;* but he gave no signs of the energy or foresight needed to meet the invasion, of which he had ample notice. Darius is said, indeed,

* The accounts of his personal courage at Arbela are quite disproved by Arrian's narrative.

to have spent the summer of B.C. 335 in collecting great forces both by sea and land; but the defence of Asia Minor was left chiefly to Memnon and his mercenaries. The Macedonian army, which, as we have seen, was sent over into Asia by Philip, under Parmenio and Attalus, after taking possession of the Greek cities in Mysia, was kept in check by Memnon, and even—it would seem—driven back across the Hellespont. Meanwhile Demosthenes and the patriot party at Athens maintained communications with Memnon, with a view to embarrass the enterprise of Alexander. This policy has often been represented as a siding with the ancient enemy of Greece, in order to revenge themselves on the present foe. But, as matters now stood, Demosthenes regarded Macedon, rather than Persia, as the arch-enemy of Hellenic liberty and civilization. The prevailing sentiment of Greece tended in the opposite direction. It was not at once easy to believe that the empire of Darius and Xerxes, the kingdom which had lately dictated terms of peace to the Greek states, and had reconquered the provinces of Egypt, Phœnicia, and Cyprus, was in a state of harmless decrepitude. When Demosthenes himself began his public career, there were great apprehensions of war with Persia, on account of the aid given by Chares to Artabazus. His first extant speech “On the Symmories,” though delivered in the very year in which Philip was actively intriguing in Eubœa (B.C. 354), deals, not with the danger so near home, but with the means of organizing the resources of the city against its former enemy. Each peace that was made with Philip gave new life to the sentiment, of which we have the eloquent expression in the “Panegyric Oration” of Isocrates, that Greece had found a champion to avenge the invasions of Darius and Xerxes; and the hope of a last triumph of Hellenism over barbarism formed some consolation for the catastrophe of Chæronea and the fate of Thebes. Which view was right? Not necessarily that which was justified by the issue: for, in politics, as in other human affairs, success is not the sole test of principles. The party of Demosthenes had at least the rectitude of pure patriotism; nor was their failure so certain as to justify their opponents in a course, the motives of which were lower even than far-sighted policy. Athens was the centre of Hellenic liberty. A great modern historian, speaking in the light of the event, says,—“We feel indifferent how the rest fare, seeing there is no longer any help for Athens.” But he none the less recognizes the different point of view from which Demosthenes regarded the possibility

that Greece might yet be saved, by playing Persia and Macedonia against each other. "The mere negative existence of Persia saved Athens after the battle of Chæronea; the fear lest the Persian and Athenian fleets should attack Macedonia induced Philip to grant to the Athenians such favourable terms. So long as the Persian empire existed, the servitude of Greece was anything but irretrievable; it was only necessary for the Peloponnesians to be informed of their true position, and to have their eyes opened to the tyranny of Macedonia, to put an end to its power."* Such is the true justification of Demosthenes, even when he received money from Persia to gain over the Greeks.

When, however, we turn from the questions of the day to the wider view of Alexander's enterprise, as a step in the history of the world, we cannot but see that the time had come for a great change upon both continents. Greece had, for the time, done her work; and her existing race, both of people and statesmen, had proved themselves unworthy to enjoy longer the liberty of which she had given the pattern to coming ages. However great her loss, it was an unspeakable gain to Asia to have the yoke of an effete despotism broken off her neck, and the language of Homer and Sophocles, the political wisdom of Pericles and Thucydides, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the art of Phidias and Apelles, spread from the Ægæan to the Caspian, from the Nile to the Indus. Above all, the general diffusion of the Greek language through the East proved a powerful instrument for the rapid spread of Christianity. ••

In the army which Alexander assembled for his expedition, the most important element was the Macedonian phalanx, which had been perfected by Philip. It was based on the *Lochus* or Band of sixteen men as its first unit, and this number expressed the regular depth of each file. Its chief component part was the *Pentacosarchy*, or Regiment of Five Hundred, which consisted of 512 men (besides ten supernumeraries), being made up of two squares of 256 men, 16 on each face of the square, each square comprising 16 lochi.† Such a regiment formed a body complete in all its equipments, and capable of acting by itself as a phalanx*. Eight of these regiments, or sixteen squares, formed the simple phalanx of 4096 men; and four times that number the quadruple

* Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, by Schmitz, Lect. lxxi.

† The name of this square was *Syntagma*, which signifies a body drawn up in array.

phalanx, of 16,384, which appears to have been the full sum of Philip's heavy infantry. When Alexander reorganized his army at Susa, he doubled many of the regiments to the force of four squares, or 1024 men, under the command of a Chiliarch. The whole phalanx bore the name of *Pezetæri* (*Foot-Companions*), or Foot-Guards of the king.

The ponderous strength of the phalanx required support from a body more flexible in its evolutions, and this was supplied by the *Hypaspists* (Shield-Bearers), or Guards, who originally formed the body-guard of the king. Their organization and array resembled that of the Greek hoplites. They were employed in operations requiring the strength of regular infantry, but for which the unchangeable order of the phalanx was too cumbrous,—such as rapid night marches, and the assault of fortified places. In some of Alexander's battles, the Hypaspists are used to support the cavalry and light-armed troops, and they are themselves supported by the phalanx. The light-armed troops consisted of a mixed multitude of peltasts, javelin-men, archers, and slingers, partly Macedonian, but for the most part foreigners. Either by themselves or mixed with the cavalry, they skirmished in the front and flank of the heavy infantry, or pursued an enemy in flight. Alexander kept them incessantly occupied. The Macedonian army was not more distinguished by the phalanx than by its splendid cavalry, a force cultivated by the earliest kings, and brought to perfection by Philip. The plains extending beside the Macedonian rivers were equally favourable to the breeding of horses and to the evolutions of cavalry; and the adjacent barbarian tribes, up to and beyond the Danube, have always been renowned as fearless horsemen. When Philip invaded Scythia a few years before his death, he is said to have sent 20,000 chosen mares into Macedonia. The cavalry, like the infantry, formed two distinct bodies. The heavy cavalry, who were honoured with the title of Companions (as the infantry of the phalanx were called Foot-Companions), were armed with a short pike (*xyston*) for dealing thrusts in close combat; the light-armed were called Lancers (*Sarissophori*), from their longer spears, and were employed for skirmishing and scouring the country. The Companions were divided into squadrons, some of which were named from the cities and districts of Macedonia. Their usual place was in the front of the battle array, and Alexander himself generally charged at the head of the *Agema* or Leading Squadron. His person was always surrounded by the Royal Youths, a select body of the sons

of the Macedonian nobles, and from these were chosen the most select corps of all, the Body-Guards, who fought around him in the field, and from whom he selected commanders for special services. Finally, the care of Philip had attached to the army what has been well called an effective siege-train, composed of the best engines for battering walls and hurling missiles which had yet been invented; and Alexander either carried this artillery with him or had it constructed as occasion required by his skilled engineers. This arm contributed greatly to his conquests, while its use gave to his celebrated successor, Demetrius, the title of *Poliorcetes*, the *Besieger of Cities*. The capital Pella was the great central depôt of this vast military organization, which, as Mr. Grote has observed, was the embodiment of that martial pride, which stood the Macedonians in lieu of a national sentiment:—"The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship with highly gifted intelligence."

It is important to observe what part Alexander's newly acquired Greek subjects had in this great military organization. That part, in fact, was very small. The Thessalians, indeed, who had become almost a dependency of Macedonia, contributed their celebrated cavalry, and bodies of hoplites were raised in various parts of Greece. But mutual jealousy, combined with Alexander's pride in his own army, seems to have prevented any general muster of the national forces under their new generalissimo; and the Greek auxiliaries were more numerous in the Persian than in the Macedonian armies.

Such was the force with which Alexander marched forth to the conquest of Asia in the spring of B.C. 334. His oldest counsellors, Antipater and Parmenio, had advised the postponement of the expedition till he could leave an heir behind him; but he preferred to lessen the risks of his absence by putting to death the connections of his late step-mother Cleopatra, and entrusting the regency to Antipater, whom he continued to support firmly against the jealousies of Olympias. Leaving with Antipater an army of 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, he took with him a force probably of 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry, while the highest estimate is only 43,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry.*

* This is the account of Diodorus, who gives us the detailed composition of the army as follows:—

The smallness of this force must not be viewed as a matter of vague wonder. There are three modes by which an invader may attempt the conquest of a country, not to mention the case of the migration of an entire people. There is the plan of the Asiatic despot, like Xerxes, attempting to carry with him an army numerous enough to overpower resistance, with all its supplies;—a plan as impracticable for Alexander as it was out of date. Next, there is the powerful and numerous army, resting on a vast base of operations, like that with which Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, or more moderate numbers, reinforced and supplied by an open communication with their resources, like the allied army in the Crimea in 1854—6. Lastly, there is the movable column, which throws itself into the heart of an enemy's country, trusting to rapid success for safety. The last was the character of Alexander's movement into Asia; and he gave at once a proof of his great military qualities, by not encumbering himself with numbers difficult to maintain. He had, however, from the first, a secure military base in his possession of Thrace, and, after his first victories had given him the command of Asia Minor, reinforcements and supplies continued to reach him across the Hellespont.

It was in April, B.C. 334, that Alexander finally turned his back on his hereditary kingdom, to become the sovereign of a new empire. His march was from Pella, through Amphipolis, along the coast of Thrace, and down the Chersonese. In sixteen days he reached Sestos, and embarked on the fleet which had

INFANTRY.

Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists	12,000
Allies, chiefly from the Greek states	7,000
Mercenaries	5,000
<hr/>	
Total regular infantry, under Parmenio	24,000
Thracians and Illyrians	5,000
Agrianes (Pæonian javelin-men) and archers	1,000
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Total infantry	30,000

CAVALRY.

Macedonian heavy—under Philotas, son of Parmenio	1,500
Thessalian heavy, under Callas	1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian, under Erigyius	600
Thracian and Pæonian light, under Cassander	200
<hr/>	
Total cavalry	4,500

The above account of the Macedonian army is, in substance, that of Mr. Grote, *History of Greece*, chap. xcii.

been appointed to meet him there. While the passage of the army to Abydos was effected by Parmenio without resistance, Alexander went to Elæus, at the extremity of the Chersonese, to visit the shrine of Protesilaüs, who had been the first Greek to disembark on the Tröjan shore, and had fallen by the spear of Hector. Having invoked the hero to give a happier issue to his own landing, Alexander crossed over in the admiral's ship, which he steered with his own hand for the beach near the mouth of the Hellespont, where the Greeks were believed to have landed for the war with Troy. He sacrificed midway to Poseidon and the Nereids; as he approached the land, he hurled his spear on shore, as a sign that he took possession of Asia; and was the first to leap in full armour on to the beach. There was no Hector to oppose him; no Troy to resist his progress; but he stayed to celebrate the former glories of the spot. On the hill of Ilium he sacrificed to Athena, the tutelary deity of the departed city. At the tomb of Priam he made expiatory offerings for the cruelty of his ancestor Neoptolemus. But his chief reverence was paid to his favourite hero and model, Achilles, whose monumental pillar he crowned with a garland, and ran naked round it, anointed with oil, after the manner of a Grecian athlete. The place where his army had crossed was marked by altars to Jove, Hercules, and Athena, both on the European and the Asiatic shores. In these proceedings we may see, not only the heroic youth emulating the fame of his ancestor, in the same spirit of seeking every good in war and conquest,—

“Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis”*—

but also the chief captain of the Hellenic name carrying out the poetical idea with which Herodotus opens his history, that the wars of Greece and Persia were the decision of the long quarrel between the two continents, which began even earlier than the siege of Troy.

The unopposed passage of the Hellespont, notwithstanding the vastly superior naval force of Persia, and in opposition to the advice of Memnon, seems to imply that the satraps were confident in their ability to crush the army of Alexander. They had assembled a large force at Zelea, near the Propontis, under the command of Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia. With him were associated forty men of the highest rank, called the kinsmen of the king; among whom were Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Mithridates, Pharnaces; and others. A large proportion of

* We are indebted to Mr. Grote for this application of the verse.

the whole force was formed by the Asiatic cavalry, which numbered 20,000 men; the infantry are reckoned at the same number by Arrian, who is the best authority, though other writers make them far more numerous. A large part of them were Greek mercenaries, under the command of Memnon. This able leader, well knowing the might of the Macedonian infantry, and the confidence inspired by the presence of Alexander, earnestly dissuaded the risking of a battle. His advice was, to retire before the invaders, wasting the country, and even destroying the towns, and to employ the superior naval force of Persia in harassing the coasts of Macedonia and Greece. But the satraps were equally unwilling to incur the disgrace of retreat and to destroy the country on which they depended for their revenues. They resolved to hazard a battle, and took up their station on the little river GRANICUS (Koja Chai), which flows from Mount Ida into the Propontis. The post occupied by the Persians was on the right or eastern bank of the river, just where the last slopes of Ida sink down to a plain that extends to the sea. The river itself is shallow, and fordable in several places; but the steepness of the bank gave some strength to the position.

Alexander advanced steadily from Arisba, where he had reviewed his army, by a line of march parallel to the shore of the Hellespont and the Propontis. The phalanx was preceded by a strong advanced guard of cavalry and light-armed foot, and flanked on both wings by the rest of the cavalry, the baggage following in the rear. On the fourth day, Alexander approached the Granicus, and made his dispositions for an attack on the enemy, whose cavalry lined the opposite bank. The Macedonian army was divided into a right and left wing, each composed of half the phalanx, flanked on its outer side first by the Hypaspists, then by the light cavalry, and lastly by the heavy cavalry, consisting, on the right, of the "Companions," on the left, of the Thessalians. The king himself took the command of the right-division, entrusting the left to Parmenio. Alexander's division was the first to attempt the passage of the river; and a close conflict was joined by the cavalry on both sides, Memnon and his sons fighting in the front rank with the bravest of the Persians. The latter, having the vantage of the bank, made a strenuous resistance to the landing of the Greeks. The battle became a press of horseman against horseman, in which the short pikes of the Macedonian Companions gave them an immense advantage over the missile javelins of the Persians. The bank was carried, and the battle continued on the high plain above it. Alexander, fore-

most, as usual, in the charge, became engaged in a personal conflict with several of the Persian satraps. A blow of his pike in the face hurled Mithridates from his horse. A second stroke thrust through Rhoesaces, whose scimitar had just shorn off part of Alexander's helmet. At this moment, the sword of Spithridates was uplifted over Alexander's head from behind, when Clitus, one of Philip's veteran officers, severed the Persian's arm from his body. How he was finally rewarded for saving his master's life, is one of the most melancholy passages in Alexander's history.

In this *mêlée* the Persian cavalry were broken; and they were soon in full flight, pursued by the Macedonian horse; while Alexander brought up the phalanx and the hypaspists to attack the infantry, who had as yet taken no part in the combat. These, consisting chiefly of Greek mercenaries, fought with a courage worthy of their race; but they were outnumbered and borne down by the weight of the phalanx. They fell in their ranks to a man, with the exception only of 2000 prisoners, and a few who lay hidden among the slain, so densely did these heap the field. Their destruction deprived Persia of a large part of the force best fitted to stand against Alexander. The loss of the Persian cavalry was not more than 1000, but among these were included a large number of their noblest princes. Their general, Arsites, escaped from the field, but put himself to death through mortification at his defeat.

The loss on Alexander's side is stated at only 25 of the Companions, 60 of the other cavalry, and 30 of the infantry; numbers which would be incredibly small were not the disproportion paralleled, as we have seen, in other battles of the ancient Greeks. The services of the fallen, and the sufferings of the wounded, were honoured by Alexander in a manner worthy of a victory that gave the presage of complete success. With his usual generosity to his followers, he consoled the wounded by visiting them in person, and granted to the relatives of the slain immunity from taxation and personal service. The twenty-five slain Companions were distinguished by bronze statues at Dium from the hand of Alexander's favourite sculptor, Lysippus. The funeral honours of the slain were shared by the bodies of the enemy. In dealing with the Greek prisoners as traitors to the common cause of Greece, and sending them to Macedonia to work in chains as slaves, Alexander might claim to be more merciful than the Greeks themselves, who had often put to death prisoners whom they viewed as rebels. While striking terror into the disaffected Greeks by this example,

he took a step at once to conciliate Athens, to express his resentment against Sparta, and to keep in view his character as the leader of the Hellenic nation, by sending three hundred panoplies to be dedicated to Athena in the Acropolis, with the inscription:—"Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians, out of the spoil of the foreigners inhabiting Asia."

The moral effect of the battle of the Granicus was enormous. Not only was the first army of Persia overthrown, with the loss of many of her chief nobles, but two of those nobles had been killed by the victor with his own hand. The whole satrapy of Phrygia at once submitted to Alexander, and Sardis, with its impregnable citadel, surrendered at his approach. As master of the capital of Cræsus, Alexander proclaimed freedom to the Lydians. He then marched upon Ephesus, where Amyntas, a Macedonian exile, had found refuge. Amyntas and the garrison of Greek mercenaries escaped by sea, and Alexander entered the city unopposed. It is interesting to find a despot restoring the democratic government, which a recent révolution had subverted; but the oligarchical party, besides being probably friends to Sparta, had overthrown the statue of Philip in the temple of Artemis. While several of his officers were despatched to receive the submission of the other cities of Ionia, Alexander marched upon Miletus, to which place his fleet proceeded at the same time under Nicanor. The Persian governor of this great maritime city had offered to surrender, immediately after the battle of the Granicus, but his intentions were now quite altered by the approach of the Persian fleet of 400 Cyprian and Phœnician ships, with Memnon on board. An edict was already on its way from Susa, appointing this captain to the chief conduct of the war; and meanwhile the fleet and the garrison of Miletus chose Memnon for their commander. But it was too late. The Persian fleet found their access to Miletus barred by the Macedonian admiral, who had taken his station three days before with his 160 ships at the island of Ladé in the mouth of the harbour, to which Alexander had also sent across 4000 soldiers; and they retired to the roadstead of Mycalé. Wisely refusing to risk a battle against the more numerous fleet and better trained seamen of the enemy, Alexander pressed the siege by land with his powerful engines, breached the walls, and stormed the city with great slaughter. One body of 300 Greek mercenaries, who had taken refuge on a rock at the harbour's mouth, were admitted to a capitulation, and received into the Macedonian army.

Memnon made his last and most desperate stand at Halicar-

nassus, to which place the Persian fleet retired. The princes of the house of Hecatomnus were now divided among themselves.* After the death of Artemisia, Idrieus had reigned with Ada, his sister and wife; but, on the death of Idrieus, Ada had been expelled by Pixodarus, the surviving brother, who warmly espoused the Persian cause. Ada, who still reigned over the rest of Caria, with Alinda for her capital, welcomed the approach of Alexander, addressed him as her adopted son, and made over to him her kingdom. The city had been fortified with works of immense strength by Memnon, whose fleet now shut out the Macedonians from approach by sea; while, within, it was defended by the desperate courage of Ephialtes, one of the two generals who had been banished from Athens on the demand of Alexander. The Macedonian siege-train was now put to a severe but successful trial. The besieged opposed to them inventions like those of the defenders of Plataea,† and made two gallant sallies, in the second of which Ephialtes fell. Memnon now withdrew the garrison and stores and many of the inhabitants, and fired the town, which Alexander, marching in, saved with difficulty. He restored it to Ada, with the whole of Caria, as a tributary principality, and left Ptolemy the son of Lagus, with 3000 men, to blockade the two citadels, which were still held by the Persians. He then drew off his forces, partly to Tralles, and partly to his head-quarters at Sardis.

By these conquests of the sea-ports, Alexander had effected the great strategic object of shutting out the Persian fleet from the western coast of Asia Minor. The winter of B.C. 334—333 was occupied with operations on the southern coast. The terror of his name proved stronger than the barrier of Mount Taurus, and all Lycia submitted; the town of Marmareis alone emulating the ancient obstinacy of Xanthus.‡ The very elements seemed to conspire with the conqueror, as he advanced to Perga in Pamphylia by the coast-road round the foot of Mount Climax. The south wind had blown for some time, covering this road with the sea; but, on Alexander's approach, the wind changed suddenly to the north, though even then the men waded through with water up to their waists. Meanwhile, the main body marched over the mountains, practicable roads being made by an advanced guard of light Thracian troops. The cities on the Pamphylian coast were soon subdued; and Alexander returned into Phrygia through the wild mountain tribes of Pisidia, taking several of their fastnesses. Arriving at Celænæ, the capital of Southern Phrygia, at the

See Chap. xv. p. 9.

† See Vol. I., p. 501.

‡ Ibid. p. 278.

sources of the Marsyas and the Mæander, with its royal paradise or park, mentioned by Xenophon, he found its citadel, which stood on a precipitous rock, garrisoned by 1000 Carians and 100 Greek mercenaries, who promised to surrender the fortress if it was not relieved within sixty days. Here he left Antigonus, with 1500 men, appointing him satrap of Phrygia; while he pursued his march northwards to Gordium, on the river Sangarius, the ancient capital of the kings of Phrygia (February or March, B.C. 333).

The founders of that dynasty, Gordius and his son Midas, were said to have been Phrygian peasants. Designated by an oracle to the royal dignity, they had ridden into their new capital in a rude waggon, which had ever since been preserved as a sacred relic in the citadel of Gordium. The yoke was fastened to the pole by the complicated mass of cordage, which has become proverbial under the name of "*the Gordian Knot*;" and an oracle had declared that the empire of Asia awaited him who should untie it. Amidst the eager expectation both of Asiatics and Macedonians, Alexander ascended to the citadel, and cut the knot with the sword which was destined to fulfil the prophecy.

The means of making good the omen had been provided by his forethought, and he was joined at Gordium by the part of his army that had wintered at Sardis, under Parmenio, reinforced by new levies from Macedonia and Greece. Here also envoys came to him from Athens, to pray for the release of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granicus; but Alexander refused to loosen his hold upon the fears of allies so doubtful. In fact, his tenure of Greece seemed to be endangered by the proceedings of the Persian fleet, under the able command of Memnon, who was proceeding to execute his plan of carrying the war to the opposite shores of the Ægean. He had taken Chios and the greater part of Lesbos, and had laid siege to Mytilene, when he fell sick and died. The city surrendered to Pharnabazus, whose immediate breach of the terms of capitulation proved his unfitness to conciliate the Greeks. Already several of the Cyclades had sent in their adhesion to Memnon; Eubœa was looking for the Persian fleet as the instrument of liberation; and the Lacedæmonians were preparing to rise. But the death of Memnon was the loss of the only leader capable of heading a combined movement; as he alone, of all the brave and able Greeks in the service of Darius, had the perfect experience of Orientals, which he had acquired in his satrapy, and he alone possessed that influence with Darius, which might have induced him to persevere in Memnon's plan for the campaign.

Great as was the loss of Asia Minor, it left the Persian king with a better defensive position than before. First, there was the chain of Taurus, over which Alexander must cross into Cilicia; next, the two narrow passes around the head of the Gulf of Issus, between Mount Amanus and the sea,—the “Gates of Amanus” on the west, and the “Gates of Cilicia and Syria” on the east,—and, lastly, the “Syrian Gates” over the chain of Amanus itself. Nor was Darius left without good advice, which he treated with the infatuation of a man doomed to ruin. Among the Greeks who had fled to him was the Athenian general Charidemus, who enjoyed a large share of his confidence. On hearing of the death of Memnon, Darius resolved to risk all upon his own military ability and the vast resources of his empire. An army, such as had not been assembled since the time of Xerxes, was collected in the plain of Babylon, consisting of 400,000, or, as some say, 600,000 infantry, 100,000 cavalry, and 20,000 or 30,000 Greek mercenaries. The review of these forces inflamed Darius with the sense of a power equal to the best days of the monarchy, and the eager applause of the courtiers encouraged his belief. He looked to Charidemus for a confirmation of his hopes; but the Athenian replied with a boldness such as the Spartan Demaratus had used of old to Xerxes, pointing out the inefficiency of these Asiatic hordes, and advising the king to enlist an increased body of Greek mercenaries, whom he himself offered to lead. Enraged at the slight upon his mighty forces, Darius was easily persuaded by the courtiers to regard the proposal as an act of treason. With his own hand he delivered the too faithful counsellor to the executioners; and Charidemus was led away, exclaiming, “My avenger will soon be upon you.”

The prediction was already in the course of being accomplished. Alexander left Gordium in the latter part of May, and advanced through Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, which submitted to him, though they were not effectually subdued. As before, in the expedition of the Younger Cyrus, the unaccountable negligence of the Persians, or rather their infatuated reliance on the vast army behind, left open the high road from Cappadocia into Cilicia, through the Cilician Gates, a pass over the chain of Taurus, quite impracticable for an army in the face of any serious opposition.

At Tarsus, which he entered without needing to strike a blow, Alexander's course was nearly cut short by a fever, which he was thought to have contracted by bathing in the chilly waters of the

snow-fed Cydnus. All his physicians were helpless with fear of the disease, and of their own responsibility for its issue. One only, an Acarnanian named Philip, dared to prescribe for the king. The anxiety of Parmenio prompted him to send Alexander a letter, denouncing Philip as employed by Darius to poison him. Alexander placed the letter under his pillow, and awaited the arrival of the physician. Then, taking the potion from Philip's hand, he drank it off without a word, at the same time handing him Parmenio's letter, and watching his countenance as he read it. The physician's whole manner confirmed his protestations of innocence, which the king's recovery established, and a delay for some time at Tarsus completed his restoration to health.

While Alexander himself undertook the reduction of the Cilician towns and of the mountaineers of Taurus, he sent forward Parmenio to seize the pass on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus, which was called the "Gates of Cilicia and Syria," as being the proper boundary between the two countries. The Persian guard fled after a slight resistance, and Alexander soon afterwards resumed his onward march from Tarsus. At Mallus, a town on the western headland of the Gulf of Issus, he received the news that Darius was at Sochi, in Syria, two days' march from the chief pass over Mount Amanus. Notwithstanding that the Persian army occupied a vast plain, most favourable for its immense numbers, and especially for its vastly superior cavalry, Alexander would not check the ardour of his followers to be led at once to battle; and he advanced round the Gulf of Issus, through both the great passes, to Myriandrus, a town on the southern side of the "Gates of Cilicia and Syria."

Meanwhile an important change had been made in the plans of Darius. On abandoning the defensive policy of Memnon, he had adopted the next best course, of choosing his own field of battle. But, like Xerxes, he made all his arrangements, not as for a campaign to be fought out, but for an assured triumph, to be signalized with all possible splendour. He was accompanied by his mother, his wife, and all his harem, his children, his courtiers, and all the paraphernalia of luxury and splendour. In the enormous baggage-train, no less than 600 mules and 300 camels were laden with gold and silver. This treasure was left in the rear at Damascus, where it fell into the hands of Alexander after the battle. Meanwhile the passes of the Taurus and the Amanus were left, as we have seen, virtually open, that the Macedonian might advance to the field chosen for his destruction. But the

cagerness of Darius for a decisive battle could not brook the delay of Alexander in Cilicia; and, once more rejecting the counsel of his Greek advisers, he resolved to meet him in the defiles so unfavourable to his own army. The Persians crossed the Amanus by the northernmost of its two passes, which brought them down into the plain of Issus, north of the "Cilician and Syrian Gates." It was fortunate for Alexander that this movement was not executed before his advance, in which case the detachment of Parmenio at the Gates would have been cut off. As it was, Darius obtained possession of Issus, with the Macedonian sick and wounded, who were partly put to death and partly mutilated, to gratify the cruelty of the Persian nobles.

It was while Alexander was detained for a day at Myriandrus by a storm, that he received the news that Darius was in his rear; and, like Napoleon at Marengo, he faced round to meet the enemy thus interposed between him and his own country. He seized the gates during the night, and advanced at daybreak, deploying his narrow column as the ground opened. The Persian army was posted on the right bank of the river Pinarus, south of Issus, across which Darius had thrown 30,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry; but this advanced guard was withdrawn as Alexander approached. Another detachment of 20,000 foot, posted in the mountains in order to outflank the Macedonian right, were easily driven back by the Agrianian javelin-men, and were kept in check during the battle by 300 heavy cavalry.

The right bank of the Pinarus, naturally steep in some places, and scarp'd away in others, was lined by the best troops of Darius, who filled the whole width of the pass, from the mountains to the sea, while his mingled hordes were massed behind upon the plain, and took no part in the battle—the best use, perhaps, to which they could have been put. To meet the shock of the Macedonian phalanx, Darius relied upon his 30,000 Greek mercenaries, supported on each flank by an equal number of chosen Persian troops, armed after the same manner. These 90,000 hoplites formed one unbroken line, behind the centre of which Darius took his station in a magnificent chariot, surrounded by his chief nobles and his body-guard of Immortals. Alexander divided the phalanx, as at the Granicus, into two bodies, each supported by its auxiliary force of hypaspists, cavalry, and light-armed troops. He extended his front to equal that of the enemy; and, himself taking command of the right, he entrusted the left to Parmenio, with orders to keep near the sea, lest he should be outflanked.

His own impetuous charge across the river at once routed the left wing of Asiatic hoplites, whose flight uncovered the position of the Persian king. There are different accounts of the degree of the danger to which the person of Darius was exposed;* but, at all events, he turned his chariot and fled with all speed to the hills. There he mounted a swift horse, and rode off, casting away his bow and shield and royal mantle as encumbrances to his flight.

His desertion of the field, followed of course by the whole centre, decided the battle which still hung in doubt upon the other wing. The advance of Parmenio, on the left centre, had been checked by the Greek mercenaries, with the loss of 120 men of the front ranks of the phalanx; while the Thessalian cavalry, stationed on the extreme left, were vigorously attacked by the Persian heavy horse. But, as Alexander pressed on his victory from the other flank, and the news of the king's flight was spread, the contest was abandoned. Some at least of the Greek mercenaries escaped in good order to the hills, but the Persian cavalry suffered severely in their flight. The routed combatants were thrown back upon the vast masses behind them, who were already in disorderly retreat, while Alexander pressed on the pursuit with all his might. Pent up in the narrow pass, and in the defiles of Amanus, which enclosed them in the rear, the masses of the Persians trampled each other to death, and, in one place, a ravine was bridged over by their dead bodies. Their total loss is reckoned at 10,000 horse, and 100,000 foot; that of the Macedonians at 150 horse and 300 foot. Amongst the enormous spoil of the camp, which was given up to the soldiers, there were no less than 3,000 talents in money. Among the captives were Sisygambis, the mother of Darius, and Statira, his wife, who were taken into the royal tent. It was on returning from the pursuit, which he had continued till the dusk of the November day, that Alexander entered the pavilion of Darius, and saw for the first time all the rich and effeminate appliances of oriental luxury—the bath steaming with odours, the banquet

* Arrian says nothing of the fierce combat round the chariot of Darius, described by Diodorus and Curtius, in which one authority (quoted by Plutarch) even speaks of Alexander's being wounded in the thigh by the hand of Darius. A fine mosaic at Pompeii—whether or not copied from an ancient picture, we cannot tell—represents such a conflict. Alexander, charging at the head of his horsemen, has just run through one of the body-guard of Darius with his spear: Darius is leaning over the side of his chariot, with his right arm stretched out towards his fallen follower, while his charioteer is urging to flight the horses, which seem entangled in the press.

spread to regale Darius after his expected victory. But from an inner compartment were heard the voices of the women wailing for the supposed death of Darius. The fancy of painters has delighted in the imaginary interview of the royal ladies with their magnanimous captor; but, in truth, Alexander was too respectfully observant of oriental customs to insult them by his presence. He sent them assurances that Darius was still alive, that he regarded him as no personal enemy, but as a rival for the possession of empire, and that they should be treated with the honour due to their royal dignity.

The battle of Issus not only decided the fate of Asia by the destruction of the army of Darius, and the proof it gave of the helplessness of the Asiatic hosts against Macedonian discipline and Alexander's consummate generalship, but its moral effect was equally decisive in Greece. The eighteen months of Alexander's absence had given his enemies time to encourage one another with the hope that some great disaster might befall him. When he passed the Taurus, and especially when he fell ill at Tarsus, Athens was agitated with such rumours as had been rife twenty years before, during Philip's absence in Thrace; and Demosthenes is said to have gone about, showing with exultation letters which declared that Alexander was pinned up in Cilicia. Meanwhile the successes of the Persian fleet in the Ægean seemed to afford a basis for action, and Agis visited Pharnabazus, the successor of Memnon, with a view of persuading him to land a force in Peloponnesus. But the fleet had already been fatally weakened by the withdrawal of the Greek mercenaries serving on board, to reinforce the army of Darius; and, on receiving news of the battle of Issus, Pharnabazus hastened back to Asia in fear that Chios would revolt. Though Agis was too resolute to renounce his projects, Sparta was once more isolated, and the other states of Greece, assembled in full congress at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, sent Alexander a gold crown as their offering of congratulation.

It was Alexander's plan to secure full possession of the Mediterranean coast, and by the conquest of Phœnicia to deprive Darius of his fleet, before plunging into the heart of the empire. He first marched southwards through Cœle-Syria to Damascus, which was surrendered by the treachery of the satrap in command. Besides the vast treasure which had been left there by Darius, there were a host of persons of distinction, wives, daughters, and other members of nearly all the chief families of Persia, who

had accompanied the march from Mesopotamia. There were also many Greek exiles: those from Athens and Thebes were dismissed with honour, and those from Sparta were detained but for a short time. Among the former was Iphicrates (a son of the celebrated Athenian general), whom Alexander's kindness induced to remain with him; and, when he died of sickness not long after, his ashes were sent home to his family at Athens.

Advancing into Phœnicia, Alexander received the ready submission of the great maritime cities of Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon, whose naval contingents were at this very time serving with the Persian fleet. At Marathus, on the mainland opposite the island of Aradus, he received a letter from Darius, who had recrossed the Euphrates to Babylon, where he was collecting a second army from the contingents of the more distant provinces, which had not had time to reach him when he began his former march. The letter asked for the restitution of his family, and proposed friendship and alliance on equal terms, which Alexander haughtily rejected. "Come to me yourself"—he said, "as to the matter of all Asia, and lord of all that belongs to you. You shall receive back your wife and children, and whatever else you wish. Or, if you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be."

But, before he could perform this boast, which indicates how fully his mind was set on the one object of unbounded conquest, he had to finish his present enterprize, and his course was delayed by an unexpected obstacle. As he approached the great city of Tyre, the queen of the Phœnician coast, he was met by a deputation, headed by the son of the reigning prince, bringing the present of a golden crown and supplies for his army, and offering to submit to him, like the sister cities. But they reserved a point of vital importance, on which Alexander was equally determined to insist. Since Nebuchadnezzar's siege, the city had been transferred from its ancient position on the mainland, now called Old Tyre (Palætyrus) to the more secure site of a little island off the coast. The entrance of a foreign force into this New City had been forbidden with extreme jealousy; and the Persians had never been so admitted during the whole period of their domination. Alexander's was not the spirit to brook such a restraint, and he proposed to offer sacrifices at the altar of Melcart (the Tyrian Hercules) within the city. The Tyrians tried to evade compliance by referring him to a more venerable shrine of the same deity in

Old Tyre. Upon this, he cast aside the pretext, and began the siege;—the first example of his throwing away a substantial advantage for a mere point of pride; for the alliance of Tyre would at once have made him master of the Phœnician shores and fleet.

The Tyrians, trusting in their impregnable position, prepared for a determined resistance, and sent off many of their wives and children to Carthage. The island was divided from the mainland by a channel about half a mile wide, shallow near the coast, but deep where it touched the island, which rose up sheer out of the water in rocky precipices, crowned by the solid walls of the city, to the height of 150 feet. There were plentiful springs of fresh water in the island; and several ships of war in the harbour, though the greater part of the navy was absent, serving as a part of the Persian fleet, under the prince Azemilchus himself. Much now depended on the movements of that fleet. On hearing of the events in Phœnicia, the contingents of Aradus and Sidon had returned home, while Azemilchus hastened to the defence of Tyre. The Cyprians in the fleet remained for a time undecided which part to take.

Meanwhile, Alexander had begun his operations against Tyre, by constructing a mole from the mainland. Two towers were raised at its extremity, from which missiles were hurled against the Tyrian ships that perpetually harassed the work. But the besieged, choosing a windy day, let loose some fire ships, which burnt the towers, while an attack of their whole navy destroyed the greater part of the mole. The work was commenced anew on a larger scale; but Alexander saw that success depended on his being master of the sea; and, while he collected ships from other quarters, he went in person to Sidon, and obtained the eighty Phœnician ships which had lately returned from the *Ægean*. To these 120 more were added by the voluntary submission of the Cyprians. It is needless to recount the noble but vain resistance of the besieged to this overwhelming force. The mole was pushed up to the city wall, which was breached by the mighty artillery of Alexander. He himself was among the first to mount the wall, while his fleet forced its way into the harbour. The townsmen made a desperate resistance in the streets; no quarter was given, except to those who took sanctuary in the temple of Melcarth, among whom was the prince Azemilchus, and to a few for whom the Sidonians interceded. Two thousand prisoners, who from various causes escaped the general massacre, were

hanged along the sea-shore. The women and children, to the number of 30,000, were sold as slaves; and Alexander offered his promised sacrifice to Melcarth amidst the ruins of the devoted city, which never again rose to greatness. Its capture took place in July, B.C. 332, after a siege of seven months.

Shortly before the fall of Tyre, Alexander received fresh overtures from Darius, who offered the cession of all Asia west of the Euphrates, with a payment of 10,000 talents as the ransom of his wife and mother, and proposed to ratify the alliance by the marriage of his daughter to Alexander. Such terms might well have tempted a man who aimed at any advantage short of universal empire, and Parmenio ventured to say that he would accept them, if he were Alexander. "So would I"—said Alexander—"if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must give another answer:" and he sent that answer in the same arrogant language as before, its sum being this:—"All you have is mine already."

Still pursuing his great object of becoming master of all the points by which the East communicated with the Grecian seas, Alexander pursued his march southward towards Egypt. The resistance of the frontier town of Gaza, a place of enormous strength, delayed him for two months, and entailed on its defenders the same penalties that had been inflicted on the Tyrians; while Alexander showed himself able to improve upon the most savage act of his heroic model. Achilles had dragged the corpse of Hector round the walls of Troy, at the tail of his chariot; Alexander perpetrated the like cruel indignity on the living body of the eunuch Batis, the governor of Gaza. Before passing into Egypt, we are told by Quintus Curtius that Alexander visited some of the cities which still refused to submit to him; and among these, if we may believe a tradition preserved by Josephus, was Jerusalem itself. Critics still hesitate between the acceptance and rejection of the picturesque story, which at all events demands a notice.

Our last view of the restored Jews left them in the peaceful enjoyment of municipal liberty and of the religious constitution restored by Ezra and Nehemiah, under their own High Priests.* They repaid the protection of Persia with a devoted loyalty, which prompted them to refuse the demand of submission, made by Alexander during the siege of Tyre. He marched to chastise them after the fall of Gaza, and the beautiful city had already

* Vol. I. pp. 281-2.

risen before his view on the hill of Zion, when he found the High Priest Jaddua waiting his approach at the watch-station of Sapha, clad in his robes of gold and purple, and followed by a train of priests and citizens in pure white. The conqueror bowed in reverence to the Holy Name upon the high-priest's frontlet; and, being asked by Parmenio the reason of his conduct, said that in a dream, at Dium, he had seen the God of Jaddua, who encouraged him to pass over into Asia, and promised him success. Then entering Jerusalem, he offered sacrifice in the temple, heard the prophecy of Daniel about himself, and granted certain privileges to all the Jews throughout his empire. The desire to honour a shrine so celebrated as the Jewish temple is quite in accordance with the conduct of Alexander at Ilium and Ephesus, Gordium and Tyre. The privileges he is said to have conferred upon the Jews were enjoyed under his successors, and some minor matters have been adduced in confirmation of the story. On the other hand, the classical writers are entirely silent on the subject, and the details of Josephus involve grave historical inconsistencies. It seems not an unreasonable conjecture, that the story is an embellishment of some incident that occurred when the High Priest came to Gaza to tender the submission of the Jews. But we must not dismiss it without a remark on the vast influence which the conquests of Alexander had in bringing the Jews into closer relations with the rest of Asia, and so preparing them to fulfil their ultimate destiny as Christians.

It was about this time that Alexander was rejoined by his fleet, which had cleared the Ægæan of the Persian navy. All the conquests of Memnon among the islands had been regained. At Chios, Pharnabazus had been captured, with the whole fleet that had remained with him after the departure of the Phœnicians and Cyprians; and, last of all, Chares had surrendered Mytilene. There remained no fear that rebellion would be excited among the insular Greeks by the gold of Persia, and her communication with the continent was rendered difficult. The fleet met Alexander at Pelusium, the eastern city of the Delta, and was despatched to sail up the Nile as far as Memphis. Alexander was welcomed in Egypt as a deliverer from the hated yoke of Persia, and the satrap Mazaces was in no condition, even had he desired, to make any effectual resistance. The conqueror's habitual respect for the religion of the nations he passed through, enhanced as it was by the venerable antiquity of Egypt, won the hearts of priests as well as people. Here, at length, he found himself in a land which his

Greek instructors had described with minute curiosity as the most ancient seat of religion and civilization; as the source from which Greece had derived her arts, her laws, her gods themselves. Here, then, was the sacred spot where the descendant of Hercules and Achilles might set at rest the question, which had been suggested ever since his birth, and which his superhuman fortune seemed again to raise, whether he was not, in a still more literal sense, the son of Jove. With this view, he undertook a pilgrimage to the ancient oracle, where, in the midst of the Libyan sands, the god was worshipped under his most ancient name of Ammon.* The special favour of the god was shown in the incidents which facilitated Alexander's five days' march from the Mediterranean shore, which he followed westward from the Delta, across the desert to the sacred Oasis; nor were the hopes thus excited doomed to disappointment. He was well satisfied with the oracle, which the priests introduced him to consult in private; though he kept the response as a holy secret, the god was believed to have saluted him as a son; and his effigy on his coins bears the horn which was the sacred symbol of Ammon impersonated as a ram. The visit forms a marked epoch in Alexander's career, from which we may date the development of that superhuman arrogance, which already began to alienate his chief followers, who saw the fair fame of Philip sacrificed to the vanity of his son.

The most enduring memorial of Alexander's four or five months' stay in Egypt was the city to which he gave his name, and which still forms, though fallen far from its ancient greatness, the port that links the eastern to the western world. It was on descending the western branch of the Nile from Memphis, to visit the isle of Pharos, of which Homer had sung as lying a day's sail from the river Ægyptus (the Nile), that the intuitive genius of Alexander saw the fitness of the spot for a great commercial city. The site was chosen on the narrow tongue of land between the lake Marcotis and the sea; and this was joined to the isle of Pharos by a causeway called the Heptastadium (*Seven Stadia*), on each side of which was a harbour, protected by the island. Fifty years later, in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus, the great lighthouse was erected, which caused the name of Pharos to be applied to all such structures. The ports were connected with each other by two channels through the Heptastadium, and by another with the lake Mareotis,

* The history of Alexander having come down to us through the Greek writers, custom has prescribed the use of this form of the name, instead of the *Amun* or *Amen* of the Egyptian mythology.

which communicated with the Nile by a number of canals. The city was laid out in two chief streets, exceeding 100 feet wide, the one extending more than three miles east and west from the "royal quarter" to the Necropolis; the other more than a mile north and south from the sea to the lake. The best architects were employed in planning and embellishing the city; and the inhabitants of Canopus were transported in mass to people it.

Having spent the month of January, B.C. 331, at Memphis, and received reinforcements from Macedonia and Greece, Alexander returned into Phœnicia. On his way, he took signal vengeance on the Samaritans, who had burnt alive the Macedonian governor. He remained three or four months in Phœnicia, arranging the affairs of Greece and Western Asia. During this time his new subjects began to witness the workings of Hellenism among them in the splendid festivals and dramatic contests, which were celebrated after the model of the Attic Dionysia, the princes of Cyprus taking the lead. Meanwhile, all preparations were made for advancing into the heart of Asia, and a force was sent on to make bridges over the Euphrates at Thapsacus. The Persian satrap Mazæus, who watched the passage with 3,000 men, retired on the approach of the main army, and Alexander soon found himself beyond the "bordering flood," which Darius had vainly proposed as the limit of his empire.

At Thapsacus, "the fatal ford," as it has been called from the many adventurers who have crossed it, on the way either to empire or destruction, the direct route to Babylon lay down the left bank of the Euphrates. But Xenophon had recorded the difficulties of the march through the sandy desert which here reaches across the Euphrates into Mesopotamia; and the direction in which Mazæus retreated confirmed the report of some of the prisoners, that Darius was posted on the Upper Tigris. Alexander therefore struck across the plain of Upper Mesopotamia, having the foot-hills of Mount Masius on his left, and reached the Tigris at a point some distance above Nineveh. No Persian army was there, as he had expected, to contest his passage; but the river was only forded with great difficulty. It was not without misgivings that the followers of Alexander found themselves thus led on at the will of an all-daring youth, to tempt fortune in the unknown regions beyond the two mighty rivers. Profound discouragement was caused by an eclipse of the moon, which occurred while they were resting from the labours of the passage (September 20th, B.C. 331); but Alexander's astrologers, Grecian and

Egyptian, declared that it was the Greek god Helios asserting his supremacy over the Persian goddess Selené.*

While proceeding 'four days' march through the district of Aturia, between the Tigris and Great Zab, Alexander fell in with an advanced guard of Persian cavalry; and he learnt from them that Darius was near at hand. It was from a mixture of fear and policy that the Persian king had chosen so distant a region of the empire for his final stand. The defeat of Issus had lost him the confidence of his followers, and all thoughts of a bold policy were paralysed so long as his family were hostages in Alexander's hands. The only hope left was, that by surrendering the western part of his empire, with its rich provinces, he might be allowed to retain the old possessions of Media and Persis. But he learned from Alexander's replies, that this lesser half must be fought for as desperately as if it were the whole. Vast forces were still available from the more distant provinces, as far as Arabia on the south, the Indus on the east, and the Oxus and Jaxartes on the north. In his new army, which was said to be more numerous than that overthrown at Issus, we read of new descriptions of force, fifteen Indian elephants, and 200 scythed chariots, armed with a sharp point projecting in front of the pole, three sword blades stretching out on each side of the yoke, and scythes extending from the ends of the axle. The cavalry are reckoned at 40,000, the infantry at no less than 1,000,000. Among the latter, Darius had still a body of 50,000 Greek mercenaries. His own soldiers were armed with new weapons and shields, more nearly resembling those of the Macedonians.

This time he had chosen a field of battle admirably suited for the movements of a vast army, and for the courses of the chariots. The head-quarters were at ARBELA (Erbil), a caravan-station near the foot hills of Zagros, about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, and about thirty miles from the battle field to which it has given its name. The latter was an undulating plain some twelve miles west of the Great Zab, marked by the village or post-station of GAUGAMELA (the *Camel's House*, now *Karmelis*) near the little river Burnadus. It was to draw the enemy to this spot, that the fords of the Tigris had been left open, and as soon as Alexander reached that river, Darius moved forward across the Great Zab, the passage of which occupied five days, leaving his baggage and treasure at Arbela. He formed a main

* So far as the interpretation meant anything more than flattery, the Moon-goddess (Selené) must have signified the Babylonian Beltis.

line of his most warlike forces, in the centre of which he took his own station, with the native Persian guards and other select troops, including the Greek mercenaries. In front of this line the cavalry and chariots were posted in three divisions. The multitude of less trustworthy troops were placed in large masses in the rear.

It was at the close of his fourth day's march from the Tigris, that Alexander found himself within seven miles of the Persian host. He entrenched his camp, and allowed his army four days' rest. Then, with only his effective troops, he made a night march towards the enemy, and the passage over a low ridge brought him in sight of them at daybreak. By Parmenio's advice, he halted for one day, to reconnoitre the ground, and formed a new entrenched camp, the distance between the armies being about three miles. The open field of battle presented a problem quite different from those of the Granicus and Issus; and Alexander showed his consummate generalship by adapting his tactics to the altered circumstances. Preserving his usual array of two wings, he drew up his army in two lines, the phalanx, hypaspists, and heavy cavalry in the front, and the light cavalry, the archers, and the Agrianian javelin men in the rear. As the whole Macedonian army numbered but 40,000 foot and 7000 horse, it was essential to guard against attempts to outflank and surround it in the rear. With the same object, Alexander, who took his station on the extreme right, opposite to the Persian left centre, led his division into action with an oblique movement towards his right. The Bactrians, who formed the Persian left, endeavoured to outflank his advancing cavalry, and checked him for a short time, but being supported by his light horse, he broke their line where it was weakened by this lateral movement. Meanwhile, a charge of the scythed chariots had entirely failed, and Alexander wheeled round against the Persian centre, hoping to decide the battle, as at Issus, by an attack on the person of Darius. Once more, as at the Granicus, the short pike of the Macedonian Companions proved victorious in the *mêlée*, and by this time the phalanx was pressing on the Persian front. The native Persians and the Greek mercenaries made a fierce resistance around the king, but as Darius, from his lofty chariot, saw Alexander pressing on towards him, nearer and yet nearer, his courage again failed him as at Issus, and he gave the example of flight to his whole centre. Hotly pursued by Alexander, he is said to have owed his escape solely to the clouds of dust which wrapt the field in a darkness like that of the Homeric battles.

Meanwhile the left had been engaged in a more doubtful contest, and Parmenio was so hard pressed by the Persian cavalry under Mazæus, that he was fain to seek aid from Alexander. His messengers stopped the two left divisions of the phalanx, and so separated them from the other four, which were pressing on after Alexander in the pursuit. A body of Indian and Persian cavalry dashed right through the gap thus made to the Macedonian camp, and began to plunder the baggage; but the second line, recovering from their first surprise, repulsed them with great loss; while the cavalry of Mazæus, having by this time learned the rout of Darius, were in full flight before the Thessalian horsemen. The fugitives were met face to face by Alexander, who was returning across the field to the succour of Parmenio. The conflict that ensued was the fiercest of the whole day, no hope being left to the Persians but to cut their way through the enemy. Sixty of the Companions were killed, and Alexander himself was in great peril. At length he formed a junction with Parmenio, and the whole army pressed forward in pursuit. Here again, as at Issus, the defeated combatants were rolled back upon the inert masses that only served to block up the plain behind them, and the mingled multitude, driven one over another, wave upon wave, perished as much by their own weight as by the sword and lance of the pursuers. The slaughter was most dreadful at the passage of the Great Zab, where hosts of prisoners were taken, and here the Macedonians halted for awhile from sheer exhaustion. But it was Alexander's eager desire to secure the person of Darius; so at midnight he pressed on towards Arbela, which he entered the next day, and found the bow, shield, and chariot of the king, with all his stores and treasures. Parmenio meanwhile took possession of the Persian camp, and the camels and elephants became, with the baggage, the prize of the conquerors. The numbers of the slain and prisoners were enormous. Arrian computes the former at 300,000; Curtius, whose estimate is the lowest, at 40,000. The Macedonian loss is variously stated at from 100 to 500, but the number of their wounded was unusually large. The battle of Arbela, which was fought on or about October 1st, B.C. 331, completely annihilated the military force of Persia, and left the empire at the disposal of Alexander.

He forthwith marched to Babylon, where he was met outside the gates by the great mass of the population, headed by the Chaldæan priests, who had been continually persecuted by the devoted worshippers of Auramazda. Their best hopes were

gratified by the respect which, according to his custom, Alexander paid to their religion. He sacrificed to Belus, and ordered his ruined temple to be rebuilt. The treasures of Babylon enabled him to make a liberal donative to his soldiers, who were permitted to refresh themselves for a month, after their four years' toil, while Alexander exercised his sovereign rights by the appointment of new satraps. In this act he commenced the policy of treating the Orientals no longer as enemies, but subjects. Mazæus, who had led the Persian cavalry so gallantly at Arbela, was confirmed in the government of Babylon, but associated with two Greeks, a commander of the forces and collector of the revenue, the city being of course occupied by a Macedonian garrison. Mithrines, who had betrayed the citadel of Sardis, was rewarded with the satrapy of Armenia; that of Syria and Phœnicia was given to Menes, who was entrusted with 3000 talents for Antipater. About the middle of November, Alexander marched to Susa, one of the other capitals of the empire, which had surrendered to Philoxenus immediately after the battle of Arbela, with a treasure reckoned at eleven and a half millions sterling. Here he received a reinforcement of 15,000 men from Europe, and remodelled his whole army. The government of Susa, like that of Babylon, was committed to the satrap who had surrendered the city, in conjunction with two Macedonian officers. He next marched into Persia Proper, inflicting by the way a signal chastisement on the Uxii, a tribe of mountain robbers, who had dared to demand of him the tribute they had been accustomed to exact when the Persian king passed from one capital to another.

Persepolis lies in a plain environed by mountains, the road through which was by an impregnable pass, called the Susian or Persian Gates. Here the conqueror was checked by Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persis. After a first attack had failed, he was hesitating whether he could bring himself to turn aside and approach Persepolis by a more circuitous route, when a Lycian captive, employed as a shepherd on the hills, made known to him a mountain path, by which, after a difficult passage over the snow-clad heights, he descended upon the flank of Ariobarzanes, while Craterus renewed the attack in front. The Persians were cut to pieces, or perished among the rocks, Ariobarzanes being one of the few who escaped. His final effort to save Persepolis, or at least a portion of its treasures, was frustrated by the commandant of the citadel; and he himself was cut to pieces, with his band of devoted followers, by the rapid advance of Alexander and his cavalry.

Alexander was now master both of Persepolis and the more ancient capital of Pasargadæ. At the latter he visited the tomb of Cyrus, whose empire he had overrun, and whose further conquests he was about to follow; at the former he beheld a spectacle which roused other feelings than ambition. In this remote capital of the empire, he found 800 Greek captives, mutilated according to the barbarous custom of the Persians, of arms or legs, ears or eyes. Too ashamed of their condition to accept the offer of restoration to their homes, they were settled on lands granted them by Alexander's bounty. It remained to deal with the city of Persepolis. Too distant to be made a royal residence, it was sure to become the stronghold of the ancient national spirit, which had its home in the mountains of Persis. Nor did it seem impolitic to Alexander, amidst his prevailing clemency and toleration, to strike one blow which might terrify the disaffected. So after the royal treasure had been placed on 5000 camels and an immense number of mules, for conveyance to Susa and Ecbatana, Alexander gave up the city to pillage and conflagration. Some say that he set fire to the royal palace with his own hand. The male population were massacred, and the women sold as slaves. While the main body of the army rested for a month at the ruined city, Alexander, with a moveable column, secured the submission of all Persis. The return of spring, while Alexander was still at Persepolis, completed four full years since his departure from Macedonia (March, B.C. 334, to March, B.C. 330). During that period, he had effected the conquest of all the countries which have hitherto been prominent in history, and which became afterwards the region of Hellenic life in Asia. The remaining seven years of his life were occupied with wonderful adventures rather than political achievements; and he never revisited the countries west of the Euphrates.

His first object was the pursuit of Darius, who had fled to Ecbatana, where he waited to see whether any chance yet remained to him, or whether he must continue his flight into the wild regions of Central Asia. He was driven to the latter course by the approach of Alexander, who, after taking possession of Ecbatana, pressed on through Media with such speed, that in eleven days he accomplished the march of 300 miles to Rhagæ, 50 miles from the pass through Mount Elburz, called the "Caspian Gates." Learning that Darius had already passed the gates, Alexander gave his followers five days' rest, and then followed to the same pass. The fugitive king was guided in his flight by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, who had held a high command at the battle of Arbela,

with the satraps of the other distant provinces in the north and east of the empire. Their scheme was, if possible, to carry off Darius into Bactria, and there to make a stand in his name, but really for their own advantage ; but, if Alexander should overtake them on the way, they were prepared to make their peace with him by giving up Darius. So they bound him with chains of gold, and carried him on in a covered chariot, so closely guarded by the Bactrian troops, that the small body of Greek mercenaries, who still remained faithful to the king, could attempt nothing in his behalf. Alexander heard this news when he was a day's journey beyond the Caspian Gates, and pressed forward eastward with redoubled speed at the head of a picked body of cavalry and infantry, with only two days' provisions. Twice he reached the site of the Persian camp, only to find that the fugitives were still before him. At length a shorter route was pointed out to him, and a night march of five and forty miles through the waterless desert of Hyrcania brought him to the encampment of the satraps on the fourth morning. Taken completely by surprise, Bessus tried to persuade Darius to continue his flight on a swift horse. But the fallen king preferred to cast himself on the clemency of Alexander. Incensed at his refusal, and well knowing that the possession of his person would complete Alexander's title to the obedience of the provinces, the satraps transfixed the king with their javelins, and fled with all speed. A Macedonian soldier, coming up with the covered chariot, found the dying and deserted monarch just able to utter a few words of thanks to Alexander for his kind treatment of his captive family. He was already dead when the victor himself reached the chariot ; and Alexander cast his own cloak over the body of his rival. The death of Darius was a grievous disappointment to the conqueror on every ground both of pride and policy ; but it would be unjust not to believe that a more generous sentiment prevailed alike over the desire to exhibit him as a prisoner and the advantage to be gained from the possession of his person. He granted Darius a royal funeral in the sepulchres of the Persian kings.

Alexander reunited his army at Hecatompylos, in Parthia, and granted them a period of repose, before continuing the pursuit of Bessus, and the subjugation of the northern and eastern provinces. He then rapidly subdued Parthia and Hyrcania, with the wild tribes of *Mount Elburz*, which divides the two provinces. Thence he marched eastward into Aria, the satrap of which province, an ally of Bessus, fled before him ; and here he founded the city of

Alexandria Ariorum, the modern *Herat*. Reserving Bactria for his last attack, he turned southwards into Drangiana (*Seistan*), on the banks of the river Erymandrus (*Helmund*). His stay at the capital, Prophthasia (probably *Peshawarun*) was rendered but too memorable by the fate of Philotas and his father Parmenio. The true cause of this tragedy must be sought in the changed relations of Alexander to his nearest friends, consequent upon his uninterrupted tide of success. Parmenio was the chief of Philip's old officers. We have seen him not only acting ordinarily as second in command, but freely giving advice which was not always palatable to Alexander. Philotas shared his father's views, and, as commander of the Companion cavalry, stood next to him with Alexander. For some time, and especially since the visit to the oracle of Ammon, both had shown feelings of disgust at their master's increasing arrogance, while themselves betraying a somewhat exalted sense of their own share in his success. The incautious speeches of Philotas, repeated by a treacherous mistress, had been used by his rival Craterus to inflame the jealousy of Alexander; and he was now put to death on a charge of treason, after he had been tortured into a confession. His father, Parmenio, who was residing at Ecbatana in the high office of governor of Media, was despatched by the daggers of emissaries, who justified their act to the indignant soldiers by producing the orders of the king. For the details we must refer to the biographers of Alexander. It is enough to say that the evidence was utterly inconclusive, and even had it been otherwise, the case pre-eminently called for Alexander's boasted magnanimity. But, in truth, his character had by this time undergone a complete change; or rather, its barbarian elements had been irresistibly developed by unbroken prosperity. The habits of wild revelry which had degraded Philip in the eyes of the Greeks, now began to gain the mastery over Alexander, and his recent marches had been alternated with drunken debauches. It is but fair to make some allowance for the physical effect of his enormous toils, combined with the cares of the general and the sovereign, on a constitution predisposed to cerebral excitement. Henceforth his whole career is chequered with examples of the speedy retribution which overtakes the possessor of power too great for man. Meanwhile a most painful impression was produced upon his followers, whose unbounded confidence and admiration were replaced in no small degree by disgust and fear. The vacancy caused by the death of Parmenio was filled up by the division of the Companion cavalry

between Clitus and Hephæstion, who in some degree succeeded to the place which Parmenio had held in Alexander's confidence (October, B.C. 330).

Having spent the winter in completing the conquest of the provinces which occupy the north-eastern part of the table-land of Iran, in the angle between the two branches of Mount Paropamisus (the *Mountains of Soleiman*, and the *Hindoo Koosh*),* he crossed the latter mighty chain, which reaches to the height of 15,000 or 18,000 feet, while the passes were still covered with snow. His soldiers, whose imagination had been fed with the traditions of the Greek poets respecting Mount Caucasus, to pass which they deemed the highest achievement of foreign adventure, flattered their chief by transferring to this chain the name of the "Indian Caucasus," by which it has ever since been known. He was now in Bactria, which Bessus had found himself too weak to defend, and had crossed the Oxus (*Amoo* or *Jihoun*), into Sogdiana, the last border province towards the Massagætæ and Scythia. Alexander pressed on through the sandy deserts, amidst great sufferings, to the most difficult river he had yet crossed, and transported his army on their tent-skins, filled with air and straw.† Bessus, deserted by his fellow-conspirators, and even by his own followers, was overtaken by a light division under Ptolemy, and placed at the road-side, naked and in chains, to await the approach of Alexander's chariot. On arriving at the spot, Alexander upbraided him with his treason to Darius, and ordered him to be scourged and sent in chains to Bactra. On Alexander's return to Bactria, Bessus was again brought before him, condemned to the Persian punishment of the mutilation of his nose and ears, and sent to Ecbatana, that the Medes might take the final revenge upon him for his treacherous murder of their king. If these refined cruelties may be explained by a politic desire on Alexander's part to clear himself of all suspicion with regard to the death of Darius, they none the less bear witness to that growth of Oriental vices in his character, of which he gave another proof by the massacre of the Greek colony of the

* These provinces were Drangiana, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ, or people of Mount Paropamisus, corresponding to the modern *Seistan*, *Affghanistan*, and the western part of *Cabul*. During these marches, he founded two more cities, Alexandria in Arachosia (probably *Candahar*), and Alexandria ad Caucasum, at the foot of the Hindoo Koosh, about 50 miles north-west of Cabul. He seems to have crossed the Hindoo Koosh by the pass of *Bamian*, the only one of its four passes practicable for an army in the winter.

† The same mode of transport is seen on the old Assyrian sculptures.

Branchidæ,* in Sogdiana, though under the specious pretext of the avenger of Apollo. Having taken Maracanda (*Samarcand*), the capital of Sogdiana, Alexander advanced to the Jaxartes (*Sir*, or *Sihoun*), the boundary between the Persian empire and Scythia. On its banks he founded the most distant of the cities that bore his name,† near that which marked the limits of the empire of Cyrus (*Cyreschata*), who had failed in that attempt to subdue the Scythians, which Alexander proposed soon to renew. Meanwhile he returned into winter quarters at Zariaspe, the capital of Bactria,‡ where he punished Bessus in the manner already described (B.C. 329).

In the following year, Alexander returned to Sogdiana, to put down a formidable revolt headed by the late satrap Spitamenes. After a successful campaign, in which his army, divided into five columns, traversed the whole country, he had returned to Maracanda. Intending to pursue his march into Scythia, he appointed his bosom friend, Clitus, who had saved his life at the Granicus, to the satrapy of Bactria, and gave a parting banquet on the eve of the day fixed for Clitus to set out. The drunken revels, which were now common on such occasions, ended in the most tragic of all Alexander's bursts of passion. His appetite for adulation had grown so insatiable, that he not only permitted flatterers to place him above his father, and to insult that father's memory by lauding him as the son of Ammon, who awaited an apotheosis like that of Hercules, but himself claimed all the merit of Philip's later victories. Clitus was one of those who revered the late king, and had taken deep offence at Alexander's wanton insults to the Macedonian soldiers. Wine had loosed the restraints of prudence, and he rebuked the flatterers severely. He went further, and boldly awarded the palm to the father above the son, since Philip had created the force which alone had enabled Alexander to conquer,—the force whose chief leaders, Parmenio and his son, had been put to death, and the soldiers scourged with Persian rods. The more such language provoked Alexander, the more did Clitus persist in it; till, holding himself forth as the champion of the old Macedonian party, he exclaimed, with an air of defiance, "This hand, Alex-

* These were the descendants of the Branchidæ, who had charge of the temple of Apollo near Miletus, and surrendered its treasures to Xerxes, by whom they were removed to Sogdiana, out of reach of the vengeance of the Greeks.

† This is called *Alexandria ad Jaxartem*, *Alexandria Eschaté*, or *Alexandreschata* (the furthest *Alexandria*), and was probably on the site of the modern *Khujend*.

‡ Also called *Bactra*; it is the modern *Balkh*.

ander, saved your life at the Granicus! Listen to the truth, or invite to your suppers none but barbarian slaves!" Alexander's attendants had put his dagger out of his reach; his chief officers clung round him as he rushed at Clitus, whom others tried to remove from the room. But the king's fury only provoked Clitus to more bitter taunts; while Alexander exclaimed that his officers were acting to him the part of Bessus to Darius. At length, overpowering their resistance, he transfixed Clitus with a pike which he snatched from an attendant, the blow being accompanied with the taunt, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio." The sight of his friend weltering in his blood produced an instant and complete revulsion of feeling. Overwhelmed with remorse, he lay upon his bed for three days and nights, refusing all food, and repeatedly calling upon Clitus, whose name he coupled with that of his nurse Laniée, as the second saviour of his life. The lover of freedom, who looks beyond the exploits which blind men to the littleness of her enemies, could hardly desire to see the humiliating lesson read more plainly, unless it were in the abject flattery and superstition in which the illustrious drunkard and murderer at length found solace. While the prophets discovered at once a cause and excuse for his deed in the anger of Dionysus, and the philosophers told Alexander that his regret was a too generous sentiment, inasmuch as his will was the only law, the army passed a vote that Clitus had been justly slain, and their leader obtained the praise of magnanimity by refusing to allow his murdered friend to lie unburied.

But the best remedy for his grief was in renewed action, for which the enemy gave him ample opportunity. Assisted by the Scythians, the Sogdians carried on a desultory warfare for a whole year, during which Alexander penetrated their deserts and mountains, and subdued many of their fortresses, till Spitamenes was slain by his Scythian allies, and his head sent to Alexander. His celebrated storming of the impregnable "Sogdian rock," gave him among the captives, Roxana, the daughter of a Bactrian chief; and Alexander was so struck with her charms, that he made her his first Asiatic wife. The marriage, which was celebrated at Bactra, was made the occasion for another step towards Oriental despotism. Alexander exacted the ceremony of prostration even from his Greek followers, by the mouth of the philosopher Anaxarchus. The philosopher Callisthenes, of Olynthus, the nephew of Aristotle, dared to resist the proposal, which Alexander withdrew. But he soon found means to revenge himself on Callisthenes, who was tortured and hanged as an accomplice in a conspiracy which

was about this time detected among the royal pages. Nor did Alexander abstain from hinting that Aristotle shared in his nephew's disloyalty, and threatening that he should share his fate. "Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Bactra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Callisthenes; hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Callisthenes not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal." *

With the return of summer, Alexander left Bactra, to recross the Paropamisus and subdue the still unknown lands of INDIA. We will not interrupt the progress of our narrative, to discuss the deeply interesting chapter of history which is opened by the mention of that name. There are indeed questions of the highest importance affecting the relations of India to the language, religion, and civilization of the ancient world; but these questions are almost entirely speculative. In ancient history, India appears but once or twice in the background, as a region stimulating a curiosity which there was little knowledge to gratify; exciting, only to disappoint, the ambition of conquerors, such as Semiramis, Darius, and Alexander; and chiefly known, after his time, by the rich products with which it rewarded the commercial enterprise that had its centre at Alexandria. The India, with which Alexander made his brief acquaintance of a year or two, was only the region so called in the proper but narrower sense, the *Land of the Indus* and its tributary streams, in other words, *Scinde* and the *Punjab*, or country of the *Five Rivers*. This, too, was the region occupied by the Indian branch of the great Aryan family of mankind, the original home of the Sanscrit language and the Hindoo religion; and the names of persons and places mentioned by the historians of Alexander can generally be explained by Sanscrit etymologies. •

The details of Alexander's march through Cabul are full of interest for the geographer, but are only remarkable for the historian on account of the facility with which he subdued the mountaineers who have proved so troublesome in our time. The campaign, like his former passage of the Paropamisus, was made in the depth of winter. Following the course of the river Cophen

* Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. xii. pp. 301, 302.

(*Cabul*), he crossed the Indus about *Attock*, having first allowed his soldiers a rest of thirty days. The prince of the *Doab** or country between the Indus and the Hydaspes (*Jeloum*),—whom the Greeks called Taxiles, from his capital Taxila, but whose real name was Mophis, or Omphis—came out to meet Alexander with valuable presents, among which were twenty-five war elephants, and brought a reinforcement of 5000 men. Porus,† the king of the next *Doab*, showed a very different spirit. He appeared with a large force, including many elephants, to dispute the passage of the Hydaspes. The skilful generalship of Alexander gained a passage some miles higher up, and a battle was fought on the left bank, in which Porus, conspicuous by his gigantic stature, and mounted on a huge elephant, fought with the greatest courage to the last, having seen two of his sons fall. After repeated efforts to rally his defeated troops, he was disabled by wounds and thirst from making good his retreat; and he was brought as a prisoner before Alexander. Struck by his noble form and undaunted bearing, Alexander asked him how he desired to be treated. "Like a king"—was the reply, uttered like a king, and received by Alexander like a king. As a tributary to the conqueror, he received an accession to his dominions. The town of Nicæa was built in commemoration of the victory, which was celebrated with games and sacrifices on the banks of the Hydaspes. The rest of the Punjab afforded an easy conquest. The swollen stream of the Acesines (*Chehab*) was crossed on inflated skins; and the quieter current of the Hydraotes (*Ravee*) was more easily passed. Here alone a serious resistance was made by the Cathæans and other independent tribes, whose capital, Sangala (probably *Lahore*), was stormed, 17,000 of the inhabitants being put to the sword, and 70,000 taken prisoners. The other towns of the *Doab* submitted, and the whole territory was added to the dominions of Porus.

Alexander had now reached the farthest limit of his conquests. At the Hyphasis (*Sutlej*), the last of the Five Rivers, his ambition received a new impulse from the intelligence, that a march of eleven days would bring him to the great river Ganges and the powerful nation of the Gandaridæ. But on his ordering the preparations for passing the river, the long-suppressed feeling of the soldiers, that they had done enough, and marched far enough into unknown regions, broke out into open mutiny. In vain did Alex-

* This term signifies the space between each two rivers of the Punjab.

† This name, or rather title, seems to be only a corruption of the Sanscrit *Paurusha*, a hero.

ander harangue his officers: they were as resolute as the men. He shut himself up in his tent for two days, indulging his moody grief, not that there were no regions left to conquer, but because he was at length made to feel the curb which dependence on fellow men imposes on the strongest will. He recovered himself so far as to submit with a good grace. As if still persisting in his design, he offered the preliminary sacrifices; but the omens proved unfavourable, and he yielded to the will of the gods what was forced on him by his followers.

The divine wanderers, Hercules and Dionysus, were said to have erected pillars to mark the furthest limits of their progress. Alexander, who boasted to have advanced further than either, imitated the example by building twelve immense altars on the banks of the Hyphasis, and celebrating games and sacrifices to the twelve great gods. He then retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, his double march across the Punjab having been the more wonderful as it was performed during the summer rains. Here he was met by a reinforcement which had marched from Europe, such was the tranquillity of his empire. He now formed the plan of following the course of the Indus to its mouth, and exploring the shores of the Ocean to the Euphrates. A fleet of 2000 vessels was prepared by the beginning of November, and Alexander embarked with his admiral Nearchus, while the main body of the army marched in two divisions along the banks, under Hephæstion and Craterus. Thus they went down the Hydaspes to the Acesines, and onwards past the mouths of the Hydraotes and the Hyphasis, to the junction of the united rivers with the Indus. It was, however, no peaceful progress of a conqueror. Alexander again and again disembarked to fight the tribes that lived along the banks. His encounter with the Malli was remarkable for the daring courage with which he scaled the wall of their citadel, and leaped down alone amongst the enemy, whom he kept at bay till aid arrived, though severely wounded in the breast.* Having founded a new city at the confluence of the Acesines and Indus, to command the navigation of the rivers, Alexander continued his voyage down the Indus, the mouth of which was reached after about nine months from the commencement of the voyage (August, B.C. 326). The soldiers were astonished at the Ocean tides, unknown to them in the Mediterranean.

Alexander now projected the great voyage which Nearchus suc-

* The scene of this exploit was near the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines. The town is thought by some to be *Mooltan*.

cessfully performed, from the mouth of the Indus to the Persian Gulf and the Tigris. To estimate this achievement, we must remember that the Greek knowledge of the geography of these distant regions had advanced little beyond the fables of Homer and the mythical wanderings of Io, as described by Æschylus. The theory that the earth was a flat circle, surrounded by the river Ocean, had a tendency to bring the outer parts of the earth into an imaginary proximity. Thus, when Alexander's soldiers reached the Jaxartes, they thought they were on the banks of the Tanais, and when they saw crocodiles in the Indus, they supposed they had reached the Nile. The better information which Alexander doubtless possessed, from the surveys of the empire made since the time of Darius Hystaspis, only reduces his project within the limits of a sagacious, instead of a foolhardy daring; and the achievement of Nearchus was the true opening of the Indian Ocean to the commerce which has ever since enriched the world. The difficulty of the voyage was enhanced by the barrenness of the shores along which it lay, for navigation was still dependent on communication with the land; but he brought the fleet safely to the port of Harmozia (*Ormuz*), where he landed to report progress to Alexander in Carmania, and then returned to complete the voyage to the Euphrates. He finally rejoined Alexander on the Pasitigris, near Susa, about February, B.C. 325, having set sail from the Indus at the preceding autumnal equinox. He was rewarded with a crown of gold.

Alexander in the meantime accomplished his celebrated march through the desert of Gedrosia. How he shared the terrible sufferings of fatigue and thirst with the meanest of his soldiers, is illustrated by the well-known anecdote, which shows Alexander practising a generous self-denial, only paralleled by that of Sir Philip Sidney.

“ These are the precious balsam drops
Which woeful wars distil.”

The true hero is far more conspicuous in the general pouring out the helmet full of water on the sand rather than enjoy it alone, than in the ensuing progress of the pretended son of Ammon through Carmania, in emulation of the Indian Dionysus, a character which was sustained by an incessant drunken revel for seven days, after the fatigues and dangers of the desert. Crossing the mountains to Persepolis, and thence advancing to Susa, Alexander employed himself at both capitals in punishing the abuses of which the satraps had been guilty during his long absence. Some

were executed, and all were compelled to dismiss their mercenary soldiers.

Enthroned in the chief capital of the Persian kings, after far surpassing the exploits of Cyrus, Alexander assumed the full state of the Great King. He adopted the Persian costume, and the full ceremonial of the Persian court. Amidst splendid festivities, he celebrated his nuptials with Statira, the daughter of Darius, and with Parysatis, the daughter of Ochus. At the same time Hephæstion and others of his chief officers, to the number of about 100, espoused the noblest of the Persian ladies; and no less than 10,000 of the common soldiers took Asiatic wives. However politic these intermarriages might be, as a means of conciliating the rival nations, they brought the disgust of the Macedonian veterans to its climax. A mutiny broke out at a review held at Opis on the Tigris; and, when Alexander offered to send home the wounded and disabled; the soldiers cried out that he had better dismiss them all and make his future conquests by the help of his father, Ammon. At this taunt Alexander leaped down among the crowd, followed by a few of his guards, and seized thirteen of the ringleaders, who were led off to instant execution. Then, haranguing the soldiers, who were cowed by the example, he reproached them with ingratitude to their king, who, having borne the chief part in all their toils and dangers, had given them the substantial rewards of success, reserving for himself only the honours and cares of the tiara. In fine, he ordered them to take their discharge; and he shut himself up in the palace, committing its guard to Persian troops. Soon the veterans came flocking round the palace, throwing down their arms, and praying for forgiveness. A solemn reconciliation cancelled the resentment which Alexander had never ceased to feel since the mutiny on the Hyphasis; and 10,000 of the most worn veterans were sent home under Craterus, who was appointed to succeed Antipater as viceroy of Macedonia.

In the summer Alexander visited Ecbatana, where his bosom friend Hephæstion died of a fever contracted amidst the incessant revelries; and Alexander mourned his loss with an extravagance of grief like that of Achilles for Patroclus. A funeral pile was ordered to be erected at Babylon for his obsequies, at a cost of 10,000 talents, and the extermination of the Cossæi, a border tribe between Media and Persia, was regarded as an offering to his manes. The ungovernable emotion of Alexander at this loss, attended as it was with an irritability so extreme that his courtiers

scarcely dared to approach him, seems like the presage of his own approaching fate—"the beginning of the end."

But he had first to quaff the full cup of triumph. Early in B.C. 324, he commenced his progress to Babylon, where, "as in the last scene of some well-ordered drama, all the results and tokens of his great achievements seemed to be collected to do honour to his final exit." Even before he reached the capital, he was met by embassies, not only from all parts of his own dominions, but from the distant nations of the west;—from Carthage, which had heard the fame of his exploits through the Tyrian fugitives;—from Sicily and Sardinia;—from the Etruscans and other nations of Italy;—and even, according to a probable tradition, from Rome itself, then struggling to hold its ground in Italy, amidst the fierce conflict of the Second Samnite War. There were envoys from Ethiopia, Scythia, Iberia, and Gaul; and, amidst this concourse of the nations, which seemed for the first time to hail a mortal as master of all the earth, the ambassadors of the Grecian states approached him with the sacred garlands which owned him as the divine son of Ammon. Still a drop of bitter was infused into the cup by the warning of the Chaldæan soothsayers, that it would be dangerous for him to enter the city. The warning seems to have made a deep impression on his mind, though pride and policy alike forbade him to turn his back on the capital of his empire and the destined centre of his new projects.

Of these projects, the first was the formation of a navy powerful enough to explore, command, and conquer the shores of the Indian Ocean. Orders had been despatched to Phœnicia and Cyprus, to have ships carried in pieces to Thapsacus on the Euphrates. There they were put together, and floated down to Babylon, where vast docks were already commenced. The capital was destined to be also the chief naval arsenal of the empire; while, for purposes of commerce, an emporium was to be founded on the Persian Gulf on a vaster scale than Sidon, Tyre, or Carthage. Finding the greater part of the fleet already collected at Babylon, Alexander concerted with his admiral Nearchus an expedition to circumnavigate and subdue Arabia. A squadron started on the adventure under Hiero, a pilot of Soli in Cyprus, who, however, abandoned the apparently interminable voyage. In the prosecution of these plans, Alexander went in person down the canal Pallacopas, to explore the Chaldæan marshes, and to restore the works of the old Chaldæan kings for the regulation of the course of the Euphrates; *

* See Vol. I. p. 191.

and he chose a spot on which he ordered a new city to be founded. It was probably in this voyage that Alexander contracted the germs of the fever which so soon proved fatal.

He returned to Babylon to complete the preparations for his expedition to Arabia, which he designed to be only a first step towards the conquest of the remaining nations of the world. Some new levies from the western shores of Asia were incorporated with his old soldiers into a sort of Perso-Macedonian phalanx, which he expected to be peculiarly efficient. All the preparations were made for the expedition; and at the same time the funeral pile was ready, which he had long since ordered to be constructed for Hephæstion. He resolved to combine the sacrifices inaugurating his enterprise with the obsequies of his friend. A splendid banquet was prepared for the whole army, at which the conqueror himself presided. After partaking freely in the universal revelry, he supped with his favourite, Medius, and spent the night in a carouse. A second night was passed in the same manner; and Alexander, who had gone to bed in the house of Medius, was unable to rise in the morning. For nine days he tried to shake off the fever, conversing with his generals about his schemes, playing at dice with Medius, and rising each day to bathe and offer sacrifice. At last, he was unable to make this effort; and by the time his generals had been summoned round his bed he had become speechless. His last act was to take off his signet-ring, and deliver it to Perdiccas; but it was reported that, just before his utterance failed him, he was asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, and that he replied, "*To the strongest!*" The soldiers, hearing of his approaching end, surrounded the palace, and being admitted without their arms, they passed before his bed in mournful and respectful silence, while their dying leader made them signs of recognition. His generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to learn by a dream whether he might be healed if he were transported thither; but the oracle bade him be left where he was; and he expired in the afternoon of June 28, B.C. 323, at the age of thirty-two years and eight months, and wanting four months of completing the thirteenth year of his reign.

Historians have delighted in speculating on what would have been the result, had Alexander lived to carry out his new designs, and to come into conflict with the nations of the West. Considering the vast resources of his empire, his prudent skill in turning them to the best account, and his profound knowledge of the art of war, we may be quite sure that he would have accomplished

deeds surpassing any that he had yet achieved. But his success would only have tended to overwhelm the rising civilization of the West beneath the backward wave of that Orientalism which had already been once repelled from the shores of Greece. The world was reserved for another destiny, to be moulded by Roman energy, Roman law, and the stern Roman sense of duty. Meanwhile, the conquests of Alexander had a prodigious, and upon the whole a most beneficial, effect, in bringing the East within the sphere of Hellenic civilization. It may be true that the spread of that civilization was due rather to his successors than to himself, and that his one moving principle was the insatiable lust of conquest. But perhaps the reaction from blind admiration of his exploits has led to a too sweeping denial of those civil qualities which time was not granted him to develop. Even amidst the rapid course of conquest, the pupil of Aristotle, the founder of Alexandria, and the projector of the voyage of Nearchus, was not altogether indifferent to the cause of science, and the genius which organized his army, and so soon reduced his vast empire to order, had equal capacities for civil administration, though it may be doubted whether his impatient temper could have rivalled the works of Caesar or Napoleon. The cities that he founded in the distant regions of Asia may have been designed chiefly as the outposts of a great military empire; but they became, in fact, the germs of powerful states, which were influenced by Greek civilization from their very origin, and commercial centres by which communication was kept up between the nations of the West and the distant realms of India, and even China. The increased facilities of intercourse—an object at which Alexander was ever aiming—formed a result of his conquests only second in importance to the diffusion of the Greek language. His personal character has been sufficiently delineated in recounting the events of his marvellous career.

CHAPTER XVII.

DIVISION OF ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE.—FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE ACCESSION OF ANTIOCHUS SOTER.

B.C. 323 TO B.C. 280.

"Therefore the he goat waxed very great; and when he was strong, the great horn was broken; and for it came up four notable ones toward the four winds of heaven. . . . Now that being broken, whereas four stood up for it, four kingdoms shall stand up out of the nation, but not in his power."—*Daniel*, chap. viii. 8, 22.

SETTLEMENT OF THE KINGDOM ON PHILIP III. ARIDÆUS—PERDICCAS REGENT—DIVISION OF THE PROVINCES—THE DIADOCHI—FUNERAL OF ALEXANDER—BIRTH OF ALEXANDER ÆGUS—THE LAMIAN WAR—PERDICCAS AND EUMENES, ANTIPATER AND OLYMPIAS—DEATH OF PERDICCAS—NEW PARTITION OF THE PROVINCES—WAR OF EUMENES WITH ANTIGONUS—DEATH OF EUMENES—MURDER OF PHILIP ARIDÆUS—CASSANDER MASTER OF GREECE, ANTIGONUS OF ASIA—COALITION AGAINST ANTIGONUS—DEMETRIUS POLIORETES—BATTLE OF GAZA—GENERAL PACIFICATION—MURDER OF ALEXANDER ÆGUS—RENEWAL OF THE WAR—PTOLEMY IN GREECE—BATTLE OF SALAMIS IN CYPRUS—THE GENERALS BECOME KINGS—SIEGE OF RHODES—DEMETRIUS IN GREECE—SUCCESSSES OF SELEUCUS Nicator—NEW COALITION AGAINST ANTIGONUS—BATTLE OF IPSUS—THE HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS—SYRIA—EGYPT—PERGAMUS—BACTRIA.

THE untimely death of Alexander left his empire without an heir, and found the generals unprepared with any plans. Alexander had left an illegitimate son, Hercules, by Barsine, the widow of the Rhodian Memnon; but no pretensions were put forward on his behalf till some years later. The child of the queen Roxana was not born till after Alexander's death. There only remained the half-brother of Alexander, Philip Aridæus, the son of Philip by a Thessalian woman, a youth of weak intellect, and therefore a convenient puppet in the hands of the generals, till time should decide the real heir by the test of Alexander's dying words,—“To the strongest.” The conflict almost broke out at the council which was held the day after Alexander's death, under the presidency of Perdikkas, to whom the dying monarch had given his signet ring; but an arrangement was at last made on the following basis. PHILIP III. ARIDÆUS was recognised as the successor to the empire, a share in the inheritance being reserved to the unborn child of Roxana, should it prove to be a son. PERDICCAS took the command of the Companion cavalry, which was vacant by the death of Hephæstion, with the regency on behalf of Philip. The eastern part of the empire was reserved for his immediate government. The pro-

vinces west of the Euphrates were divided among the other generals, nominally as satrapies, but virtually as independent governments. PTOLEMY, the son of Lagus, who, besides his great talents, had the claim of consanguinity with the royal family, received Egypt and Syria. EUMENES, a Greek of Cardia in the Thracian Chersonese, who had been Alexander's secretary, and had of late shared his confidence with Hephæstion, was appointed to the government of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, provinces not yet thoroughly subdued. Phrygia Proper, with Lycia and Pamphylia, were assigned to ANTIGONUS, the ablest soldier of them all; Hellespontine or the Lesser Phrygia, to LEONNATUS,* and Thrace to LYSIMACHUS, an officer of Sicilian extraction and of low birth, but of the most undaunted courage, and celebrated as a lion-killer. Macedonia itself, and Greece, were to be divided between the late regent, ANTIPATER, and CRATERUS, who had been appointed by Alexander to supersede him, but had not yet started. Olympias, the mother of Alexander, was left out of the arrangement, but hers was not a temper to rest quiet. It was fortunate for the generals that Philip Aridæus was at Babylon; for the possession of his person might have transferred the decision to Antipater, who was at first disposed to claim the regency of the whole empire by virtue of his viceroyalty of Macedonia. But sufficient occupation was soon found both for him and Craterus in the common danger of a Greek war; and Olympias was so afraid of her old enemy Antipater, that she fled for the present into Epirus. One general remains to be mentioned, SELEUCUS, the son of Nicator, who, though omitted in the original distribution, raised himself at last to the possession of the seat of empire, and of all the Eastern provinces.

These, and others yet to be mentioned, are the men known in history as the DIADOCHI, that is, *Successors* of Alexander the Great. Their wars occupied a space of two-and-twenty years, before the final division of the empire in consequence of the decisive battle of Ipsus (B.C. 323—301). In untwining the intricate thread of these events, it is desirable to confine our attention as much as possible to Asia, reserving for a separate view the last struggles amidst which Greek liberty set, but not without the hope of a temporary revival. First, however, it is necessary to mention the obsequies of Alexander, which were conducted with the grandest barbaric pomp. The body was placed on a funeral car, of such size and so loaded with gold ornaments, that eighty-four mules

* Leonnatus only just needs to be named, as he was killed in the following year.

laboured for a whole year in drawing it to Syria, on its way to Alexandria, where the conqueror fitly rested amidst the most enduring monuments of his fame, in what afterwards became the sepulchre of the Ptolemies.* Meanwhile Roxana gave birth to a son, who was named Alexander Ægus; after she had got rid, by assassination, of the rival queen Statira, and her sister, Drypetis, the widow of Hephæstion.

For the present, we keep in the background the gallant struggle of Greece for liberty, attempted in vain by Agis, and renewed, after Alexander's death, by Athens in the "Lamian War," which ended in the victory of Antipater, and the proscription and death of Demosthenes (B.C. 322). During this war, Leonnatus crossed over into Europe to aid Antipater; but he was defeated and slain by the allied Greeks, and thus one name is already erased from the list of the Diadochi. Craterus also arrived in Greece in time to contribute to the victory of Antipater; and both had begun measures for the subjugation of Greece, when they were recalled to Asia to take part in the general war which was kindled by the ambition of Antipater and the arts of Olympias.

Perdiccas, possessed of the command of the choicest troops, and of the persons of the two nominal sovereigns—Philip Aridaeus and the infant Alexander IV.—was not disposed to forego the substance of power over the satraps in Asia. He began the consolidation of his government by aiding Eumenes in the conquest of Cappadocia; and the campaign gained him, besides much military reputation, the alliance of the most intelligent and prudent of the Diadochi, for such was the character of Eumenes. Alarmed at the growing power of Perdiccas, Antipater made him overtures for an alliance, with the offer of the hand of his daughter Nicæa. But when Olympias proposed to him a marriage with Cleopatra, her daughter by Philip, as the price of his aid against Antipater, the aged Perdiccas was dazzled with the prospect of uniting the whole empire under his own government. Meanwhile, he attempted to assert his authority as regent by bringing Antigonus to trial for alleged misconduct in his satrapy. But Antigonus fled to Macedonia, carrying to Antipater information of the schemes of Perdiccas and Olympias. A league was formed by Antipater and Craterus with Antigonus and Ptolemy; while Perdiccas was joined by Eumenes, who, besides being moved by gratitude, had

* The beautiful sarcophagus in the British Museum, formerly supposed to be that of Alexander, has been identified by the inscriptions upon it as that of Nectanebo I. (See vol. I., pp. 140, 141).

now the prospect of becoming master of all Asia Minor, by the addition of the satrapies of Leonnatus and Antigonus to his own. While Eumenes defended himself against the united forces of Antigonus and Craterus, Perdiccas attacked Ptolemy, who stood on the defensive in an entrenched camp beyond the Nile, near Pelusium. The failure of all attempts to carry this position wore out the soldiers of Perdiccas, who mutinied and murdered their general. Antipater, who was in the camp of Ptolemy, now obtained the regency, with the persons of the two kings, whom he carried into Europe, with Roxana, the mother of Alexander Ægus, and Eurydicé, the wife of Philip Aridæus. After the death of Perdiccas, the allied generals met at Triparadisus in Syria, and made a new partition of the provinces. Antipater retained Macedonia and Greece, with the nominal regency of the empire; Ptolemy kept Egypt; Antigonus received Susiana, in addition to his former province; and Seleucus, as satrap of Babylon, succeeded to much of the central authority of Perdiccas. Eumenes was declared an outlaw by the vote of the Macedonian army (B.C. 321).

It devolved upon Antigonus to conduct the war with Eumenes, who, though deserted by Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and embarrassed by the jealousy of his Macedonian officers, had gained a decisive battle, in which Craterus himself fell, shortly before the murder of Perdiccas. Pressed by the superior force of Antigonus, he shut himself up with a few followers in the fortress of Nora in Cappadocia, and held out against a long blockade, till he found an opportunity of escaping to the upper provinces (B.C. 319). Meanwhile, Antipater died in Macedonia, at the age of eighty, bequeathing his authority, not to his son Cassander, but to the Epirot Polysperchon, who was, like himself, one of Alexander's oldest generals. Cassander, whose military fame made him a formidable enemy, and who had a powerful party among the oligarchies which Antipater had established in the Greek cities, rose in open rebellion; and Polysperchon, feeling the need of new support, invited Olympias back from Epirus to become the guardian of the royal family, who were kept at Pella. Olympias engaged Eumenes to renew the war in Asia, and the influence which she had always been known to possess with Alexander obtained for him the support of the "Argyraspids," a body of veterans who were living in retirement in Upper Asia. His cause was espoused also by the satraps of the eastern provinces, who gave up to him the royal treasures in their possession. Thus the

whole monarchy, both in Europe and Asia, was involved in a war between those who used the name of Alexander's family and those who possessed the greater part of his power. Of the course of affairs in Europe we shall have presently to speak. Had Polysperchon and Olympias been content to abandon Asia, and to call over Eumenes to their aid, his vast ability would have consolidated their authority in Macedonia and Greece. That ability was vainly exerted on behalf of what Eumenes considered the cause of his master's family, in a series of campaigns which are among the most brilliant of any recorded in ancient history. For two years he maintained himself against the united forces of Antigonos, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, while beset by treachery in his own camp. The seat of the war was first in Cilicia and Phœnicia, afterwards, as Eumenes was compelled to give ground, in Susiana, Persis, and Media. The struggle ended at last, not by his defeat, but by his betrayal by the Argyraspidæ, who added to the fickle arrogance of a favoured body of soldiery the cupidity which made them accessible to the bribes of Antigonos. Eumenes was put to death by the vote of a council of officers, in opposition, it is said, to the wish of Antigonos himself. He was the most honest and humane, the best educated, and in the whole combination of qualities, the most able of all the generals of Alexander. The best authorities are agreed that he was only prevented from distancing all competitors for the empire by the prejudice which his Greek origin excited among the Macedonians. He was forty-five years old at his death (B.C. 316).

It was his misfortune, in death as in life, to have fought for a cause that was falling of itself. For while Polysperchon was engaged in Greece in a fierce and doubtful contest with Cassander, Eurydicé, the wife of Philip Aridæus, formed the plan of casting off the regent's yoke. In her husband's name she gathered an army in Macedonia, and made an alliance with Cassander. Polysperchon and Olympias marched against her, in league with the king of Epirus. Olympias displayed herself at the head of a train equipped with Bacchanalian emblems. Her presence won over the wavering fidelity of the Macedonians. Eurydicé fled with her husband to Amphipolis, where both were seized and murdered in the most cruel manner by Olympias, who proceeded to put to death the family and friends of Antipater. Cassander now marched into Macedonia to stay and avenge these barbarities. After a siege of some months, Olympias surrendered Pydna, with Roxana and the young Alexander, on condition that her own life

should be spared ; but Cassander broke his faith rather than incur the danger of letting her live. He imprisoned Roxana and her son at Amphipolis, entirely setting aside the claims of Alexander. Polysperchon retired into Æolia, and left Cassander master of Macedonia (B.C. 316).

Antigonus had not waited for the death of Aridæus and the captivity of Alexander to seize the vacant throne. As the prize of his victory over Eumenes, he claimed the mastery of all Asia,* being thus the first to cast off the mask. He had the claim of being the oldest of Alexander's generals, and the most skilful in the field. He was nothing but a rough soldier, cruel, faithless, and avaricious, with a savage manner, made the more sinister by the loss of one eye. Yet his blunt straightforward humour gained the affection of soldiers as rough as himself. Once, it is said, when he overheard two sentinels complaining that he was starving them to death, and they must go over to the enemy, he thrust his pike at them through the canvas of his tent, bidding them go out of his hearing if they wanted to abuse him. His kingdom now extended over all Asia Minor and Upper Asia, except the satrapy of Babylon, which was held by Seleucus. On his return from Upper Asia, Antigonus ordered Seleucus to be arrested ; but the latter escaped from Babylon, and fled to Ptolemy in Egypt.

A league was now formed against Antigonus by Ptolemy and Seleucus with Cassander and Lysimachus, who during all these events had by the greatest skill subdued all Thrace. The allies required Antigonus to surrender Upper Asia, and to content himself with the lower provinces. The generals of Antigonus found sufficient occupation for Cassander in Greece, and Lysimachus took little part in the war in Asia, which was thus almost confined at first to Antigonus and Ptolemy. The latter held the provinces of Cœle-Syria and Palestine,† which were destined henceforward to be the battle-field between the Greek kingdoms of Syria and Egypt. Here Antigonus waged a successful war with Ptolemy, and here we first meet with his son Demetrius, then quite a young man, who added to the vices he inherited from his father the most contemptible meanness, and a taste for the lowest debauchery. Niebuhr, with characteristic vehemence, calls him "the most unprin-

* He did not assume the title of king till some years later.

† The name Cœle-Syria (i. e. *Hollow Syria*) denotes properly the valley between the two ranges of Lebanon ; but, in the history of the wars between the Greek kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, it is constantly used to include Palestine. Damascus was the capital of Cœle-Syria in this wider sense.

cipled and most detestable man that ever existed." Nevertheless, he has obtained a conspicuous name in history, and the high-sounding title of Poliorcetes (*Besieger of Cities*), by a peculiar development of that mechanical skill which distinguished the Macedonian engineers. Demetrius was only eighteen years old when he was entrusted by his father with the command in Cœle-Syria, having already distinguished himself in the campaign against Eumenes. His defeat at Gaza (B.C. 312) was partly retrieved by a subsequent victory, and Cœle-Syria was again overrun by Antigonus. Seleucus took advantage of the battle of Gaza to recover Babylon, and a victory over Nicanor, the lieutenant of Antigonus, soon afterwards gave him possession of Media, and laid the foundation of the great kingdom of his successors.* The exhaustion of all the combatants brought about a general peace, by which the division of power was left much as it was before the war. Antigonus kept Asia, Ptolemy Egypt, Lysimachus Thrace, and Cassander was to hold Macedon, and Greece till Alexander, who was now sixteen, should come to full age; but he at once made the crown his own by the murder of the young prince and his mother (B.C. 311). In the following year, Polysperchon, who was in Ætolia, sent for Hercules, the illegitimate son of Alexander, now seventeen years of age, from Pergamus, and proclaimed him king; but he was bribed by Cassander to murder him and his mother (B.C. 309). The last surviving relative of Alexander, his sister Cleopatra, who was about to marry Ptolemy, was secretly murdered by Antigonus at Sardis. Such was the end of Alexander's labours to found his imperial house.

The peace was not intended to be permanent, and it was broken in the following year. Ptolemy came forward as the liberator of the Greek cities, to which Cassander had failed to grant the freedom stipulated for them by the treaty. Having subdued Cyprus and the southern shores of Asia Minor, he appeared on the coast of Peloponnesus with a powerful fleet (B.C. 308). Sicyon and Corinth were at once surrendered to him by Cratesipolis, the widow of Alexander, the son of Polysperchon; but from the other cities he received only vague promises. He therefore made a treaty with Cassander, and withdrew from Greece, leaving garrisons in Sicyon and Corinth. Antigonus now resolved to attack Cassander in the name of the liberty of the Greek cities. The campaigns of his son Demetrius Poliorcetes will be noticed in the next chapter. His first stay in Greece, during which he captured Athens, was but

* The "Era of the Seleucids" dates from this year, B.C. 312.

brief, as he was recalled to Asia by Antigonus to besiege Salamis in Cyprus (B.C. 307). There he gained a decisive naval victory over the Egyptian fleet of 140 vessels under Menelaüs, the brother of Ptolemy, who was compelled, in consequence, to surrender Cyprus (B.C. 306). Antigonus, now master of the sea, and of almost the whole of Asia, assumed the title of king; and his example was followed by Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus. Each made his accession a new chronological epoch, the "Macedonian Eras," of which that of the Seleucidæ is alone used in chronology.

Antigonus and his son having been completely foiled in an attempt to decide the war by invading Egypt, Demetrius made an attack on Rhodes, which had refused its aid against Ptolemy. The siege is one of the most memorable in ancient history, for the new and tremendous engines of attack, and the perseverance of the defence; and the "Besieger of Cities" at length retired baffled (B.C. 305—304). He then returned to Greece; and had carried on the war against Cassander for nearly four years with such success, as to be saluted at Corinth as the Captain of the Greeks, when he was once more recalled to assist his father in Asia. Before his departure, he made a treaty with Cassander, by which Greece was declared free (B.C. 301).

The new danger, which was now pressing upon Antigonus, arose from the growing power of Seleucus. Re-established, as we have seen, at Babylon, ten years before; he had employed the interval in subduing the whole of Upper Asia, from the Euphrates to the Oxus and the Indus. He now made a new coalition with Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, against Antigonus, whose Asiatic possessions were reduced to Asia Minor, Northern Syria, and Cyprus. Scarcely anything is known of the details of the campaign, except that the confederates poured from all sides into Asia Minor, where Antigonus mustered all his forces to resist them. Demetrius, marching from Thessaly through Thrace, joined his father before the decisive battle of Ipsus, in Phrygia (August, B.C. 301).^{*} Immense numbers, with many elephants, fought on both sides. The victory was mainly decided by the heavy infantry of Cassander and Lysimachus. Antigonus died on the field of battle, at the age of eighty-one. Owing to the negligence of the allies in the pursuit, Demetrius made an orderly retreat to Ephesus with the remnant

^{*} This is the received date, confirmed by the authority of Clinton; Mr. Grote's arguments for fixing the battle as late as the beginning of B.C. 300, do not appear to be decisive.

of the army. Thence he passed over to Cyprus, and afterwards to Greece and Macedonia. The possessions of Antigonus were divided between Lysimachus and Seleucus, the former obtaining the greater part of Asia Minor, and the latter Northern Syria, with part of Phrygia and Cappadocia, while Cassander seemed to be secured in the possession of Macedonia and Greece. The events that followed the battle of Ipsus are so connected, for the most part, with the history of Greece, that we reserve them for the following chapter; only now casting a glance at the settlement of those new Asiatic kingdoms which, from the large intermixture of Greek elements in their government, their population, and their language, have received the title of *Hellenistic*.* Their further history is not of intrinsic importance enough to be pursued in detail; it will be best reviewed when they reappear as drawn within the sphere of Roman action.

By far the greater part of the East was divided between the two kingdoms of Syria and Egypt. The former was the more powerful; the latter by far the more compact, and therefore the more lasting. Nor was this result less due to the very different policy pursued by the two dynasties of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies;—perhaps we should say, forced upon the former by their position between the growing powers of the West, and the forces still residing in the nomad tribes of the East. From the very first, Seleucus, as we shall soon see, was brought into a conflict with the kings of Macedonia and Thrace, which only ended with his assassination by Ptolemy Ceraunus (B.C. 280). He was succeeded by his son, ANTIOCHUS I., Soter. Amidst his constant wars, Seleucus had found time to carry on with great vigour the diffusion of Hellenic civilization through his empire, especially by the erection of cities, settled by Greek and Macedonian colonists, which were called by the names of Antioch, Seleucia, Apamea, and Stratonicea, after his father, himself, and his two wives, besides others bearing such Macedonian appellations as Bercea, Edessa, and Pella. The chief of these was the exquisitely beautiful ANTIOCH, now *Antakia*, in Syria, which rose amidst its gardens, by the luxurious grove of Daphne, in the fair valley of the Orontes, between the mountain ranges of Casius and Amanus. Hither Seleucus transferred his capital from Babylon, and here the Seleucidæ reigned for nearly 250 years; but their wide empire was speedily narrowed to a precarious tenure of Syria itself. At

* The term *Grecian*, used by our old writers, and among the rest by the translators of the Bible, is not sufficiently distinguished from *Greek* to be exact.

the end of half a century (B.C. 250), the revolt of the Parthians cut off the provinces beyond the Euphrates. Half a century later, the ambitious interference of Antiochus III., the Great, with the Romans in Greece lost him all Asia Minor beyond the Taurus. His successor, Antiochus Epiphanes, forfeited Palestine by his mad persecution of the Jews. From his time, the history of Syria dwindles away into a succession of murderous contests within, and dangers on all sides from Parthia, Egypt, and Rome, till Pompey constituted Syria a Roman province in B.C. 65.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the prudent policy of Ptolemy I., the son of Lagus, surnamed Soter (Saviour) by the Rhodians after their great siege, had laid the solid foundations of that growing prosperity and civilization which reached its climax under his successor, Ptolemy II., Philadelphus, who was associated with his father in the kingdom in B.C. 285, and began to reign alone in B.C. 283. We have already given a summary of the history of Egypt, down to its incorporation with the Roman empire in B.C. 30.*

A third kingdom arose in Asia Minor about this epoch out of the ruins of that of Lysimachus. It was founded by Phileterus, a Paphlagonian eunuch, who, having been left by Lysimachus in charge of his treasures at Pergamus, revolted to Seleucus, when he saw the scale turning in his favour. The death of Seleucus enabled Phileterus to found a kingdom, to which his successor gave an air of old legitimacy by assuming the name of Eumenes.† Comprising at first the north-western corner of Asia Minor, it was greatly enlarged by the Romans, who, after the defeat of Antiochus the Great, conferred upon their ally, Eumenes II., the whole of Mysia, Lydia, the two Phrygias, Lycaonia, Pisidia, and Pamphylia (B.C. 190), which his grandson, Attalus III., gratefully restored to them by his testament (B.C. 133), and which formed the province of Asia. It was under Eumenes II. that Pergamus became a seat of learning which rivalled Alexandria, with a library, in the formation of which the scarce‡ and fragile papyrus was replaced by parchment (*charta Pergamena*).

It remains only to mention the Greek kingdom of BACTRIA,

* Vol. I. p. 141.

† The following is a list of the kings of Pergamus :—Phileterus, B.C. 280—263 ; Eumenes I., B.C. 263—241 ; Attalus I., B.C. 241—197 ; Eumenes II., B.C. 197—159 ; Attalus II., Philadelphus, B.C. 159—138 ; Attalus III., Philometor, B.C. 138—133.

‡ Scarce, because of the vast quantity used in Egypt.

founded by the revolt of Theodotus, the governor of the province, from Antiochus II., in B.C. 255, and overthrown by the Parthians about B.C. 125, after its kings had ruled over a considerable part of India; and the Persian kingdoms of Pontus and Cappadocia, which, established by the rebellion of satraps in the last days of the empire, regained their independence with the decline of the Seleucidæ, and will be heard of again in the course of Roman history.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LAST YEARS OF LIBERTY IN GREECE.—FROM THE EXPE-
DITION OF ALEXANDER TO THE RISE OF THE ACHÆAN
LEAGUE. B.C. 334 TO B.C. 280.

“Much-suffering heroes next their honours claim,
Those of less noisy, and less guilty fame.
Here his abode the martyr'd PHOCION claims,
With AGIS, not the last of Spartan names.”—POPE.

CONDITION OF GREECE AT ALEXANDER'S DEPARTURE—ATHENS AND SPARTA—MOVEMENTS OF AGIS—HIS DEFEAT AND DEATH—ÆSCHINES AND DEMOSTHENES—AFFAIR OF HARPALUS—EXILE OF DEMOSTHENES—ALEXANDER'S EDICT FOR RESTORING THE EXILES—EFFECT OF ALEXANDER'S DEATH—THE LAMIAN WAR—VICTORY OF ANTIPATER—DEATHS OF HYPERIDES, DEMOSTHENES, AND DEMADES—POLYSPERCHON—PROCLAMATION OF GREEK LIBERTY—DEATH OF PHOCION—CASSANDER MASTER OF ATHENS—DEMETRIUS THE PHALEREAN—CASSANDER IN PELOPONNESUS—FORTIFICATION OF SPARTA—AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA—RESTORATION OF THEBES—SUCCESSSES OF ANTIGONUS IN GREECE—GENERAL PACIFICATION—CASSANDER MASTER OF MACEDONIA AND GREECE—DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES AT ATHENS—HIS SECOND VISIT—SUCCESSFUL WAR WITH CASSANDER—RECALL TO ASIA, AND RETURN TO GREECE—REPULSE FROM ATHENS—DEATH OF CASSANDER—PHILIP IV., ANTIPATER, AND ALEXANDER—DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES TAKES ATHENS—KING OF MACEDONIA—HIS WARS IN GREECE—WITH PYRRHUS AND LYSIMACHUS—HIS FLIGHT TO ASIA, IMPRISONMENT AND DEATH—EXPULSION OF PYRRHUS BY LYSIMACHUS—ANARCHY IN MACEDONIA—ANTIGONUS GONATAS AND HIS DYNASTY—DEATH OF LYSIMACHUS—PYRRHUS IN ITALY—IRRUP-TION OF THE GAULS—RISE OF THE ÆTOLIAN AND ACHÆAN LEAGUES—CONNECTION OF GREECE WITH THE WEST—SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS—AGATHOOCLES—LITERATURE AND ART DURING THE MACEDONIAN PERIOD—SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

WE have now to look back upon the condition of Greece during the absence of Alexander in Asia, and the period of the wars of the Diadochi. It is seldom that a free country acquiesces in the surrender of its liberty. Political rights may be snatched away by a surprise, borne down by force, or forfeited by apathy and internal dissensions; but a vigorous political life only expires, after many a hard struggle, in the crushing embrace of overwhelming strength. The Macedonian conquest had deprived Greece of the free use of her liberty; but it was only finally extinguished by the arms of Rome. When the time arrived for the catastrophe, it proved an immense gain to the conquerors, and to the whole world, that the Hellenic life had not first been absorbed into an Oriental despotism. The last efforts for liberty kept alive that “ingenium civile,” which was a more precious gift even than the arts and letters which the victors received from the vanquished.

In accepting the results of Chæronea and of the fall of Thebes,

the Greeks had consoled themselves with the belief, whether real or affected, that their conqueror was their proper leader to the final triumph over Persia. How far this sentiment wrought among them, as at least a pretext for willing and even flattering consent, and how there remained a party which had not abandoned a truer view of the case, we have already seen. It is difficult to estimate the strength of that party throughout Greece; and we can only trace its working with certainty at Athens and at Sparta, in the party divisions of the former state and the sturdy secession of the latter. The intuitive sagacity of Alexander judged rightly of the position of the two cities, when he took every opportunity to flatter Athens, but without loosening his grasp upon her, while he excepted Sparta from all share in the honours of the common enterprise.* The difference was equally marked in the conduct of the two cities themselves.

While the patriot party at Athens were retailing every piece of news that seemed unfavourable to Alexander, with more curiosity than hope, the Spartans, under the guidance of King Agis III.,† were watching their opportunity for action, and meanwhile reviving, with considerable success, the confederacy of Peloponnesian states. How little reason there was for despair, if Darius had shown the least power of resistance, is apparent from the feelings excited by the successes of the Persian fleet under Memnon (B.C. 334—333). We have seen how the change in the plans of Darius, consequent upon Memnon's death, paralyzed the fleet by the withdrawal of the Grecian mercenaries, and how, though Pharnabazus continued the operations in the Ægæan, and met Agis to concert a landing in Peloponnesus, he was recalled to Asia by the news of the battle of Issus. He left, however, ten triremes and thirty talents with Agis, who sent his brother Agesilaus to reduce Crete, and Alexander found it necessary to send a naval force to act against him (B.C. 331).

In the following spring, Agis declared open war against Antipater, the regent of Macedonia. The time seems ill-chosen, so soon after the victory of Arbela; but he was perhaps encouraged by Alexander's increasing distance from Europe, as well as by the revolt of the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Agis was joined by many of the Greek mercenaries who had been serving Darius; and he obtained the support of the Eleans, the Achæans, and the

* See, for examples, chap. xvi. pp. 38, 47, 49, 50, 52, 58.

† The Eurysthenid king, Cleomenes II., appears to have been a mere cipher throughout his long reign of sixty-one years.

Arcadians, except Megalopolis, which was decidedly Macedonian. The influence of Phocion kept down the war party at Athens, and even Demosthenes would not advise the risk. The brief war which followed was confined to Peloponnesus. Agis, with an army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, laid siege to Megalopolis, which Antipater hastened to relieve; and Agis fell, with 5000 men, in a battle so desperate that it cost the victors 3500 killed and wounded. The synod of Greek states was again convened at Corinth, to pronounce the complete submission of Greece, and Lacedæmonian envoys followed Alexander as far as Bactra to place their city at his disposal. We are not told what answer they received. The defeat of Agis seemed to secure a complete ascendancy to the Macedonian party at Athens, who seized the opportunity for that grand attack upon Ctesiphon and Demosthenes, which recoiled so signally upon Æschines (B.C. 330).

The history of Greece is now a complete blank till the return of Alexander from India to Susa (B.C. 325). Among the satraps who had abused their power during his absence, was Harpalus, whom he had treated with distinguished favour, and made governor of Babylon. While Harpalus was engaged in squandering the royal treasure in luxury, and treating his subjects with true Oriental tyranny, he was cultivating close relations with Athens, and sending presents both to the city and to many of the leading statesmen. So, when he fled from Babylon, with 5000 soldiers and a large treasure, he steered for Cape Sunium, secure of a favourable reception. Prudence, however, forbade a step so directly hostile to Alexander; and Phocion and Demosthenes were agreed in opposing it. Nay more, when envoys came from Antipater demanding that Harpalus should be given up, it was Demosthenes who moved his arrest. He contrived, however, to escape from the prison, and fled to Crete, leaving his treasure under sequestration in the Acropolis. On comparing its value with the account given in by Harpalus, a large deficiency was discovered; and the Areopagus, after investigating the matter on the motion of Demosthenes himself, preferred a charge of peculation against several citizens, amongst whom were Demosthenes and Demades. The latter fled, but the former was found guilty by a dicastery of 1500 citizens, and sentenced to a fine of fifty talents. Having no means of payment, he was cast into prison, whence he escaped, and resided sometimes at Trœzen, and sometimes at Ægina. It is said that he might often be seen upon the beach, shedding tears as he looked to the coast of Attica. Among his accusers was Hyperides, the

most violent enemy of Philip and Alexander; and there can be little doubt that his condemnation was secured by a disgraceful combination of the Macedonian party with the friends of Harpalus, whom he had refused to support, and who wanted a scapegoat for their own corruption.*

One of Alexander's last acts was to throw a firebrand into Greece. In the midst of his own final triumph in Asia, he doubtless felt secure of obedience in providing a triumph for his partizans at home. Nicanor was sent to the Olympic festival (B.C. 324) with a rescript proclaiming to the exiles throughout Greece their restoration to their cities, which Antipater was instructed to enforce. Under the guise of a universal amnesty, the edict provided in effect for the maintenance of a Macedonian party in every state—for its supremacy in many. Envoys were sent to remonstrate with Alexander; and the whole of Greece was already in excitement when the news arrived of the monarch's death.

The feeling produced is summed up in the striking image of the orator Demades, that the power of Macedonia was now like the monster Polyphemus when Ulysses had put out his single eye. The long-suppressed desire for free action found vent at Athens, in spite of the opposition of Phocion, who remained at his post, and kept his office as General, while others of his party fled to Antipater. Though Demosthenes was in exile, the youthful orator Leosthenes united with Hyperides in stirring up the people. Forty triremes, and 200 quadriremes,† were ordered to be equipped, and all citizens under forty years of age were called out. Envoys were sent round to the cities of Greece, and their efforts were seconded by Demosthenes, who was presently recalled in triumph. By the autumn, Leosthenes found himself in command of an allied army near Thermopylæ, though Bœotia, Corinth, Sparta, and Megalopolis, kept down by Macedonian garrisons, rendered no assistance. His force amounted to 13,000 foot and 600 horse, with 110 ships, which sailed along the coast.

The decision of the Thessalians for the Greek cause deprived Antipater of their splendid cavalry, and entailed upon him a great defeat in Thessaly. He threw himself into the town of

* See the elaborate argument of Mr. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. xii, pp. 402—416.

† Vessels with four banks of oars, which began about this time to replace the smaller but more handy triremes. The difference, to compare small things with great, is something like that between the first rates and seventy-fours of the British navy, both now becoming as obsolete as the triremes. The battle of Salamis, mentioned in the last chapter, was remarkable for the large size of the ships engaged.

Lamia, near the Spercheius, to await the aid which he sent to ask from Asia. The allies were obliged to be content with a blockade, and Phocion indulged in sinister predictions:—"The short race has been run splendidly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course." The augury seemed confirmed by the death of Leosthenes, who was struck on the head by a stone hurled from a catapult; and a fatal delay took place while his successor was being chosen. Little advantage was gained by the defeat and death of Leonnatus, who had advanced from Asia into Thessaly with 20,000 foot and 2500 horse. His army was rallied by Antipater, who escaped from Lamia, and retired into Macedonia, to await the approach of Craterus; while his fleet gained some advantages over the Athenians.

In the following summer, the united forces of Antipater and Craterus gained a decisive victory over the allies at Crannon in Thessaly, and Greece lay once more at the mercy of the Macedonian regent (August, B.C. 322). Refusing to treat, except with individual states, he marched to the Cadmean fort, where Thebes once had stood, as if about to enter Attica. Demosthenes, Hyperides, and the other anti-Macedonian leaders, fled to Ægina, and thence to sanctuaries elsewhere, while Phocion and Demades went to intercede with Antipater for the city. The best terms they could obtain were the surrender of the leading orators, including Hyperides and Demosthenes, the restriction of the franchise, and the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the port of Munychia. Demades, who has been so often named as the servile partisan of Macedonia, moved the decree for the arrest of the orators, and officers were sent with the envoys of Antipater to pursue them. The temples in which they had taken sanctuary proved no protection. Hyperides was carried back to Athens and put to death, after Antipater—as it is said—had taken revenge for his free speech by ordering his tongue to be cut out and thrown to the dogs. Demosthenes escaped a fate probably still worse by a voluntary death, which was no crime in the eyes of a Greek. The story is related with various romantic details, but all we know for certain is that, when the satellites of Antipater came to drag him from the sanctuary of Poseidon at Calauria, he took poison in the temple, and then coming forth, as if to surrender himself, he died as he passed the threshold. It was affirmed by his nephew Demochares that, instead of dying by his own hand, he had been removed, like Sophocles, by an *euthanasia* in the sacred precinct, beyond the reach of Macedonian cruelty. At least it was time

for him to die, when he had survived the freedom to which his life had been devoted. His fate was less lamentable than that of his great rival Phocion, who perished by a similar death, after he had been compelled for a few years to administer the city according to the will of the Macedonian conqueror. But he deserves at least the praise of doing his best to govern justly.

Antipater followed up his victory by setting up oligarchies of Macedonian partisans in the leading cities of Greece, and by wholesale deportations of the free citizens. Having reduced all Peloponnesus, he had crossed over with Craterus into Ætolia, with the design of transporting the rude and warlike inhabitants, to people the deserts of Upper Asia, when both were recalled, as we have seen, to resist the projects of Perdiccas (B.C. 321). The only event worth recording, in Greece, before the death of Antipater, is the savage murder of Demades, who had been sent to Pella to request the withdrawal of the garrison from Munychia. Unluckily for the orator, a letter of his had been found among the papers of Perdiccas, urging him to come over and rescue Greece from her dependence on "an old and rotten warp." Cassander avenged the insult to his father by putting Demades to death, after his son had been killed in his arms. Thus were the friends as well as the foes of Macedonia cut down one after the other (B.C. 319).

The civil war which the will of Antipater caused between his son Cassander and his successor Polysperchon involved the whole of Greece, and Athens first of all. Polysperchon, having allied himself with Olympias, and acting in her name and that of the sons of Alexander, who were now at Pella, issued an edict, proclaiming that the Greek cities should be delivered from the oligarchies set up by Antipater, and their constitutions restored, as they had existed under Philip and Alexander; and the exiles expelled by Antipater were recalled to their homes. The Athenians at once required the Macedonian garrison to evacuate Munychia. But Nicanor, who had been sent by Cassander to supersede the former governor, not only refused, but took Piræus by surprise, while Phocion, who was still at the head of affairs, not only neglected to take precautions, but refused to lead the Athenians to recover the port. Things were in this state, when Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, arrived with the advanced guard of his father's army, to enforce a peremptory mandate from Olympias for the evacuation of the garrison;* but instead of making common cause with the Athenians, Alexander spent the time in fruitless negotiations with Nicanor, till Cassander arrived at Piræus with a large armament

supplied to him by Antigonus. The blame of all was laid on Phocion, who was accused of intriguing both with Nicanor and Alexander, to obtain protection against the returning exiles. These had no sooner recovered their power in the city, than they proceeded to depose the magistrates who had held office under the government established by Antipater, and among them Phocion. Some were condemned to death; others fled; and Phocion repaired to the camp of Alexander, who received him well, and sent him with letters to Polysperchon, to whom the Athenians also sent a deputation, accusing Phocion of high treason. Polysperchon affected to hear the case impartially; but, bent on obtaining Piræus for himself, he endeavoured to conciliate the Athenians by giving up Phocion, who was sent in chains to the city. He was tried by the popular assembly, and condemned to death, with four colleagues, amidst the most insulting exhibition of vindictive feeling by the returned exiles. He bore all with the most dignified patience; and his last words, before he drank the hemlock, were to bid his son to cherish no evil memory of the Athenians. He died at the age of eighty-five. The Athenians soon afterwards received Cassander into the city, who restored the oligarchical government, under the distinguished orator, philosopher, and poet, Demetrius of Phalerum, who held his power for ten years. Meanwhile, the repulse of Polysperchon from Megalopolis, and the defeat of his navy by that of Cassander, strengthened the party of the latter throughout Greece. In a progress through Peloponnesus, he received the adhesion of most of the cities. One incident, highly characteristic of the abandonment of old Greek traditions is, that the Spartans now for the first time surrounded their city with walls (B.C. 317).

We have seen how Cassander was recalled to Macedonia to put down the sanguinary tyranny of Olympias. His successes drove Polysperchon back into Ætolia, while Alexander maintained himself in Peloponnesus. It was on his way to attack the latter that Cassander rebuilt Thebes, twenty years after its destruction by Alexander, and invited back the Theban exiles from all the cities of Greece, Sicily and Italy. The measure was most popular through the whole Hellenic world; the Athenians, Megalopolitans, and Messenians, being especially forward in aiding the work (B.C. 315).

Cassander had already gained great successes in Peloponnesus, when Antigonus began to interfere in the affairs of Greece, proclaiming freedom to the cities. He despatched an armament

under Aristodemus to the aid of Alexander, with whom Cassander proceeded to make terms, leaving him the government of the peninsula under himself; and both were thus united against Aristodemus. Alexander was soon after assassinated, but his widow Cratesipolis maintained herself in Sicyon, while Cassander gained considerable advantages over the Ætolians, formerly the allies of Polysperchon, and now of Antigonus. The latter now made a vigorous effort by sending over a new armament under his nephew Ptolemy, who was rapidly gaining ground in every quarter, when the war was suspended by the general pacification of B.C. 311, and all the powers united to guarantee the autonomy of the Greek cities, though the provision remained a dead letter, and Cassander kept his garrisons in the cities that he now held. He afterwards granted the government of Peloponnesus to Polysperchon, as the price of his treachery in the murder of Hercules; * while his own power in Northern Greece seems to have embraced all the western coast and a large part of Epirus (B.C. 309). We have seen how he secured the crown of Macedonia by the murder of Roxana and Alexander.

The abortive expedition of the Egyptian Ptolemy (B.C. 308) † had, however, the effect of drawing upon Cassander the more serious attacks of Antigonus, who sent over his son Demetrius Poliorcetes, with a formidable armament, from Ephesus. Such was the confused state of the relations between Greece and the generals in Asia, that when Demetrius suddenly appeared on the coast of Attica in May, B.C. 307, his fleet was mistaken for that of Ptolemy, the ally of Cassander, and he sailed into Piræus before the error was discovered. Demetrius the Phalerean, after governing well for some years, during which he improved the laws of Athens and adorned the city with splendid buildings, had degenerated into a sensual and luxurious despot. So, when Demetrius Poliorcetes proclaimed that he had come to free the city and to expel the Macedonian garrison, the people went over to him, and the late ruler retired to Thebes, and thence to Egypt. After reducing the Macedonian garrisons both of Munychia and Megara, and declaring the latter city free, Demetrius made a triumphal entry into Athens, proclaiming the freedom of the city, and promising magnificent donations from his father. He was received with such unbounded adulation and divine honours to his father and himself, that he is said to have declared himself ashamed of these degenerate Athenians. The only voice raised in opposition to the universal flattery

* See chap. xvii. p. 88.

† Ibid.

was that of Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes. Amidst the reaction against the philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum, a law was passed restricting the liberty of teaching in the philosophic schools, which were now, as we shall soon see, at the height of their reputation. The philosophers made a spirited appeal by leaving Athens in a body, and the decree was repealed the next year. Demetrius had remained only a few months at Athens, when he was recalled, as we have seen, to the naval war on the shores of Cyprus (B.C. 306).

During the absence of Demetrius in the East, the war in Greece was renewed between Polysperchon and Cassander. The latter had gained a decided advantage at many points,—had taken Corinth, and was blockading Athens by sea and land, when Demetrius opportunely returned with a large fleet to the Euripus, and landed at Aulis in Bœotia. Cassander, thus threatened in the rear, raised the siege of Athens, and retired towards Thessaly. He was pursued and defeated near Thermopylæ by Demetrius, to whom a body of 6000 Macedonian troops went over. Demetrius once more entered Athens, to be received with flattery more abject and impious than had been paid to himself and his father some years before. A decree was carried by Stratocles, that Athena invited Demetrius to be her guest. Lodged in the back chamber* of the Parthenon, he profaned the temple with the most abominable orgies of Aphrodité, to whom he erected chapels throughout the city for his courtezans. The only voice raised against the decree of Stratocles is said to have been that of Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who at all events was soon banished from Athens for his opposition to the extreme measures of the flatterers of Demetrius.†

In the following spring (B.C. 303), Demetrius prosecuted the war in Peloponnesus against the garrisons of Cassander and Ptolemy. He conquered Corinth, Sicyon, all the states of Argolis, and the whole of Arcadia, except Mantinea; and he made an expedition with his fleet to Leucas and Corcyra. After these successes, a congress at Corinth conferred upon Demetrius, as formerly upon Philip and Alexander, the dignity of captain-general of the Greeks. In the spring of B.C. 302, he returned to Athens, and

* It has been already explained, that the *Opisthodomus*, or back chamber, of a Greek temple was not the inner shrine, but a sort of vesty and treasury, as well as a lodging for the keepers of the temple.

† The return of Demetrius was in B.C. 304; the banishment of Demochares in B.C. 303-2.

was received as a god by a procession of the people, with garlands and incense. But even the hymn which they sang to him, as the god who alone had appeared to deliver them, was the measure of their debasement and distress. It is especially interesting to observe the language used respecting the growing power of the *Ætolians*, who are compared to the *Sphinx*, flying from its rock to carry off the helpless citizens. Both the order of the calendar and the most venerable customs of religion were made to yield to the wish of *Demetrius*, to be at once initiated into the highest grade of the *Eleusinian mysteries*. In the proper course, a candidate could only be initiated at the Lesser Mysteries, in the month of *Anthesterion*, and admitted to the higher degree sixteen months later, in *Boëdromion*. *Demetrius* had reached Athens in *Munychion*, two months after the former period; but, on the motion of *Stratocles*, it was declared that the current month should be considered as *Anthesterion*, and the next month as the *Boëdromion* of the following year; and then, after the two ceremonies, another decree set the calendar right again. A century before,* *Aristophanes* had made *Meton's* reform of the calendar an occasion for the jest, that the gods and men would be celebrating their festivals at different times; but such proceedings as these prove, as *Niebuhr* observes, that "no one at that time had much faith in those matters; all was mere curiosity, and an obscure remnant of superstition." *Demetrius* repaid this adulation by exacting from the Athenians a contribution of 250 talents, which he insulted them by squandering on his pleasures.

Still pursuing the object of driving *Cassander* out of Greece and Macedonia, he marched into Thessaly at the head of 56,000 men, and became master of much of the country. His continued success was one cause of the new coalition against his father in Asia; and *Cassander* protracted the contest till *Demetrius* was recalled by *Antigonus* to share his defeat at *Ipsus*. Before he left Greece, he concluded a peace with *Cassander*, by which the Hellenic cities were declared free (B.C. 301).

The military talents of *Demetrius* were conspicuous in his conduct after the battle of *Ipsus*. Retreating with the remnant of the army, he joined his fleet at *Epltesus*, and passed over to Cyprus, where he rallied all his forces, in order to secure Greece. There he might hope to hold out till the coalition of the generals in Asia should be dissolved by their mutual jealousies, and his own aid be sought, as in fact soon afterwards happened. For this contingency he at once paved the way by opening negotiations

with Ptolemy, through the medium of the young PYRRHUS, king of Epirus, whose name now appears in history for the first time, and of whose share in these transactions more will be said anon. But Demetrius had not calculated on the great effect produced in Greece by the defeat of Ipsus. Most of the cities that had so lately saluted him as their leader hastened to make their submission to Cassander. Even Athens had recovered from her servile prostration, and recalled Demochares, who guided her councils in the spirit of his uncle. Demetrius had already sailed from Ephesus, secure of a favourable reception at Athens, when he was met by an embassy, forbidding him to approach the city. At the same time they conducted his wife, with all her retinue and property, to Megara, and gave up to him the ships and treasures he had left behind. It was not the policy of Demetrius to involve himself in a war with Greece, which he had hoped to use as his basis of operations against Asia. So he carried his armament to the Thracian Chersonese, and there began an irregular warfare against Lysimachus.

Meanwhile Lysimachus and Ptolemy had formed a closer league with each other, to counteract which, Seleucus sought the aid of Demetrius, and sued for the hand of his daughter, whom he afterwards resigned to his son Antiochus. This is the earliest example of those incestuous marriages, which afterwards became common both among the Seleucidæ and the Ptolemies. Demetrius forthwith sailed to Syria, and on his way he made himself master of Cilicia; and his refusal to give up this acquisition produced an ill feeling with Seleucus at the very moment of their alliance. About the same time, the negotiations which Demetrius had opened with Ptolemy were brought to a successful issue. Thus strengthened, he returned to Greece, and gained a footing in Peloponnesus before he attempted to recover Athens.

It was about this time that Cassander died, after he had enjoyed for a few years the power restored to him by the victory of Ipsus (B.C. 297). He left three sons, Philip, Antipater, and Alexander. The first succeeded to the Macedonian throne as Philip IV., but died of sickness the next year (B.C. 296). His death was followed by one of those murderous contests, which now became the usual incidents of the succession to the crown. Antipater killed his mother, whom he suspected of favouring Alexander; and the latter, esteeming his own life in danger, applied for aid both to Pyrrhus and Demetrius. The order of events is now obscure; but it seems that Demetrius was engaged in the siege of Athens;

and so Pyrrhus had the first opportunity, which he hastened to seize. It is now time to give some account of the life of this remarkable man up to the present period.

The country of Epirus, the most ancient seat of the Pelasgic religion, and, according to some accounts, the cradle of the Hellenic race, was now subject to the *Æacid* family of *Molossian* princes, who claimed their descent from Pyrrhus or Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles. It seemed to be the destiny of these princes to bring on the inevitable collision between the powers of Greece and Italy. The first who bore the title of King of Epirus, Alexander, the son of Neoptolemus, and brother of Olympias, was killed in the war which he waged on behalf of the Tarentines against the Lucanians and Bruttii (B.C. 326). His cousin and successor, *Æacides*, was deposed by the Epirots, who disliked the part he took in the war of Olympias against Cassander (B.C. 316). He was subsequently recalled; but only to be defeated and slain in battle by Philip, the son of Cassander, who thus obtained the mastery of Epirus (B.C. 313). Pyrrhus, the son of *Æacides*, was born in B.C. 318. On his father's deposition, the infant, saved by his faithful servants, found refuge with Glaucias, the king of the Illyrian Taulantians, who brought him up with his own children, and refused to betray him to Cassander for a large bribe. Niebuhr observes the resemblance in the conduct of the old Illyrian chief to the respect of the modern Albanians for the ties of hospitality, when once their word is pledged, notwithstanding their cruelty and venality. The same historian sees a proof of the natural excellence of the character of Pyrrhus in the fact, that he was not barbarized by his early training. Ten years later, Glaucias restored Pyrrhus, then only twelve years old, to the throne of Epirus; but, after five years, Cassander took advantage of the recall of Demetrius to Asia, to procure the expulsion of Pyrrhus by the Epirots. The young prince, who was now seventeen, fled to Demetrius, who had married his sister, and fought with great distinction on the field of Ipsus. He was then employed, as we have seen, in a negotiation with Ptolemy, whom, like all with whom he came in contact, Pyrrhus so won by the peculiar charm of his character, that the Egyptian king sent him back to Epirus with a large force, and the queen Berenicé gave him the hand of Antigóné, her daughter by a former marriage. Pyrrhus was well received by the Epirots, and concluded an arrangement with Neoptolemus,*

* Plutarch, who alone mentions this Neoptolemus, does not tell us who he was. Niebuhr supposes him to have been a son of Alexander, the late King of Epirus.

the reigning prince, to share the kingdom; but Neoptolemus was soon put to death, on the ground, as is supposed, of a plot against the life of Pyrrhus.

The wealth supplied by Ptolemy enabled Pyrrhus to raise Epirus to great prosperity. He founded cities, and developed the military resources of the country, doing for Epirus what Archelaus and Philip had done for Macedonia. Like the latter prince, he was passionately fond of war, and endowed by nature with the highest military genius. But here the resemblance ceased. Pyrrhus loved war, less for its substantial gains than for the excitement of the pursuit, as an artist works at his art to gratify an inward prompting. But, obeying only this impulse, his efforts were as desultory as they were eager. He is said to have purposely abstained from following up victory, lest the campaign should end too quickly, like a chase, the pleasure of which is lost if the game be caught too soon. Had he possessed Philip's steady purpose, and especially Philip's knowledge when to remain quiet, he might have been the greatest conqueror of his age, as he was almost, if not quite, the greatest captain of any age. Hannibal is said to have placed Pyrrhus first, Scipio second, and himself third, among the masters of the art of war; or, according to a more probable version of the story, he assigned the first rank to Alexander, the second to himself, and the third to Pyrrhus. He was one of the first generals that wrote on the art of war. But he was not cold-blooded enough to be a great conqueror. Some change of purpose, or some generous impulse, perpetually turned him aside from an advantage already won. He was compared by Antigonus Gonatas to a gambler, who is often favoured by the dice, but knows not how to use his luck;—he might have added, who cares not whether he loses or wins. For the most striking feature in the character of Pyrrhus was a frank and cordial cheerfulness, which bore him up through all the changes of fortune, and won the hearts of all with whom he had to deal. "There never was a prince," says Niebuhr, "in whom the character of a soldier had so much of poetry."

Pyrrhus had made some progress in the consolidation of his kingdom, when he was called to the aid of Alexander, who offered to give up to him certain districts which had been acquired by Macedonia on the frontier of Epirus, as well as Acarnania, Ambracia, and Amphilochia on the western coast. Pyrrhus speedily drove out Antipater, who fled to his father-in-law Lysimachus, in Thrace, and was not long after put to death by him.

Pyrrhus then withdrew to occupy his new possessions on the western coast, and fixed his residence at Ambracia. He soon became master of Corcyra, and probably of Leucas; and thus his kingdom looked towards Italy, in which he was destined soon to act so conspicuous a part.

Meanwhile Demetrius Poliorcetes had been prevented from at once obeying the call of Alexander by his occupation with the siege of Athens. The city had fallen under the tyranny of a certain Lachares, whom some call a demagogue, and others a creature of Cassander: he may have been both. The exiles whom he had driven out invited the aid of Demetrius; but the citizens in general, fearing his resentment for his former repulse, held out against a long blockade, till famine forced them to yield.* Demetrius forgave the past, and distributed corn to the famished people; but he took precautions for the future by placing garrisons in the ports of Piræus and Munychia, as well as on the hill of Museum (B.C. 295). He then advanced into Macedonia; and, having procured the assassination of Alexander, he was saluted by the army as king (B.C. 294). He was already in possession of nearly all Greece, except Bœotia, Ætolia, and the ports on the western coast in the hands of Pyrrhus. The reign of Demetrius lasted seven years, and was one perpetual series of wars with his neighbours in Europe, and with his rivals in Asia. For the greater part of this period he committed the government of Greece to his son, Antigonus Gonatas, who at last succeeded in founding a dynasty, which endured to the end of the Macedonian kingdom. In B.C. 292 Demetrius took Thebes, after an obstinate defence.

In the following year (B.C. 291), the misfortune of Lysimachus, who, having crossed the Danube, had been compelled to surrender with his whole army to the Getæ,† gave Demetrius an opportunity to invade Thrace; but he was recalled by a new revolt of Thebes, which was again taken in B.C. 290. During this campaign Pyrrhus invaded Thessaly, to make a diversion in favour of Thebes, but he was repulsed by Demetrius. At the same time the latter was engaged in war with the Ætolians. The confederacy of this rude people seemed now almost the sole refuge of Hellenic liberty, while the rest of the Greeks were passive spectators of the

* Among the more ordinary incidents of suffering, common to cities closely besieged, we are told of a father and son quarrelling for a dead mouse!

† These were the great and warlike people, apparently of Thracian origin, who were called Dacians by the Romans, and gave their name to the province of Dacia. The king of the Getæ behaved generously to Lysimachus, and soon released him.

conflicts of the two northern monarchies. Each invaded the other's country, and each gained victories over the other; but, while the conflict was thus indecisive, the moral victory remained with Pyrrhus. His chivalrous generosity, and his kindness to his prisoners, won the hearts of the Macedonians. Contrasting his frank simplicity with the ostentatious luxury and the tyrannical licence of Demetrius, they came to desire Pyrrhus for their king (B.C. 287).

While Demetrius was thus engaged at home, his Asiatic possessions were divided between Ptolemy and Seleucus, who now formed a new coalition with Lysimachus and Pyrrhus to strip him of his dominions in Europe. While Ptolemy sent a powerful fleet into Greece, and Lysimachus advanced against Macedonia from the east, Pyrrhus entered it from the west, the army went over to him, and he was proclaimed king, dividing the kingdom at first with Lysimachus. Demetrius fled to Asia, where, after adventures which it is not worth while to follow, he was compelled to surrender to Seleucus (B.C. 286). He was kept a close prisoner, though not otherwise ill-treated, till his death in B.C. 283.

The arrangement between Pyrrhus and Lysimachus soon came to an end. The latter had destined the crown of Macedonia for himself, and, when Pyrrhus had reigned only seven months, he again invaded Macedonia. The fickle people again went over from the Epirot stranger, as they now chose to regard Pyrrhus, to the old comrade of Alexander. Pyrrhus was driven back into Epirus (B.C. 286), whence, after a few years' rest, he undertook his memorable expedition into Italy. Thus, in the year which several other events concur to mark as an epoch in history, we find Greece for the first time brought into direct contact with Rome (B.C. 280). The celebrated campaigns of Pyrrhus in Italy and Sicily belong to the history of Rome (B.C. 280—275). After his return to Epirus he made a predatory war upon Antigonus Gonatas, whom he expelled, and became once more king of Macedonia (B.C. 273). He now aimed at the conquest of Greece. Repulsed from Sparta he marched to Argos, to support one of the contending factions, which admitted him into the city. But the citadel, and all the strong places, were held by the other party; and Pyrrhus was endeavouring to force his way back out of the place when a tile, hurled by a woman from a house-top, struck him on the nape of his neck, and he fell senseless from his horse. He was recognized and quickly despatched by the soldiers of Antigonus, who carried his head to their master. Antigonus showed great emotion on beholding it, and ordered the remains of

Pyrrhus to be interred with due honours. Thus fell this great and noble-minded soldier, like Abimelech at Thebez, by the hand of a woman, in the forty-sixth year of his age (B.C. 272). Had he lived in happier times, he might have devoted to the defence and establishment of freedom the powers which were wasted in wars without result.

The expulsion of Pyrrhus from Macedonia had left Lysimachus in possession of a magnificent kingdom, embracing nearly the whole of Asia Minor, with Thrace and Macedonia; but Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, still held his ground in Greece by means of his powerful fleet, and many of the Greek cities maintained their independence. Lysimachus reigned for five years and a half over these enlarged dominions (B.C. 286—281); but he was doomed to a violent death, like all the Diadochi, except Ptolemy, who, however, contributed indirectly to the fate of Lysimachus. The two families were connected by various intermarriages. Ptolemy had been twice married; first, to Eurydicé, the daughter of Antipatér, whom he had divorced in favour of her attendant, the beautiful Berenicé.* Eurydicé had borne him two sons, Ptolemy surnamed Ceraunus (i.e. *Thunderbolt*), and Meleager, both of whom were excluded from the succession, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, the son of Berenicé, was associated with his father in the kingdom (B.C. 285). This step, which was probably taken through the influence of Berenicé, seems to have rested on the principle, still a point of dispute in the East, that the children of a king, “born in the purple,” should take precedence of those born before his accession. Besides these sons, Ptolemy had, by Eurydicé, a daughter Lysandra (who was married to Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus by his first wife), and, by Berenicé, another daughter, Arsinoë, who was the second wife of Lysimachus himself. Such were the relations between the two families, when Ptolemy Ceraunus, enraged at his exclusion from the throne of Egypt, fled to Lysimachus. His kind reception appears to have brought to a head the jealousy of Arsinoë against Agathocles, both as the rival of her children and the husband of her step-sister. Agathocles, who was now a man of mature age, had distinguished himself in many of his father’s campaigns, and was sure to be his successor, in which case Arsinoë, who had long been his declared enemy, might well fear, according to Macedonian precedents, for

* This name, so common in the Hellenistic royal families, is the Macedonian form of the Greek *Pherenice*, which signifies *bringing victory*.

her own and her children's lives. Lysimachus, induced by her to believe that his son was plotting against his life, first treated Agathocles with insult, and then caused him to be poisoned. The resentment of his subjects only confirmed the king in the belief of a conspiracy, and his rage was directed by Arsinoë against the brothers and friends of the murdered Agathocles. Several of the Asiatic cities now broke out into open revolt; and Seleucus, to whom the wife of Agathocles had fled for refuge, seized the opportunity of extending his power over Asia Minor. He crossed the Taurus at the head of a powerful army, and advanced to the plain of Corupedion in Phrygia, where Lysimachus, betrayed by the followers whom he had alienated, was defeated and slain (B.C. 281). By his death Seleucus became master of the whole empire of Alexander, except Egypt and its dependencies, Southern Syria, Phœnicia, and Cyprus. But he did not long enjoy his conquest; he had crossed the Hellespont to take possession of Thrace and Macedonia, and was sacrificing near Lysimachia, a city which Lysimachus had built on the neck of the Chersonese, when he was murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus, whom he had taken under his protection as a rival to the king of Egypt, seven months after the death of Lysimachus (B.C. 280).

The death of the last of Alexander's own followers forms a natural resting-place in the history of the East, especially as the epoch is marked by other great events. But those events must be noticed, and a glance must be cast forward on the settlement of the affairs of Greece, before we turn to the great rising power of the West. Ptolemy Ceraunus was at once recognized as king of Macedonia and Thrace. Antiochus Soter, the son of Seleucus, who had long since resigned to him the provinces of Upper Asia, was a thoroughly Asiatic sovereign, and cared nothing for power in Europe. After a brief war, for the purpose of avenging his father's murder, and checking any designs which Ptolemy Ceraunus might have had on Asia, Antiochus made peace with Ptolemy, who, in his turn, had the prudence to effect a reconciliation with his brother, Ptolemy Philadelphus, resigning to him all claims to the throne of Egypt. Thus, with the establishment of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus on the throne of Egypt, and of Antiochus I. Soter on that of Asia, the history of the East becomes separate from that of Europe, till they are again brought into contact by the ambition of Antiochus the Great.

Returning to Macedonia, Ptolemy Ceraunus found a rival in Antigonus Gonatas, whose operations, however, were confined to

Greece. Ptolemy's sister, Arsinoë, the widow of Lysimachus, had¹ taken up her abode, with her family, in the fortress of Cassandrea. Fearing, it would seem, that this position might give the king of Egypt a hold upon the country, Ptolemy made a treacherous offer of marriage to his sister; and, being admitted to the fort, killed her sons and banished her to Samothrace. His crime was soon punished by an event, which requires us to take a glance beyond the northern boundaries of Macedonia.

We shall soon have occasion to speak more fully of the great nation of the GAULS or CELTS, who occupied, from very early times, all the regions of Western Europe, beyond the Alps and the Rhine, and who gave their name to the country of Gallia (*France*). Their early settlements in Italy, and the great irruption in which they sacked Rome (B.C. 390), will be noticed in the next book. During the ensuing century, the tribes which were established in the great plain of Northern Italy² (Gallia Cisalpina) were constantly pressing on eastward round the head of the Adriatic; and these movements appear to have caused the irruptions of the Triballi and other Illyrian nations into Macedonia. About B.C. 308, a body of Gauls had reached the frontiers of Macedonia, and Cassander gave them settlements in Mount Orbelus. During the following years, new swarms arrived from Italy, and accumulated beyond the mountains of Scardus, Orbelus, and Scomius, through which they poured into Macedonia towards the close of B.C. 380. Ptolemy ventured to meet them in the field; but the Macedonian phalanx was broken before the superior numbers, the savage war-cries, and the broadsword of the Gaul, like the Roman legions at Allia, and many a disciplined army since. Ptolemy Ceraunus was killed in the battle, and his kingdom fell into complete anarchy. His brother Meleager, and Antipater, a nephew of Cassander, successively failed in the attempt to establish themselves on the throne, which was at last offered by the army to Sosthenes, who had meanwhile succeeded in checking the invaders. Their main body seems to have retired behind the mountains when satiated with plunder; but they returned in the following year, and inflicted on Sosthenes a defeat, which was soon followed by his death (B.C. 279). On this occasion, the Gauls pressed on as far as Delphi, to plunder the temple. The local tradition declared that Apollo defended his sanctuary by miracles like those which had baffled the Persians two hundred years before;* but sober history must give the honour of the achievement to the Greeks. They assembled their forces,

* Vol. I. pp. 420, 421.

under the Athenian Callippus, and routed the invaders, disordered by plunder and excess. Brennus, the leader of the Gauls, was slain. The hordes that followed him retreated partly across the Hæmus to the banks of the Danube; part founded settlements in Thrace; while another body passed on to the Hellespont and Propontis. Of these, some crossed the Hellespont in search of plunder, while others were invited over from Byzantium by Nicomedes I., king of Bithynia. These two hordes, reinforced by fresh swarms, overran the whole of Asia Minor within the Taurus, exacting tribute of its princes, while some bodies of them crossed the Taurus, and served in the armies of Syria and Egypt. Their ascendancy was checked by the growing power of the kings of Pergamus; and at length, just half a century after their first entrance, Attalus I. inflicted on them a decisive defeat, and compelled them to settle within the limits of the district which was henceforth called Galatia* (B.C. 230). Intermingling with the Hellenist population around them, they adopted Greek manners, but they preserved their own language, with their political organization. They formed three tribes, bearing the thoroughly Gallic names of Tolistobogi, Trocmi, and Tectosages, each consisting of four clans, which the Greeks called Tetrachies.

The anarchy of Macedonia was ended, shortly after the expulsion of the Gauls, by the victory of Antigonus Gonatas over the other competitors for the throne (about B.C. 278). We know but little of his exact position up to this time. He had been appointed, as we have seen, by his father, Demetrius Poliorcetes, to the government of Greece, where he had held his ground amidst the contests for the throne of Macedonia, on the one hand, and the risings of the Greek cities, supported by the king of Egypt, on the other. His usual residence seems to have been at Demetrias, in Magnesia, and his chief strength lay in his close alliance with the Ætolians, whose power now reached eastward as far as Phocis. The extent of his hold upon Peloponnesus is very doubtful; but, as will be seen presently, that hold was greatly loosened, at the epoch of B.C. 280, by a new movement in assertion of Pan-hellenic liberty. About the time when Ptolemy Ceraunus was contending for his newly usurped crown, with Antiochus on the one side, and Antigonus Gonatas on the other, a confederacy of the Greek states appears to have been formed against the latter, under the leadership of Sparta, and with the aid of Egypt-

* It was also called Gallo-Greciæ and Græco-Galatia, from the mixture of Gauls and Greeks in its population.

tian money and ships. As a pretext for combining their forces, an Amphictyonic war was declared against the Ætolians, the allies of Antigonus, on the old ground, the cultivation of the devoted plain of Cirrha. The mover in the enterprise was Areus, king of Sparta, who, with the money supplied to him from Egypt, kept up a mercenary force, and imitated the pomp of the Asiatic courts. It has been seen how disastrously former Amphictyonic wars had ended, nor was the present an exception. The allied army was utterly defeated and dispersed by the Ætolians, but the war was still maintained in a desultory manner by Areus. One gain from it appears to have been the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons from the ports of Athens.

It was soon after the defeat of the allies, that Antigonus Gonatas obtained the Macedonian throne, and became the founder of a dynasty, and the restorer of the monarchy. After the brief interruption of two or three years, when he was expelled, as already related, by Pyrrhus, he kept the crown till his death, in B.C. 239. The dynasty he founded lasted for seventy years after his death, numbering three generations and four kings. Macedonia became the umpire in the conflict between the contending Greek forces of Sparta and the Achæan and Ætolian leagues. Demetrius II., the son of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239—229), carried on war with his dangerous neighbours, the Ætolians. His cousin and successor Antigonus Doson (B.C. 229—220), supported the Achæan League, and gained the decisive battle of Sellasia over Cleomenes, king of Sparta (B.C. 221). The long reign of Philip V., the son of Demetrius II. (B.C. 220—178), witnessed the culminating power of this later Macedonian kingdom, and its humiliation in the conflict with Rome, to which it finally succumbed under his son Perseus, in B.C. 168. The last successor of Philip and Alexander, and the lineal descendant of the great Antigonus, was dragged in chains through the streets of Rome, to grace the triumph of Æmilius Paulus, and then thrown into a dungeon, but he ended his days in an honourable captivity at Alba.

We shall have to return hereafter to the history of these later Macedonian kings, as well as to that of the Achæan League, and its two great heroes,

“ARATUS, who awhile relumed the soul
Of fondly lingering liberty in Greece ;
And him, her darling as her latest hope,
The gallant Philopœmen, who to arms
Turned the luxurious pomp he could not cure
Or toiling in his farm, a simple swain,
Or, bold and skilful, thundering in the field.

Meanwhile it is well to take a prospective glance at the causes and the issue of this last effort for freedom. During the war in which Pyrrhus lost his life, Antigonus Gonatas was at the head of an army in Peloponnesus, where he obtained complete ascendancy after the fall of Pyrrhus. Some of the cities were held by his garrisons, and others by tyrants in his interest. Sparta, which he had aided against Pyrrhus, was soon at war with him again, in alliance with Athens and the king of Egypt. The details of this war are very obscure. The Spartan king Areus was killed in battle; and Athens, after being nearly ruined by a long blockade, was forced to surrender to Antigonus, about B.C. 262. The Macedonian garrisons were replaced in Piræus and Munychia, but the city was declared free, and Antigonus, in his frequent visits to Athens, paid marked honour to her eminent philosophers, especially to Zeno. Sparta, now closely dependent on Egypt, seemed to be the only Hellenic power capable of withstanding the Macedonian king, except the great confederacy of the Ætolians, who were his close allies.

But an ancient state, which had remained hitherto almost isolated in the midst of Greece, was gradually rising up into new life, to afford the country a last hope of liberty, and to give the world a brilliant example of the working of a federation. The Achæan race, who, in the time celebrated by Homer, had been dominant in Peloponnesus, had remained in political insignificance since the great Dorian migration drove them up to the strip of land along the northern coast of the peninsula. Their twelve great cities* had been anciently united in a Panachæan confederation, which was chiefly, like the old Panionian confederacy in the same region, for religious objects. This league had been dissolved by the policy of Philip and Alexander, who could not, however, destroy the bond between the cities. During the troubles that followed the death of Lysimachus (B.C. 280), four of these cities, Dyme, Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ, formed a league to resist the Macedonian domination, which was afterwards joined by all the Achæan towns, except Olenus and Helice. At first, however, they were reduced by Antigonus, with the other cities of Peloponnesus, and were occupied, like the rest, by his garrisons, or by the tyrants he set up. The oppression of these rulers furnished a fresh motive for the renewal of the league after Antigonus had withdrawn; and the king, residing at Pella, seems to have overlooked so insignificant a state. Thus left to itself,

* Afterwards reduced to ten by the destruction of two of them by an earthquake.

its growth was gradual, and it had time to mature its constitution before being exposed to serious conflicts. At first the league was presided over by a secretary (*Grammateus*), and two generals (*Strategi*), assisted by a council of ten *Demiurgi*. In the election of these officers, every citizen of the Achæan towns, above the age of thirty, had a vote, and the ultimate decision of all questions of public policy rested with the general assembly of the citizens, who met twice a year in a grove near Ægium. About B.C. 256, a more concentrated power was given to the government of the League by the election of a single Strategus. It now only wanted an able and enterprising leader to become a truly great power; and such a leader came forward in the person of the young ARATUS, a Sicyonian exile residing at Argos, whose father Clinias had been killed by Abantidas, the tyrant of Sicyon. When he had reached his twentieth year, Aratus, at the head of a band of exiles, made himself master of Sicyon, by a daring adventure in the night, expelled the reigning tyrant, and forthwith united the city to the Achæan League (B.C. 251). The acquisition of a city, so important by its power and position, was only less valuable to the League than the gain of such a leader. The very defects in the character of this remarkable man supplied special qualifications for the work he had now to do. Incapable of directing the movements of a pitched battle, and even wanting personal courage in the field, he was a daring and skilful leader of surprises and ambuscades, and a most successful negotiator. But his intellectual culture was very imperfect, and his practical knowledge of politics in early life had been confined to the experience of tyrannical oppression, and the bitterness and cunning which it engenders. Hence, when the growing power of the League might perhaps have afforded an opportunity to a Demosthenes for realizing the old dreams of Panhellenic patriotism, Aratus was unequal to the occasion: when hard pressed by Sparta and the Ætolians, he called in Antigonus Doson, and so once more made a Macedonian the umpire of the liberties of Greece. But the time had probably gone by, when even a Demosthenes could have raised the country from its depressed state, aggravated as it was by the famine and pestilence that resulted from half a century of desultory warfare. Aratus was rightly judged by his countrymen for what he had done, rather than for his faults and failures, when they paid divine honours to his memory. He died in B.C. 213, poisoned by the order of his former friend, Philip V. of Macedon. Aratus wrote *Memoirs* of his own times,

down to B.C. 220, the year in which the *History* of Polybius begins.*

It was in B.C. 245 that Aratus was first elected as Strategus of the League, which had meanwhile been steadily consolidating itself. About this time the Achæans formed an alliance with the Bœotians, the state which seemed best able to check the growth of the rival Ætolian confederacy; but the Ætolians fell upon the Bœotians, and crushed them before the Achæans came to their aid; and the old Bœotian confederacy, with its slight remnant of power, was absorbed into the Ætolian League. The loss was compensated by Aratus's daring surprise of Corinth and its citadel, which Antigonus had carelessly entrusted to a Stoic philosopher and a garrison of Syrian mercenaries. The former proved incompetent, the latter treacherous; and the loss of the Acrocorinthus deprived Antigonus of the key to Peloponnesus. Aratus followed up this enterprize by the capture of Megara; and the Achæan League was joined successively by the smaller states of the Argolid peninsula, by all the chief Arcadian cities, including Megalopolis (B.C. 234); and finally by Argos (B.C. 228). These cities had up to this time been governed by tyrants, several of whom laid down their power voluntarily. On the other hand, Elis and some of the western cities of Arcadia joined the Ætolian League; and thus Peloponnesus was divided between the two confederacies, with the exception of the southern part, where Messene remained at first neutral, but ultimately joined the Achæan League; and Sparta pursued the peculiar policy which remains to be described. In Northern Greece, the only states not embraced in the Ætolian League were Acarnania and Athens. The Acarnanians formed a confederacy of their own, which was destined to play an important part in the war with Rome; but at present they were still subject to Macedonia. Athens, as we have seen, had been declared free by Antigonus (B.C. 256), who had, however, pulled down the long walls, and left his garrisons in Piræus and Munychia, which the Athenians and Aratus persuaded the Macedonian governor to withdraw (about B.C. 229). Thus Athens became an ally of the

* The Memoirs of Aratus are lost. This is a suitable occasion to mention the great uncertainty of this period of history, which, as Niebuhr remarks, has to be unravelled from a hundred different sources. Our leading authority is the "Philippic Histories" of Justin, a work probably of the fourth or fifth century of our era, itself an epitome of the "Philippic Histories" of Trogus Pompeius, a writer of the Augustan age. The latter most valuable work, which embraced a history of the Macedonian monarchy, with such digressions into the stories of the old Asiatic empires as to give it the character of a universal history, is entirely lost in its original form.

Achæans, though not an actual member of the League; but she had almost lost all political weight in Greece; and the thoughts of her citizens were chiefly occupied with her philosophical schools. That this rapid progress should have been made by the Achæans without the interference of Macedonia, can only be explained by the indolence into which Antigonus Gonatas sank during the latter part of his long reign, and the occupation found for his successor Demetrius by the Ætolians. On the other hand, Aratus was continually aided by funds from the king of Egypt, Ptolemy III., Euergetes.

In this state of affairs, the balance of Greek liberty was in the hands of Sparta; but Sparta was in no condition to rise to the occasion. Her rulers were the more loath to abandon the hope of recovering her supremacy, as they pursued it no longer in the old spirit of Dorian hardihood, but as the rivals of the newly founded monarchies. The gold of Egypt had introduced a corrupting luxury, amidst which the old Dorian hatred of the Achæans and the Arcadians grew more intense. A brief hope of better things was held out by the accession of the Proclid king, Agis IV., whose patriotism aimed at once at a revival of the institutions of Lycurgus, and an alliance with the Achæan League. Like Cleomenes, who renewed his attempts at reform, Agis was a young man full of generous enthusiasm, and Plutarch has most fitly compared them with the Gracchi. Ascending the throne at the age of twenty (B.C. 244), Agis found the number of Spartan citizens reduced to seven hundred, of whom not more than one hundred possessed property. Members of the royal and noble families went abroad to serve as mercenaries, and returned laden with the wealth, and corrupted by the vices of the East. The influence of such men, headed by the other king, Leonidas II., formed an insurmountable obstacle to the plans of Agis for restoring Sparta to her ancient glories; and the partial success of his measures, which we cannot stay to describe, only provoked a more violent opposition, to which he fell a victim, with his near relatives (B.C. 240). But he found a follower, at first more fortunate, in the son of the very rival who had foiled him, the Eurysthenid king, Cleomenes III., who married the widow of Agis, and succeeded his father Leonidas in B.C. 236. Cleomenes, however, in his zeal to revive the martial spirit of Sparta, viewed the Achæan confederacy, not, like Agis, as a pattern and an ally, but as a rival. He made war upon the Achæans for the possession of Orchomenus, Tegea, and Mantinea, with such success as to obtain the power to

carry out his reforms at home. He put to death the Ephors who were at the head of the opposite party, and carried out the reforms of Agis, and others of his own. Taking the field again as the head of a renovated and united state, he gained new successes against ~~Aratus~~, who now called in the aid of Antigonus Doson (B.C. 223). The war had now lasted five years. For two years more Cleomenes held out against the united forces of the Macedonians and Achæans, till he was defeated, and his army utterly destroyed, at Sellasia, in Laconia (B.C. 221). Cleomenes found refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy Euergetes; but he was imprisoned by his successor, Ptolemy IV., Philopator. Escaping from prison, he made one last attempt to rouse his countrymen against their new master; and, when he found them submissive to the yoke, he died by his own hand. Greece was, however, saved from the domination of Antigonus Doson by his recall home to meet an invasion of the Illyrians, followed shortly by his death in the same year as that of Cleomenes (B.C. 220).

Meanwhile the Ætolian League had been steadily gaining ground during the war between Cleomenes and the Achæans. On the death of Antigonus and the accession of Philip V., who was only seventeen years old, the Ætolians made an attack upon Messenia, and inflicted a complete defeat on Aratus and the whole force of Achæa. Aratus once more sought aid from Macedonia; Philip entered into a close alliance with the Achæans, and Aratus became his most trusted friend and counsellor. The "Social War" between the Ætolian and Achæan Leagues, the latter being aided by Philip, lasted about three years (B.C. 220—217). Its chief result was a great accession of power and reputation to Philip by his repeated victories over the Ætolians, followed by a marked deterioration in his own character. The news of Hannibal's first victories in Italy tempted him to seek new laurels on the same field. With this view, he made peace with the Ætolians, and presently afterwards concluded an alliance with the Carthaginians (B.C. 216). His first unsuccessful attempts against the Romans in Illyria were accompanied by arbitrary proceedings in Greece; and it was for his remonstrances against these acts that Aratus was removed by poison (B.C. 213). The Romans now appear upon the scene as the allies of the Ætolians (B.C. 211), while Aratus found a worthy, and in some points a nobler successor, in PHILOPOMEN, by whose victories over Sparta the power of the Achæan League was extended throughout Peloponnesus. How the advantages thus gained were lost, and how Greece was finally constituted a Roman province under the name of Achaia

(B.C. 146), will be related among the other conquests of the republic.

This summary of the history of Greece during the period of the Macedonian supremacy would be very incomplete without some notice of that important section of the Hellenic race, which was settled in Italy and Sicily. The affairs of the Italian Greeks gave occasion to those enterprizes of the Epirot kings, which brought them into collision with the Romans; and the history of Sicily is embellished by the romantic adventures of Agathocles. The cities of Magna Græcia, severed from the objects of interest which absorbed the attention of the mother country, found it difficult to hold their own against the aggressions of their Italian neighbours, the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Messapians; and the expeditions which the two Dionysii undertook in Italy weakened these cities instead of assisting them. Tarentum was especially hard pressed by the Messapians; and it was in an expedition to its aid that the Spartan king Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, lost his life, about the time of the battle of Chæronæa (B.C. 338). The Epirot king Alexander, the brother of Olympias, next undertook an expedition to the aid of the Tarentines, in which, after some successes, he was assassinated (B.C. 331). Fifty years passed before the same enterprize was renewed by Pyrrhus, in the manner which is to be more fully related in a future chapter.

Meanwhile, the like distresses of Croton, causing it to seek aid from Syracuse, gave occasion for the first appearance of the celebrated AGATHOCLES, an adventurer rarely equalled in the history of the world for unbounded daring, fertility in resource, and utter want of principle. His name breaks the silence of nearly twenty years, in which the affairs of Syracuse are shrouded after the death of Timoleon, in B.C. 336. We only know that in this interval the popular constitution had been overthrown and an oligarchy of 600 set up, under Sosistratus and other leaders, about the time when an expedition was undertaken to aid the Crotoniates against the Bruttians (probably about B.C. 320). In this expedition, the popular voice assigned the highest place of merit to Agathocles, who had recently risen from the obscure station of a potter. He was the son of Carcinus, a Rhegian exile, who had settled at Therma, in the Carthaginian part of Sicily. His birth is surrounded by that halo of legend which is so often reflected on to the cradle of great men from their subsequent exploits; such as that his father, having dreamed that he would be a cause of evil to Sicily, would have exposed the infant, but he was saved by

his mother, and secreted till his seventh year, when his father had long repented of his supposed murder. At eighteen years of age, he was settled at Syracuse, following his father's humble occupation of a potter. He became equally conspicuous for his profligate habits, and for his tall and handsome form, his vast strength, his courage in military service, and his fluency of speech. A wealthy citizen named Damas took notice of him, supplied him with money, and gave him the opportunity of distinguishing himself in a subordinate command against the Agrigentines; and, when Damas died, Agathocles succeeded to his wealth and influence by marriage with his widow. In the expedition to Croton, Agathocles served as an officer under his brother Antander, who was one of the generals; and when the oligarchical leaders withheld from him the prize of valour, he charged them openly with aspiring to set up a tyranny. Not succeeding in effecting a revolution, he left Syracuse, and levied a band of mercenaries in Italy, whom he employed sometimes in attacking the Greek cities, sometimes in aiding them against their enemies. After making two unsuccessful assaults on Syracuse, he took the neighbouring city of Leontini, and was established there when a revolution in Syracuse led to his recall. In the war which ensued with the oligarchical exiles, who were assisted by the people of Gela and by the Carthaginians, Agathocles was the mainstay of the city; but the suspicion of his designs was so strong that he was driven out of the city, and a plot for his assassination was only frustrated by his departing in the disguise of a beggar. He appears to have found refuge with the Carthaginians, by whose aid the oligarchical government was restored soon afterwards at Syracuse. Agathocles, burning with hatred towards the citizens who had expelled him, was received back into the city through the mediation of Hamilcar. He took an oath to support the government, and to respect the rights of all classes of the citizens, and to keep peace with Carthage; and he was forthwith appointed as general. Scarcely was this done, when Agathocles, in collusion with Hamilcar, collected a large force of mercenaries, and let them loose to slay and plunder the senate and their wealthy supporters. For two days, Syracuse presented the appearance of a city taken by storm; and the massacre of 4000 citizens was followed by the banishment of 6000 more. Agathocles then presented himself to an assembly of the people—consisting doubtless of his own soldiers and the rabble who had joined them in their late savage deeds—congratulated them on the recovery of their liberty by the extirpation of the

aristocrats; and by offering to lay down his command he obtained his appointment as "Autocrat," or sole ruler with unlimited powers. Thus did Syracuse succumb to a usurpation far worse than that of the Dionysii (B.C. 317).

But Agathocles answered, not to the type of the self-indulgent tyrant, but to that of the military despot—a type less contemptible, but more odious than the other, and doubly dangerous, not only from the power and aggressive policy of such princes, but from the readiness of men to reward their success with admiration—nay more, to render to them respect, if they appear to make any good use of the power seized by perjury and bloodshed. Once firmly seated on his usurped throne, Agathocles proclaimed that he would govern for the good of the people; and his generous courtesy proved that his atrocities had been committed, not from the impulse of a cruel nature—they had not even that wretched excuse—but in the pursuit of a deliberate policy. That policy was to found an imperial power in Sicily, alike over the Greek cities and the parts now subject to Carthage; and, had Sicily possessed a leader with the spirit of Hellenic patriotism, the liberty lost in Greece might have flourished on her soil.

After various and rapid successes, Agathocles attempted the reduction of the two cities where the Syracusan exiles were chiefly harboured, Messana and Agrigentum. He was repulsed from the former, while the latter prepared for a vigorous defence, and invited Acrotatus, the son of Areus, from Sparta as a leader. But the young prince brought nothing with him but the airs of Asiatic royalty which he had learned from his father; and his murder of Sosistratus provoked an insurrection, in which he only saved his life by flight. The Agrigentines were glad to conclude a peace by the mediation of the Carthaginians, and Agathocles was recognised as the leader of the Greek cities, which were declared free, except Himera, Selinus, and Heraclea: these remained subject to Carthage. With his accustomed perfidy, Agathocles set to work to subdue the cities which had thus become his allies. Having compelled Messana to accept his terms, and to drive out the exiles, he laid siege to Agrigentum.

The Carthaginians, alarmed at the growth of his power, sent a fleet to the defence of the city, an act which involved them in open war with Agathocles. He ravaged their territory, and perpetrated another atrocious massacre of the citizens of Gela, whom he supposed to be ready to revolt; but the Carthaginians were strongly reinforced from home, and Hamilcar defeated Agathocles

in the great battle of Himera (B.C. 310), the same place at which Gelo had defeated and slain another Hamilcar, a hundred and seventy years before.* The Greek cities in general welcomed the Carthaginians as deliverers, and Agathocles was besieged in Syracuse. He now set the daring example, afterwards followed by Scipio, of carrying the war into Africa, first providing for the safety of his rule at home by another massacre of 1600 wealthy citizens, whose goods supplied him with funds for the expedition. His voyage, which was signalized by a solar eclipse, lasted six days and nights; and he just succeeded in distancing the Carthaginian squadron which had allowed him to escape from Syracuse, as he reached the coast of Africa.

Landing at the "Stone Quarries," some days' march east of Carthage,† Agathocles burnt his ships as a solemn offering to Demeter and Persephone, and advanced through the rich territory of Carthage, which had never yet been trodden by an enemy. The unwall'd cities offered no resistance to his progress, and the exuberant products of the corn-fields, the vineyards, the olive-yards, and the orchards kept his army in luxurious abundance. At length he reached Tunes (*Tunis*), at the bottom of the Carthaginian Gulf; and here, having stormed the city, he fortified his camp at the distance of little more than ten miles from Carthage. The intelligence of his advance had preceded the news of his landing, which had been sent from the fleet; but the first consternation at Carthage was changed into the assurance of victory, when they heard that Agathocles had left Sicily as a fugitive, and had cut off his own escape. The vastly superior army which went out to meet him carried 20,000 handcuffs, a sort of provision which has ever proved ominous to those who have made it, from the time of Xerxes to that of the Invincible Armada. The command was entrusted to Hanno and Bomilcar, two leaders of the opposite factions which divided the Carthaginian state. Their rivalry, which was expected to act as a salutary mutual check, proved fatal. Bomilcar, who commanded the left wing, held back, while Hanno, on the right, made a vigorous attack. At the moment when the Greeks began to give ground, Hanno was killed, and his fall gave Bomilcar an excuse for ordering a retreat, which ended in the defeat of the entire army. While the Carthaginians endeavoured to propitiate the gods by sacrificing two

* See Vol. I. p. 433.

† The data are insufficient to identify the places. The spot where Agathocles landed seems to have been on the western side of the tongue of land terminating in Cape Bon.

hundred children of their best families with the horrid rites of Moloch (whom the Greeks and Romans identified with their Croons and Saturn), Agathocles advanced from his fortified post at Tunes to the conquest of the cities on the eastern shore of the Carthaginian territory, the modern Regency of Tunis. The jealous policy of Carthage had secured her dependencies by no bond of mutual attachment; and their rapid submission, to the number of 200, proved the instability of her empire.

The enterprise of Agathocles had, however, failed to draw back the Carthaginians from Syracuse. Hamilcar pressed the siege, and showed the prow-ornaments of the ships of Agathocles as signs of his destruction. The city was almost in despair, when the truth was learned by the arrival of a messenger from Agathocles, and Hamilcar raised the siege, sending off a part of his forces to Africa. Some months later, he returned to Syracuse at the head of 100,000 men, while his fleet blockaded the harbour. He attempted to hasten the operations by the very same manœuvre, in which Demosthenes had failed a century before, a night surprise of the heights of Epipolæ, which were now included in the line of fortifications. The assault utterly miscarried, and Hamilcar was taken prisoner; thus fulfilling, in a cross sense, the prediction of a soothsayer, that he should sup that night in Syracuse. That supper was his last. He was put to death with the most cruel tortures, and his head was sent over to Africa. But his fall, instead of restoring the supremacy of Agathocles in Sicily, gave the Greeks new hopes of freedom under the leadership of Agrigentum; and Syracuse remained blockaded by the Carthaginian fleet (B.C. 309).

The news of Hamilcar's death found Agathocles posted at Tunes, while the Carthaginians were encamped between him and their city; and he hastened to display the head of Hamilcar before their eyes. But in this moment of triumph, the murder of an officer by his son Archagathus, in a drunken brawl, caused a mutiny in his camp. The piteous appeals of Agathocles not only brought back his soldiers to obedience, but evoked a new outburst of devotion, amidst which he led them on to a successful attack on the Punic camp; and this was followed up by another victory over a Carthaginian force in the interior of the country (B.C. 308).

Still his force was insufficient for the reduction of Carthage herself; and he invited aid from Ophellas, the governor of Cyrene, who had delivered that city from the incursion of an adventurer named Thimbron, after Alexander's death, and had reduced it

beneath the government of Ptolemy I. Enticed by the promise of the sovereignty of Carthage when it should be subdued, Ophellas collected a body of 10,000 colonists from all parts of Greece, and, with the like number of infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots, he performed a difficult march of two months along the sandy shores of the Syrtes, to join Agathocles. His arrival seems at once to have inspired Agathocles with the hope of securing the aid of his forces, and getting rid of their commander and his claims. In an assembly of his own soldiers, he accused Ophellas of a plot against his life. The victim was despatched upon the spot, and his soldiers were cajoled or intimidated into submission. While this tragedy was acting, Carthage was in a state of civil war, through an attempt of Bomilcar to complete his treasonable designs. The plot was defeated, and Bomilcar was put to death with tortures; but the opportunity was lost of attacking Agathocles during the confusion which followed the murder of Ophellas (B.C. 307).

With his forces thus increased, Agathocles subdued the old Phœnician settlements along the shore westward of Carthage, Utica, Hippo, and Hippagreta, the last within a few miles of Carthage, which was thus environed on both sides. It seemed that he might safely return to Sicily, where his affairs made no progress, though he had recently assumed the title of its king. He crossed over with 2000 men, leaving his son Archagathus to command in Africa, and landed at Selinus. His presence and activity at once turned the tide of events. Though Dinocrates, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, kept the field against him, the Agrigentines were twice defeated, and several cities were taken; when Agathocles was recalled to Africa by disastrous news. His son had been twice defeated by the Carthaginians, and was now blockaded in the camp at Tunes; the army was mutinous through want of supplies and pay, and the Libyan allies, as well as the cities called Libyphœnician, from the mixed race that peopled them, had fallen off at the first appearance of bad fortune. Agathocles saw no chance but the desperate one of a battle, though his forces were far inferior to the enemy, who refused to leave their entrenchments. The failure of his attack on the camp was followed by scenes as strange as have ever occupied the night after a battle. The Carthaginians were engaged in sacrificing the comeliest of their prisoners as a thank-offering to their gods, when the fire kindled for this hideous purpose spread a conflagration through the whole camp, and the army dispersed in terror.

But Agathocles was in no condition to profit by the accident. Despairing of holding his position in Africa, and unable to carry off his army for want of vessels, he was stepping on board a ship to make a secret escape, when he was arrested by the order of his son Archagathus, and put in chains. Even then his fortune did not fail him. On an alarm that the enemy were coming to attack the camp, Agathocles was hastily brought out by his guards to give his advice. The sight of their leader in his fetters recalled the devotion of his soldiers, who loudly demanded his release. Agathocles used his liberty to steal away in a skiff, which bore him safe through a November storm to Sicily. His two sons were sacrificed to the fury of the deserted army, who purchased their personal safety by the surrender of all their conquests (B.C. 305).

It is one of the most marvellous features in the romantic story of Agathocles, that, after a catastrophe like this, he survived to renew his cruelties and victories in Sicily, and died in possession of his sovereignty. A peace with Carthage, and a victory over Dinocrates, who has been suspected of treachery, were followed by the restoration of Agathocles to the despotism of Syracuse, in conjunction with Dinocrates (B.C. 301). He recovered much of his empire in Sicily; carried on successful wars in the Lipari Isles, Italy, and Coreyra, where he gained a great naval victory over Cassander; formed alliances with Demetrius Poliorcetes, and with Pyrrhus, to whom he gave his daughter in marriage; and at the age of 72, he was planning a new expedition against Carthage. His proclamation of his favourite son, Agathocles, as his successor, was the signal for the rebellion of his grandson, Archagathus, who treacherously poisoned his uncle, and, according to one form of the story, his grandfather also. At all events, Agathocles fell sick, and had only time to send off his wife and young children to Alexandria, when he died (B.C. 289). We might be surprized to hear that his deathbed was surrounded by a circle of mourning friends, were we not told that, in common with others of the greatest scourges of mankind, he possessed the art of fascinating his associates and victims by a genial frankness of manner. His career, rightly studied, forms one of the most instructive episodes in the history of despotism. His extinction of his country's liberties is a warning of what may always be done by an unscrupulous adventurer, wielding the engine of a mercenary soldiery, against a people that has lost the power of maintaining its liberties. His wonderful fortune,—to use the unmeaning language by which short-sighted men conceal from themselves the true causes of events—is an

example of the extent to which the supreme moral government of the world grants success for a while to energetic wickedness, for the accomplishment of ends not seen as yet. The wonderful success of his African expedition, and its disastrous result, proved that the conquest of the great Semitic republic of Carthage was reserved for another power than the Greeks, and that the force of the Hellenic race had reached its limit towards the West. The death of Agathocles closes the history of the Grecian states in Sicily. While Syracuse and the other cities fell under the rule of successive despots, and were torn by intestine factions, they were only saved from Carthage by foreign aid. Campaigns against the Carthaginians in Sicily formed an episode of two years and a half in the Italian war of Pyrrhus (B.C. 278 to B.C. 276).

On his departure, the government of Syracuse fell into the hands of Hiero II., who claimed descent from Gelo, the founder of the ancient dynasty (B.C. 275). His war with the Mamertines of Messana (B.C. 270) was the cause of calling in the Romans, who, in the long and fierce conflict of the first Punic War (B.C. 264 to B.C. 241) wrested the northern and western parts of the island from Carthage, while they left Hiero to govern the south-east and Syracuse, with a wisdom and mildness which surpassed the magnificence of his great namesake, till his death at the age of 92 (B.C. 216). The rash boy, Hieronymus, who succeeded him at the age of fifteen, abandoned his grandfather's long fidelity to Rome; paying the penalty in his own speedy assassination (B.C. 215), and involving Syracuse in the celebrated siege, which ended in its capture by Marcellus, and the reduction of Sicily to a Roman province (B.C. 212). The details of these events belong to the history of Rome.

There still remain certain outlying members of the Hellenic race whose subsequent destiny it would be interesting to trace; but, with one exception, none of them have any important bearing on the general history of the world. That exception is the Phœcean colony of Massalia (*Marseilles*), with its dependencies on the coasts of Gaul and Spain.* Maintaining its ground against the jealousy and hostility of the Carthaginians and the Tyrrhenians, this great commercial city diffused the civilization which the Romans found already distinguishing the "Province" from the rest of Gaul. The Massaliots preserved their municipal independence and their Hellenic institutions by an alliance with Rome; and the city became a great seat of Greek learning.

* See Vol. I. p. 365.

The loss of liberty produces a more rapid effect on literature than on art; unless we should rather say that the decline of original vigour in the former is a symptom of the decay of that manly energy by which freedom itself is maintained. Art, on the other hand, can long survive the benumbing influence of despotism, and may even seem to gain new energy by its patronage. It was under such patronage that painting was perfected by Apelles, and the art of statuary in bronze by Lysippus, both the favourite artists of Alexander.

As for literature, it seems scarcely in the nature of things, that the supreme excellence of the three great Attic tragedians should have been continued through a second generation, even had the same stimulus continued, of the Athenians flocking to keep the festivals of Dionysus in all the conscious pride of liberty. They had, indeed, elegant imitators in such poets as Agathon, the friend of Euripides, Iophon, the son of Sophocles, and the younger Sophocles, his grandson; and tragedies continued to be written long after the true dramatic spirit had evaporated.

Still more needful was "freedom's caller air" to such comedies as those of Aristophanes, which were always regarded by a party at Athens as a dangerous licence. Repeated attempts were made to check the freedom of the Old Comedy, which received fatal blows from the aristocratic revolution of B.C. 411; and the elevation of the Thirty Tyrants. Some of the later plays of Aristophanes himself belong to the Middle Comedy—so called because it is regarded as a transition from the Old Comedy to the New—a form in which such satire as was still indulged in was levelled less at individuals than at classes, manners, opinions, and fashions in literature and philosophy; while the satiric spirit itself gradually merged into mere burlesque, the favourite subjects of which were taken from mythology. The part of the chorus was, at the same time, greatly restricted, and at last dispensed with altogether. The slight interest which now belongs to the Middle Comedy, and the paucity of its fragments, form a strange contrast to the fertility of its writers. Athenæus tells us that he had read 800 plays of the Middle Comedy; and of its two chief poets, Antiphanes (B.C. 404—330) is said to have written as many dramas as there are days in the year, and Alexis (B.C. 394—288) no less than two-hundred and forty-five.

The great age of the latter poet brings him far within the period of the New Comedy, which arose at Athens about the beginning of the Macedonian supremacy. The personal and

political satire of the Old Comedy had not only become dangerous, but its spirit had died out with the loss of political freedom. The interest once inspired by politics was thrown back into the sphere of domestic life; and the vicissitudes of fortune, caused by protracted wars, created many a romance within the circle of a family. The comic poet, no longer assuming to be the censor of the state and her great men, but making the amusement of the audience his one object, chose his subjects from the manners and intrigues of ordinary society and domestic life. The founder of this style was Philemon, a native of Soli in Cilicia, who was born about B.C. 360, and lived nearly a hundred years. He began to exhibit at Athens about B.C. 330, and was the author of ninety-seven plays. Still more celebrated, though less successful in the dramatic contests,—for he won only eight prizes with more than one hundred plays—is MENANDER of Athens, whose polished wit seems to have had too much of gentle elegance for the taste of his contemporaries. *The extant fragments are altogether inadequate to give us an idea of the plots and spirit of Menander's comedies; but they are full of those clever and pointed maxims,* suited for quotation, which abound in all the Greek dramatic poetry. In these *Gnomic* passages we see the influence of Epicurus and Theophrastus, with both of whom Menander lived in close intimacy. He was himself a thorough Epicurean, not only in the principles of the school, but in the habits into which it soon degenerated. The New Comedy was imitated by Plautus and Terence among the Romans, and their plays have transmitted its form, with much of its spirit, to the stage of modern Europe. Terence especially aimed at reproducing the elegant wit of Menander, with a degree of success attested by his lasting popularity, and yet far inferior to his original.†

In prose literature, the chief works of the age are those of the Attic orators and philosophers. We have already seen how, out of the early schools of philosophy, there arose a class of teachers who, without abandoning the higher fields of speculation, made it their business to train the youth of Athens in those practical arts of rhetoric and dialectics which were required for the public assembly and the courts of law. The Sophists may therefore be

* Called by the Greeks *γνώμαι*, *sentiments*.

† The epithet applied by Cæsar to Terence—*O dimidiatæ Menander*—unquestionably implies this inferiority, though its primary reference is no doubt to Terence's practice of combining two plays of Menander's into one.

regarded as, in a sense, the parents both of philosophy and rhetoric; but the demand for the latter, as an art, threatened to draw off attention from the former, when Socrates arose to teach philosophy in a new spirit. The fruit of the rhetorical teaching of the Sophists, but still more of the free institutions of Athens, was seen in the long line of orators, from Pericles, the pupil of Anaxagoras, to Demosthenes and his contemporaries. TEN of these ATTIC ORATORS were selected as the worthiest by the Alexandrian critics, who have handed down to us some of their orations. They are Antiphon and Andocides, whom we have met with in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War; Lysias, the greatest master of the pure Attic style; Isæus and Isocrates, who were especially distinguished as professors of rhetoric; Demosthenes and Æschines, and their contemporaries, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. The discussion of their literary merits and their extant works must be left to the special histories of literature.

Still less does the vast field of the history of philosophy fall within our province. It must suffice to indicate the celebrated schools, which arose out of the teaching of Socrates, the great master who first separated philosophy from the rhetorical and dialectic lectures of the Sophists. The four great schools were the *Academic*, founded by Plato; the *Peripatetic*, by Aristotle; the *Stoic*, by Zeno; the *Epicurean*, by Epicurus. While the teaching of all four embraced questions both of ethics and philosophy,—the latter term comprising every branch of human knowledge,—the two former sects were chiefly distinguished by their intellectual, the two latter by their moral teaching. And, in both cases, the leading points of difference may be traced more or less in all later systems: every school of philosophy leans either to the idealism of Plato or the analytic method of Aristotle: every system of ethics partakes largely of the Stoic self-sacrifice or the Epicurean quest of the highest pleasure as the chiefest good. Among the minor sects, which sprang from the school of Socrates, the two most celebrated were those which may be regarded as the extreme developments of the principles of Epicureanism and Stoicism, though anterior to them in their foundation,—the *Cyrenaic* school of Aristippus, who placed the source of happiness in the gratification of the senses; and the *Cynic* school of Antisthenes, who taught his disciples to despise not only the indulgences but the decencies of life. We have already had to speak of the most famous member of this school, Diogenes of Sinopé.

BOOK V.

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ITALY AND THE RISE OF THE ROMAN
STATE.

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FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS TO THE SUBJUGATION OF
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CHAPTER XIX.

ITALY AND ITS PRIMITIVE POPULATIONS.

“ITALIA, too, ITALIA! looking on thee,
Full flashes on the soul the light of ages,
Since the fierce Carthaginian almost won thee,*
To the last halo of the chiefs and sages
Who glorify thy consecrated pages:
Thou wert the throne and grave of empires; still
The fount at which the panting mind assuages
Her thirst of knowledge, quaffing there her fill,
Flows from the eternal source of Rome's imperial bill.”—BYRON.

ROME AND HER EMPIRE—ITS RELATION TO ITALY—DESCRIPTION OF THE PENINSULA—THE ALPS AND APENNINES—COMPARISON WITH GREECE—NATURAL QUALITY OF ITALY—ITS PRIMITIVE INHABITANTS—ITS THREE CHIEF STOCKS—THE IAPYGIAN RACE—THE ITALIAN RACE—ITS TWO DIVISIONS, LATIN AND SABELLIAN—THE ETRUSCANS—THEIR COUNTRY—THEIR ORIGIN—TYRRHENIANS AND RASENNA—THE ETRUSCAN LANGUAGE—THEIR EARLY POWER BY LAND AND SEA—RELATIONS TO GREECE AND CARTHAGE—THEIR DECLINE AND CONQUEST BY THE ROMANS—THE ETRUSCAN CONFEDERACY—THEIR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS—ETRUSCAN ART AND SCIENCE—ARCHITECTURE—SEPULCHRES—STATUARY AND METAL-WORK—PAINTINGS—DOMESTIC LIFE—SCIENCES, BORROWED BY THE ROMANS.

THE power which was destined at length to raise an universal empire on the ruins of the eastern monarchies, of the free states of Greece, and of the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, combined in itself the strongest points of the systems that it superseded. A material force, if not so vast, yet truly greater than that wielded by any oriental despot, was regulated by political principles, of which a regard for law was the most conspicuous, and all was consolidated by the mighty bond of an aristocratic government based on a patriarchal foundation. If the Hellenic republics were fitted to give the freest scope to personal and political liberty, the polity of Rome was an instrument specially adapted to achieve imperial power abroad by subordinating individual freedom to the concentrated action of the state. This mighty power was purchased at the price of an internal struggle, which, when it had once broken out, became perpetual, between the privileges of the ruling class, often abused to the most selfish ends; and the claims of the lower orders to personal freedom and political power. Just when the conquest of the countries which form the seat of ancient civilization—the countries lying round the basin of the Mediterranean—was completed, this internal conflict was brought to its crisis by

the utter corruption of the state through the plunder of the world. Under a single ruler the government of the empire was consolidated, from the borders of Caledonia and the banks of the Rhine and Danube to the Libyan Desert and the cataracts of the Nile: and the barbarian tribes, that had long been pressing down from regions as yet beyond the pale of civilization, were kept at bay, till the work of diffusing Christianity throughout the Roman world was completed. Then the empire and classic paganism fell together; and the deluge of nations that overflowed them settled down into the new order of the modern world.

To comprehend rightly the origin of this power, we must not be content to take our stand upon the Seven Hills of Rome, and to look round upon Italy, as if it were a foreign country, to be gradually brought under the sway of the new city. It is necessary at first to regard Rome from the Italian point of view rather than Italy from the Roman. Nay more, in speaking of Italy, even as "a geographical expression," we must greatly modify our present conception of its meaning. Fitted as the peninsula, with its large adjacent island, is to form one great state, from the Alps to the Adriatic, the Ionian, and the African Seas, and ardent as must be the hopes of every friend of human progress to see it thus united, the consummation is a vision of the future, not a tradition of the early past. As a strictly ethnic term, the country of the Itali, or Siceli, or Siculi (for the words are varieties of one)* was confined to Sicily and the southern half of the peninsula; and even in the wider meaning, in which it embraced several other tribes, it could not be extended, in any proper sense, north of the Apennines.†

As in the case of Greece, the physical formation of the peninsula had a marked influence on the political relations of its inhabitants. It resembles Greece in projecting far out into the waters of the Mediterranean, upheld by central highlands; but the highlands of Italy do not ramify, like those of Greece, into a network of ridges, cutting up the whole country into valleys comparatively isolated, nor do their extremities run out into the sea so as to form the

* The interchange of the hard mutes, *c* and *t*, and the loss of the initial *s*—both among the commonest changes in language—account for the difference. *Siceli* and *Siculi* are Greek and Latin varieties. The old Italian tradition, which derives the name of the peninsula from a King Vitalus, or Vitulus, serves to show that the word began with a consonant.

† The name acquired this wider meaning after the conquest of the Italian states by the Romans, about B.C. 264. It was not till the time of Augustus that it was made to include the whole region up to the Alps.

deeply indented coast-line and chains of islands, which made the Greeks of necessity a race of adventurous mariners. The mountains of the Italian peninsula form one great continuous chain; their slopes and valleys spread out into more extensive and connected spaces: the coast-line, though long, is very regular, undulating in wide bays rather than deep gulfs. These differences will be more clearly seen from a description of the whole peninsula, with the vast plain which stretches across its head, and which, though not properly a part of ancient Italy, has always been closely connected with its history.

Viewed in this wider sense, the land of Italy is the western division of that beautiful region of Southern Europe, which is enclosed in so marked a way by the gigantic chain of the Alps and its prolongations eastward to the Black Sea. These mountains, the grand passes of which are ascended by a long and gradual slope from the north side, sink down abruptly on the south, as if to form a rampart about the fair lands at their feet. This sudden descent upon the southern side forms one of the chief charms of that first passage over the Alpine chain, which marks an epoch in the traveller's life, when

"He instantly receives into his soul
A sense, a feeling, that he loses not—
A something that informs him 'tis an hour
Whence he may date henceforward and for ever." •

The chain, so venerable for its towering height and the diadem of perpetual snow, from which it receives its name,* results from the most recent of the great upheavings by which our continent has been formed. The primitive rocks have burst through all the superincumbent strata, to give the crowning beauty to the face of the country, in such ranges as those of Scandinavia, the western mountains of our own islands, of Brittany, and the Spanish peninsula, the Atlas in Africa, and the Pyrenees, Alps, Apennines and Balkan on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean basin. The primitive chain of the High Alps has been thrown up in that remarkable curve which encloses the great plain of Northern Italy. On both its flanks lie those great secondary strata, of which the most conspicuous is the "Jura limestone," so called

* *Alp* is generally supposed to be the root so common in Celtic (as in *Albion*, *Albany*, &c.), and which also appears in the Latin *alpus* and *alba*, signifying *white*. Singularly enough, however, the name *Alp* is applied in Switzerland, not to the high mountains (which are called *horns*, *peaks*, *needles*, &c., or by the figurative names of *Giant*, *Monk*, *Virgin*, &c.), but to the upland pastures of comparatively moderate elevation, such as the *Wengern Alp*.

from the great chain which faces the Alps across the plain of north-western Switzerland, and forms a member of the system. Along the northern side of the plain of Lombardy, the chain extends through Switzerland and the Tyrol, as far as the "Great Bellman" (*Gross Glöckner*) near the sources of the Drave, whence one branch pursues its course to Vienna, and connects itself beyond the Danube with the Carpathians, while another branch, turning to the south-east close round the head of the Adriatic, is prolonged along the Illyrian coast, and then down the whole peninsula of Greece, after it has thrown off the great chain which reaches the Danube under the name of Hæmus, or the *Balkan*. Returning to the western extremity of the chain at Mont Blanc, we trace it southward to the sources of the Var, where it bends to the east round the Gulf of Genoa, and is then continued in the chain of the Apennines.

Neither in direction nor in geological character is there any marked transition from the Maritime Alps to the Apennines. Some geographers place the division at the natural depression in the chain, above Savona; others, farther down the western shore of the Gulf of Genoa, at the bold headland of the *Capo delle Melle*. At first the Apennines pursue their course eastward, but slightly verging to the south, almost parallel to the Po, as if to meet the shore of the Adriatic. The secondary strata, which form a part of the system, bordered by a narrow belt of tertiary formation, do in fact reach the opposite shore, in the neighbourhood of Ariminum (*Rimini*, $44^{\circ} 10' N.$ lat.), marking the physical boundary between the true peninsula of Italy and the alluvial basin of the Po, which is thus enclosed within the mighty sweep of the Alps and Apennines, except on the east, where it lies open to the Adriatic, on the waters of which it is constantly encroaching.* It was in agreement with this physical division, that the political boundary between Italy and Cisalpine Gaul was placed at the petty, but ever memorable river RUBICON. From about the same latitude, the Apennine chain itself turns off to the south-east, and forms the back-bone of the peninsula. About the same point, the primitive rocks cease to rise above the surface, only reappearing near the centre of the peninsula, in the ancient Sabine territory, and again in the "toe" of the "boot," to which Italy bears so

* Our map exhibits the change made in the coast-line by the alluvial deposits of the Po, the Adige, the Piave, and the lesser streams which flow down from the Carnic Alps. As compared with the ancient state of things, Venice is, literally, "a city in the sea."

curious a resemblance, and on the opposite point of Sicily, from Messina down to Etna. The "heel" is formed by a lower range, in which tertiary deposits predominate. The prevalence of the secondary formations, and chiefly of the later limestones, gives to the chain a character altogether different from the pointed peaks of the primitive Alps and Pyrenees, or the battlemented escarpments of the ancient limestone of the Jura. The highest summit, Monte Corno (the ancient Cunarus), east of Aquila, reaches little above 9500 feet, and, though another mountain in the Sabine territory boasted the name of Nivosus (*snowy*), the limit of perpetual snow, in the mild climate of Italy, does not embrace the highest summits of the Apennines. There are few parts in which vegetation does not reach quite, or almost, to the tops of the mountains, whose smoothly rounded forms, and easy passes, form no difficult obstacle to human intercourse or even habitation, while their remoter recesses, especially where the ancient limestone and granite break out, as in the Abruzzi and Calabria, have always secured fastnesses for the wilder tribes of ancient times—such as those in the Sabine and Samnite territory—and for the brigands of later days. The great tertiary plains, which slope down on both sides of the chain, and in its great southern fork, watered by innumerable streams, and by some considerable rivers—as the Arno, Tiber, and several others—clothed with exuberant fertility, except where the rivers have been permitted to form pestilential marshes, and varied by undulating hills,—seem provided by nature for the abode of great peoples, with their "tower'd cities" and "the busy hum of men," till some one, stronger than the rest in arms or influence, should unite all into a powerful state. The most remarkable of these plains are those of Etruria, Latium, and Northern Campania in the west, Apulia on the east (stretching down from the "spur" of Mount Garganus), and that of Lucania in the south, opening on to the great Gulf of Tarentum. Both physically and politically, the island of Sicily forms as natural an appendage of Italy, as the "Island of Pelops" does of Greece, the isthmus of the latter being replaced in the former by the narrow strait or "rent," which gave a name to the town of Rhegium.* Its central mountains, which are a prolongation of the Apennines, are bordered, especially on the south and east, by a tertiary belt of unsurpassed fertility, which has already engaged our attention as the seat of great Hellenic cities. The great plains and grassy hill-sides of the whole peninsula give it capabilities,

* *ῥήγμων* signifies a *rent*.

vastly superior to those of Greece, for agriculture and pasturage; and Sicily was especially the home of shepherds and their pastoral poetry.

But Italy was as conspicuously inferior to Greece in facilities for maritime intercourse and adventure. Though possessed of so vast a coast-line, she is singularly wanting both in harbours, and in those off-lying islands, which formed invaluable stepping-stones to the timid navigation of early ages. But this very defect may be regarded as a natural argument for her political unity, that so the few good harbours may be enjoyed by all the peoples of the peninsula. A similar argument is furnished by the very fact which is sometimes used on the other side,—the great length of the land as compared with its width. The distance from Mont Blanc to Cape Spartivento exceeds 700 miles; and while the width of the northern alluvial plain is about 350 miles, that of the peninsula itself does not average above 100. The ease and completeness of the interruption made in the intercourse necessary to the welfare of such a country by the existence of independent states, reaching across it like barriers, even if their governments were tolerable in themselves,—would be an intolerable evil. The absurd platitude, that Italy is condemned thus to suffer by some mysterious necessity, is sufficiently refuted by her unity under the Roman domination. The causes which have subjected her to this evil, in every other age, are among the most interesting enquiries in the History of the World.

As the above outline of the physical geography of Italy is intended solely to throw light upon the history of its populations, it is not necessary to describe in detail one of the most striking of its natural characteristics, the great volcanic belt which extends along a large part of its western shore, culminating in Vesuvius, and reaching by way of the Lipari Isles to Sicily and Etna,—the region assigned by ancient fable to the punishment of the giant Typhœus;

“*Tum sonitu Prochyta alta tremit, durunque cubile
Inarime, Jovis imperiis imposita Typhœo.*” *

Nor is it worth while to dilate on matters so well known as the delicious climate and the exuberant fertility of the peninsula.

A writer, who has recently made an invaluable contribution to the history of Rome, has acutely observed a point of connection between the configuration and the destinies of the peninsulas of

* Virgil, *Æn.* ix. 715, 716. The passage is imitated from Homer (*Il.* ii. 783) with a strange confusion of the localities

Greece and Italy:—"While the Grecian peninsula turns towards the east, the Italian turns towards the west. As the coasts of Epirus and Acarnania had but a subordinate importance in the case of Hellas, so had the Apulian and Messapian coasts in that of Italy; and, while the regions on which the historical development of Greece has been mainly dependent—Attica and Macedonia—look to the east, Etruria, Latium, and Campania look to the west. In this way, the two peninsulas, such close neighbours and almost sisters, stand, as it were, averted from each other. Although the naked eye can discern from Otranto to the Acroceraunian mountains, the Italians and Hellenes came into earlier and closer contact on every other pathway rather than on the nearest across the Adriatic sea. In their case, too, as has happened so often, the historical vocation of the nations was prefigured in the relations of the ground which they occupied; the two great stocks, on which the civilization of the ancient world grew, threw their shadow, as well as their seed, the one towards the east, the other towards the west."*

The very interesting but difficult question, concerning the primitive inhabitants of Italy, was first discussed in a scientific spirit by Niebuhr. The population of Italy has always been one of the most mixed in the whole world. Neither the names of the tribes scattered over the peninsula, nor the ancient traditions respecting them, afford us any certain information. Our only trustworthy guide is the science of comparative grammar; but the aid it furnishes is limited by our very slight knowledge of the languages of ancient Italy. No trace is found in the peninsula of that primitive population (probably Turanian) which was spread over the north of Europe at a period when civilization was in such a backward state, that iron implements were unknown, and which has therefore been called the Age of Stone. Such relics as remain of the earliest Italian tribes attest their knowledge of the arts of agriculture and metal-working. It is clearly ascertained that all the populations, of which we have any distinct trace, were of the Indo-European family; and they may be divided into three principal stocks;—the Iapygian, the Etruscan, and the Italian,† the

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, translated by the Rev. W. P. Dickson, vol. i. p. 6. It is proper to acknowledge, thus early, our great obligations to Dr. Mommsen's admirable work.

† In this classification, which has been introduced by Mommsen, it should be observed that the term *Italian* is used in a different sense from that already described; namely, with an historical signification, to describe the races that chiefly peopled the Italy of the Romans.

last being subdivided into the Latin and Umbrian, and the second of these subdivisions including several tribes of Central Italy, as the Umbri, Marsi, Volsci, and Samnites.

Peninsulas, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain, backed up on the one side by mountains, and offering on all other sides an extensive line of coast, have been of course peopled either from the land or from the sea. There are certain natural conditions which help to show in which direction the stream of immigration is most likely to have flowed; and a guide is also furnished by the successive waves of population which have passed over the same land in the period of recorded history. In the cases of Greece and Spain, the islands of the Archipelago and the narrow straits of Gibraltar afford facilities for access from Asia and Africa respectively, which do not exist in the case of Italy, unless it be across the mouth of the Adriatic. But decisive arguments are presented against the last hypothesis by the width of the strait between the coasts of Epirus and Apulia, by the dangers of the passage—proverbial among the ancients down to a late period—by the absence of any evidence that the earliest inhabitants of either coast were a seafaring people, and by the fact that the historical settlements in Magna Græcia were made in almost every direction rather than in this. On the other hand, the glorious climate of Italy, and the rich fertility of the great Sub-alpine plain, have in all ages attracted the tribes of the less favoured north through the passes of the Alps.

If then we assume the probability of successive immigrations by the same route in the prehistoric times, we shall expect to find the earliest inhabitants pressed down to the south of the peninsula. It is here, in fact, that we find traces of the IAPYGIAN race, in the peninsula called by the Greeks Messapia, and in modern times Calabria, the “toe” of Italy, as well as in the “heel,” or Apulia.* Their numerous inscriptions, in a dialect more nearly akin to the Greek than to the other languages of the Italian peninsula, and often exhibiting the very names of the Greek deities, suggest the probability that they belonged to that great Pelasgic family which peopled both peninsulas in the earliest ages, and which, if not the actual parent of the Hellenic race, was very near to it in kindred. This race was characterized by an unwarlike simplicity, which gave ground before its own hardier and more warlike scions, as, in its

* It was to this “heel” that the Greeks applied the name of Iapygia, of which, according to their custom, they gave a genealogical derivation, from Iapix, who was believed to have led a Cretan colony into Italy; for in this way did they account for the presence in that region of a race kindred to their own.

own mythology, Saturn was expelled by Jove.* In Greece, it remained comparatively undisturbed in Epirus, and in other parts it was driven back into the mountain fastnesses; while, on the less intricate surface of Italy, it seems to have been forced back in mass towards the south. The close connection of this Iapygian race with the earliest Greeks may help to account for the ease with which the Hellenic settlements were made in Magna Græcia. The relations of the Iapygians with the Siculi is a question not yet determined.

The two branches of the great ITALIAN race, which occupied the central part of the peninsula, have left us much more distinct traces of their nationality in the peculiar forms of their languages, which exhibit a clearly marked difference from the Greeks and Iapygians, on the one hand, and from the Etruscans on the other; while the points of resemblance are sufficient to establish an affinity with the Greek nearer than with any other of the Indo-Germanic languages. The fact, so important to be clearly apprehended, in the study of language as well as history, that Greek and Latin are but dialects of one common tongue, was vaguely recognized in the guessing attempts to derive certain words in the one language from the other, before comparative grammar became a science. It is not, however, the province of the historian to enter into the details of the argument by which the affinity of the two languages has been accurately established.

The Greeks themselves recognised the unity of the Italian races, to the exclusion of the Iapygian and Etruscan, by applying to them collectively the name of *Opici*, which is only another form of *Osci*, just as the Latins included all the branches of the Hellenic race under the common name of Græci.† The parallel has been carried so far as to suggest a comparison between the division of the Hellenes into the Ionian and Dorian races with that of the Italians into two great branches, the eastern and the western, and of these the western is represented, in historic times, by the Latin nation; the eastern by the Umbrians, Sabines, Marsi, Volsci or Ausones, and other tribes, which extended from the north-eastern coast down into Southern Latium and Campania. The last-named district seems to have been of old the

* This comparison is more than a mere figure; for the plain of Apulia was the fabled refuge of Saturn, where he reigned in the golden age of pastoral simplicity; and hence Italy received its poetical name of "Saturnia tellus."

† The *Ausones* or *Aurunci* of Campania and Southern Latium, bear a Greek name etymologically identical with the native *Volsci* and probably with *Osci*.

chief seat of the Oscans; and here their language was preserved, both as a popular dialect, and in the farces known at Rome as the *Fabulæ Atellanæ*.* These eastern Italians are again subdivided into two chief branches, a northern and a southern, the former embracing the peoples of Umbria, the latter those included under the name of Oscans in its widest sense, and, after they had ceased to be a people, represented chiefly by the Samnites. Hence the two branches of the Italian race are distinguished by the names of *Latin* and *Umbro-Samnite* or *Sabellian*.† The former branch gave origin to the Roman state, which now becomes the central point of our history; but, before describing its rise, a few words must be added concerning the other chief people of the Italian peninsula.

At their junction with the Maritime Alps, the Apennines enclose the beautiful *Riviera*, or coast terrace, round the head of the Gulf of Genoa, the Liguria of the ancients;‡ and then from the line of the river Macra (*Magra*, at 9° E. long., mouth about 44° N. lat.), their bold sweep surrounds the magnificent country, which has always borne one of the names of the race we have now to speak of. Physically, indeed, the region is bounded by that branch of the chain which runs southward towards Cape Circelli (the ancient promontory of Circe), along the eastern margin of the valley of the Tiber; but, from the foundation of Rome, this river divided Etruria from Latium. The Apennines shelter this country on the north and east, and their lateral chains diversify its surface with wooded heights and sweeping valleys, watered by

* These plays derived their name from the city of Atella in Campania.

† More will be said of this race when we come to speak of the Samnite wars.

‡ The Ligurians, or, in Greek, *Ligyæ*, were a very ancient people of uncertain race. Some suppose them to have been Celts, others Iberians, and others a branch of the Siculi or earliest Italians. They were known to the Greeks from very early times, doubtless through the Phœcean mariners, who traded to the gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, and founded Marseilles. Hesiod and Æschylus mention them as visited and fought against by Hercules; and the latter poet incidentally shows his acquaintance with the advance of the delta of the Rhone, a proof that he is not dealing with mere vague names. At that early age, the Ligurians appear to have spread round the whole coast from the Pyrenees to the mouth of the Arno, and to have extended inland far beyond the Alps. In later times they were driven back by the Gauls to the Maritime Alps and the Apennines, and the coast below, round the head of the Gulf of Genoa. Here they became famous as warlike mountaineers, of small stature, but hardy and active, and admirably qualified for light troops. In this capacity they served the Carthaginians, and, after the close of the Second Punic War, they long resisted the efforts of the Romans to subdue them. It was only by the removal of many of them to Samnium, and by the plantation of Roman colonies, that their country was thoroughly pacified.

the Arno, the confluent of the Tiber, and the intervening rivers. Of such valleys we may find types, celebrated by the poets, in the Sabine retreat of Horace,

“ Or in Val d’Arno, where the Etrurian shades
High overarch’d, embower.”

This fair region was once, in all probability, divided between the Ligurians and the old Sicilian or Iapygian inhabitants of Italy; but in the historic times, it was the home of the people who called themselves *RAS*, *Rasena*, or *Rasenna*, but were named by the Greeks *Tyrsemi*, or *Tyrrheni*, by the Latins *Tusci*, or *Etrusci*, and their land *Etruria*.* Their origin and early growth forms one of the most interesting and difficult problems of antiquity. A supposed oriental element, of which, however, even some ancient writers denied the existence, in their customs and institutions, gave rise, as we have before seen,† to the fable that the ancient Lydian king, Tyrseus, had led a colony from Etruria; and the theory that they came by sea from the east has found advocates in modern times. But it is far more probable that their origin is to be sought beyond the Alps. It seems certain that, as early as the foundation of Rome, the Etruscans were a very powerful people, extending from the Alps over the plain of Lombardy and the western part of Italy, as far to the south as Vesuvius. At the northern limit of this wide region, the central chain of the Alps (in the *Grisons* and *Tyrol*) was occupied by the Rhætians, a name very similar to *Rasenna*; and ancient traditions represent the Rhætians as a branch of the Etruscans, driven back into the Alps, when the mass of the nation were expelled from the plain of Northern Italy by the Gauls. It seems very probable that the tradition, as often happens, has only inverted the true order of the movement, and that the Rhætians were (and, to some extent, still are), the representatives of the old *Rasenna*, in or near their ancient seats. We have the testimony of Livy, whose native city, Patavium (*Padua*), was not far from the Rhætian Alps, that the Rhætian language closely resembled the Etruscan; and singular likenesses have been traced between the existing local names in Rhætia and those of ancient Etruria.

* The Greek and Latin names are essentially the same, the apparent differences being due to the prosthetic vowel, and to the softening of the sibilant and its attendant mute. The original form seems to be that preserved in an old Umbrian inscription, *Turscus* (Lepsius, *Inscr. Umb.* tab. i. b.). In the name *Rasenna*, the root is *Ras*, the *enna* being a gentile termination; which is seen also in such names as *Pors-enna*, *Mæc-enas*, *Viv-enna*, &c. The Greek name *Turs-eni* seems to have the same termination.

† Vol. I. p. 252.

But the Rasenna alone did not form the Etruscan nation. It appears that a branch of the great Pelasgic race, who were the earliest known inhabitants of the whole region to the south of the Alps and the Balkan,—a branch which had made greater progress than the rest in civilization and power,—crossed the Alps and Apennines, and drove out the Umbrians from the region along the western coast, as the latter had previously driven out the Iapygians; and that these Tyrrhenian Pelasgians were in turn subdued by the powerful Rasenna, who descended from the Alps. The Rasenna did not expel the Tyrrhenians, but formed a dominant aristocracy, like the Normans in England. From the amalgamation of the conquerors with the conquered, seems to have sprung the great nation of the Etruscans, whose high civilization and maritime power is one of the earliest known facts of European history.

Unfortunately, the problem of their origin derives little aid from the powerful instrument of comparative philology, not for want of considerable remains of their language, but because the efforts to decipher their sepulchral inscriptions have been attended with scarcely any success. The great obstacle seems to be the want of close affinity to any known language. "The Etruscans," says Dionysius, "are like no other nation in language and manners." There seem, however, to be isolated elements in the Etruscan language closely akin to the Greek, and others like the Umbrian; thus representing the Pelasgian Tyrrhenians and the Umbrians, whom they are said to have displaced; while the bulk of the language, quite distinct from both these; and from the whole Græco-Latin family, is supposed to represent the dialect of the conquering Rasenna. If the opinion recently advanced should be confirmed by further researches—that this Rasennic element is akin to the Scandinavian dialects,—we should be brought to the deeply interesting result, that an infusion of Gothic blood gave its wonted stimulus to the greatness of the Etruscans, and that the Lombard plain was peopled to a great extent in the most ancient as in modern times, by the fair-haired Teutons.*

For, let their origin have been what it may, their ancient power and civilization are unquestionable facts. In the earliest ages of European history, they overspread the whole plain of Northern

* The phrase is introduced, not as an ornamental epithet, but from actual observation of the extent to which light hair, especially among the children, still bears witness to the Gothic element in the population of Lombardy.

Italy,* where remnants of the Etruscan population were left, after the nation had been expelled by the Gauls, as for example at Mantua; and other important cities were of Etruscan origin. Among these was the port of Adria,† which, by giving its name to the Adriatic, has borne witness, down to the present day, of the maritime power of the Etruscans in the eastern sea; while on the opposite side of the peninsula, they gave their own name to the Tyrrhenian or Tuscan Sea. Their naval enterprise is constantly referred to in Greek poetry and history. The colonies in Magna Græcia and Sicily were harassed by Tyrrhenian pirates; and in B.C. 538, they joined the Carthaginians, with sixty ships, in the great sea fight with the Phocæans off Alalia in Corsica.‡ They were leagued with the Carthaginians by treaties of commerce and navigation, with the view of preserving their empire in the Western Mediterranean against the maritime enterprises of the Greeks. Meanwhile, they had extended their power by land southwards as far as Campania, where, as well as in Central Etruria, they founded a confederacy of twelve cities, among which were Capua (which they called Vulturnum), and probably Pompeii, Herculaneum, and other cities on the coast.§ Here they came into conflict with the Greek cities, about B.C. 500, the epoch of their greatest ascendancy; but they did not succeed in reducing them. They made a great attack on Cumæ in B.C. 525; and again in B.C. 474, when Hiero of Syracuse, called in to the aid of the Cumæans, totally defeated the combined fleets of the Carthaginians and Etruscans. This was a great blow to the maritime power of the latter people, and before long we find the Syracusan navy ravaging the coasts of Etruria, and seizing the island of Æthalia (*Elba*), in B.C. 453. The Tyrrhenians sent a force to the aid of the Athenians in Sicily, in B.C. 414; and, on the other hand, Dionysius I. led an expedition against Cære, in Etruria (B.C. 387). Some time before this, the Samnites had conquered the Etruscan settlements in Campania; and the Gauls had overrun the plain of

* They seem to have been the sole masters of the country north of the Po. South of that river, they appear to have been mingled with the Umbrians.

† Some make Adria a still older Umbrian town. The place lost much of its importance through that change in the coast-line which has been noticed; but it still exists, with the same name, on the left bank of the *Tartaro*, north of the Po.

‡ See vol. I. p. 276.

§ It should be observed that they seem never to have displaced the Latin race from the left bank of the Tiber. Indeed it was only at a late period that the Etruscans expelled the Umbrians from the region on the right bank of that river; the Ciminian forest (south of Viterbo) having long formed the boundary of the races.

Northern Italy; * so that the Etruscans were almost confined to the limits of Etruria Proper. Their expulsion from Melpum, the last of their possessions beyond the Apennines, coinciding exactly with the taking of Veii by the Romans, marks the epoch of the decline of the Etruscan state (B.C. 396). But it took more than another century to complete their conquest by the Romans; and as late as B.C. 307 we find their navy taking part in the war of Agathocles with Carthage. A fatal blow was given to their power in Etruria itself by the victory of Q. Fabius Maximus over the united confederacy, at the Vadimonian Lake (B.C. 310). A few years afterwards, their last great stand against Rome, in league with the Umbrians, Samnites, and the Gallic Senones, failed in the two great battles of Sentinum, in Umbria (B.C. 295) and the Vadimonian Lake (B.C. 283), and the final triumph over the Etruscans as a nation was celebrated by Q. Marcius Philippus in the same year in which Pyrrhus arrived in Italy (B.C. 281). The few later wars were isolated efforts of single cities; the last being the revolt of the Faliscans in B.C. 241. But it seems clear that the Etruscans were the last people of Italy who submitted to the Romans.

The political constitution, the religious rites, and the high civilization of this great people are among the most interesting enquiries of ancient history, and are of peculiar importance for the elements which they contributed to the formation of the Roman state. We find among them those definite numbers, which play so important a part in the institutions of early nations.† The Etruscans worshipped twelve great gods, and formed a confederacy of twelve great cities, in each division of their empire. Their twelve cities in Central Etruria are well known, though we possess no perfect list of them: we are expressly told that they founded twelve also in Campania; and we can have no doubt, from analogy, that a similar dodecapolis existed in Northern Etruria, between the Alps and Apennines. Each city of the confederacy had its own independent government, by a close aristocracy, whom the

* The taking of Rome by the Gauls (B.C. 390) furnishes a proof of their previous conquest of the valley of the Po.

† The conflict and combination of the numbers 3 and 5, and, as arising out of them, of the duodecimal and decimal systems of notation, may be distinctly traced in Italy from a very early age. We may perhaps safely say that the primitive Sicilians were content to count by their 5 fingers and 2 hands, and that the Etruscans were the principal introducers of the more scientific combination of the numbers 3 and 4. The peoples of Central Italy used a combination of 3 and 10, as in the 30 Latin states, the 30 curiæ of Rome, and so forth.

Romans call *Principes* (chief men), and who alone had any voice in the councils of the nation. If the mass of the free citizens had any municipal power, it was extremely limited. The rural population, consisting probably of the conquered Pelasgian and Umbrian races, were in a state of serfdom, like the Spartan helots, and, like them, served in war under their masters. The ruling family, or caste, in each city, was that of the *Lucumones*,* who formed a sort of patriarchal priesthood, with a chieftain or king, elected from their number, sometimes for life, but allowed only a very limited power by his peers. The whole confederacy—we are now speaking of Central Etruria, as known in the historic times—met annually in the national sanctuary of Voltumna, just as the Latins met in the grove of Ferentina; and extraordinary meetings were held at the same place. The primary object of the assembly seems to have been religious, and in particular for the election of a chief pontiff for the whole nation. But we find no trace of a supreme magistrate, even in time of war; and, though it cannot be doubted that the assembly would consult for the common political interests, so little was there of concert, that most of the wars with Rome were carried on by separate states. In this want of unity we may trace the mutual jealousy of aristocratic governments, and in it must be sought the cause of the decline of a state once dominant in Italy. Another source of their weakness was the employment of mercenary soldiers, an instrument of vast power in the hands of an able despot, but a most insecure support for a free state. Their naval power would, from the very nature of the case, be subject to a more concentrated authority, though we are not told what it was. The analogy of history, however, teaches us that a fleet, whether raised by a central government, or formed by the contingents of different cities, when it goes forth to meet the perils of the sea and to face the enemy under an able admiral, soon forms a community severed in a great degree from the factions of home, and preserving, together with the professional spirit of the sailor, a strong sense of common patriotism, in a spirit opposed to revolution. Nor is it at all surprising that the marine was the last branch in which the Etruscan power succumbed.

The religious institutions of the Etruscans formed a chief element in those of Rome. Their polytheism retained traces of a purer theism; for, above the Twelve Great Gods, they recognized a higher class of deities, the “Shrouded Gods,” who did not

* This title, which in Etruscan appears to have been *Lauchmê*, is frequently mistaken by the Romans for a proper name.

reveal themselves to mankind, and to whose will even the great gods were subject. These latter, six male and six female, formed the council of their chief, TINA, or TINIA, whom the Romans identified with Jupiter, as they saw in the chief female deity, *Cupra*, their Juno. The goddess next in rank, *Menrva* or *Menerva*, was of course the Roman Minerva. In the numerous minor gods or *Genii*,* the *Penates* or household deities, and the *Lares*, or spirits of deified men, we trace some of the most characteristic features of the Roman mythology. It was chiefly, too, from the Etruscans that the Romans learnt the arts of augury and divination. The ceremonials of worship were detailed, with minute precision, in the twelve sacred books ascribed to a mysterious being, named TAGES, the son of a Genius Jovialis, who appeared in the form of a boy, but endowed with the wisdom of an old man, and died as soon as he had dictated the contents of the sacred books. It is scarcely necessary to point out the resemblance to the fable of Zoroaster, by which the Persians likewise gave dignity to their sacred books. Such was the "Etrusca Disciplina," which the noblest Roman youths studied under the Lucumones.

It remains to mention the great progress which the Etruscans had made in art at a very early period. The ruins of their great cities, with the traditions respecting their temples and fortifications, attest their proficiency in architecture. One of the orders used by the Romans bore the name of "Tuscan," but it is generally regarded as a later modification of the Greek Doric.† The remains of their city walls are in the massive style called by the mythical name of Cyclopean. They consist of irregular blocks, rudely squared, and laid in horizontal courses without cement, a form which seems to differ from the polygonal construction of the Latin and other cities, not as a stage in the progress of the art, but simply in consequence of the natural cleavage of the different materials. The most marked characteristic of Etruscan architecture is the use of the arch, especially in its application to the construction of works of drainage, not only for cities, but as the means of carrying off the waters of lakes and redeeming marshes for

* The exact idea attached to this name, which literally signifies a *birth-spirit*, is that of an inferior deity, who had the power of producing life, and who attended the being he had ushered into the world, through its whole mortal course, as a sort of spiritual essence, governing his destiny for good or ill, like the *Dæmons* of the Greeks. The good *genii* were *Genii Joviales*, the offspring of Jove.

† Though grand in its simplicity, this order is said by Vitruvius to have had a low and heavy effect. It may be seen in Inigo Jones's portico of St. Paul's, Covent Garden.

cultivation. Of this we have a celebrated example in the great sewer of Rome, the *Cloaca Maxima*, an undoubted work of the Etruscan period of the monarchy. Their fame for laying out the streets of their cities affords another proof that their art was based upon utility. From the tradition that the Romans borrowed from the Etruscans their dramatic entertainments, their races, and athletic sports, and even their exhibitions of gladiators, it has been inferred that the latter people possessed theatres and amphitheatres, but none of these buildings have been discovered, except such as probably belong to the Roman period. The influence of their domestic architecture on that of Rome is proved by the statement that the *atrium* of the Roman house was borrowed from the Etruscans. The general arrangement of their dwellings seems to have been imitated in their tombs.

These tombs furnish nearly all our monumental knowledge of the Etruscan people, and our hope of acquiring more. Unlike the raised sepulchres of the Romans, they are invariably sunk beneath the ground, or excavated in the solid rock, though often with an architectural superstructure or vestibule. The form is either round or square; the ceiling is flat, and frequently sculptured in imitation of the beams of a house; and the walls are decorated with paintings, representing scenes of common life. In one case, a labyrinth has been found, such as Livy describes at the base of the tomb of Porsenna. The sarcophagi and urns, found in these tombs, furnish the chief examples of Etruscan sculptures, in the narrower sense of the word. They belong chiefly to a late period, and their style and subjects bear evident marks of Greek influence. But in the plastic forms of statuary the Etruscans early attained great excellence. Their bronze statues (*Tuscanica signa*) and smaller figures (*Tyrrhena Sigilla*) were celebrated throughout the ancient world, and many examples of them are still preserved. The most conspicuous are the famous She-wolf of the Capitol, and the Chimæra and Orator in the gallery of Florence. These works were, for the most part, in the same stiff archaic style which we see in the earliest examples of Grecian art. The Etruscans were also great manufacturers of candelabra, mirrors, and other works in bronze, and of gold cups, necklaces, and metal ornaments in general. The processes and useful applications of metallurgy were known to them from a very early age. They worked the iron mines of Elba, and the interior of Etruria furnished them with that abundance of copper, which accounts for the early use of a massive bronze coinage in the states of

Central Italy. They were equally famous for their terra-cotta vases and statues, and their black and red pottery; but the painted vessels, which have become famous under the name of "Etruscan Vases," are now proved to be works of Greek art, whatever may have been the places of their manufacture. They have been found, not only in Etruria, but throughout Magna Græcia, and in Greece itself; their subjects are from the Greek mythology, the figures being often distinguished by their Greek names; and in many cases they are inscribed with the names of their Greek artists. But, indeed, the whole character of Etruscan art, from a very early period, attests the influence of the Greeks, and bears out the criticism that it was rather receptive than creative.*

The wall-paintings in the Etruscan tombs are of very unequal merit, and generally in the stiff archaic style. They are chiefly valuable for the light they throw on the domestic life of the people, and their festive scenes confirm the statements of the Roman writers respecting the fondness of the Etruscans for the pleasures of the table. The natural resources of their country, their wide dominion and extensive commerce, aided by the early use of coined money, would naturally tend to their growth in wealth and luxury; but the records of their high civilization and gross sensuality seem both to have been exaggerated. Their own traditions described the art of writing as introduced by the Greeks, of whose alphabet the Etruscan seems to be a modification. There is no proof of their having possessed a literature other than their sacred books; and their science was chiefly connected with religious uses. Its most important applications were to the marking out the boundaries of land, which were placed under the safeguard of the proper deities;—observing and mapping out the heavens for the purposes of augury;—determining the divisions of months and years, and those longer secular periods to which they attached a mysterious importance, as governing the destinies of their nation;—and arranging a scale of numerals, and a system of weights and measures;—in all which points they were followed by the Romans.

It should be added that the Etruscans were distinguished from the other Italian races, as well as from the Greeks, by their personal appearance. They were short and stout, with large heads, and had a tendency to corpulence, aggravated by their luxurious habits; at least, such was the opinion of the Romans, embodied in the proverbial epithet, "*obesus Etruscus*." One feature in the

* Müller, *Archäologie der Kunst*, § 178.

history of this people deserves especial notice, namely, that, after all that is told of their extensive maritime power, they have left no traces of their influence beyond the limits of their own country. "Their historical development," as Mommsen observes, "began and ended in Italy." They were already a powerful state, when the foundation of Rome formed a new starting-point for the history of the peninsula and of the world.

CHAPTER XX.

ROME UNDER THE KINGS.

"The Niobe of nations! there she stands,
 Childless and crownless, in her voiceless woe;
 An empty urn within her wither'd hands,
 Whose holy dust was scatter'd long ago;
 The Scipio's tomb contains no ashes now;
 The very sepulchres lie tenantless
 Of their heroic dwellers: dost thou flow,
 Old Tiber, through a marble wilderness?
 Rise, with thy yellow waves, and mantle her distress!

"The Goth, the Christian, Time, War, Flood, and Fire
 Have dealt upon the seven-hill'd city's pride;
 She saw her glories, star by star, expire,
 And up the steep barbarian monarchs ride
 Where the car climbed the Capitol; far and wide
 Temple and tower went down, nor left a site:—
 Chaos of ruins! who shall trace the void,
 O'er the dim fragments cast a lunar light,
 And say,—'Here was,' or 'is,'—where all is doubly night?"—BYRON:

THE CAMPAGNA AND SURROUNDING HILLS—THE TIBER: ITS COURSE AND CHARACTER—THE SITE OF ROME—ITS PRIMEVAL ASPECT—DESCRIPTION OF ITS SEVEN HILLS—MYTHICAL CHARACTER OF THE EARLY ROMAN HISTORY—EVANDER—ÆNEAS—ASCANIUS AND THE ALBAN KINGS—LEGEND OF ROMULUS AND REMUS—ROMANS AND SABINES—INSTITUTIONS AND CONQUESTS ASCRIBED TO ROMULUS—HIS DEATH AND APOTHEOSIS—ROMAN CHRONOLOGY—ERA OF THE FOUNDATION OF ROME—INTERREGNUM—LEGEND OF NUMA POMPILIUS—HIS RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS—THE ROMAN CALENDAR—THE SUBSEQUENT KINGS OF ROME—DISCUSSION OF THE LEGENDS—LATIN ORIGIN OF ROME—EARLY SETTLEMENTS ON THE SEVEN HILLS—THE CITY OF THE RAMNES ON THE PALATINE—TWO PRINCIPAL THEORIES OF ITS ORIGIN—FIRST, AS A ROBBER COLONY OF ALBA, EXTENDED BY WAR, CONQUERED AND REMODELLED BY THE SABINES—CHARACTER AND INSTITUTIONS OF THIS PEOPLE—THE SETTLEMENT ON THE QUIRINAL, AND UNION WITH THE RAMNIANS—THE SECOND THEORY OF A NATURAL GROWTH FROM LATIN SETTLEMENTS ON THE SEVEN HILLS—ROME VIEWED AS THE EMPORIUM OF LATIUM—EXTENT OF THE PRIMITIVE CITY—THE ORIGINAL SEPTIMONTIUM—AMALGAMATION WITH THE CITY ON THE QUIRINAL—TULLUS HOSTILIUS—LEGEND OF THE HORATII AND CURIATII, AND OF THE CONQUEST OF ALBA—ETRUSCAN AND SABINE WARS—ANCUS MARCIUS—HIS CONQUESTS IN LATIUM AND ALONG THE TIBER—HIS WORKS AT ROME—ORIGIN OF THE PLEBS—THE ETRUSCAN DYNASTY—TARQUINIUS PRISCUS—HIS INSTITUTIONS, WARS, AND PUBLIC WORKS—SERVIUS TULLIUS—HIS NEW CONSTITUTION—THE WALLS OF ROME—ALLIANCE WITH THE LATINS—LEGEND OF HIS DEATH—TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS—HIS FOREIGN ALLIANCES AND WARS—THE SIBYL—TAKING OF GABII—L. JUNIUS BRUTUS—THE LEGEND OF LUCRETIA—EXPULSION OF THE TARQUINS—REVIEW OF REGAL ROME.

To TRACE the greatness of Rome from her first beginnings, we must go back to a time when the Tiber flowed, not through a "marble wilderness," strewn with the wrecks of imperial magnificence, but through the open waste of the wide Campagna. This

plain, a scene so memorable in history, extends along the central portion of the western shore of Italy for the length of about ninety miles, between the spur of the Apennines, which terminates at Cape Linaro,* and the Circean Promontory. It has an average breadth of twenty-seven miles between the long stretch of flat coast which presents so striking a contrast to the noble gulfs of Gaeta, Naples, and Salerno further down, and the lower chain of the Apennines, which encircle it on the north and east. A spectator, standing on Mount Janiculus, overlooking the site of Rome, sees this chain across the undulating surface of the Campagna at the distance of about ten or fifteen miles, and behind it the central ridge of the Apennines, capped with snow for half the year. The chief objects of the panorama are as memorable for their historical and poetical associations, as they are conspicuous for their beauty. To the north-west, the plain of the Aro (*Arrone*) is bounded by the Etruscan hills. On the north, about twenty miles distant, stands out Soracte, whose snow-clad summit invited Horace to enjoy the pleasures of winter. Eastward, across the Tiber, lies the beautiful range of the Sabine Apennines; and conspicuous above the rest the peak of Lucretilis (*M. Gennaro*), which sheltered the poet's summer retreat. Nearer in the foreground, where the Anio bursts out of the hills, is Tibur (*Tivoli*), whose beauties he extols above all the most famous sites of Greece. Then follow the hills of Latium, with their sterner associations;—the rocky summit of Præneste (*Palestrina*) standing out in front of the chain, celebrated in medieval as well as ancient history;—and the isolated volcanic mass of the Alban Mount (*Monte Cavo* or *Albano*), the sanctuary of the Latin race, down the side of which the "Long White City" (*Alba Longa*) extended to the lake of the same name. Its highest summit, crowned of old with the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, was visible even to mariners at sea. From this point there is an uninterrupted view to the south-east over the plain, till it sinks into the sea, which is only distinguished from the land by the brighter light reflected from its waters. Far off amidst this level may be dimly seen the isolated hill of the promontory of Circe, whose white cliffs reflect the rising beams of the sun, her fabled father. Of the aspect of the Campagna near Rome, no better idea can be given than by the description of Dr. Arnold:—"The lowland country of the Campagna is broken by long green swelling ridges, the ground rising and falling, as in the heath

* This headland, the site of the Roman fort of *Castrum Novum*, lies a little above 42° N. lat.

country of Surrey and Berkshire. The streams are dull and sluggish, but the hill sides above them constantly break away into little rocky cliffs, where on every ledge the wild fig now strikes out its branches, and tufts of broom are clustering, but which in old times formed the natural strength of the citadels of the numerous cities of Latium. Except in these narrow dells, the present aspect of the country is all bare and desolate, with no trees, nor any human habitation. But anciently, in the times of the early kings of Rome, it was full of independent cities, and in its population, and the careful cultivation of its little garden-like farms, must have resembled the most flourishing parts of Lombardy or the Netherlands.* The southern extremity of the Campagna forms a dead level, opening on to the Gulf of Gaeta, between the Circean promontory and Tarracina, and watered by the Nymphæus, Ufens, and Amasenus, with other rivers. The "Pomptinus Ager" as it was called, from Pontia (a town which disappeared very early), was once celebrated for its fertility, and contained twenty-three flourishing towns. But, before the middle of the second century B.C., the neglect to regulate the water-courses had converted it into a pestilential marsh, which was only partially drained by Cethegus (B.C. 160) and Julius Cæsar. The canal, which continued the Via Appia through the Pomptine Marshes to the temple of Feronia, at the foot of the hill of Anxur (*Terracina*), furnished Horace with his well-known picture of the lazy and extortionate boatmen, and the traveller, kept awake by gnats and frogs, singing of his mistress till he falls asleep. The drainage works were resumed about the end of the eighteenth century, but the marshes are still a hotbed of malaria in the summer. Their extent is about twenty-four miles long by eight or ten wide.

The northern part of the Campagna is watered by the Tiber and its confluent, of which the Anio is the chief. The sacred river of the Romans, "Father Tiber," more anciently called Rumon and Albula, has a course somewhat shorter than the Thames,† of about 200 miles from its source near Tifernum, in the Apennines, to its

* *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 35.

† A fancy, similar to that which compares Edinburgh with Athens, has likened the Tiber to the Tay. The resemblance is said to have been first traced by the Romans themselves, who saw a second Campus Martius in the North Inch of Perth; but Sir Walter Scott resents such a disparagement of the northern river:—

"Behold the Tiber!" the vain Roman cried,
Viewing the ample Tay from Baigle's side;
But where's the Scot that would the vaunt repay,
And hail the puny Tiber for the Tay?"

mouth at Ostia. For the first 110 miles, it flows as a mountain stream, between Etruria and Umbria, to its confluence with the Nar, which divided the latter country from the Sabine territory, division continued by the Tiber itself for about 70 miles, to its confluence with the Anio, three miles above Rome. It is in this part of its course, between M. Soracte and the Sabine Apennines, that the Tiber flows out of the mountains into the plain of the Campagna. The Anio separated Latium from the Sabine territory, which thus occupied the angle between the two rivers, looking towards Rome. From this point to its mouth, a distance of about 21 miles, the Tiber was the boundary between Etruria and Latium. It falls into the sea by two mouths, forming an island which was sacred to Venus, and is still called the *Isola Sacra*. At its southern mouth stood the ancient port of Ostia, which was so early blocked up by the deposits of the river, that Augustus made a new port on the northern mouth, the *Portus Augusti*, now *Fiumicino*. From Ostia the Tiber was navigable for the largest ships up to Rome, whence the navigation for boats was continued as far as the confluence of the Nar. At Rome the river is about 300 feet wide, and from 12 to 18 deep: its fall for the 18 miles down to its mouth is 33 feet.

The character of the Tiber, as a rapid mountain stream, flowing through no lake to regulate its volume and receive its alluvial deposits, is summed up in the one line of Virgil,

“ Vorticibus rapidis et multa flavus arena ; ”

and its turbid water still justifies the frequent epithet of the “yellow Tiber.” Its rapid eddies, frequent floods, and large alluvial deposits, have produced great effects on its course through the Campagna and on the site of Rome itself. All the engineering skill of the masters of the world was unable to protect their city from the inundations of its sacred stream, one of which (probably that of B.C. 27) is so graphically described by Horace:—

“ Vidimus flavum Tiberim, retortis
Litore Etrusco violenter undis,
Ire dejectum monumenta regis
Templaque Vestæ.”

It was not indeed till the Etruscan kings executed the great drain, the “*Cloaca Maxima*,” that the valleys between the hills of Rome were made dry land; and it seems that at no distant time the hills nearer to the river were islands. On the other hand, the single island (*Insula Tiberina*) in the stream, opposite to the

Capitol, is supposed to have been formed by the deposits of the river within the historic period.

If a traveller had performed that voyage up the Tiber, which Ovid ascribes to the Arcadian Evander and his mother Carmenta about 60 years before the Trojan War, and on stopping at what was long afterwards the site of Rome, had heard the prophetic voice of the nymph declaring,

“ Fallor an hi fient ingentia moenia colles,
Juraque ab hâc terrâ cætera terra petet :
Montibus his olim totus promittitur orbis : ”—

it is hard to decide whether the fitness of the spot for such a destiny would have been so evident as to silence the doubt,—

“ Quis tantum fati credat habere locum.”

From the bend of the river below “the island of the Tiber” (if that island had then an existence) he would have seen on his left the long ridge of Mount Janiculus, which afterwards formed the outpost of the city on the Etruscan side, rising to the height of 260 feet. The plain below the mountain, round which the river swept, and where the “Gardens of Cæsar” afterwards lay, was probably a lake or a marsh; and such was certainly the case with the level on the other bank, afterwards the Velabrum and the Cattle Market (Forum Boarium), and with the valleys that branched out from it, between the Palatine hill in the centre, the Capitoline on the north, and the Aventine on the south. These three hills, or mountains, as the Romans always called them, formed the front group of the famous Seven Hills. They are divided by a continuous valley, on the N.E. and S.E. from the rest, which sweep round them like a theatre—the Quirinal, the Viminal, the Esquiline, the Cælian, and another hill further to the south, which faces the Cælian on the north-east, and the Aventine on the north-west. This last had no distinctive name, but was reckoned as a part of the Aventine, and included in the circuit of the most ancient walls. At the northern extremity of the whole site is a ninth hill, the Mons Pincius, or Collis Hortorum, separated by a valley from the Quirinal, and looking down to the south-west upon the Campus Martius, the level plain enclosed by the sweep which the Tiber makes towards the northern foot of Mount Janiculus. The northern part of this plain is continued on the right bank of the river in the “Ager Vaticanus,” which is bounded on the west by the Mons Vaticanus, a ridge resembling the Janiculus, but smaller and lower. In ancient times this hill

re-echoed the shouts with which the people assembled in the Campus Martius greeted a favourite,

“ ut patèrni
Fluminis ripæ, simul et jocosa
Redderet laudes tibi Vaticani
Montis imago ; ”—

and now the glorious basilica of St. Peter, and the palace of the Popes, called the Vatican, stand in the plain at its foot. The long ridges of the Vatican and Janiculus rise to a much greater height than the hills on the opposite bank. “The hills of Rome”—says Arnold—“are such as we rarely see in England, low in height, but with steep and rocky sides. In early times the natural wood remained in patches amidst the buildings, as at this day it grows here and there on the green sides of the Monte Testaccio.” Their elevation was far more conspicuous in ancient times than now,* when the valleys between them have been raised generally fifteen or twenty feet, and in some places considerably more. Their precipices have been scarped down, and their natural outlines obliterated, more or less, by time and building; and it is only here and there that the steep sides remain unaltered, as in the cliff at the south-west angle of the Capitol, called with doubtful correctness, the Tarpeian rock.

This general outline of the site of Rome requires to be filled up somewhat more in detail, but only so far as to prepare for a better understanding of the history; for it is quite beyond our province to touch upon those questions of topography, which have been disputed with an animosity as fierce as if the Romans and Sabines were once more fighting for their respective hills. The central one of the whole group of hills is the PALATINE, which was also the seat of the original Latin city of Rome. It rises above the Capitoline and Aventine by about fifteen feet, but is lower than the four eastern hills. Its shape is a tolerably regular lozenge, looking north-west

* The following table of heights, as determined by Sir George Schukburg, is taken from Mr. Dyer's elaborate and invaluable article, “Rome,” in *Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography* :—

HEIGHT ABOVE THE MEDITERRANEAN.

JANICULUS, near the <i>Villa Spada</i>	260 feet
PINCIAN, garden of the <i>Villa Medici</i>	165 „
ESQUILINE, floor of <i>S. Maria Maggiore</i>	154 „
VIMINAL and QUIRINAL, at their junction	141 „
PALATINE, floor of imperial palace	133 „
CÆLIAN, near the Claudian Aqueduct	125 „
CAPITOLINE, W. end of the Tarpeian rock	118 „
AVENTINE, near the <i>Priority of Malta</i>	117 „

towards the Capitol, across the valley of the Vicus Tuscus; west, over the low ground already noticed, to the Tiber and Mount Janiculus; south-west to the Aventine; south-east to the Cælian; and north-east to the group formed by the Esquiline, the Viminal, and the Quirinal. In the valley which skirted this side, beginning from the eastern face of the Capitoline, lay the Forum and the Sacra Via, along which the triumphal processions of the conquerors of the world ascended to the Capitol. This part of the valley is slightly divided from its eastern prolongation, which runs between the Esquiline and the Cælian, by a small hill, projecting like a bastion from the north-eastern face of the Palatine, called Velia, over which the Via Sacra passed. Of the hills around the Palatine on the east and north, the Cælian stands alone; the other three—or more properly four—are but the branches of one mass, which slopes down on the north and east to the Anio and one of its tributary brooks; while on the west, the Quirinal and the southern branch of the Esquiline curve inwards like the horns of a harbour, enclosing within their sweep the Viminal and the southern branch of the Esquiline. The two arms of the Esquiline were originally reckoned as separate hills, the southern or principal being named Oppius, and the smaller offshoot Cispius. The Capitoline, the smallest but most famous of the whole group, originally called the Saturnian hill,* stands out like a detached prolongation of the Quirinal towards the river, from which it is distant about 300 paces. It was originally almost close to the Quirinal, till Trajan scarped off a portion of the latter, to enlarge the valley for his Forum. The Capitoline has a saddle-like depression, dividing its top into two summits; of which the northern was probably the Capitol, and the southern the Arx, or citadel of Rome. Lastly, the Aventine stands out, to the south-west of the group formed by the other six,—in an isolation which, as we shall see, is not without political significance,—with the Tiber sweeping round its western base. Its shape is similar to the Palatine; but it is somewhat larger. Such was the surface of the ground on which Rome was built. The extent of the city, first, when its different parts were united under the kings, and finally, as it existed under the emperors, is shewn on our map by the two lines of walls, which bear the names of Servius Tullius and of Aurelian. But the original

* The *Capitolium* itself, from which the hill was named, was the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the chief Roman sanctuary, to which the triumphing generals carried up the spoils of their victories.

city was confined within limits much narrower even than the former.

When the Romans, who were not by nature a literary people, began to study their own early history, they found an endless store of poetical legends, accumulated by national and family pride, with a paucity of genuine records almost unparalleled in the annals of any other people. Untrained in the principles of criticism, and caring but little for the naked truth, in comparison with the illustration of the long story of Rome's greatness, they not only accepted the legends without suspicion, but even adhered to them with a wilful neglect of the better authorities within their reach. The records kept by the Pontiffs were destroyed in the burning of the city by the Gauls; and it was far easier to supply their place from popular traditions, and from the lays of ancient bards in praise of the great patrician houses, than to decipher antique inscriptions, and unravel the truths hidden beneath national customs and institutions. Thus it happened that when, in the Augustan age, the poet Virgil and the historian Livy undertook to illustrate the origin of the people, the latter, equally with the former, composed an epic of the city's greatness, of no authority as a history.*

It is quite unnecessary to relate at length the oft-repeated stories, which traced the origin of the Roman people from the East, and which were developed into no less than twenty-five different accounts of the foundation of the city. The connection of the old Latin race with the Pelasgian stock was recognized by the traditions which ascribed the origin of Rome to the latter, as well as by the very ancient legend, that Evander, flying from Arcadia, sixty years before the Trojan War, was directed by his mother, the prophetic nymph Carmenta,† to build a city at the foot of the Palatine hill, which was called Pallantium from his grandson Pallas, or from the Arcadian town of the same name. This venerable tradition was eclipsed in general favour by the more popular legend of the settlement of a Trojan colony in Italy under Æneas.

* It is beyond our province to discuss the great question of the credibility of the early Roman history, which was first raised more than a century ago by L. de Beaufort, in his work, *Sur l'incertitude des Cinq Premiers Siècles de l'Histoire Romaine*, Utrecht, 1738, and has been decisively settled by Niebuhr. Besides the well-known recent histories of Rome, the reader may consult the work of Sir G. C. Lewis on the subject, and for a popular sketch of the poetical sources of the legendary history, the "Introduction" to Lord Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

† In this name (originally Casmenta) we trace that of the Camenae (Casmene), the Latin Muses.

One form of the story made Æneas himself the founder of Rome, either alone, or in conjunction with the Aborigines of Latium. This is the favourite account with the Greek writers, some of whom even represent Æneas as coming into Italy in company with Ulysses, while others ascribe the foundation of Rome to a son of Ulysses and Circe. The other form of the Trojan story, so well known from its adoption by Virgil and Livy, is said to have been first embodied in an historical work by Q. Fabius Pictor, the earliest Roman annalist in prose, about B.C. 200. Æneas arrives in Italy, after many adventures in his flight from Troy, marries the daughter of Latinus, the king of the Aborigines, builds the city which he names after her Lavinium, and unites the Aborigines with his Trojan followers into the Latin people. Thirty years later, his son Ascanius removes his capital to Alba Longa. After eleven generations of kings, who reign over the Latins at Alba for three hundred years,* Amulius usurps the throne to the exclusion of his elder brother Numitor, whose only daughter Silvia he dooms to perpetual virginity as a Vestal. But Silvia is visited by Mars, and bears the twins Romulus and Remus, whose cradle, exposed by the order of Amulius on the flooded Tiber, is floated to the foot of the Palatine, and overturned by the roots of a wild fig-tree, which became, under the name of Ficus Ruminalis, as profound an object of reverence as the sacred olive of Athena.

The twins are suckled by a she-wolf,† fed by a woodpecker, and at length found by the king's herdsman Faustulus, who brings them up as his own children. The brothers, with a band of other youths, feed their flocks on the Palatine, while the herdsmen of Numitor occupy the Aventine. A quarrel between the two bands leads to the recognition of Romulus and Remus, the slaughter of Amulius, and the restoration of Numitor to the throne of Alba, while the twins return to found a new city at their former haunts. Romulus wishes to build on the Palatine, Remus on the Aventine; the quarrel ends in the death of Remus by his brother's hand, and ROME, the city of Romulus, rises on the summit of the Palatine. To people his new city, Romulus opens an asylum for outlaws and runaway slaves. He provides them with wives by the stratagem so well known as the "Rape of the Sabine women." In the war

* The prevalence of the numbers 3 and 10 among the Latins is seen in these legends:—Æneas reigns 3 years; Ascanius, at Lavinium, 30 years; his dynasty at Alba 300 years.

† This part of the legend is commemorated by the celebrated bronze wolf of the Capitol, already mentioned as a work of Etruscan art, and said to have been dedicated in B.C. 296.

which ensues, Titus Tatius, the king of the Sabines of Cures, obtains possession of the Saturnian hill, afterwards called the Capitol. After many battles in the swampy valley where the Forum afterwards stood, the combatants are separated by the devotion of the Sabine women, the daughters of the one people and the wives of the other. The nations are united under the joint government of their two kings, each having its separate city, the Romans on the Palatine, the Sabines on the Quirinal, while the "Comitia," or assemblies of the united people, are held in the valley already mentioned. They are distinguished as two tribes,* by the names of Ramnenses and Titienses; and the numbers already adopted by Romulus in the organization of the state are doubled. Each tribe contains ten curiæ of a hundred citizens; with a hundred horsemen, ten to each curia. The retention by the Sabines of the Capitol, which formed with the Quirinal their city of Quirium, the adoption by the united people of the Sabine name of Quirites (*Spearmen*),† and the Sabine appellation of Quirinus, by which Romulus was deified, are tacit confessions that the Sabine prevailed over the Latin nationality in the union; and though the legend makes Romulus sole king, after Tatius had been slain by the people of Laurentium, he is succeeded by the Sabine Numa, who gives laws and religious institutions to the united people. Meanwhile, another element is introduced into the new state. In the midst of the contest between the Romans and the Sabines, we find an Etruscan Lucumo, named Cæles Vibenna, in possession of the Cælian hill, and aiding Romulus in the war with Tatius. His followers are admitted as a third tribe, called Luceres; and thus the number of the curiæ becomes 30, and of the citizens, 3000. These form the *Legio*, or military *levy* of the whole state, with the 300 cavalry, who are at first called *Celeres* (that is, *swift*), and afterwards *Equites* (horsemen), whose three *Centuries* always bore the names of Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres.

In their civil capacity, these 3300 citizens formed the ROMAN

* *Tribus* = a third part. Hence, the division of a whole into "two tribes" is an apparent contradiction in terms. But, besides that the word is used with reference to the ultimate number of three tribes, this generic use of the "third" for a division, among a people who counted by threes, resembles our use of the word "quarter."

† This name became the appellation of the Romans in their civil capacity; but the memory of their double origin is preserved in the formula "Populus Romanus Quirites." In such formulæ it was the custom to omit the conjunction, as in "Patres Conscripti" for "Patres et Conscripti," and in the names of the consuls when used for the date of each year.

PEOPLE,* who alone enjoyed political rights. The government was a limited monarchy, the king being bound to lay every matter of importance before the people in their *Comitia Curiata*, or Assembly of the *Curiae*, where the question was decided by the majority of the *Curiae*. Even the *imperium*†, or power of life and death, which has always been held essential to command in war, had to be conferred on the king by a vote of the *Curiae*. This power, with that of corporal punishment, was symbolized by the axes, bound up in bundles of rods (*fascēs*), which were borne before the king by twelve officers called *Lictors* (binders), a mark of state which is said to have been borrowed from Etruria. The king had his council called the *Senate*, or body of Elders, which consisted at first of 100 members, 10 from each of the original *Curiae*. This number was doubled by the junction with the Sabines; but the Luceres did not at first send any member to the Senate, which remained therefore at 200, till Tarquinus Priscus, the first Etruscan king of Rome, raised its numbers to 300 by the admission of the Luceres. The Senators bore the title of *Patres* (Fathers); and there can be little doubt that they were the heads of the *Gentes* (Houses or Clans), ten of which originally composed each *curia*. Every gens was distinguished by a name, which was borne by each of its members (*gentiles*) as his principal surname;‡ and all were bound together by

* *Populus Romanus*. It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind the meaning of this phrase, especially as we are accustomed to use the word *people* in the opposite sense—for the non-privileged class.

† Amidst the confusion of terms introduced by the pride of rulers and its reflection in their subjects, it is well to bear in mind that *imperial* power signifies properly the absolute power of life and death.

‡ The gentile names are of the adjective form, ending in *-ius*. They were usually derived from some divine, or heroic, or other ancestor—real or supposed—as the *Marcii* from Mars; *Julii* from Iulus, the son of *Æneas*; the *Appii Claudii* from the Sabine leader, Attus Clausus. A Roman had ordinarily three names: (1) the *Prænomen*, (forename) or personal name, as Quintus, Marcus, Titus, &c.; (2) the *Nomen*, or name proper, which was the gentile name, as Tullius, Cornelius, &c.; (3) the *Cognomen*, or surname, which was the name of his familia, as Cicero, Scipio, &c. A man might be addressed either by his *nomen* or *cognomen*; but the formal mode of address was by the personal and gentile name. Thus, when Cicero was asked to give his opinion in the Senate, the Consul would address him with the words, “*Dic, Marce Tulli.*” A second cognomen, called the *Agnomen* (or added name), or even more than one, could be obtained as the record of some achievement. Lastly, there was the *Nomen Adoptivum*; when a member of one gens was adopted into another he usually took the three names of his adoptive father, with the name of his own gens added in the form of an adjective in *-anus*. We have examples of all these forms in the name of the younger Scipio. He was the son of L. Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia; being adopted by P. Cornelius Scipio, he took this name with the adoptive addition; his exploits in Africa and in Spain added two *agnomina*; and

certain religious rites (*sacra gentilitia*) celebrated in the chapel of the gens (*sacellum*); but there was no necessary connection of kindred among the members. The Gentes were divided into *Familie*, which properly denoted *persons* in the legal sense, those, namely, who had the power of a *pater-familias* over their children, children's children, and slaves. In all this we see a patriarchal constitution, with the Patres at its head. The Patres of the Luceres were distinguished by a title which implies an inferiority of privilege in their tribe, as the *Patres Minores Gentium*. It may be well here to explain, by anticipation, the full title by which the Senators were ultimately distinguished. To fill up the vacancies caused by the tyranny of Tarquinius Superbus, the earliest consuls under the Republic enrolled in the Senate certain noble plebeians of equestrian rank; but these were distinguished from the Patres of the three tribes by the name of *Conscripti* (enrolled), and thenceforth the full title of the Senators became *Patres Conscripti*.

The *Patres* were the heads of houses of the *Patricii*, or Patricians.* Under this name were included all those who were numbered in the tribes, *curiæ*, and *gentes*, in one word all the full citizens of the state.† They possessed, of course, all the rights and were bound to discharge the duties of a citizen. Their rights were public and private;‡ the former including the right of voting in the tribes,§ and (afterwards, under the Republic,) eligibility to the offices of the state;|| and the latter, the freedom of trading and contracting marriages with each other.¶ To them alone belonged a share in the religious rites of the state.** At a later age, when, as we shall see, other persons were admitted to the citizenship with less complete privileges, the full citizens were distinguished by a special title.†† These alone, as we have said, formed at first the Roman People; but, beside them, there existed, from the very first, an inferior class, of great importance in the constitutional history of Rome, the Clients (*clientes*), to whom the Patricians stood in the relation of Patrons (*patroni*).‡‡

so he became *P. Cornelius Scipio Emilianus Africanus Numantinus*. Titles of office were placed after the name.

* The frequent confusion of *Patres* and *Patricii* must be carefully avoided. The words had probably at first the same meaning, namely *fathers of families*.

† The term *civitas* denoted properly, in the concrete sense, the body of citizens: it was also used, in the abstract sense, for the condition of a citizen.

‡ *Jus publicum* and *jus privatum*. § *Jus suffragii*. || *Honores*. ¶ *Commercium* and *connubium*. ** *Jus sacrorum*. †† *Optimo jure cives*.

‡‡ The etymological connection of *patricius* and *patronus*—both derived from *pater*—seems to show that the client was regarded as belonging to the family of his patron.

The client looked to his patron for counsel and support, especially in law-suits, and rendered in return certain aid, defined by custom, in the form of pecuniary and personal service, like the retainers of the feudal barons in the middle ages. This resemblance strikes us when we read of the Sabines under Tatius being followed by their clients, and of the Sabine chieftain, Attus Clausus, coming to Rome with a numerous *clientela*; and such cases seem to prove that the institution was an ancient one among the Italian nations. It has been conjectured also that a part, at least, of the body of clients was formed by the Italians who were conquered in the first wars which doubtless followed the foundation of the city, and which the legend represents Romulus as carrying on without intermission during the forty years of his reign. That many of the neighbouring people, who joined the new state from policy or fear, would be enrolled as clients, seems highly probable; but to regard the people of conquered cities in that light appears to trench upon the distinction between the Clients and the Plebs, a question which has presently to be noticed. The client bore the gentile name of his patron, and enjoyed a modified citizenship.

Such is the political constitution ascribed to Romulus by the legend of the foundation of the city. He is further represented as just and gentle in the exercise of his judicial functions. The practice attributed to him of punishing crimes by a fine of cattle rather than with death, is a well-known patriarchal usage. The stories of his exploits in war are as purely mythical as his own personal existence. Of these the most celebrated is the defeat of the people of Cæcina, whose king Acron was slain by the hand of Romulus, and his arms dedicated in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, under the name of *spolia opima*. Only two other cases are recorded in the history of Rome of such a dedication by a general of the arms stripped from a hostile commander, killed by his own hand. The second *spolia opima* were won by A. Cornelius Cossus from Lar Tolumnius, the king of Veii; the third by M. Claudius Marcellus from the Gallic king Viridomarus.

The mythical founder of the Roman state was duly honoured with an apotheosis. Having been snatched away by his father Mars, amidst a fearful storm and supernatural darkness, when the people were assembled in the Campus Martius, he appeared the same night, in more than mortal stature and beauty, to a senator

and as subject, in some degree at least, to his *patria potestas*. The word *cliens* is perhaps derived from the old verb *cluere*, signifying to hear and obey.

named Proculus Julius, who was returning from Alba to Rome. "Go," said he, "and tell my people that they weep not for me any more; but bid them to be brave and warlike, and so shall they make my city the greatest in the earth." So the people built a temple to Romulus, as a god, and worshipped him by the name of Quirinus. His parting message gives point to the whole spirit of his legend, which marks Rome, from its first beginning, as a martial and conquering state, in which, as her very language testifies, Valour was the supreme Virtue—the highest quality of Man (*Virtus*);—a spirit prophetic of the destiny she had to fulfil.

The ascription by the legend of thirty-seven years to the reign of Romulus calls for a remark on the system of Roman chronology and the great epoch of the foundation of the city. That epoch is as destitute of all historical authority, as the lengths of the reigns of the seven kings are of any probability. The trustworthy chronology of Rome, as preserved in the *Fasti* by the names of the annual magistrates, began at the taking of the city by the Gauls in B.C. 390. But there appear to have been safe grounds for reckoning back 120 years to the *Regifugium*, or expulsion of the kings, which was the Era of the Republican chronology (B.C. 510).^{*} From that point all was conjecture; for popular tradition never supplies chronological data. It only remained for the Pontiffs, who had the annals entirely in their hands, to invent some plausible system; and this they appear to have found in the duplication of the time since the *Regifugium*, thus assigning 240 years to the whole period of the kings. This reckoning brings us to the very date assigned by Cato for the building of the city, B.C. 751; and the eras adopted by other authorities all fall within a very few years of this. That used by most of the ancient writers, and generally followed in modern works, is the ERA OF VARRO, according to whom the city of Romulus on the Palatine was founded on the day of the *Palilia*—the Feast of Pales, the deity of shepherds—on the 21st of April, B.C. 753.[†]

^{*} The festival of the *Regifugium* was kept on the 24th of February, just at the close of the Roman year. See the account of the Calendar given below.

[†] The other principal eras are those of Polybius, B.C. 750, and of Fabius Pictor, B.C. 747. In practical chronology the Varronian era is reckoned from the 1st of January, B.C. 753. In comparison with the Greek chronology, it was the year, in the middle of which OI. 6. 4 began. The following are easy formulæ for the conversion of the Roman years and our own into one another — A U.C. + B.C. = 754; and A U.C. — A.D. = 753, or 753 + A.D. = A U.C. The letters stand for the current year of

On the death of Romulus,—according to the legendary story—no one was deemed worthy to supply his place. Instead of electing a new king, the Senate formed themselves into bodies of Ten (*Decuriae*), each of which governed with royal power for five days, the chief member (*Decurion*) being called an *Interrex* (or Between-King). This *Interregnum*, as it was called, had lasted for a year, when the discontent of the people made it necessary to choose another king. The rival claims of the Romans and Sabines (for the Luceres are not said to have had a voice in the election) were settled by the former choosing a king out of the number of the latter. The curiæ of the Ramnes elected NUMA POMPILIUS, a Sabine, famous for his personal sanctity and his knowledge of the worship of the gods. Some said that he had derived his wisdom from the Greek philosopher, Pythagoras; but all agreed that he learnt the will of the gods from the nymph or Camena, Egeria, who met him at a fountain in the recesses of her sacred grove, and became his wife. She taught him to entrap the deities Picus and Faunus in the wood of Mount Aventine, that he might learn how to draw forth signs of the favour of Jupiter. In the midst of an assembly of the people, the god appeared in the form of lightning, and sent down from heaven the *Ancilë*, or sacred shield of Mars. This shield, with eleven others made so exactly like it that no man could distinguish the real one among the twelve, Numa committed to the custody of the twelve *Salii*, or dancing priests of Mars, whose special office it was to officiate at the public thanksgivings (*supplicationes*) for great victories.

Besides this symbol of divine *protection*, there was another of *life*, to be preserved with equal care. As a Latin colony—for this character of the city now appears clearly in the legend—Rome possessed the sacred fire of Vesta (the goddess of the hearth), brought from her temple at Alba. Vesta was worshipped, with the household gods (*Penates*), at every Roman hearth; and, as the common sanctuary of the whole Roman family, Numa built her a circular temple on the north slope of the Palatine towards the Forum, and appointed four priestesses (*Vestales*), vowed to perpetual virginity, under the pain of being buried alive, to keep the fire ever burning on her altar. That the Vestal Virgins were an old Latin institution is implied in the legend of Silvia. The same is probably true of the *Salii* and the other colleges of priests

the epoch they denote. Thus, Rome was taken by the Gauls in the 364th year of the city: this is B.C. 390, for 364 + 390 = 754. Again, Rome was taken by Alaric in A.D. 410: this was A.U.C. 1168.

ascribed to Numa. As a sign of the state of peace which he preserved through his reign of forty-three years, Numa built in the midst of the Forum the porch or covered passage of Janus, the god of day, who governed the beginnings of all things, and their issues—the opener and shutter,—attributes which were symbolized by his two faces, looking outwards and inwards over gateways. The folding doors at either end of this passage were shut in time of peace, and open during war. They were never closed, from the end of Numa's reign to the pacification of the empire by Augustus, except for a short space after the first Punic War.

The whole religious institutions and civil legislation of Rome are ascribed to Numa, as the political and military constitution is to Romulus. He established the College of Pontiffs, to direct the ceremonies of religious worship, and to regulate the calendar, on which the festivals depended, as well as the system of weights and measures.* The Pontiffs were four in number, two being taken from each of the old tribes of the Ramnes and Titienses; and at their head was a Pontifex Maximus. Another college was that of the six Augurs, Auspices, or Haruspices (*Bird-Seers*), who preserved the art of interpreting the will of the gods by the flight of birds, and afterwards by the other signs called *omens*. These “colleges of sacred lore” were close corporations, all vacancies being filled up by the members themselves; and a place in them was an object of ambition with the greatest men of Rome. Julius Cæsar was Pontifex Maximus. They were doubtless, like the Vestal Virgins, an old Latin institution. A third college was that of the Heralds (*fetiales*), who were the guardians of the public faith, and with whom it rested to perform the solemn rites that belonged to the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, some of the

* The explanation of the title *Pontifices* as *bridge builders*, because they built the *pons sublicius* (or bridge on piles) in order to perform the sacrifices on both sides of the river, is a mere guess, and inconsistent with the tradition which ascribes the bridge to Ancus Marcius. A better reason for the name is found in the ancient sacrifice of the *Argei* which they offered annually on the Ides of May on the sublician bridge. The word has also been derived from *pompa*, a religious procession, the ordering of such ceremonies belonging to the *pompifices* (*pontifices*). Mommsen adheres to the common etymology, and regards the pontifices as “the Roman engineers, who understood the mystery of measures and numbers, whence there devolved upon them also the duties of managing the calendar of the state, of proclaiming to the people the time of new and full moon, and the days of festivals, and of seeing that every religious and every judicial act took place on the right day . . . Thus they acquired (though not probably in its full extent till after the abolition of the monarchy) the general oversight of Roman worship and of whatever was connected with it. They themselves described the sum of their knowledge as ‘the science of things human and divine.’”

formulae of which are preserved by Livy. Their number appears to have been twenty, ten from each of the two ancient tribes. To Numa also is ascribed the appointment of the priests (*flamines*, that is, *fire-kindlers*) of particular deities, and especially of Mars Gradivus and his son Quirinus, as well as the *Flamen Dialis*, priest of Jupiter. These three formed the sacred triad of high-priests; and there were many more, to conduct the rites of the gentes, the curiæ, and the whole state.

Numa, finally, was the reputed author of those institutions by which the most important affairs of common life were placed under the sanctions of religion. He fixed the boundaries of fields and estates by landmarks, sacred to the god Terminus, in whose honour he instituted the feast of the Terminalia, which closed the sacred rites of the year.* He divided the territory of Rome outside the city into districts, called *pagi*, an act commemorated by the festival of the *Paganalia*. Hence arose that distinction between the *urbani* (townspeople) and the *pagani* (country folk), names which have so curiously acquired a social and religious meaning from the higher polish of the inhabitants of cities, and from the fact that the countrymen were the last to abandon heathenism for Christianity. The regulation of the calendar, connected with the name of Numa, is too intimately connected with our own mode of reckoning time to be passed over. The Italians, like all early nations, numbered periods of days by the phases of the moon; but they had of course a notion of the annual cycle of the seasons, though astronomical observation was required to determine the true length of the year by the sun's course among the stars. Some ancient writers, indeed, assert that the Romans had from the beginning a tropical year (*annus vertens*) of 365 days, divided into 12 months; but the weight of authority is all in favour of a year based on the Latin predilection for the decimal scale—a year of ten months, which were lunar, with slight modifications. This is called the *Year of Romulus*. It certainly began with March (the month sacred to Mars); all the names after the first four indicate the numerical succession of the ten months; † and there is sufficient evidence that December was the last. Instead, however, of preserving the average lunar cycle of 29½

* It was on February 23rd, which was the last day of the ordinary year, for, when an intercalary month was introduced, the last five days of February were incorporated with it.

† Before the Julian reformation, *July* was *Quintilis* (the fifth month), and August *Sextilis* (the sixth) · the other four still bear their numbers.

days, four of the months appear, from the earliest times, to have had 31 days, and the other six 30. The former—March, May, Quintilis, and October—were called *full* (*pleni*), the latter *hollow* (*cavi*) menses; and the full months remained such through all subsequent changes of the calendar. Thus the year consisted of 304 days; and by what system of intercalation it was filled up to the tropical year, we are not informed. The change ascribed to Numa consisted in the introduction of the duodecimal division of the year into months more nearly lunar, by the addition of January and February at the end. If these months had had 31 and 30 days, their addition to the year of Romulus would have made up 365 days, the nearest approximation to the tropical year which seems to have been known in the West.* But this was not the object aimed at. The importance attached to lunar months in religious festivals required a lunar year. Now the true length of a year of twelve lunations is 354 days, 8h. 48'. 36"; and the ancients reckoned it at 354 days. This sum would have been made up exactly by six months of 30 days alternated with six months of 29 days; but the reasons for a variation from this plan are not far to seek. With the duodecimal system (probably from the Etruscans) there had come in a superstitious regard for the good and bad luck of odd and even numbers. Therefore, as it seems, Numa † made the year consist of 355 days; and, retaining the full months at 31, reduced the hollow months to 29, assigning the same number to January, and 28 to February: but even here the odd number was preserved by dividing February into two parts of 23 and 5 days, between which the intercalary month, called Mercedonius, of 22 or 23 days, was inserted every other year. ‡ Each month was divided at a day called the Ides (*Idus* or *division*), which fell on the 15th day of the four full months, and on the 13th of the rest; the ninth day before the Ides (reckoning both extremes) was called the Nones (*Nonæ*, or *ninth*), and fell on the 7th of the full months, and the 5th of the rest. The 1st of every month was called the *Kalends* (*Kalendæ*, or proclamation-days), because the Pontifices proclaimed the commencement of the month, just as the

* We have already seen that the Egyptians, and probably the Chaldeans, knew the year of 365½ days.

† We follow the language of the tradition for the sake of convenience.

‡ The order of the months, as thus divided, was the following:—Martius, 31 days; Aprilis, 29; Maius, 31; Junius, 29; Quintilis, 31; Sextilis, 29; September, 29; October, 31; November, 29; December, 29; Januarius, 29; Februarius, 28: Total, 355 days; but one of these days, namely the 24th of February, was regarded as intercalary, and was inserted wherever the Pontifices chose.

Mohammedan muezzin announces the first appearance of the new moon from his watch on the minaret. From the name Kalends was derived that of the Kalendar (*Kalendarium*), a tabular view of the whole year, distinguishing the common days and holidays.* The oldest Roman calendars contain a division, somewhat analogous to that of weeks, in the periods of eight days, distinguished by marking the successive days from the beginning of the year by the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H. According to the Roman mode of reckoning both extremes, these were called periods of nine days or Nundines (*nundinæ*). The various details, and especially the mode of intercalation, were regulated by the Pontiffs, who used their power, for political and other purposes, in a way so arbitrary and irregular as to bring about that utter confusion of seasons, festivals, and everything, which was rectified by the great reform of Julius Cæsar in B.C. 46, which, with the slight correction of Pope Gregory, regulates our present calendar.

Such are the principal legends concerning the foundation of the Roman state, and concerning its primitive constitution, while yet it was confined to a narrow territory, hemmed in by the powerful confederacies of the Latins, the Etruscans, and the Sabines. The story goes on, in the same mythical vein, to tell how the third king, a warrior only second to Romulus, broke the strength of the Latins and destroyed Alba, and how his successor, the grandson of Numa, consolidated the laws of Rome, while he carried on the subjugation of the Latin nation, and laid the foundation of the new plebeian order by the settlement he gave to the conquered people on the Aventine. After this, the state assumed a new character from the accession of an Etruscan dynasty of three kings, of whom the first speedily invests it with the splendour of a rich and powerful monarchy; the second amalgamates the heterogeneous elements into a constitution which secures to every class a fair share of privilege; the third, ruling with insolence, and endeavouring to build up his arbitrary power on the destruction of the aristocracy, is driven from the throne, the monarchy falls with him, and the era of the Republic begins. But, before pursuing the legendary history through these second and third stages, it is needful to inquire what are the truths concerning the primitive state of Rome, which are partly concealed and partly dimly indi-

* From *fas*, sacred law, *dies fasti* and *nefasti* signified, not holy and unholy days, but just the opposite, namely, days on which it was lawful and unlawful to do ordinary business. The Scotch have a similar use of "*holy* days," in contradistinction to the Sabbath.

cated, by the mythical stories of Romulus and Numa. In a question on which the greatest scholars of our own times have brought vast learning and ingenuity to bear, and respecting which there is still so wide a margin of controversy, it must suffice to indicate those leading points on which there is a general agreement, or those different views which are too important to be omitted.

The very position of Rome is a type of the mingled elements which enter into its earliest history. Standing on the Latin bank of the Tiber, looking across that river into Etruria, and up the river to the point where, at the confluence of the Anio, the Sabine territory juts forward between the other two; offering, moreover, in its several hills, sites for different settlements, it seems destined for the union of the three races that peopled Central Italy. Nay more, the ready access to it up the river appears to invite settlers from beyond the sea, and to make it a refuge for adventurers wandering over the Mediterranean in search of a home. For this last reason we should hesitate to reject altogether such legends as those of Æneas and Evander; of which the one may indicate a prehistoric settlement of the Thracian branch of the Pelasgic race, the other a Greek element, of which eminent scholars have found marked traces in the primitive institutions of the Roman state.* It is especially on the Saturnian (Capitoline) hill that marks of a Greek colony are supposed to have existed. But these are at best doubtful speculations, compared with the evidence that Rome was at first a Latin village on the Palatine, while other settlements existed on the other hills; and that, by a process very different from that described in the popular legends of the nation—except as the truth forces itself to the surface, as it were, against the will of the romancers—other elements, Sabine, Latin, and Etruscan, were superadded, bringing with them laws and institutions, and forms of civilization, unknown to the first Latin settlers; while the perpetual conflict of opposing forces made Rome from the first a military power by the necessity of self-defence.

Among the first proofs of the Latin origin of Rome is the fact that its language was called Latin from the earliest age that it is known to have had a name at all. But the presence of Sabellian and Oscan elements in Latin gives equally clear evidence of the admixture of that stock in the earliest Roman people; while the want of an Etruscan element in the language seems to show that the Etruscan influence, which appears in the institutions of Rome,

* The reader may consult the arguments of Mr. Newman, in his *Regal Rome*.

was superadded at a later age. When we turn to the name of the city for further light, we are met by a variety of conjectures, deriving it from several different languages. The Latins themselves had a tradition that *Rome* was a foreign word, and that the city had another and a sacred name, which it was not lawful to utter. The river, by which Rome stood, was variously called by the names of Rumon, Albula, Thybris, and Tyberis, of which the second seems clearly Latin, and the first is connected with the name of Rome, and its people the Ramnes.* In calling Rome the city of the Ramnes on Mount Palatine, we have summed up in a word all that the name can tell us. Some suppose the name itself, and also those of the Titienses and Luceres, to be Etruscan; others, Oscan. Few doubt that these three names represent villages, or communities of some sort, which had grown up on the hills afterwards included in the site of Rome. All are agreed that the Ramnes were of the Latin stock, and the Titienses of the Sabine; but there is a very great division of opinion as to whether the Luceres were Etruscans or Latins. At all events, they held a far less important place than the other two in the first consolidation of the Roman state. Besides these three, tradition speaks of various other settlements on the Seven Hills, and in particular of a Greek town, called Antipolis,† on Mons Janiculus; but the name, at all events, cannot have been used till an important city had grown up on the left bank. The condition in which these settlements are supposed to have existed cannot be better described than in the words of Mommsen:—"Long, in all probability, ere an urban settlement arose on the Tiber, these Ramnians, Titics, and Luceres, at first separate, afterwards united, had their strongholds on the Roman hills, and tilled their fields from the surrounding villages. The 'wolf-festival' (*Lupercalia*) which the gens of the Quinctii celebrated on the Palatine hill, was probably a tradition from these primitive ages—a festival of countrymen and shepherds, which preserved, more than any other, the homely pastimes of patriarchal simplicity, and, singularly enough, maintained itself longer than other heathen festivals in Christian Rome."

As to the origin of the Palatine city of the Ramnes, the question lies between two chief theories. Both are agreed that the Latin nation already existed, long before the foundation of Rome, as a pastoral and agricultural people, having their strongholds

* It is almost superfluous to observe that the names of *Romulus* and *Remus* are derived from that of the city, as its imaginary heroes eponyms.

† That is, the opposite city.

in numerous cities, which were united—as some think—in different leagues, or—as others suppose—in one confederacy, with Alba for its head. The one theory then follows the popular legend so far as to suppose that an Alban colony, whether driven out by force, or led by the love of adventure, settled on the Palatine, and became the nucleus to which political and other outlaws flocked from all the neighbouring cities; and the community thus formed, consisting almost entirely of males, took to the practice, common in a wild state of society, of women-stealing. “Alban Rome,” says Mr. Newman, who advocates this theory—“was clearly a robber-city; yet we do not know it to have been stained with blood-thirsty treachery, like the Mamertines of Messene. She is rather to be compared to the petty states of early Greece, when they practised piracy without scruple, and gloried in it.”* Such a state could only maintain its existence by unceasing wars with its neighbours, and the necessity of its position would demand constant accessions of a warlike population. Its power was early extended, so as to add to the original city on the Palatine another stronghold on the Capitoline, and a suburb on the Esquiline. The wars of Romulus with the neighbouring towns, as Cæcina, Antemnæ, and Crustenerium,—falsified as they manifestly are in their details by national vanity—represent a long conflict which was attended with successes that enabled the Romans to transfer the inhabitants of conquered cities in mass to Rome, and laid the foundations for the class of Clients. All this must have taken far more time than the space assigned to the single reign of Romulus, under whose name it was the pride of later times to embody in a definite form all the military and political institutions which grew up with time and experience. For the real form of government, we must look to the other Latin cities, which we find bringing out their forces to war under an elective military chieftain. “We must perhaps rest,” says Mr. Newman, “in the general probability, that the successive heads or kings of Alban Rome (however many are concealed under the name of Romulus)—as captains of a people to whom warlike interests were all in all,—exercised a severely despotic discipline with high approbation, as long as they were successful in war and just in the partition of spoil: and that, though no written law defined the rights of the king; and no precedents could have grown up to give strength to a senate, yet brave and turbulent men, with arms in their hands, knew how to prevent their leader’s authority from degenerating into

* *Regal Rome*, p. 37.

tyranny." Such was the condition to which the military colony of the Ramnians had grown, when it received at once a military check, and, as a consequence, new elements of civilization, from the Sabines of the neighbouring city of Cures. This hardy people, a branch of the Umbro-Samnite stock, lived in the highlands of the Apennines, between the Tiber and the Anio; where their descendants preserved, down to the imperial age of Rome, their rustic simplicity of manners. Like the Lacedæmonians, with whom Greek writers therefore imagined them to have an affinity, they dwelt in unwall'd villages, relying for safety on their arms. Their government was a patriarchal confederacy of clans or houses (*gentes*), which had their own religious ceremonies and regulated the conduct of their members, each of whom bore the name of his own clan. There was no slavery, in the proper sense of the word; but a class of serfs existed, under the name of Clients, bound to their lord or Patron by a sense of duty and attachment, which inculcated obedience and service on their part, and on his, protection and care of their welfare. The institution resembles that which has survived to our times, however weakened, among the Gælic inhabitants of Scotland; and, in fact, the language of the Sabellian tribes seems to prove their affinity to the Celtic stock. The great dignity of a noble consisted in the maintenance of a large clientage; and his state seems to have been supported, in a great degree, by the rent of the lands cultivated by his clients. The effect of such a relation was of course to draw a clearly marked distinction between the patriarchal nobles and the lower class; which was maintained by an exclusive law of intermarriage among the nobles. Their patriarchal power was carried so far as to give the father the right of life and death, not only over his children, but his wife. The Sabines had that high regard for religion, often degenerating into superstition, which characterizes nations in a patriarchal state. "Their morality was sharply defined, eminently positive and overruling to the whole outward conduct."

This simple and hardy race increased with a rapidity which required an extension of its possessions, and thus they were spread southwards over the Italian peninsula. There is a tradition that those of the youth who were born at a particular season, called the Sacred Spring, were sent out in search of new abodes, as soon as they reached the military age. Whether it was such a band that settled in the fork between the Anio and the Tiber, under the name of *Quirites* (*spearmen*), as the servants of *Quirinus* (the

god of the spear); and with a capital *Cures* (*Quires*); can only be conjectured. But this much seems certain, that the Sabines of Cures were established on the Quirinal hill at an epoch rather later than the foundation of Alban Rome on the Palatine. War ensued between the two communities; the Sabines drove the Romans from their outlying citadel on the Saturnian hill; after a long-protracted conflict, the former prevailed by their superior numbers and discipline; and it was as the result of a real conquest that the united nation received the political and religious institutions, which the mythical account ascribes to Romulus and Numa. The Latin rites, which had been sanctified by custom, retained their place, and the conquered race were sufficiently numerous to make Latin the language of the united people, as in the parallel case of the conquest of the English by the Normans. The patriarchal aristocracy accepted the government of an elective monarch, whether as a new institution, or one developed during the residence of the Sabines at Cures, with the peculiar custom of the *Interregnum*; and it may be assumed that a long line of elective kings is represented by the three names of Numa, Tullus Hostilius, and Ancus Marcius.

The other theory treats the poetical tradition as altogether unworthy of respect, and seeks the origin of Rome in a process of more natural growth, from the time when rural communities of the Latins and Sabines (the stock most closely related to the Latins), both agricultural as well as pastoral people, cultivated the lands around the hills which they occupied as their strongholds in case of danger. "From these settlements," says Dr. Mommsen, "the later Rome arose. The foundation of a city, in the strict sense, such as the legend assumes, is of course to be reckoned altogether out of the question: Rome was not built in a day." The same historian, while not denying that there was a mixture of different nationalities, rejects with scorn "the irrational opinion, that the Roman nation was a mongrel people." He regards not only the Ramnians, but the Luceres, as a purely Latin stock, and makes far less than most other writers of the distinction between the Romans and the Sabines. "It would appear," he says, "that, at a period very remote, when the Latin and Sabellian stocks were beyond question far less sharply contrasted in language, manners, and customs, than were the Roman and the Samnite of a later age, a Sabellian community entered into a Latin canton union; and, as in the older and more credible traditions without exception the Tities take precedence of the Ramnians, it is probable that

the intruding Tities compelled the older Ramnians to accept their association in the same state (*synoikismos*). . . . With the exception, perhaps, of isolated national institutions transplanted in connection with ritual, the existence of Sabellian elements can nowhere be pointed out at Rome; and the Latin language, in particular, furnishes absolutely no support to such a hypothesis. It would, in fact, be more than surprising, if the Latin nation should have had its nationality in any sensible degree affected by the insertion of a single community from a national stock most closely related to it; besides which, it must not be forgotten that, at the time when the Tities settled beside the Ramnians, Latin nationality rested on Latium as its basis, and not on Rome. The new tripartite Roman commonwealth was, notwithstanding some elements which, it is possible, were originally Sabellian, just what the community of the Ramnians had previously been, a portion of the Latin nation." Without pursuing the discussion further, we have said enough to indicate the main features in the different theories that are now held by scholars respecting the origin of Rome, and to show how much they resolve themselves into a question of the greater or lesser degree of influence which the Sabellian element exerted upon the Latin foundation of the state. The enquiry remains, whether we can trace the growth of the city from its first small beginnings on the Palatine.

And here the historian is met by the problem, how a great city could have grown up on such a site as that of Rome, and by what conditions it obtained its decisive preponderance in Latium. For both in salubrity and fertility the site is inferior to most of the old Latin towns. It is deficient in fresh water, nor do the vine and fig trees, for which Italy is so famous, flourish in its immediate neighbourhood. It is exposed to inundations from the Tiber, the slight fall of which to the sea does not readily carry off the waters that pour down from the Apennines; and the malaria, which now infests the lower parts of the city, if less prevalent during the flourishing period of Rome, must have been far worse when the valleys between the hills were swamps. The common legend implies that it was the pressure of political necessity which caused a town to be built on a spot so uninviting: the most recent historian finds an explanation in the hypothesis, that Rome was the emporium of the Latins, as Cære was of the Etruscans. In support of this view, Dr. Mommsen cites the tradition that, when the territory of the city extended little more than five miles in any other direction from its walls, it held the

suburb of Janiculum on the right bank, and the whole course of the Tiber down to Ostia. Romulus is said to have taken the district of the "seven hamlets" on the right bank and the salt-works at the mouth of the river from the Veientes, and Ancus to have founded the port of Ostia and fortified Janiculum as a *tête-de-pont*. The very name of the Mount of Janus proves at how early a period this suburb was attached to Rome; and, among the traces of her possessions on the right bank of the Tiber, there lay, four miles below Rome, the grove of the creative goddess (*Dea Dia*), the primitive seat of the Arval festival and brotherhood; and there too were the lands of the Romilii, whose name goes far to vindicate their claim as the oldest of the Roman gentes. All this is confirmed by the importance attached, from the first age of the city, to the bridges across the Tiber. In one word, the site of Rome is as admirably adapted for an emporium as it is defective for mere habitation. Its hills furnish the only defensible position between the mouth of the river and the confluence of the Anio with the Tiber; and its position, three miles below that confluence, commands the courses of both rivers. This view is confirmed by the early relations of Rome with the Etruscan emporium of Cære, by the port-dues levied from time immemorial at Ostia, by the comparatively early appearance in Rome of coined money, and of commercial treaties with transmarine states. Hence too we may account for the early fortification of the city, for the rapid growth of its population by the influx of foreign as well as Latin settlers, and for that vigorous development of urban life, still, however, resting on an agricultural basis, which distinguishes Rome from the rustic towns of Latium. It is not, of course, maintained that Rome was one of the great commercial cities of the world, like Carthage or even Corinth. Its mercantile importance was limited by the strictly agricultural character of the country to which it served as the emporium; and it is only in relation to Latium that it had this character. To the question, how the Latins came to found a commercial city on their frontier river, Dr. Mommsen answers,—“Whether it was a resolve of the Latin confederacy, or the clear-sighted genius of some unknown founder, or the natural development of traffic, that called the city of Rome into being, it is vain even to surmise.”

As to the extent of primitive Rome, tradition affords us more certain evidence. The original city occupied the Palatine hill alone, from the shape of which it derived its name of “Square Rome” (*Roma Quadrata*). Its limits are traced by Tacitus, in a

well-known passage, the discussion of which must be left to the topographers.* From the very first, the city was encompassed by the sacred belt of the *Pomœrium*,† which could only be extended by those whose victories had enlarged the Roman territory, with the divine approval, signified by augury. But, at a period which is still within the traditional age of Romulus, suburbs were added to the city, each enclosed by its own ring-fence, and all connected with the circumvallation of the Palatine. Thus there was formed, almost from the earliest age, a "City of Seven Hills," within and distinct from the more famous seven hills of historic Rome; and its existence was commemorated by the ancient feast of the *Septimontium*. These seven hills were, the *Palatine* itself; the *Cermalus* (or *Germalus*),‡ on the declivity of the Palatine towards the valley between it and the Capitoline; the *Velia*, or spur of the Palatine towards the Esquiline; the *Suburra*, an outlying fort on the low ground between the Esquiline and the Quirinal; and the three summits of the Esquiline,§ named *Fagutal*, *Oppius*, and *Cispus*. The memory of this state of things is preserved in the later division of the city into regions, three of which are the Palatine, the Suburran, and the Esquiline, the last being considered as inferior in consequence to the other two. There seems also to have been a suburb on the Cælian; but it was not included in the *Septimontium*. The Capitol and the Aventine were probably also occupied as detached forts, if the expression may be used of the simple enclosures of that early age. There is every reason to believe—especially if the theory of Mommsen be adopted—that the Mons Janiculus was occupied as a *tête-de-pont* to the primitive "bridge of piles" (*pons sublicius*) across the Tiber; but not within the circuit of the fortifications. "The regulation," says Dr. Mommsen, "which was adhered to as a ritual down to the latest times, that the bridge should be composed simply of wood, without iron, manifestly shows that in its original practical use it was meant to be a flying bridge, which must be capable of being easily at any time broken off or burnt. We recognize in this circumstance how insecure, for a long time, and liable to interruption

* Tacit. *Annal.* xii. 24 : see the article *Roma* already quoted.

† That is, *post* or *pone muros*, a space on each side of the boundary, whether the city was fortified or not, which must not be built upon, or profaned by any common use.

‡ In the old Roman alphabet the letter *c* had (like the Greek *T*) the same force as *g*.

§ The name of the Esquiline, almost certainly derived from *ex-quiliae*, that is, *out-buildings*, marks it as the principal suburb of the city on the Palatine.

was the command of the passage of the river on the part of the Roman community."

Such was the original city of Rome, usually called the city of Romulus, in its more extended compass. Of the theories respecting other cities on the other hills, belonging to the different Italian races, and contributing various elements to the Rome of history, there is but one that will stand the test of criticism. The Quirinal, which lay entirely beyond the bounds assigned to the circuit of old Rome, is marked by uniform tradition as the seat of an independent community. The worship of Mars, the founder of the city, was observed doubly on the Palatine and the Quirinal; and the latter hill had its "old head fortress" (*Capitolium Vetus*) with temples corresponding to those in the Capitol itself. Nay more, there is a curious distinction in the very names of the hills on which the two cities stood. While the other eminences within the circuit of the later city are called *Mounts* (*montes*), the Quirinal and its connected spur, the Viminal, bore the name of *Hills* (*colles*), and the Quirinal was often designated simply as the Hill. On this nomenclature Dr. Mommsen bases a distinction of the two peoples into *Romans of the Mount* (*montani*) and *of the Hill* (*collini*), in place of the ordinary division into the Romans and Sabine Quirites. Still he admits that a diversity of race may have lain at the foundation of this distinction between the two neighbouring cities, and that the etymological connection of Quirites, Quirinus, and Quirinalis with Ures may probably be correct, while he strongly opposes the view which traces the most distinctive institutions of Rome to a Sabine origin. Such is the present state of the question, which we are content to indicate to those who are qualified and willing to pursue it. Meanwhile, with whatever diversities of opinion as to the different races represented by these communities, all are agreed that the two cities of the Palatine and the Quirinal were the chief constituent elements in the great city of the Seven Hills, which was at length enclosed by the walls that bear the name of Servius Tullius. To trace the steps by which the power of Rome was consolidated, abroad as well as at home, before that epoch, we must return to the picturesque traditions of the popular mythical history.

The death of Numa, says the legend, was followed by another interregnum, which was terminated by the election of Tullus Hostilius by the citizens assembled in their curiæ.* The ponti-

* It is to be observed that the office of the Interrex and the elective monarchy are now seen fully established.

fical chroniclers attempted to preserve the symmetry of their tripartite system, by making the third king of Rome the representative of the Luceres, as the first had been of the Ramnes, and the second of the Tities. In this legend, however, the Luceres are clearly Latin, not Etruscan. Tullus represents the Latins who did not trace their origin from Alba; his grandfather* having come from Medullia to aid Romulus against the Sabines. But, on the other hand, he is connected with the Sabines also by the position of Medullia,—a Latin colony in the Sabine territory, between the Tiber and the Anio;—such are the wavering indications of these traditions. His connection with the Luceres is marked by his residence on the Cælian Mount, which he assigned as an abode to the poor who had no homes on the other hills, and to the strangers who flocked to Rome or were transported thither from the conquered cities. In the legends of his reign, we may trace two distinct elements, preserved respectively by Livy and Dionysius, of whom the former follows chiefly the poetical fables, the latter the scarcely less fabulous records of the pontiffs.

There are some poetical inventions, which, however destitute of any basis in fact, claim the notice of the historian, because their hold on the minds of men is itself an historic truth. Such is the Trojan War; and such is the magnificent legend of the conquest of Alba by Tullus Hostilius. That the power of Rome was enlarged by the destruction of her greatest rival in Latium, in the interval before the final settlement of her constitution, is clear from her subsequent history, and from the disappearance of Alba. The poetic chroniclers, and especially those who sang the exploits of the Horatian Gens, placed this event in the reign of Hostilius, and decorated it with the beautiful legend of the Horatii and Curiatii, and the tragic fate of Mettius Fufetius.

The growing power of Rome led to predatory collisions on the border between her territory and that of Alba, of which both states mutually complained, and both refused redress. The Alban dictator, Caius Cluilius, led his army to a spot within five miles of Rome, long after marked by the entrenchment called “the Cluilian Dyke” (*fossa Cluilia*). Mettius Fufetius, having been elected his successor, was obliged to march back against king Tullus, who had meanwhile invaded the territory of Alba. The two armies were drawn up in battle array, when it was agreed that the quarrel should be settled by three champions chosen from each side. It happened that in either army there were three twin

* *Hostus Hostilius*, the eponymus of the Gens *Hostilia*.

brothers,* equally matched in age, birth, and courage. The Romans were named the Horatii, the Albans the Curiatii.† These were chosen as the champions; and it was agreed that the victory should decide which people should serve the other. The combat was fought in sight of both armies, with an obstinate courage worthy of the stake. At length two of the Horatii were slain, and all the Curiatii were wounded. The third Roman, though alone, was unhurt. He feigned to fly, and his enemies pursued, as well as their failing strength would permit. But, as soon as they were separated and faint with loss of blood, the Horatius turned upon his first pursuer, and easily despatched him; after him the second; and then the third.

So the Albans became subject to king Tullus; and the Romans returned home in triumph, Horatius marching in front with the spoils of the Alban brothers. At the Capenian Gate, he was met by his sister, who had been betrothed to one of the Curiatii. When she saw her brother bearing the blood-stained garment which her own hands had woven for her lover, she could not restrain her grief. Incensed at the tears which brought an evil omen upon his victory, Horatius drew his sword and stabbed his sister to the heart, exclaiming, "So perish the Roman maiden, who shall weep for her country's enemy."

For this horrid deed Horatius was ordered by the senate and people to be put on his trial for his life. An old law had said: "The Two Men shall give judgment on the murderer. If he appeal from their judgment, let the appeal be tried. If their judgment be confirmed, cover his head: hang him with a rope on an accursed tree:‡ scourge him either within or without the boundary of the city." The two judges condemned Horatius to this terrible doom: he appealed to the people, supported by his father, who declared that, had he not himself approved the deed, he would have punished it by his paternal power of life and death. The people decided in his favour; but, to expiate the bloodshed, Horatius was led by his father, with his head covered,

* The Latin excels the English language in the possession of a single word (*tergemini*) to express a relationship, of which, as Sir Walter Scott says in another case, we have occasion to speak and think so often.

† Another form of the story reverses the names. This is doubtless the Latin legend, as each people would of course claim the victor. The number of the champions is an example of the *ternary* system of the Latins.

‡ *Arbor infelix* was a tree which bore no fruit: it was forbidden to hang a criminal on a fruitful tree (*arbor felix*). The sacred pomærium must not be desecrated by the execution or the preliminary scourging.

beneath the gibbet, which was preserved in after ages, and called the "Sister's Gibbet," and expiatory sacrifices were continually performed by the clan of the Horatii. This story embodies, amidst its picturesque details, the ancient law for the trial of murder by the "Quæstores Parricidii," and the important constitutional right, which belonged to a Roman citizen, of an appeal (*provocatio*) to the whole people in capital cases; one form of the great principle, that a man should be tried by his peers.*

The Albans chafed under the newly imposed yoke; and their dictator, Mettius Fufetius, thought he saw a chance of shaking it off in a war in which Tullus presently became engaged. The city of Fidenæ, about five miles north-east of Rome, in the Sabine territory, but said to have been colonized from the Etruscan Veii, has been mentioned among the reputed conquests of Romulus. Those conquests may be understood as representing the earliest extension of the Roman power over the Latin cities between the Tiber and the Anio. Of these cities, Fidenæ stood in a peculiar position, from its connection with Veii. As the *tête de pont* of the Etruscans on the left bank of the Tiber, it was supported by all the force of the Veientes; and in after ages its site was devoted by formulæ of execration, as one of the bitterest enemies of Rome. The Fidenates—says the legend—still leant towards the Veientes, and their inclination to revolt was confirmed by the promise of Mettius Fufetius, to desert to them in the midst of the battle. Tullus crossed the Anio to attack Fidenæ, and the Veientes marched across the Tiber to its support. The Etruscans were posted on the right, resting upon the river; the Fidenates on the left, towards the hills: Tullus and the Romans were opposed to the former; Mettius, ranged with his Albans opposite to the latter, had the opportunity, but not the courage, to carry his treason into effect. He drew off to the hills on the flank of the two armies, and watched the turn of the battle from the higher ground. Seeing the Romans alarmed at this desertion, Tullus vowed temples to Paleness and Fright.† The Fidenates, who had seen in the first movement of Mettius the fulfilment of his promise, began to doubt when he stopped half way, and wavered in their attack. Upon this the Romans took new courage: their impetuous attack drove back the Fidenates, while the double

* The appeal was taken away by the laws of the Decemvirs, but restored by the *Lex Valeria et Horatia*, in B.C. 449. Under the kings, it could only be made by the royal permission; and the same rule held of an appeal from the Dictator.

† *Pallor* and *Pavor*, an example of the deification of passions by the Romans.

traitor Mettius fell upon their flank, and put them to utter rout. The victorious Romans turned upon the Veientes, and drove them back upon the Tiber, slaying many, while many more were drowned. For that day, Tullus dissembled his knowledge of the treachery of Mettius; but on the following day he called a council of the whole army. The Albans came unarmed, as was their custom when summoned to hear an address from a general. They were surrounded by the armed Romans: Tullus charged Mettius with treason; and ordered him to be tied between two chariots, which were then driven opposite ways; and so his body was torn asunder, as his mind had been divided in the battle. Alba was doomed to destruction, and her people were removed to Rome, where their abode was fixed upon the Cælian Mount, and Tullus himself took up his residence in their midst.

Such is the poetic legend of the fall of the chief city of the Latins, giving, as usual, not only all the success, but all the right, to the Romans. It is fruitless to enquire whether the treachery may not have been on the side of Tullus and the treason of Mettius a mere pretext; for in truth, the only historic fact in the legend is the destruction of Alba by the Romans.* The temples on the Alban Mount were spared, when all the other buildings were levelled with the ground; and the ancient Latin worship was performed there by the Romans as solemnly as at Rome. Down to the latest age of the republic, the consuls celebrated the "Latin Holiday," (*Ferie Latine*) with annual sacrifices to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount; and generals, to whom the Senate had refused a triumph in Rome itself, offered their thanksgivings at the same more ancient sanctuary. Rome founded on the destruction of Alba the claim to succeed to her

* Niebuhr regards it as more than doubtful whether Alba was destroyed by the Romans at all; for, instead of its territory becoming the property of Rome, we find the Latins holding their meetings at the Alban Mount, as long as they remained a nation. He rather thinks that it fell before a general revolt of the older states of Latium (the *Prisci Latini*), among whom it had risen up as a domineering intruder—a revolt in which Rome may have taken a part. The facts, that the deported Latins of Alba appear at Rome in the full possession of the rights of citizens, that the king takes up his residence among them, and that Alban families obtained places of the highest honour and trust in the Roman commonwealth—as the Tullii, the Servilii, the Quinctii, and others—are alleged as indicating an internal dissension at Alba, and the voluntary secession of a party in the state to Rome. But such a secession is not unlikely to have been followed by war; and Mommsen argues that "the circumstance of Rome claiming to be in a religious and political point of view the heir-at-law of Alba, may be regarded as decisive of the matter; for such a claim could not be based on the migration of individual clans to Rome, but only on the conquest of the town."

presidency over the thirty cities of the Latin confederacy. That the claim was speedily admitted, seems to be implied in the statement that Tullus made a league with the other Latins after the destruction of Alba. But the relations of Rome to the cities of Latium in general will be better considered at a later point of our narrative. Meanwhile it is to be observed that Livy expressly states that the new citizens from Alba were enrolled among the Patres,—that is the patrician order, for the Senate itself was not augmented by its third hundred till the reign of the elder Tarquin. He adds that ten troops (*turmæ*), that is, 100 men, were added to the knights from among the Albans. These statements clearly point to the completion of the patrician order by the enrolment of the third tribe—the Luceres; and in agreement with this view, the Luceres are always connected with the Cælian Mount.

The war with the Sabines, who had illtreated Roman traders at the temple of Feronia, at the foot of Mount Soracte, is made by the tradition the origin of the great festivals of the Saturnalia and Opalia, at the close of the Roman year, in fulfilment of vows made by Tullus to Saturn and Ops. He is said to have continued the contest with the Etruscans about Fidenæ by carrying the war into the territory of Veii; but no lasting successes were gained over either city till much later. The only great work ascribed to him at Rome is the Senate House, called the *Curia Hostilia*, built on the side of the Comitium facing towards the Palatine; the same spot, though not the same building, in which the Senate met to the last days of the Republic. Amidst his warlike deeds, Tullus had been neglectful of the worship of the gods. Prodigies on the Alban Mount revealed the wrath of the deserted Latin deities: a plague broke out among the people, and attacked the king himself. Terrified into superstition, and unable to obtain responses from the gods, he attempted to evoke Jupiter Elicius with the rites prescribed by Numa; but he only succeeded in drawing down lightning which destroyed him, with his whole house, after he had reigned for two and thirty years.

This fearful judgment recalled the minds of the people to the ordinances of Numa, and they elected for their fourth king his daughter's son, the Sabine Ancus Marcius. He began his reign by causing the laws of Numa to be inscribed on a white board, and hung up in the forum for all to read. For the better enforcement of the laws, he excavated a prison in the side of the Capitoline hill overhanging the forum. Beneath this prison, Servius Tullius is said to have dug the horrible dungeon called the *Tullianum*

(which still exists) twelve feet underground, into which state criminals, as for example the conspirators with Catiline, were let down and strangled. To Ancus are ascribed the interesting ceremonies of the declaration of war and the making of treaties by the College of Herald's (*Fetiales*), and their spokesman, the "Father-in-chief of the Roman people;"* but these rites were doubtless a part of the earliest Roman religion.

Ancus none the less pursued the warlike enterprises of his predecessor, and especially the further conquest of the Latins, whom the peaceful beginning of his reign had encouraged to new aggressions. In a long and obstinate war he took many of the Latin towns, and removed to Rome several thousands of their inhabitants, whom he settled on the Aventine Mount and in the valley between it and the Palatine, surrounding this new quarter by a ditch called the "Dyke of the Quirites." On the other side, he extended the Roman territory beyond the Tiber and down its course as far as the sea. He took from the Etruscans of Veii the Mæscan wood and the salt works at the mouth of the Tiber; built the port of Ostia, and fortified the suburb of Janiculum, which he united to Rome by the "Bridge of Piles" (*Pons Sublicius*). In these traditions we trace the full establishment of Rome as a maritime emporium under her elective kings.

The most interesting point in the story of Ancus Marcius, as bearing upon the development of the Roman state, is his treatment of the conquered Latins, as contrasted with that of Tullus towards the Albans. As to the removal of thousands of Latins in mass to Rome, a word must be said presently; but, whether more or fewer, they are said to have dwelt on the Aventine as freemen, but without any share in the government of the state. They were citizens (*cives*), but not of the highest class (*optimo jure*). Their condition was the origin of that middle state between the citizen and the foreigner, which was described as the "Latin Right" (*Jus Latii*). In so far as this statement represents an historic fact, it seems reasonable to infer that the full citizenship granted to the Alban Latins of the Cælian was the reward of a submission more or less voluntary; while the class represented by the other Latins, of the Aventine, were in the fullest sense a conquered people. A further explanation has been sought in the national affinities of the two branches of the Latin nation. All the traditions represent Alba as founded by a conquering race amidst the older inhabitants of Latium (the *Prisci Latini*). Now

* Pater Patratus Populi Romani.

if, as Niebuhr supposes, the latter were more nearly akin to the Pelasgians, and the former to the Oscans,—an affinity shared by the Ramnians of Rome,—it is easy to understand how the one class should be received into the state, of which the fundamental idea was a patriarchal brotherhood, and how the other should be admitted only to that less intimate association, by which it was always the policy of Rome to strengthen her body of citizens. But, after all, it is of the less importance to interpret the legend, as history vouches for the fact that, in all aristocratic governments there grows up, almost insensibly, an order of commons, as we may call them,—citizens who are personally independent, but who form, at first, no part of the governing body.

That such an order existed at Rome from an early period is not only an undoubted fact, but a fact of the utmost consequence in the political history of the state; for that history is made up, in a great degree, of the long conflict between this class and the patricians. Their importance in the state is indicated by their very name, the PLEBEIANS (*plebes*), that is, the *complement* or *filling up* of the community,—the *Many*.^{*} We must carefully avoid calling them the *People*; for this word, as we have seen, signified the ruling class, exclusion from which was the characteristic of the *Plebs*.[†] Where is the origin of this body to be sought? Not in the class of *Clients*,—though indeed this opinion has still advocates who deserve respect,—for the *Clients* seem clearly distinguished from the *Plebeians* by their privilege of enrolment among the patrician gentes, on the one hand, and on the other by their more limited enjoyment of personal independence. Besides, unless the light of tradition is to be utterly excluded, we must believe that the *Clients* had existed in the state long before the first rise of the *Plebeians*. The story of the settlement of the Latins at Rome by Ancus Marcius supplies another answer, which undoubtedly contains some elements of truth. That the *Plebeians* belonged to the Latin, and possibly other Italian races, is proved by their language, religion, and every other mark of national affinity. That they were a conquered

* The root *pleb* (in old Latin *plep*) is the same as the *ple* or *plev*, in *plenus* and *compleo*, and in the Greek *πληθος* and *πολύς*.

† It was not till the last age of the republic that this distinction came to be broken down, and the word *plebs* used vaguely for the lower orders, in opposition to the *nobiles*. Our own language inherits the confusion doubly, in the use of the words *people*, *common people*, and so forth, and in the contemptuous sense of *plebeian*. It is not, however, impossible that the words may be ultimately of the same root: *populus* (a reduplication of the root *pol*) signifying the *full body* of citizens. But this is only a conjecture.

people, explains their position in the state, as free but politically unenfranchised. That, though conquered, they were not reduced to slavery is so consistent with Roman policy, as hardly to need the explanation of respect for kindred blood. In the earliest times at least, the social state of Rome did not rest, like that of the Greek republics, on the basis of slavery. Unlike the Greeks, the Romans acknowledged the natural right of man to freedom. There were indeed slaves; but they were not numerous; and they seem to have been engaged entirely in domestic service. Among a purely agricultural people, the employment of slave labour to enrich the master by manufactures was unknown; and the small farms, cultivated by the clients, left no room for agrarian servitude, until the vast tracts of public land, which the nobles secured for themselves, required a fresh supply of labourers. Then it was that slavery became a considerable institution, bringing with it the demoralization and ultimate ruin which it ever entails. It was the necessity of Rome, from the very first, to strengthen the state by the accession of new citizens: and it was equally her character to respect the institutions of the conquered peoples. Especially would this respect be shown to those who worshipped the same gods, and observed the same patriarchal customs that they themselves held in reverence. Their condition has been compared to that of the Lacedæmonian *Periæci*, as distinguished from the enslaved Helots. The Plebeians had their own *Gentes* and *Familiæ*, with their own sacred rites, which, however, they only exercised under the superintendence of the patrician pontiffs. But, so far from answering to the modern sense of the word plebeian, they had a nobility of their own, which traced back its origin beyond many of the patrician houses, and which attained the highest distinction in the history of the state; but they had no place in the three ancient tribes or *curiæ* or patrician *gentes*, nor any share in their religious rites. Hence it was that the Aventine was never enclosed, like the Cælian, within the *pomerium*,* because that boundary was consecrated by the patrician sacrifices. In one word, they formed no part of the *Populus Romanus*. When Tarquinius Priscus attempted to raise them to an equality with the Patricians, by enrolling the noblest plebeian *gentes* in three new tribes, the plan was opposed by the augur Attus Navius,† and all that the king could effect was

* The sacred *pomerium* of a Latin city must not be confounded with its actual walls. The former might (nay, unless solemnly removed, *must*) be retained from religious reverence, while the latter were laid out from motives of convenience. The wall of Servius Tullius embraced the Aventine.

† See p. 190.

to attach them to the old tribes in a subordinate relation, by the names of the "*Second* Ramnes, Titienses, and Luceres." Their gentes also were distinguished from those of the three ancient tribes as the "*Lesser Gentes*" (*Gentes Minores*), the same epithet that was before applied to the Luceres in relation to the older tribes. On the other hand, they were not, like the clients, attached as dependents to patrician houses, or to individual patrons. They were the subjects of the whole *Populus*; and, if in any sense they could be said to have a patron, it was the king. They formed his "*following*" in war, as the clients were the followers of the patricians; and their close relation to him may perhaps be recognized in the favour shown them by Tarquinius Priscus, and the position given to them in the state by Servius Tullius. It seems, indeed, not improbable that, had the wise policy of that king been persisted in, the joint power of the king and the plebeians might have so counterbalanced the ascendancy of the patricians, as to have anticipated by centuries the great political invention of modern times, and to have secured for Rome the blessing of a limited monarchy, saving her from the long and ruinous conflict between the patrician and plebeian parties through which her aristocratic republic passed into a despotism.

The position of the plebeians—in respect of their rights and duties in the state—was that of a modified or partial citizenship. They had no share in the "*public right*" of the "*franchise and honours*;" and of the "*private right*," they enjoyed freedom of commerce, but not of intermarriage with the patrician houses.* Such a restriction was of course broken through in practice, as it is even in nations where the strictest rules of caste prevail; but the patrician who married a plebeian woman degraded his offspring to the condition of plebeians; and this appears to have been the origin of those plebeian families which bore the names of patrician gentes.† In judicial matters their condition was one of peculiar hardship; as they had no legal rights to assert against the patricians, so neither had they, like clients, the protection of a patron. Though thus excluded from the best privileges of the state, they were bound to shed their blood in its defence; and, in recompense of their military service, they were secured in the possession of the lands they cultivated. We are told, indeed, that when the conquered Latins were removed by Ancus Marcius to the Aventine, their lands became the property of the Roman state. Now, it is quite

* See p. 161.

† Thus the plebeian *Marcelli* were of the Claudian gens.

incredible that the "many thousand" inhabitants of the Latin cities could all find abodes on the Aventine, and in the valley below; and we have ample evidence that the mass of the plebeians were landholders in Latium.

The explanation of this fact involves a matter of supreme importance towards understanding the whole history of Rome,—the possession and occupation of land by the citizens. The territory of the city, in its earliest age, was a small district, which a man might walk round in a day, bounded on the west and north by the Tiber and the Anio, and reaching on the east and south not more than five or six miles from the city. The Dyke of Cluilius was always considered as dividing this original "*Ager Romanus*" from the rest of Latium. The district was connected with the city by a close religious bond; for auspices could be taken within its boundaries. It was regarded as the property of the state, that is, of the *Populus Romanus* or patrician houses, for whom it was cultivated by their clients; but in what manner it was divided among them, we are not informed. The king had a portion of it for his demesne. As the territory of the state grew by successful wars, the lands of the conquered people were regarded as the prize of victory, and became the "Land of the People" (*Ager Publicus*). * It was divided among the patricians for *occupation* (*possessio*); but the real *ownership* (*dominium*) remained with the whole state; and the "possessors" were bound to pay a rent of one-tenth of the produce of arable land, and one-fifth of that of fruit-trees, to the general revenue. The plebeians were of course excluded from this arrangement, as forming no part of the "People;" though it seems that they were permitted to feed their cattle on the public pasture land. But though politically disqualified from holding property, they were not shut out from all share in the soil which had been won partly by their blood. At every addition to the *Ager Publicus*, a portion was assigned to the Plebeians, not on terms like the "possession" of the patricians, but as the individual property of the allottees. How the patricians withheld this right, and how they evaded their own payments to the state, and in what conflicts their grasping policy involved the commonwealth, we shall ere long see.

* It is of vital importance to bear in mind, that *publicus* is here used in its strict sense, as the adjective of *populus*, and that the *populus* to whom it refers is the *Populus Romanus*, or patrician houses. There are several points in connection with the *Ager Publicus* into which we abstain from entering. Full information will be found in Mr. Long's articles *Ager*, *Agrariæ Leges*, &c., in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*.

From these arrangements for the tenure of public land in the historical age of Rome, we might infer that the original plebeians had a share in the conquered lands of Latium. The true state of the case seems to have been still more favourable. Whether in consideration of their kindred blood, or as a part of the terms of their submission, or from the impolicy of introducing a new body, who are said to have been as numerous as the previous citizens, in a state of disaffection,—it would seem that the greater portion of their land was restored to them in absolute ownership, subject only to a certain tribute. Those who removed to Rome were probably a minority, who preferred to take up their residence in the city. In the assignment of the Aventine as their residence, and in the favour shown them by the kings, there seems no reason to doubt that we have genuine facts of history. This connection with the city raised the plebeians above the disadvantage of a rural condition, and secured a centre of union to their whole body. The independence founded upon the solid basis of landed property distinguished them completely from the clients, and gave them the means of resisting the encroachments of the patricians, whose jealous policy soon began to aim at reducing them to the condition of serfs. The whole subject is thus summed up by Professor Malden, in his admirable discussion of the earliest Roman history:—“While the Patricians held possessions by sufferance in the Public Domain, the private property in land (with the exception of the small district which comprised the regions of the three patrician tribes) belonged almost exclusively to the Plebeians. To them alone had any portion of the conquered territories been sold or assigned by public authority. On the other hand, property in land distinguished the Plebeians from the Clients. The Clients received precarious grants from the possessions of their Patrons in the Public Domain; but it is not probable that, in the earlier ages, they were capable of acquiring property in land in their own persons. But the more important form of the distinction was this, that the Clients exercised all trades and mechanical arts, which were strictly forbidden to the free and independent citizen. Agriculture was the only lawful employment of the plebeian citizen; and therefore the Plebeian who did not hold property in land, though he might not be compelled to attach himself to a Patron, in all his political rights was reduced to a level with the Clients.”* The more clearly we can understand the original

* *History of Rome*, in the *Library of Useful Knowledge*, Lond. 1833. This work,

condition of the Plebeians, the better shall we perceive the relation of the history of Rome to the social history of the world. This point is of the more importance as it has been for ages the subject of constant misrepresentation; and the watchwords, under which the Roman patricians and plebeians fought their great constitutional battles, have been misapplied to the wildest theories of modern times. Of all the perverted uses of history, none is stranger than the passion with which the party conflicts of other ages are confounded with our own.

The death of Ancus Marcius was followed by the accession of a new dynasty, whose founder—according to the popular legend—came from Etruria, but derived his origin from Greece. And if, as is the prevailing opinion of scholars, we have come to a point at which tradition contains a greater portion of historic truth than before, there is no good reason for rejecting the latter part of this statement, which would furnish another example of Etruscan influence in Etruria. The story goes,* that Demaratus, a Corinthian merchant,* settled at Tarquinii, on the Etruscan coast. His son married a noble Etruscan lady named Tanaquil; and in virtue of this marriage he ranked as a Lucumo, if we may believe the Romans, who know him by no other name. But his foreign descent hindered his advancement with the jealous Etruscans, and his high-spirited wife could not brook that her husband should hold a place below her kindred. Rome lay open to the ambition of foreigners; and thither Tanaquil and her husband bent their course, with their two sons and a numerous retinue. They had reached the suburb of Janiculum, when an eagle, which had been hovering over the chariot, making a sudden stoop bore away the stranger's cap, carried it aloft to the sky, and then returning placed it on his head. Tanaquil's skill in augury saw the omen of her husband's future elevation. On his arrival at Rome, he was received as a citizen, by the name of Lucius Tarquinius, from his birthplace; his followers were also admitted to the citizenship; and he became the founder of the *Gens Tarquinia*, the first Tuscan gens that is known to have existed at Rome. As the head of his race, as well as the first of the two kings of his name, he is distinguished by the title of

though unfortunately a fragment, contains the most masterly account of the views of the best scholars on the early Roman history at the date of its publication.

* The cause assigned for his leaving Corinth is the oppression of a tyrant, who, if we could trust the common chronology, would be Cypselus, the predecessor of Periander.

TARQUINIUS PRISCUS. He rose quickly in favour with Ancus Marcius, to whom he rendered great services in the Latin wars, by his military talent and his numerous following; while by his wealth, and by the superior knowledge derived from his Greek and Etruscan training, he gained equal favour with the people.

Ancus named him as the guardian of his two sons; but, on the king's death, after a reign of thirty-four years, Tarquin is said to have offered himself as a candidate for the vacant throne, to which he was elected by the suffrages of all the people. The Roman monarchy, as we have seen, was elective; and though a member of the royal house might naturally have some preference,* this consideration was not likely to prevail over the advantage of having a king of proved ability and in the full vigour of his age, rather than an untried youth. The difficulty involved in the election of an Etruscan rests partly on the figment of a tacit understanding that the king should be chosen alternately from the Ramnians and the Tities, an arrangement which implies the perpetual exclusion of the Luceres. It has been suggested † that Tarquin was elected with the very purpose of raising the Luceres to an equality with the other tribes, a measure which he carried out by adding 100 members to the senate, which now had its full number of 300. He also doubled the number of the knights, by creating three new centuries, as some say from the Luceres, but, according to the more probable statement, from the noblest families of the plebeians.‡ That this was an attempt to raise the plebeians to a share in the privileges of the Roman people, which the patricians frustrated by the weapon of religion,—which they always well knew how to wield,—is implied in the picturesque legend of Attus Navius. This augur forbade the king to carry out his intention of creating three new centuries of horsemen, which were to have been called after his own name, and placed on an equal footing with the Ramnes, Titienses, and Luceres. Tarquin, in mockery of the augur's art, said:—"Tell me now by thy auguries whether the thing I have now in my mind may be done or not." "It may," replied Attus Navius, after he had consulted the gods by augury. "Well, then," rejoined the king, "it was in my mind that thou shouldst cut this whetstone in two with this razor." The augur took the razor and severed the whetstone; Tarquin

* As, for example, in the election of Ancus Marcius, the grandson of Numa.

† See Newman's *Regal Rome*, chap. viii.

‡ That such a preponderance should have been given to one of the three ancient tribes is quite incredible.

desisted from his scheme, and learnt to respect the omens.* The whetstone and razor were buried under a sacred covering in the Comitium, and a veiled statue of Attus Navius was afterwards set up over the spot. The three centuries were, however, added to the knights, but with the names of the "*Second* Ramnes, Titienses, and Luceres." Such is the story of Livy, who was probably misled by the exclusive application, in later times, of the names of the three old tribes to the centuries of the Equites. What seems to be the true meaning of the legend has been already explained, in speaking of the plebeians.†

It was, then, rather the moral strength gained by the recognition of the place which the plebeians had won for themselves in the state, than the doubling of his cavalry, that enabled Tarquin to gain great successes against the Latins and the Sabines. He took and destroyed the wealthy city of Apiolæ, and recovered a large number of other Latin towns, which seem to have been lost after the death of Ancus.‡ Following up these successes, Tarquin was the first Roman king who entered the Apennines, to war upon the fierce nation of the Æqui, in the upper valley of the Anio. The Sabines seized the opportunity to cross the Anio, and ravaged the lands of Rome up to the very rampart of the city. Driven back with difficulty, they renewed the attack in the following year, making a bridge of boats over the Anio, a little above its confluence with the Tiber. In the decisive battle that ensued, Tarquin gained the victory by his cavalry, while he destroyed the Sabine bridge by means of blazing rafts floated down the Anio, the fords of which above the enemy's camp he had also occupied. Few of the Sabines escaped to the mountains: the fate of the other fugitives was announced at Rome by their arms borne down the Tiber. The spoils collected on the field of battle were gathered into a heap and burnt as an offering to Vulcan, the prisoners and the recovered spoil being sent to Rome. Carrying the war into

* It is hardly worth while to point out the obvious inconsistency of Tarquin's alleged contempt for the augur's art with the augury which attended his own entrance into Rome. The further absurdity of an Etruscan despising augury will be variously viewed according to the opinion that it was, or not, a specially Etruscan art.

† See p. 185. We have a direct testimony, preserved by the grammarian Festus, that Tarquin wished to change the *tribes* established by Romulus, and that, as the result, "the body of Roman citizens (*civitas Romana*) was distributed into *six* parts, namely, the first and second Titienses, Ramnes, and Luceres."

‡ These successes of the Latins would seem to imply that the constitutional struggle, connected with the election of Tarquin and with his new institutions, had been of importance enough to absorb the attention of the Romans.

the Sabine territory, Tarquin took Collatia, an old Latin town near the Anio,* and gave it as an appanage to his nephew, who had been named Egerius† (“the Needy”), but was now known as Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, a name famous in the story of the last Tarquin.

It was in the Sabine campaign that Tarquin vowed to build the great triune temple of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva on the Saturnian hill, for which he only lived to prepare the ground. As the workmen were digging the foundations, they disinterred a human head. The augurs saw in the discovery an omen that the spot was destined to become the Head of the whole world (*caput orbis terræ*), and the new temple was called the CAPITOL (*Capitolium*). The name was afterwards extended to the whole collection of sacred buildings on the Capitoline Hill.

Tarquin adorned the city with other great works of utility and magnificence, the chief of which remains to our own day in the *Cloaca Maxima*, or Great Sewer, constructed to drain the marshy hollows between the Tiber and the Palatine, and between this hill and the Capitoline and Aventine. In the changes brought about by the ages, our own has once more learnt that even drains are not an unfit object of enthusiastic admiration; and after twenty-five centuries of desolating war, the discovery that the public health is worth the care of governments has at last produced works that surpass the “low-level drainage” of Rome. Meanwhile, the fabric which excited the astonishment of the Augustan age for its massive structure, which had bid defiance to time, earthquakes, and inundations for 600 years, has endured four times that period, with scarcely a stone displaced. The mouth of the *Cloaca Maxima* is still seen opening into the Tiber a little below the southern end of the *Insula Tiberina*, in a quay-wall which must have been constructed at the same time. Its structure shows, as we have already said, a knowledge of the arch.‡ It is a tunnel, vaulted in with three concentric rings of large stones, the innermost having an interior diameter of nearly 14 feet. The hewn stones are about 5½ feet long, and above 3 feet high; they are keyed together without cement. The material

* The exact position of Collatia is unknown: some place it on the right bank of the Anio, others on the left.

† The legend derives this name from *egero*, because he had been left to Tarquin's care without an inheritance.

‡ This affords a complete disproof of the exclusive derivation of Etruscan art from Greece.

furnishes a proof of the great antiquity of the work: it is the "tufa litoide" of Brocchi, a volcanic stone found in various spots near Rome, but which was superseded in the buildings of the republican age by the finer peperino of Gabii and the Alban hills. The Cloaca Maxima itself only extended as far as the valley of the Forum. It was afterwards continued as far as the Suburra, and a system of sewers ramified through all Rome. Agrippa, in his celebrated ædileship, set the example to more recent adventurers by navigating the sewers in a boat: the fact is worth mentioning as a proof that the sewers of Rome must have been well ventilated.

The effect of this great work was to make the valleys on the north and south-west of the Palatine for the first time firm dry land. In the former, the Forum was now enclosed by rows of shops along its northern and southern sides, and Tarquin built in it a temple of Saturn; in the latter the Great Circus (*Circus Maximus*) was built, for the exhibition of the games which Tarquin is said to have introduced from Etruria. The contests in chariot racing and boxing were carried on by hired Etruscans, the Romans looking on as spectators. The seats were divided into thirty sections, for the thirty curiæ, and the senators and knights had their assigned places. Such was the contrast between the proud patrician reserve of the Latin race, and the free public life even of the most aristocratic Greeks. This was the beginning of the Great Roman Games (*Ludi Magni Romani*, or *Circenses*), which were celebrated annually in September, in honour of the three deities to whom the Capitol was built. The booty of Apollæ is said to have supplied the means for the construction of the Circus Maximus; and the other works of Tarquin display such a command of wealth, that they have been ascribed, without any adequate reason, to forced labour. We may trace in them with greater certainty the fruits of Etruscan science; and, though many of the works ascribed to Tarquinius Priscus ought doubtless to be divided among the kings of his dynasty, there is no question but that he is rightly described as "the founder of the subsequent architectural splendour of Rome."

The city now appears as the seat of a powerful monarchy, and the worthy capital of the surrounding country. A change so marked from its condition under Ancus Marcius seemed to Niebuhr to require the hypothesis, that the accession of the Etruscan dynasty was in reality a foreign conquest. We know very well, as will soon be seen from a decisive example, that, had

such a conquest been effected, it would have been falsified in the Roman annals. But, in truth, the chasm which it is sought thus to bridge over, appears to be the mere creation of those annalists. By the arbitrary system which assigns only four kings to the period of nearly a century and a half, preceding the Etruscan dynasty, no adequate space was allowed for approaching to such a condition as that which we find under Tarquinius Priscus. It was therefore necessary to make the progress of the state seem less than it really was, at the death of Ancus Marcius; while its splendour under Tarquin is probably exaggerated by bringing into one reign nearly all the fruits of that development of commerce and wealth which was the natural result of a closer connection with Etruria. In short, this seems to be one of the cases in which the genius of Niebuhr, so acute in exposing the mythical inventions of the ancients, hurried him to the construction of positive results, entirely destitute of the solid basis of historic testimony.

It is not then necessary to imagine an Etruscan conquest of Rome, in order to explain the simple fact, that the reign of Tarquin is an epoch of great development in the power and wealth of Rome. And this advance was also marked by a greater exhibition of regal pomp. For all that we read, the outward state of the earlier kings may have been no greater than that of the elective chief of a republic, and in war the insignia of the fasces were the simple exhibition of the authority essential to the very existence of a rude military community. The introduction of these emblems, with the lictors who bore them, is indeed ascribed by Dionysius to Tarquin, but he tells us that others traced their use to the beginning of the monarchy.* But all agree that Tarquin introduced from Etruria, and assumed by permission of the Senate, "a golden crown, an ivory chair, a sceptre topped with an eagle, a crimson robe studded with gold, and a variegated crimson cloak, such as the kings of the Lydians and the Persians wore, only not square like theirs, but semicircular: such garments the Romans call *togas*."† The toga

* "In fact," as Mr. Newman observes, "it seems necessary to believe this, unless we regard Tarquin as in the strictest sense conqueror of Rome; for, of all insignia, this must have been the most revolting, if suddenly introduced. Only on the supposition of its representing supreme military sway, could it be endured by free men. A barbarous emblem, natural and in some sense necessary in a camp of promiscuous outlaws, was continued and incorporated with the splendid garb of peace, when order and art had become victorious in society."—*Regal Rome*, p. 127.

† Dionys. iii. 61. In this passage an Etruscan origin is positively ascribed only to the *toga prætexta*, but the introduction of the garment itself from Etruria seems to

with the purple border (*toga protexta*) was also worn by children with a golden ball about the neck (*bullæ*). This dress is said to have been granted as a distinction to the son of Tarquin, who, at the age of fourteen, killed an enemy with his own hand in the Sabine war. One story makes these insignia of royalty a mark of submission from the twelve states of Etruria, whom Tarquin had conquered in battle; but such a war is altogether doubtful.

These signs of outward splendour, and of substantial power, seem to prove a tendency to the aggrandizement of the king, in reliance probably on the support of the plebeians. It has been conjectured that the alarmed jealousy of the patricians was the true cause of Tarquin's violent death. The common legend attributes his murder to the sons of Ancus Marcius, who had acquiesced for thirty-six years in his possession of the throne. They employed two assassins, who appeared before the tribunal of the king, that he might decide a pretended quarrel; and while his attention was occupied by one the other clove his head with an axe (B.C. 578).

The politic and courageous Tanaquil snatched from the Marci the fruits of her husband's murder, and secured the crown for the greatest of the Roman kings. SERVILIUS TULLIUS is said to have been the son of one of the late king's clients, and of a noble Latin woman named Ocrisia, who had been brought as a captive from Corniculum, and was attached to the service of the queen. The name of Servius* points to his low origin; but the portents that attended his birth in the palace were interpreted by Tanaquil as omens of his greatness; and his quick intelligence attracted the notice of the king, who brought him up as if he were his own son. He was doubtless ennobled by Tarquin, probably among the lesser gentes; and, having given proof of the highest ability, he was appointed Warden of the City (*præfectus urbi*). The traditions vary as to whether it was before or after the murder of Tarquin that Servius married his daughter. One form of the story is, that Servius shared all the political plans of Tarquin, who had already

be implied, and it is the only dress that appears on the Etruscan monuments. On the other hand, its sacred form of wearing the toga, which was used by persons sacrificing, and by the consul or herald in declaring war—the *cinclus Gabinus*—is connected with the Latin city of Gabi. The toga with purple bars (*toga trabeata*) also is ascribed to the early kings of Rome at all events, the dress became the peculiar national costume of the Romans, who are hence called the *Gens Togata*. (For all particulars respecting it, see the article *Toga*, in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, 2nd edition.)

* From *servus*, a slave. Compare the well known line,

"Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum"

designated him as his successor, and that the sons of Ancus and the old patricians thereupon resolved on the king's death ; but this seems a mere invention to account for their having waited so long. The two sons of Tarquin, Lucius and Aruns, were of tender age ; and Tanaquil determined to secure the crown for Servius.

The bleeding corpse of Tarquin had no sooner been carried to his chamber, than Tanaquil ordered the palace gates to be shut, and gave out that the king was only wounded : in a few days he would be healed : and meanwhile he had committed the government to Servius Tullius. Urged by Tanaquil, Servius came forth in the royal robe, preceded by the lictors, and received the applauses of the people. His first act was to condemn the murderers of the late king. The Marçii had fled ; and, as to the other supposed conspirators, it is enough to remember the coward hesitation which besets a plot that is only partially successful. The position of Tullius was thus made sure, before he claimed the crown ; but, to exclude the possibility of an adverse nomination by the Senate, he dispensed with the formalities of the Interrex, and offered himself at once to the Curiae for election ; or, as some say, for the mere confirmation of his actual power, by the conferring of the imperium. The exact nature of the proceedings is a matter of conjecture ; but if we are dealing in any sense with an historical fact, we cannot be far wrong in assuming that the Latin party, roused by the danger which they regarded as their own, would support Servius Tullius, and that the large portion of the old tribes who were disgusted at the crime, or at its failure, would be willing to connive at some irregularity in the procedure by which order was restored to the commonwealth. Livy and Cicero speak of an "opportune war" with the Etruscans, in which the new king's success confirmed his power at home ; but it would seem that the disaffection of the patricians forced him to found his power on a new basis, of which the plebeians formed an integral part.

But, whatever the causes which led to the revolution, and whatever degree of credibility belongs to the personal history of Servius Tullius, the great fact in this period of Roman history is the remodelling of the constitution, which is associated with his name. Whether devised by a king and carried out by his authority, or whether it was a timely concession made by the ruling body to the irresistible power of the plebeian order, it is one of the most remarkable measures ever devised for the reconciliation of conflicting interests in a commonwealth. No attempt was made to abolish the old patrician constitution ; but a new one was

planted by its side, like the vigorous parasite which gradually stifles in its embrace the old tree whose form may still be traced beneath it. The Senate, the Tribes, the Curiae, the Gentes, the centuries of Equites, the Pontiffs, Augurs, and other colleges, were all left untouched; but a new body politic was framed, with new divisions, new powers, and new names, in which patricians and plebeians were included, their distinction being merged in a new classification.

There were two distinct features in the constitution of Servius Tullius; the one, a fresh social and territorial division of the state; the other, the creation of a new popular assembly, to form the basis of the government. The first was a change somewhat analogous to the subdivision of the French territory into departments, in lieu of the ancient provinces. The whole Roman territory and population was divided into thirty tribes;* of which four were within the city and twenty-six in the country districts. The city tribes were named according to the regions they occupied, *Suburrana*, *Palatine*, *Esquilina*, and *Collina*;† the country tribes, though strictly local, bore the names of persons and heroes. Each tribe had a stronghold upon a hill (*pagus*) as a refuge for the peasantry and cattle in war, placed under the protection of a local deity; and the common festival of these divinities was the *Paganalia*. At the head of every tribe was a magistrate, called *Tribunus*, the name already borne by the heads of the old tribes. The functions of the tribes, like their organization, were at first entirely local. The direct tax for war expenses was levied according to the tribes, whence its name (*tributum*); and each tribe contributed its contingent to the army. It seems probable that the tribes managed their own internal affairs, such as the maintenance of roads, wells, and so forth; and the meetings held for these purposes would naturally discuss questions of wider interest. It has been a matter of great debate, whether the tribes were composed solely of plebeians, or of all the

* Apart from any political reason for keeping the old name in this new sense, it should be remembered that the word is really a *general* term, capable of being applied to *any specific* division. See p. 159, note. The conquest of Rome by Porsenna cut off one-third of her territory, that is, ten of the country tribes. The subsequent accessions of territory in Italy raised the number to thirty-five.

† This quadruple division of the city is traceable to the amalgamation of the city on the Quirinal (as a fourth region) with the three regions of the old city, the Suburban, the Palatine, and the Suburban (Esquiline). The *Suburban* contained the street of that name, with the Carine and the Cælian Mount; the *Palatine* and *Esquiline*, the mounts so named, the former including the Velia; the *Colline*, the "hills" of the Quirinal and Viminal.

inhabitants of each district, including the patricians. The latter would seem to be the natural inference from their local organization; but we have high authorities for the former view. It is certain that the patricians had votes in the tribes after the epoch of the decenviral legislation; but this did not prevent their becoming more and more the great organ of the power of the plebeians; till at length the "resolutions of the plebs" (*plebiscita*) passed in the general meetings of the tribes (*Comitia Tributa*), which were held in the Forum on the market days, were declared to be binding on the whole state (B.C. 449). Nor was this all: for the assembly of the tribes gradually absorbed into itself the other popular assembly (*Comitia Centuriata*), of which we have now to speak; the latter having previously superseded the legislative power of the old assembly of the *Curiae* (*Comitia Curiata*). But this great development of their power, which was evidently contemplated by their original founder, belongs to a later period of Roman history.*

The immediate admission of the plebeians into the governing body of the state was, however, effected by a different organization, military in its form, and based on the foundation of real property. Its principle was this: that all free citizens possessed of property, whether patricians or plebeians, should be called on to defend their stake in the commonwealth; and that the place assigned to them in the army, and their political weight in the state, should alike be governed by the amount of their wealth. For this purpose, all the citizens were first separated into two great divisions, the first containing all who had the means of independent subsistence, the "wealthy" (*locupletes*), or "settled on the soil" (*assidui*); while all the rest were regarded merely as persons contributing to the population of the state (*proletarii*), and "reckoned by the head" (*capite censi*). The latter, though free citizens, had no recognized position either in peace or war. The former were the *Exercitus*, or body of armed citizens, and their meetings were held in the *Campus Martius*, outside the walls; for arms were not suffered to be borne within the city. In the early age, at which Rome had still enemies at her gates, a standard was hoisted on the summit of the Janiculan Mount while the people were thus assembled, and was lowered on the approach of danger. At this signal, all business was broken off; and the

* The *Comitia Tributa* also elected the inferior magistrates, and they had a limited judicial power, not extending beyond the infliction of fines. A full account of their constitution and history will be found in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

people, armed as they were, turned to repel the enemy. The custom was preserved, long after Rome was separated from her nearest enemies by distant seas and mountains; and in the last age of the Republic, it was used in party contests to serve the same purpose as a modern "count-out."

This "Army" was divided into five "levies" or "classes;"* and the classes into "centuries," a term which soon ceased to bear its literal meaning of 100 men. Some authorities make these classes to consist wholly of the infantry (*pedites*), placing the cavalry (*equites*) as a separate class above the first; others include them in the first class. At all events, they took precedence of all the rest; and each knight received a horse, or the money to purchase one, from the state, as well as the annual cost of keeping it, which was defrayed by the orphans and unmarried women. "In a military state," says Niebuhr, "it could not be esteemed unjust, that the women and children should contribute largely to those who fought in behalf of them and of the commonwealth." There were eighteen centuries of knights; of which six were those of the ancient tribes, doubled, as we have seen, by Tarquinius Priscus, and twelve were added from the plebeians. The five classes of the infantry included all the rest of the privileged citizens, capable of bearing arms. Those of each class were divided into the *Seniores*, the men between forty-five and sixty years of age; and the *Juniores*, from seventeen to forty-five. The latter were within the ordinary age of military service; but the Seniors were liable to be called out on emergencies: those above sixty were superannuated, and their exemption from military service involved the loss of their right to vote in the Assembly. Due weight was given to age by equalizing the number of centuries, though the number of the Juniors of course exceeded the number of the Seniors. Especially must the large number of centuries in the first class, combined with the small number of persons who came up to the required standard of wealth, have secured the Seniors of this class a preponderating voice in proportion to their numbers. The qualification for each class is stated, according to the later writers, who have preserved all the information we possess, by a pecuniary standard; but this is, without doubt, merely an estimation of the value of the land by which they were originally assessed. We may safely assume that the qualification of the first class,—who manifestly rank so far above the rest, both in the number of their centuries and the

* *Classes*, from the old verb *calare*, to call out.

completeness of their equipment,—was the possession of a certain measure of land, which was regarded as a complete estate or farm.* The census of the second class was three-fourths of this quantity; of the third class, one half; of the fourth class, one quarter; and of the fifth class, one eighth. This estimate applied only to real property, and it would seem, at first, to land alone; no account being taken of slaves, cattle, furniture, precious metals, and other valuables. The distribution of the centuries among the classes, with their property qualifications, and the arms they bore, will be seen from the annexed table.† The position of every citizen

* Dr. Mommsen applies to this unit the Teutonic name of *hide* (German, *hufe*), that is, as much as can be properly tilled with one plough (the *plough-gate* of the Scotch). Its absolute magnitude is very uncertain; but it seems to have been not less than 20 *jugera*, or about 12½ acres.

† The subjoined table, from Liddell's *History of Rome*, will make it easy to perceive these arrangements at a glance, as they are given by Livy.

Classes.	Census, or Rateable Property in Land.	Centuries.	Arms.	
			Defensive.	Offensive
First Class	Equites	6 Patrician + 12 Plebeian = 18	100	{ Helmet, shield, greaves, cuirass.
	All having 100,000 ases and upwards	40 Seniores + 40 Juniores = 80		
Second Class	Fabri 2	20	{ Sword and spear.
	75,000 ases and upwards	10 Seniores + 10 Juniores =		
Third Class	50,000 ases and upwards	10 Seniores + 10 Juniores =	20	{ Sword and spear.
	25,000 ases and upwards	10 Seniores + 10 Juniores =		
Fourth Class	11,000 ases and upwards (more probably 12,500, as Dionysius says). Trumpeters	15 Seniores + 15 Juniores = 30	34	{ Helmet (?)
	Capite Censi, or Proletarii 3		
Fifth Class 1	None.	{ Slings, &c.
		

The whole number of centuries, therefore, was 194; and in the first class alone there are more than half.

The centuries of cornicines, tubicines, &c., were called *accensi*, because they were added to the list of *censi*.

The single century of proletarii were called *capite censi*, because they were counted by the head, and not rated by their property. Later, however, the proletarii and *capite censi* were distinguished, the former being those who possessed appreciable property of less amount than 11,000 ases.

Dionysius places the 2 centuries of *fabri* in the second class; and the 2 (not 3) of musicians in the fourth. His total is 193 centuries, which is probably the more

in the classes and centuries was determined by a register (*census*) of all the landed property they possessed, to secure the accuracy of which it was enacted that all transfers of land not made in public before witnesses should be null and void. The register, and the levy-roll founded upon it, were made up every fourth year, at first by the king, afterwards by the consuls, and finally by the two great officers of state called *censors*, who added to the office of registrars a supervision of the morals of the citizens, enforced by the power of degrading the unworthy, and also the administration of the finances of the state. The census formed the basis of the tax (*tributum*) levied for the military expenses of the state, as well as for the system of voting in the Assembly. Each century had one vote; and such was the preponderance assigned to wealth, and to the nobility of the old tribes, that the first class, inclusive of the knights, had an absolute majority of all the votes—namely, 100 out of 193. It was from this system of voting by centuries, that the assembly derived its name of COMITIA CENTURIATA. But before describing its political action, it should be viewed in its primary character, as the armed levy of the state.

The name *Legion*, which originally signified the whole of this levy, was still retained for each of its chief constituent parts. It originally consisted, as we have seen, of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry; at least this was the normal standard, to which the actual numbers were as nearly as possible assimilated.* The theory, which traces in the four city tribes of the new constitution the absorption of the "Hill City" as a fourth element in the state, gives a natural explanation of the raising of the infantry to 4000, a number which becomes a little larger when adapted to the organization of the centuries. If we assume that the *Century* had originally its literal signification of 100 men, we shall find that the fourth part, or twenty-five men from every century, would compose a legion of 4250 men.† Four such legions, increased by the 1800 cavalry,

correct, as an even number, besides being unlucky, might have prevented an absolute majority of votes.

* This statement is, of course, based on the traditional view of the early history: how far it represents an actual fact we have no means of determining.

† The following are the items:—

<i>First Class</i>	80 centuries	furnished to each legion	2000 men.
<i>Second Class</i>	20	"	500 "
<i>Third Class</i>	20	"	500 "
<i>Fourth Class</i>	20	"	500 "
<i>Fifth Class</i>	30	"	750 "

Total effective infantry of the legion . 4250 "

and by the remaining centuries of engineers (*fabri*), and musicians, with supernumeraries intended to fill up the ranks, make the whole force close upon 20,000 men. Two legions usually did garrison duty at home, and two went out on active service.

The legion closely resembled the Greek phalanx, both in its formation and its equipments. The 3000 men furnished by the first three classes, armed with the long spear and straight two-edged sword, and covered with shield and helmet, were drawn up six deep, with a front of 500. The first four ranks were composed of the 2000 soldiers of the first class, who wore body-armour besides; the two hinder ranks of the second and third classes; and the light-armed men (*velites*) of the fourth and fifth classes either formed two additional ranks in the rear, or skirmished on the flanks. Here also was the place of the cavalry, of whom only 300 were attached to each legion in the field, leaving 600 of the 1800 as a reserve. Such was the constitution of the legion under the later kings, and for about the first 150 years of the Republic. About the time of the great Latin War (B.C. 340) the phalanx was abandoned for that more open order of fighting, which has become inseparably connected with the victorious career of the Roman legions.*

It was to this army, assembled in its military array in the Campus Martius, that the constitution ascribed to Servius Tullius committed all the highest elective, legislative, and judicial functions of the state; but as we do not find the *Comitia Centuriata* in full action till the time of the republic, the description of its functions necessarily refers to that period. It is useless to speculate whether or no the election of the king was reserved for the *Comitia Curiata*; since the traditional history gives us only one king after Servius Tullius;—a despot, who usurped the crown, deprived the Assembly of the Centuries of all political power, and paid no respect to that of the *Curiae*. But, under the Republic, the centuries elected all the higher magistrates,—consuls, prætors, military tribunes with consular power, censors, and decemvirs. Their legislative power† was at first confined to the passing

Dr. Mommsen makes the total 4200, or 42 centuries exactly, taking only 7 centuries from the 5th class, instead of 7½. At the period of the Latin war, in B.C. 340, the data supplied by Livy give 4725 men for the legion, though his own total is 5000, besides 300 cavalry.

* See the full account of their later order in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

† It should be remembered that the word *lex* (law) means specifically an enactment of the *Comitia Centuriata*, in contradistinction to the *Senatus-consultum*, or resolution of the senate, or the *Plebiscitum*, or vote of the *Comitia Tributa*. A law proposed

or rejecting of resolutions sent down from the Senate (*senatus-consulta*), and proposed to them by the presiding magistrate.* The earliest law which is recorded as having passed the Comitia Centuriata, was the *Lex Valeria de Provocatione*, in the third year of the Republic (B.C. 508). It was proposed by the consul, P. Valerius Poplicola, who had been suspected of affecting royal power, to give every citizen an appeal against magistrates, in Rome and for a mile beyond. The decision upon making war, on the resolution of the Senate, belonged to the Comitia Centuriata; but, in the earliest age of the Republic at least, the Senate alone had the power of making peace. Lastly, the Comitia Centuriata formed the supreme court of appeal in all questions affecting the life of a Roman citizen. The condemnation of Spurius Cassius (B.C. 485) is sometimes cited as the first exercise of this right: but others hold that the patricians assumed the power of putting Cassius to death by their own votes in the Comitia Curiata.

The great power of the Comitia Centuriata was originally limited, on the one hand, by the initiative belonging to the Senate, and on the other, by the necessity of submitting their acts for the sanction of the Curiae. But both these restrictions were afterwards thrown off, or relaxed. In relation to the choice of magistrates, the formal proposal by the presiding magistrate was not abolished, but the people compelled him to propose any candidate who came forward, without the nomination of the Senate. This step was taken in about thirty years from the beginning of the Republic. For legislation, the previous *senatus-consultum* was still necessary; and, after this had been made public for seventeen days, the *rogatio* was moved in the Comitia either by the consul or the senator who had proposed it. In later times, this previous resolution of the Senate conveyed, by a curiously indirect process, the confirmation of the Curiae. This confirmation had gradually become a mere form, when the Publilian law enacted that the patricians should give their previous assent to all the laws that might be proposed in the Comitia Centuriata (B.C. 339). When even the empty formality of the meeting of the Curiae was abolished, the senate succeeded them as representing the patrician

for enactment was called a *rogatio*, because the people were asked their pleasure respecting its passing. The terms *rogatio* and *lex* correspond to our *bill* and *act* (in parliament); and, like them, they are occasionally confounded.

* The acts of the Comitia Centuriata were distinguished by the gentile name of their movers, with the subject added, as *Lex Pompeia de Imperio Casari prorogando*.

body, and thus the initiative of the former body stood for and included the previous consent of the latter. We shall hereafter see how the powers of the *Comitia Centuriata*, which represented the whole body of the citizens, were absorbed by the more plebeian assembly of the *Comitia Tributa*.

Such is the constitution traditionally ascribed to Servius Tullius, as the fruit partly of his spontaneous sense of justice to the plebeians, and partly of the necessity which threw him on their support, against the jealousy of the old tribes. By whom, at what time, and from what causes, the change was really made, are questions which we have no certain evidence to decide. The preponderating influence assigned to wealth and rank forbids our regarding it as a democratic revolution. The form of the levy, based as it is on the four city tribes, implies that the Servian wall had been already built. The larger qualification of the higher classes, and the fact (at least if a *century* meant originally 100 men) that there were so many as 8,000 citizens possessed of the property of the highest class, implies a great extension of the Roman territory, so as to embrace probably both the lands of Alba, and those in the fork between the Tiber and the Anio. This intricate but most interesting question may be dismissed with the statement of the views of Mommsen:—"Upon the whole it is plain that this Servian constitution did not originate in a conflict between the orders; on the contrary, it bears the stamp of a reforming legislator, like the constitutions of Lycurgus, Solon, and Zaleucus; and it has evidently been produced under Greek influence. Particular analogies may be deceptive, such as the coincidence, already noticed by the ancients, that in Corinth also widows and orphans were charged with the provision of the horses for the cavalry: but the adoption of the armour and arrangements of the Greek hoplite system was certainly no accidental coincidence. Now if we consider the fact, that it was in the second century of the city that the Greek states in Lower Italy advanced from the pure clan-constitution to a modified one, which placed the preponderance in the hands of the land-holders, we shall recognize in that movement the impulse which called forth in Rome the Servian reform, a change of constitution resting in the main on the same fundamental idea, and only directed into a somewhat different course by the strictly monarchical form of the Roman state."* The reconciliation of the monarchical form of government

* "The analogy also between the so-called Servian constitution and the treatment of the Attic *meteci* (resident foreigners) deserves to be particularly noticed. Athens,

with institutions which only took effect under the republic was evidently felt as a difficulty by the Roman writers, who try to antedate the republican form of executive government by ascribing to Servius an intention of abdicating the throne in order to make way for two magistrates, to be elected by the *Comitia Centuriata*.

Besides this constitution, the legend ascribes to Servius Tullius many other benefits to Rome, and in particular to the plebeians. He is said to have discharged from his private resources the debts by which they were weighed down; and to have deprived the creditor of the power of reducing his debtor to slavery;—a tradition which was perhaps invented by the plebeians when patrician tyranny led them to look back with fond regret to the age of the “commons’ king.” He is also said to have divided among the plebeians the lands gained in his Etruscan wars; and to have appointed judges for their private causes, reserving only the public causes for his own decision. To Servius is ascribed the completion of the stone wall, with which Tarquin had begun to surround the whole circuit of the seven hills, and which remained the defence of the city down to the age of the emperor Aurelian. He advanced the sacred limit of the *Pomœrium*, so as to include the city on the Quirinal and the Viminal; and raised an immense earthen rampart along the crest from which these two hills and the Esquiline slope away towards the Campagna on the north-east.* The Esquiline, which had formerly been only a suburb, was chosen for his own residence; and he encouraged the people to build upon it; while he fixed the abode of the patricians in the valley between the Esquiline and the Caelian, which was called the Patrician Street (*Patricius Vicus*).

Finally, to Servius is ascribed the great achievement, partly by policy and partly by force of arms, of forming an alliance with the states of Latium, and making Rome the recognized head of

like Rome, opened her gates at a comparatively early period to *meteci*, and afterwards summoned them also to share the burthens of the state. We cannot suppose that any direct connection existed in this instance between Athens and Rome; but the coincidence serves all the more distinctly to shew how the same causes—urban centralization and urban development—everywhere and of necessity produced similar effects.”—(Monmsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i. pp. 102, 3.) The historian might have added the coincidence, that the legislation of Solon took place less than twenty years before the reputed date of Servius Tullius.

* The *Agger Servii Tullii*. See the Plan of Ancient Rome: it will be observed that there is a break in the wall of Servius along the west side of the Capitoline Mount, where the precipitous rock was supposed to form a sufficient defence.

the Latin confederacy. As president of the League, he built a temple of Diana on the Aventine, for a sanctuary common to the Romans and the Latins. The legend says that the Sabines not only claimed a common share in the sacrifices offered here, but aimed to secure the supremacy over Rome which the soothsayers had promised to the nation, which should first sacrifice in this temple. A Sabine brought a cow of surpassing beauty to offer on the Aventine; but the Roman priest reproved him for having neglected the proper ablutions. The Sabine departed to wash himself in the Tiber, leaving the cow at the altar; and while he was absent the cunning Roman completed the sacrifice.

Viewing the early history of Rome in its legendary aspect, Servius Tullius stands forth as the hero of the plebeian order; and the glories of his reign are crowned by a sort of martyrdom, in which he paid the price of his favours to the people with his blood. The patricians, whose exclusive possession of power he had destroyed by his new constitution, and who had a pretext for calling him an usurper, since he had not been regularly elected by the Curiae, found an instrument of their revenge in the royal family itself. It has been said that Tarquinius Priscus left behind him two sons of tender age: Servius Tullius had two daughters; and to unite the interests of both families, he gave them in marriage to the sons of Tarquin. Now in each pair of brothers and sisters there was a strange contrast of character. Lucius, the eldest son of Tarquinius Priscus, was violent and overbearing; and so was the younger daughter of Servius Tullius; while the younger brother, Aruns, resembled the elder sister in gentle goodness. In the hope of overpowering evil with good, Tullius mated the elder brother to the elder sister, and likewise the two younger. But nature was too strong for policy. Lucius murdered his wife, and the younger Tullia her husband; and the double crime was consummated by an incestuous marriage. The unnatural Tullia inflamed her husband's ambition to recover his father's throne. The newer patricians, of the tribe of the Luceres, are said to have been the most discontented with the rule of Tullius, and it was in this tribe that the Tarquinian Gens had been enrolled. Whether the details related be legendary or not, we find their spirit true to history, when we are informed that these later nobles were the most eager champions of their order, and that their young men formed clubs, to countenance each other in lawless violence. Tarquin joined these clubs, and relied on their support. He waited for the harvest-time, when the plebeians, who were attached to

Servius, were abroad in the fields ; and entering the Forum with an armed band of the lawless youths, he seated himself on the king's throne in front of the senate-house, and ordered the Senate to be summoned in the name of King Tarquinius. On hearing the news, Tullius hastened to the Forum, and asked Lucius how he dared to occupy the king's seat while he was still alive. Lucius replied, that it was his father's throne, and that he had more right to it than Tullius. Then, seizing the old man by the middle, he hurled him down the steps of the senate-house, and went in to preside over the Senate. Tullius had risen from the ground, and was making his way homeward to the Esquiline, when he was overtaken and despatched by assassins sent after him by Tarquin. Meanwhile Tullia had mounted her chariot and driven to the Forum, where, sending for her husband out of the senate-house, she saluted him as king. He bade her return home out of the tumult. Her road was through the valley where her father's body lay weltering in his blood. The charioteer stopped and pointed to the corpse ; but she ordered him to drive on, and the wheels, dashing through the pool of gore, besprinkled the chariot and the garments of the parricide with a baptism of blood. The street was ever after called "The Wicked Street" (*vicus sceleratus*). Tarquin consummated the crime by refusing burial to the body of Servius. It was said that afterwards, when Tullia entered the temple of Fortune, where her father's statue was erected, the image covered its eyes ; and a veil thrown over its head perpetuated the memory of the supernatural expression of abhorrence. Others said that Tarquin had the statue veiled, to hide the loved features from the memory of the people.

The usurper and parricide exercised his power in the same spirit in which he had seized it, and which earned for him the name of TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS. Claiming the throne as an inheritance from his father, he showed from the first his design of setting up an hereditary despotism by dispensing even with the form of an election. The patricians, who had aided his usurpation, soon learned that they were not to share his power. While he abrogated the popular laws of Servius Tullius, and retained the *Comitia Centuriata* as the means of levying the army, he paid no respect to the assembly of the *Curiae*. With the Senate he pursued the policy by which an aristocratic monarchy is converted into a despotism. False accusations brought down sentences of death and banishment, with fines and confiscations. The thinned ranks of the Senate were left unfilled ; and their forfeited property, added to the

royal demesnes and treasures, purchased for him new adherents and the protection of a trusty body-guard.

And here we cannot fail to notice the fact, that some of the chief states of Greece were at this very time passing through the same phase of their political progress. The tyranny of Polycrates at Samos, for example, was established just two years later than the usurpation of Tarquinius Superbus (B.C. 532). The coincidence is still more striking in the case of Athens, where Hippias and Hipparchus succeeded to the power of Pisistratus seven years after Tarquin's accession (B.C. 527), and Hippias was expelled in the very same year in which Tarquin was driven from Rome (B.C. 510). Like the Grecian despots, Tarquin sought at once to gratify his own splendid tastes, and to dazzle and delight his subjects, by adorning the city with magnificent works, a device which scarcely ever fails to captivate a people till stern necessity compels them to count its cost. At Rome, however, the lower orders were made to feel the burthen at once, by being forced to work on Tarquin's public buildings without hire.

Tarquin's foreign policy tended at once to strengthen his government by alliances with the neighbouring states, and to augment the territory and power of Rome. He made treaties and wars without consulting the senate or the people. His hereditary connection with Tarquinius formed the basis of a close league with the southern cities of Etruria. He drew closer the ties which Servius Tullius had formed with the Latins, by giving his daughter in marriage to the most powerful of their chiefs, Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum. By war or by intrigues he established the supremacy of Rome over all Latium. One man alone dared to oppose him, Turnus Herdonius of Aricia; and a false accusation preferred by Tarquin obtained his judicial murder by the Latin chiefs themselves. As head of the Latin League of forty-seven cities, Tarquin built a new temple to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount, and, at the general meeting, he offered the common victim, the flesh of which was divided among the states.

The city of Gabii alone refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Tarquin. Its capture forms the subject of one of those legends in which the republican poets delighted to depict in strong colours the tyrannies that justified their revolt, and so to perpetuate their hatred of the banished dynasty. "The most hateful hero of these legends is Sextus, the king's youngest son. He presented himself before Gabii in the guise of a fugitive from his father's tyranny, and was received by the Gabines as their leader. Some

petty victories, which his father permitted him to win, secured his influence in the town; and he sent to Rome for further instructions. The messenger found Tarquin in his garden. Without saying a word, the king sauntered along, knocking off the heads of the tallest poppies. Tired of waiting his leisure, the messenger returned to Sextus, who at once saw the meaning of the parable, and put it into practice by cutting off the chief men of Gabii by false accusations.* The city was then delivered up to Tarquin. As to the really historical circumstances of its surrender we only know that the treaty made on the occasion was preserved in after ages in the temple of the god of oaths, Deus Fidius or Sancus. It was written on the hide of the bull sacrificed at its ratification, which was strained upon a wooden shield.

At the head of the united Latin forces, Tarquin made war upon the Volsci, and took the rich city of Suessa Pomœtia. This victory was followed by a decisive defeat of the Sabines, who had invaded the Roman territory. He afterwards made a peace with the Æqui, an Oscan people on the upper Anio. Tarquin returned to Rome, enriched with the spoils of Suessa Pomœtia, which he devoted to the completion of the Capitol,† under the superintendence of Etruscan builders, and by the forced labour of the people. By the same means he completed the Circus Maximus and the great sewers; and when the workmen began to murmur at their burthens, he drafted off some of them to the two colonies which he founded on the borders of the Volsci and Æqui, at Signia in the interior and on the Circeian promontory. These therefore may be regarded as the bounds to which Tarquin had extended the territory of Rome. Prominent as is the legendary character of these stories, they give a sufficient general indication of the state of Rome in the last years of the monarchy:—the city adorned with splendid buildings, and enriched with the spoils of successful war; the supremacy of Rome established over Latium, and her power acknowledged by the bordering tribes of the Apennines:—at the cost of the humiliation of her nobles and the grinding oppression of her people by a lawless despotism. The dynastic alliance with Etruria, and especially the close relations it involved with the maritime city of Cære, must have added to the commercial importance of Rome; a proof of which is seen in the treaty with Carthage. Made as it was in the very first year of the republic, that treaty indicates the maritime consequence which

* Herodotus tells a similar story of the means by which Babylon was betrayed to Darius Hystaspis.

† See above, p. 192.

Rome had reached under the monarchy. But the prosperity of regal Rome was only a prelude to the fall of royalty.

The building of the Capitol was attended with omens of the future fate of the city and the reigning dynasty. The discovery of that human head, which gave the spot its name, has been already mentioned. As the building advanced, it became necessary to clear the ground of several ancient shrines and altars, which tradition ascribed to Titus Tatius and the Sabines. The gods to whom these had been raised were consulted by auguries, whether they would give place to the three great deities—Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. All the rest signified assent; but the refusal of Terminus and Youth to retire from the hallowed spot gave Rome the assurance that her boundaries were destined never to go back, her youth to be for ever renewed. A more mysterious sign was given of the future that was written for her in the book of fate. A strange woman came to Tarquin, and offered him nine volumes for a certain price. The books contained the poetical predictions of one of those prophetic women, who were called by the Greeks *Sibyls*,—some said of the Cumæan Sibyl, who had been the guide of Æneas into the world below; while some believed the bearer to be the Sibyl herself.* Tarquin refused to buy the books. The Sibyl departed, and burnt three; and returned, offering him the remaining six at the same price. The king again refused: the Sibyl burnt three volumes more; and again made the same demand for the reduced remnant. Astonished at her persistence, the king consulted the augurs, and learnt from them what a treasure he had despised. The three books were bought, and the woman vanished. The books were buried in a stone chest under the Capitol, and entrusted to the care of two men of the highest rank, by whom they were only consulted in great emergencies, and at the order of the Senate. Their contents were kept a profound secret; and the guardian who betrayed his trust was punished like a parricide, being sown up in a sack, and thrown into the sea. The information gained from them does not seem to have been, like the Greek oracles, so much the prediction of coming events, as concerning the rites by which the gods were to be propitiated, when their wrath had been revealed by prodigies. That such

* The common, and not improbable derivation of the name is from Σῖβη (Doric for Δῖς) βόλλα (Βουλή), the *counsel of Jove*. Concerning the Sibyls enumerated by the ancients, see the article in *Smith's Dictionary of Mythology and Biography*. In connection with the Greek element in the legend, it should be remembered that Cumæ was the oldest Greek city of Italy. Some ancient writers tell the tale of the elder Tarquin.

books really existed, is a certain fact; but when and by whom they were collected is utterly unknown. They were destroyed in the burning of the Capitol (B.C. 82), and the pains taken to replace them by envoys sent to Greece, Asia Minor, and the Greek cities of Italy, would seem to show that the original books were in Greek, as indeed might be inferred from the name of the Sibyl. We have thus another instance of the Hellenic element in the civilization of Rome. There is no ground for the fond fancy, handed down from Christian antiquity, and supposed by some to be confirmed by the tone of Virgil's Fourth Eclogue, that the Sibylline books contained prophecies of the future destinies of the world, emanating from a true inspiration, •

“Teste David cum Sybillâ.”

Another portent was closely connected with the fate of the royal house. A snake crawled out from the altar in the court of the palace, extinguished the fire, and devoured the sacrifice. Besides consulting the Etruscan soothsayers, Tarquin sent his two elder sons, Titus and Aruns, to enquire of the oracle at Delphi. They were accompanied by their cousin, a harmless idiot, as they supposed. Tarquin's sister had been married to a noble and wealthy Roman, Marcus Junius, after whose death the king had murdered the elder of his two sons and seized on his inheritance. To avoid sharing his brother's fate, Lucius, the younger son, had feigned himself an idiot, and thus obtained the surname, destined to be doubly memorable in the Roman annals, of BRUTUS, that is, stupid. The young men reached Delphi, where the temple stood in the renovated splendour with which it had been rebuilt by the Alcmaeonidæ, and the sons of Tarquin offered costly gifts worthy to be placed beside those of the Lydian kings. Brutus dedicated his staff of cornel wood. His cousins laughed at his simplicity, not knowing that the hollow of the staff was filled with gold; but the Pythia and her ministers had a keener discernment of the precious metal. The princes were told that Tarquin would cease to reign when a dog should speak with human voice; and the brute beside them soon spoke trumpet-tongued to the people over the body of Lucretia. Curiosity led them to enquire which of them would succeed their father; and the priestess replied, whichever should first kiss his mother. They agreed to keep the oracle secret from their younger brother Sextus, and to cast lots for its fulfilment; but Brutus perceived its hidden meaning, and as soon as they landed in Italy, he fell as if by accident and kissed his mother earth. If such legends were at

all within the province of historical criticism, it would be quite consistent with all that we know of the Delphic oracle to suppose that Brutus, meditating his great work of liberation, purchased with his staff full of gold a divine sanction, to be quoted at the proper time.

The opportunity was ere long furnished by the outrageous insolence of the king's youngest son, the hero of Gabii, "false Sextus, who wrought the deed of shame." Tarquin was warring against Ardea, a city of the Rutuli, on the coast of Latium. The army was encamped idly before the blockaded town. The sons of Tarquin, with their kinsmen, Brutus and Tarquinius Collatinus—the son of that Egerius, to whom the first Tarquin had given the lordship of Collatia—were supping together in the tent of Sextus, when the conversation turned upon the merits of their wives. Each extolled his own, and Collatinus especially was loud in praise of his Lucretia, a lady as discreet and virtuous as she was beautiful. To make good his boast, he proposed that they should take horse, and see for themselves how the ladies were occupied. They rode first to Rome, and found the wives of the king's sons giving a splendid banquet to other noble women. Leaving the city, they reached Collatia late at night, and there was Lucretia, in the midst of her maidens, carding wool and spinning by the light of a lamp. All confessed that Collatinus had been right; but his triumph was bought dear, and the issue involved the fate of Rome. The charms of Lucretia had smitten Sextus Tarquinius with lawless love. He returned in a few days to Collatia and was received by Lucretia as her husband's kinsman. Insensible alike to shame and truth, to the ties of kindred and hospitality, Sextus entered her chamber in the dead of the night, and told her that if she would not yield to him, he would slay her and one of her slaves, and tell her husband that he had taken them in adultery. His purpose was accomplished by threats and force, and he returned to the camp under cover of the night.

In the morning Lucretia sent messengers in haste to summon Collatinus from the camp, and her father, Spurius Lucretius, from Rome, where Tarquin had left him as Warden of the City. Collatinus came, attended by L. Junius Brutus; Lucretius, by Publius Valerius, the same who was afterwards surnamed Poplicola, from his ardour in the cause of the people. In the presence of these witnesses, Lucretia, whom they found sitting upon her bed bathed in tears, denounced her ravisher, and required from all present an oath that they would avenge the wrong. Then declaring that, though inno-

cent herself, she could not survive her shame, she seized a knife that she had hidden beneath her pillow, and plunged it in her heart. While her husband and her father could only utter cries of horror, Brutus, throwing off his assumed stupidity, drew the knife from the wound, and holding it aloft, swore by the blood of Lucretia that he would pursue to the uttermost, with fire and sword, both Tarquin and his accursed house, and that no man should ever after be king in Rome to repeat such crimes. Then he passed the knife to Collatinus, and then to Lucretius and Valerius, and bound them by the same oath. The corpse of Lucretia was carried forth into the market place, and Brutus, holding up the bloody knife before the people, who flocked together at the strange sight, exclaimed, "Behold the deeds of the wicked house of Tarquin." The youth of Collatia flew to arms, and while one body guarded the gates, lest news of the rising should reach Tarquin's camp, the rest followed Brutus and his companions to Rome. The sight of the armed band, with their distinguished leaders, spread an alarm through the city, and the cause of their coming was soon known. In virtue of his office as Tribune of the Celeres,* Brutus summoned the people to the Forum, and harangued them, not only on the wrongs of Lucretia, and the misery of her husband and her father, but on all the misdeeds and tyranny of Tarquin's reign. The Curiae, for it was in that form that the people were convened, passed a solemn vote depriving Tarquin of the crown, which he had seized at first without their consent, and banishing him and all his family for ever. Tullia fled from her palace amidst the tumult, pursued by the curses of the people. The city was left in the charge of its prefect, Spurius Lucretius, while Brutus went at the head of the youth to gain over the army before Ardea.

Meanwhile the news of the insurrection at Rome had reached the camp, and Tarquin had started for the city at the head of a chosen band. Brutus turned aside from the main road, and reached the army without encountering the king. His harangue was responded to in the same spirit as in the city. The sons of Tarquin were driven out; a truce was made with the Ardeans; and the army marched to Rome, where the gates had already been

* The *Tribunus Celerum*, or captain of the knights, was the officer who called together the Curiae, in the absence of the king. The entrusting such an office to a reputed idiot is but one of the many inconsistencies of the legend. Some suppose that *Brutus* originally signified no more than "grave" or "stern," like the later name *Severus*, and that the story of his assumed idiocy arose from the later sense of the word. Such inventions based on etymology are by no means infrequent.

shut against the deposed king. Tarquin fled to Cære in Etruria, where the tomb of the family is still to be seen. There he was joined by his sons Titus and Aruns. Sextus fled to Gabii, where he was murdered in requital of his former treachery.*

Thus was Tarquinius Superbus driven out from Rome, with all his family, in the twenty-fifth year of his reign, just at the close of the Roman year B.C. 510—9.† The expulsion of the last king was commemorated by the festival called *Regifugium*, or *Fugalia*, which was celebrated on the 24th of February in every year.

We have felt bound to relate those poetical legends which are inseparably associated with this most picturesque period of Roman history. The labours of the historians of Rome have relieved us from the necessity of exposing the absurdities of dry fact which lurk beneath scenes so true to nature. It is superfluous to demonstrate once more the impossibility of a chronology which assigns 245 years to seven elective kings, three of whom perished by a violent death, and the last was prematurely expelled. Nor is it possible, as some have thought, to draw any line, however general, between the periods of fact and fable, whether between Numa and Tullus, or between Ancus and the elder Tarquin. If the reigns of the earlier kings are the least trustworthy, from the absence of historic records and the manifestly unhistoric complexion of their annals, and if the history of the Tarquins seems more trustworthy—as belonging to an age of advanced civilization and commerce, an age when written documents certainly existed, and which has handed down its monuments of art and its elaborate political constitution,—yet it is at the close of this very age that the history assumes a more poetical complexion than ever, and it preserves that complexion during the establishment of the republic. The poetic fervour, in which the sense of new-born freedom or the regret for its subsequent loss found vent, though not of itself inconsistent with a substratum of true facts, effectually prevents our discerning those facts through the haze of imagination that is cast around them. There is as great a variety in the legendary stories which different writers tell of this period as in the age of Romulus and Numa; and the chronology, in becoming the more

* This is the account of Livy, who generally preserves the more poetical form of the several legends. Dionysius represents Sextus as killed at the battle of the lake Regillus, and this view is followed in Macaulay's celebrated lay.

† According to our present calendar, the expulsion of the Tarquins was on Feb. 24, B.C. 509; but, for the sake of the round number and of the agreement with the Roman year, we take the liberty of reckoning on the year 510 to its *Roman end*, which agrees also with our own "old style."

definite, only becomes the more impossible. This was indeed perceived by Dionysius of Halicarnassus; but, instead of admitting the conclusion, he makes arbitrary amendments in the data.*

We cannot make out a true and consistent history by eliminating the improbabilities of these legends, or by selecting from the interpretations of the ancients that which may seem to us the most reasonable. But, by a careful comparison of language, antiquities, institutions, traditions, and other real elements of fact, illustrated by light reflected on them by the legends, we can arrive at certain broad conclusions. The chief of these have been indicated as we have proceeded. They may be summed up in the steady growth of the city, till it became the head of Latium, on the one hand, and derived wealth and commercial importance from its connection with Etruria on the other. A constitution, based on a patriarchal aristocracy, with an elective monarchy at its head, was modified by the introduction of new elements, chiefly from the conquered Latin states, till the necessity arose for a new military organization, and a new distribution of political power among all classes of the citizens.

But, as we have already seen in the states of Greece, the first confusion incident to the admission of the commons to a share of power, gave an opportunity for the establishment of despotism; and the excesses of this despotism led to its speedy overthrow. But here was the great difference between the fall of the Greek tyrants and the Roman kings. The former were mere usurpers; the latter were the natural leaders of the people, who had indeed abused their power for a time, but whose loss left an injurious void in the constitution. The immediate effect of their expulsion on the common people cannot be better described than in the words of Mr. Newman.—“The great cause of the prosperity of the city, was that the kings had headed the movement party for enfranchising and elevating the lower classes. . . Upon the destruction of royalty, the lower population discovered that they had lost their patron, and were exposed to hundreds of tyrants. All the early history of the Roman republic is a long struggle of the commonalty to regain for itself a powerful protector: and, after a time, the success of the plebeians was complete. But Rome continued to conquer; hence, outside of the plebeians fresh and fresh masses of subjects lay, who had no organs of protection, until the Roman

* See the complete summary of these chronological absurdities—which are manifest especially in the ages of the leading persons of the story—in Professor Malden's *History of Rome*, pp. 56, 57.

constitution was violently subverted, and emperors arose. From these, at length, the population of the provinces gradually obtained the gift of Roman citizenship, which ought to have been long before granted by free Rome, in order to preserve her own freedom. It was conquest that ruined the later republic; and conquest, apparently, also that ruined royal Rome. When the victories of Ancus and Tarquin enlarged the state so rapidly, *not* to have enfranchised the new subjects would have weakened it from within; yet *by* enfranchising them, Tarquin and Servius produced a discontent in the old citizens, which exploded into violence, and wrecked the constitution under Tarquin the Proud. If Brutus and Collatinus, instead of abolishing the royalty, had restored it with all the formalities of interregal election, but with such limitations as experience suggested, we now see that it would have been far better for the plebeians of Rome. The wicked deed of Sextus Tarquinius did not need royal power; it might have been perpetrated by any man who wore a sword. But it was attributed to the inherent haughtiness of royal blood, and the question of raising some one else to the throne was never even moved at all. In consequence, the plebeians were suddenly left without legal representatives. No man of their body was capable of holding office, because he was essentially inadmissible to patrician religion. It was soon manifested that, while excluded from executive government, possession of legislative power was a mockery: unfortunate war forced them to incur debt, and the penalties of debt were rigorously enforced. Art and skill migrated from Rome when her arms could no longer defend the industrious, and rudeness so great came over the city of the Tarquins, that sheep and oxen became the current coin of a community which, but a little before, had made a treaty of commerce with Carthage. Under an exclusive patrician caste, Rome sank more rapidly than she had risen; until tyrannical powers, vested in tumultuous tribunes, became an alleviation of the intolerable evils caused by the loss of the elective king. For the destruction of the monarchy did not come in the ripeness of time, when monarchy had finished its work, and the lower people had gained the power of self-defence. It was the explosion of rage against an institution because of personal iniquity; and it became the prelude to a century and a half of suffering to the plebeians." *

* Newman's *Regal Rome*, pp. 169—171.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE PATRICIAN REPUBLIC—FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE
TARQUINS TO THE INVASION OF THE GAULS.

B.C. 509 TO B.C. 390.

“Then the great Consuls venerable rise:
The public Father, who the private quelled,
As on the dread tribunal, sternly sad:
He, whom his thankless country could not lose,
Camillus, only vengeful to her foes;
Fabricius, scorner of all-conquering gold;
And Cincinnatus, awful from the plough.”—THOMSON.

BEGINNING OF THE REPUBLIC—INSTITUTION OF THE CONSULATE—BRUTUS AND COLLATINUS CONSULS—RETIREMENT OF COLLATINUS—CONSPIRACY FOR THE TARQUINS—BRUTUS AND HIS SONS—DEATH OF BRUTUS—VALERIUS PUBLICOLA—RIGHT OF APPEAL—TREATY WITH CARTHAGE—DEDICATION OF THE CAPITOL—LEGEND OF LARS PORSENNA—BATTLE OF THE LAKE REGILLUS—SABINE WAR—IMMIGRATION OF THE CLAUDII—END OF THE MYTHICAL PERIOD OF ROMAN HISTORY—REAL STATE OF ROME—CONQUEST BY PORSENNA—REPULSE OF THE ETRUSCANS—INDEPENDENCE OF LATIUM—INSTITUTION OF THE DICTATORSHIP—THE SENATE—RISE OF A NEW NOBILITY—THE CONSTITUTION ARISTOCRATIC—POSITION OF THE PLEBEIANS—DISTRESS OF THE SMALL LANDHOLDERS—CONSULSHIP OF CLAUDIUS AND SERVILIUS—M. VALERIUS DICTATOR—SECESSION TO THE SACRED MOUNT—TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS AND PLEBEIAN ÆDILES—COLONY SENT TO VELITRÆ—CONTINUED DISSENSIONS—LEGEND OF CORIOLANUS—SPURIUS CASSIUS—TREATIES WITH THE LATINS AND HERNICANS—WARS WITH THE VOLSCIANS AND ÆQUANS—AGRARIAN LAW OF SPURIUS CASSIUS—HIS DEATH—WARS WITH THE ETRUSCANS—LEGEND OF THE FABII AT THE CREMERA—IMPEACHMENT OF CONSULS—MURDER OF THE TRIBUNE GENUCIUS—PUBLILIAN LAW—IMPEACHMENT OF APPIUS CLAUDIUS—ROGATION OF TERENTILIUS—LONG CONFLICT OF THE ORDERS—ÆQUIAN AND VOLSIAN WARS—STORY OF CINCINNATUS—THE DECEMVIRS—LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES—STORY OF VIRGINIA—SECOND SECESSION OF THE PLEBS—FALL OF THE DECEMVIRS—VALERIAN AND HORATIAN LAWS—MILITARY TRIBUNES IN PLACE OF CONSULS—INSTITUTION OF THE CENSORSHIP—FAMINE AT ROME—DEATH OF MÆLIUS—WAR WITH THE ETRUSCANS, ÆQUANS, AND VOLSCIANS—VICTORY AT MOUNT ALGIDUS—RISE OF THE SAMNITES—FALL OF FIDENÆ—LAST WAR WITH VEII—DRAINING OF THE ALBAN LAKE—LEGEND OF CAMILLUS AND THE FALL OF VEII—AGRARIAN LAW—BANISHMENT OF CAMILLUS—THE GAULS IN ETRURIA—DECLINE OF THE ETRUSCANS.

ROME was delivered from the tyrant and his house. The Patricians lifted their heads once more: the lower orders rejoiced in the cessation of their forced burthens. The common sense of freedom disposed both orders to co-operate in the restoration of order; and a common basis was furnished in the revival of the *Comitia Centuriata*. The forms of the constitution were scrupulously observed. Though the royal family had been expelled, and the name of king abolished, the first step taken was to fill up the place thus left vacant at the head of the state by the intervention of an *Interrex*, as of old: Spurius Lucretius was appointed to this function, either in virtue of his office as warden of the city,

or by the vote of the decimated Senate. He convened the people in the assembly of the Centuries, for the election of new chief magistrates. The change now made was of a very simple character. By putting two elective magistrates in the place of one, and leaving each in full possession of the powers of the former kings, independently of the other, a constant mutual check was provided against tyrannical usurpation. Their dignity was still marked by the chair of state* and the other insignia of royalty, except the diadem. Even the fasces and axes were retained, as the emblem of military power; but they were borne by the twelve lictors only before one of the two magistrates, each for a month in turn. There was, however, no corresponding alternation in the exercise of their power, and no division of their functions, except such as convenience might suggest; as when one remained to administer justice in the city while the other was engaged abroad in war. It does not seem even to have been an essential condition of the office, that it should be held only for a year; and, though this restriction was established by custom from the very first, the consulship did not expire of itself at the lapse of that period. It was only vacated by the magistrate's formally laying down his office; nor does it appear that an attempt to prolong its tenure, however unconstitutional, would have been positively illegal. The repeated elections of the same man in the first years of the republic (as in the case of P. Valerius Poplicola, who held office for four of the seven years before his death, three of them in succession) show a tendency to a longer tenure; but the accident of the deaths of two chief magistrates and the abdication of one, in the very first year of the republic, may have helped to establish the precedent of an annual election. In conformity with the military character of the Roman state, these two chief magistrates were at first named *Prætors*† (that is, *generals*): from their judicial functions they were called *Judices*: and from their equal authority they received that famous name of CONSULS (that is, *colleagues*),‡ which did not prevail over the title of *Prætor* till

* The *sella curulis*, a term not derived (as is often said) from *currus*, a chariot, but probably of the same root as *curia*. It was inlaid with ivory and, in later times, overlaid with gold. Its form, often shown on coins, was a square stool, with curved cross legs. It pertained to all the higher magistracies, which were hence called *curule*. The royal chariot and purple robe were disused: the consuls walked on foot (except in a triumph) like other citizens, and wore a robe with only a purple hem (the *toga prætexta*).

† Literally *leaders*, those who *go before*, from *præ* and *eo*. The judicial officers, who afterwards bore the name of *prætors*, were first appointed in B.C. 366.

‡ The true etymology of this word is from *con* (together), and the root which

the restoration of the office, after its interruption by the decemvirs, in the 305th year of the city (B.C. 449). The celebrity, however, of this latter title has caused it to be used from the beginning of the history of the republic.

The consular office, then, as Mommsen observes, "manifestly sprang out of the endeavour to retain the regal power in legally undiminished fulness." But, after all that has been said of the elective character of the Roman royalty, we cannot but trace a sort of reverence for the patriarchal sanctity of the office, the "divinity doth hedge a king," which was not fully transferred to the consuls, as it has never been to Protector, Stadtholder, President, or even to imperial adventurers. This was especially manifested in relation to the religious functions of the king, and his power of nominating the priests. For the sacrifices that he had been accustomed to offer, as the patriarchal head of the state, special provision was now made; and the conservative spirit of the Roman religion was shown in retaining for this religious officer the otherwise proscribed name of King.* But, lest he should be tempted to aim at extending the meaning of the title, he paid the price of the great honours belonging to his office by incapacity for all civil functions. Even in his religious duties, he was subject to the supreme authority of the chief pontiff. The "Sacrificial King" was at once the first in rank and the least in power of all the Roman magistrates. In every other use, the title of King was ever abhorred by the Roman people with an almost fanatic hatred; and the first act of the new consuls, after they had purified the city, was to bind all the people by the oath, already sworn by Brutus over the body of Lucretia, that they would suffer no man ever again to be King in Rome.

It was natural that the first consular election should fall upon Brutus, the hero of the revolution, and L. Tarquinius Collatinus, whose great wrong had been its immediate occasion. The choice of the latter was likely to conciliate the moderate partisans of the exiled family. But the public indignation proved too strong to endure the very name of a Tarquin, and Brutus himself made a

appears in *sed-eo* (*sit*), *sel-la* and *sol-ium* (a *seat*), *con-sil-ium* (*counsel*), *ex-sul* (an exile, whose abode is out of the state), *præ-sul* (a president).

* *Rex Sacrorum*, king of the sacrifices. Just so, at Athens, the second archon, who presided over the public worship of the state, was called the King Archon (*ἄρχων βασιλεύς*). Other royal prerogatives were abolished, as the enacting of forced labour to till the domain, the delegation of the military power to the *Præfectus Urbi* and the *Tribunus Celerum*, and of the judicial to the *Quæstores Parricidii*. The latter now became permanent magistrates.

motion, on the authority of a decree of the Senate, to deprive Collatinus of his office, and to extend the sentence of banishment to the whole Tarquinian gens. Collatinus yielded to the public feeling, and withdrew to Lavinium, where he lived to a good old age. The Comitia Centuriata elected Publius Valerius consul in his room.*

This apparently harsh measure was probably rendered necessary by symptoms of that reaction which is wont to follow revolutions. The banished house had still a powerful party among the Roman nobles; and they were plotting their restoration from the neighbouring Etruscan city of Cære. The story of these attempts is continued in the same poetical vein which we have traced through the whole history of the last Tarquin; but it is surely needless to relate in full those beautiful legends, with which every educated reader will have been familiar from his childhood:—how the claim of Tarquin for the restoration of his property enabled his envoys to engage several noble families in the conspiracy which involved the death of the two sons of Brutus, and the sacrifice of their father's natural feelings in that ever memorable example of the stern Roman sense of duty:—how, when Tarquin marched against Rome, at the head of the forces of Tarquinii and Veii, his son Aruns encountered Brutus in the face of both armies and they fell transfixed by each other's spears:—how, in the night that followed the indecisive battle, a supernatural voice, proclaiming that the Romans were victorious, smote the Etruscans with a panic fear, and the consul Valerius returned to Rome, to celebrate the first triumph of the republic, and the funeral obsequies of Brutus, whose statue in bronze, holding a naked sword, was placed in the Capitol, in the midst of the effigies of the kings:—how Valerius, falling into suspicion through his delay in the election of another colleague, and because of the splendid house he had built upon the Velia, came forward to clear himself before the people, lowered his fasces in acknowledgment of their sovereignty, pulled down his palace, and received in recompense a plot of ground at the bottom of the hill:—how he carried the laws proclaiming outlawry against the man who should aim at kingly power, and securing every citizen the right of appeal from the

* Thus, in the very first year of the republic, we have an example (and we shall meet with two more before the end of the same year) of what was afterwards called the "consul suffectus," or supplied consul. Such an one succeeded, in all respects, to the position of the consul whose vacant place he filled up, and went out of office at the expiration of his predecessor's term. This does not, of course, apply to the nominal consuls under the empire, of whom there were often two or three sets in one year, appointed merely as a mark of imperial favour.

sentence of a magistrate within the city and one mile round :*—and how these measures gained for him the surname of *Poplicola*, the People's Friend. After carrying these laws alone, Valerius convened the Comitia, for the election of a consul in place of Brutus. Their choice fell first upon Spurius Lucretius, and—on his death after only a few days—upon M. Horatius Pulvillus.

Such are the transactions which the legendary stories ascribe to the first year of the Republic (B.C. 509). Of its real history, we possess an invaluable remnant in the treaty with Carthage, which was engraved on brass, and escaped the destruction of the city by the Gauls. Its chief provisions are preserved by Polybius, who tells us that he translated it with difficulty,† as its archaic style was barely intelligible to the Romans of his day.‡ The Carthaginians bound themselves to make no trading settlements on the coasts of Latium or Campania; and the Romans engaged not to sail south of the Hermæan promontory (*C. Bon*). Rome is recognized as the head of Latium, and as possessing the Italian coast, as far as the Bay of Tarracina.

In the second year of the Republic (B.C. 508), when Valerius was again consul, with Titus Lucretius, the brother of Lucretia, a new census was taken, and the armed force was found to be 130,000.‡ In the next year (B.C. 507) Valerius was consul for the third time, and had M. Horatius Pulvillus again for his colleague. In this year, according to the annalists, the temple of the Capitol was finished, and it fell to the republican consuls to dedicate this great work of the two Tarquins. They cast lots for the honour; the lot fell upon Horatius;§ and Valerius departed to carry on the war with Veii. But his friends were envious of his colleague, and they contrived a stratagem to postpone the ceremony. Horatius had laid his hand upon the gatepost, and was beginning the prayer of dedication, when a cry was

* This was in effect the abdication of the imperium within the prescribed limits, and in sign thereof the consular *fascēs* were borne without the axes : but beyond those limits the consul retained the full *imperium* of the kings, and the axes were bound up with the *fascēs*.

† It is one among other similar proofs of Livy's negligence, that he takes no notice of this treaty. If the labour of deciphering it, from which Polybius had not shrunk, was too great for a Roman, he might have retranslated it from Polybius.

‡ The census of Servius Tullius is said to have given 84,700 citizens ; but all these numbers are of very doubtful authority. See Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. 1., p. 131.

§ Here is an indication how completely the consulship was, like the royalty, vested in the individual and not in the two conjointly, or, as the Romans would say, in the "collegium." Thus the consuls are never called *duumviri*.

heard,—“ Consul, thy son is slain,” A single word of mourning would have broken off the rite by its evil omen. “ Carry out the dead,” said Horatius, still holding the post and finishing the prayer; and, when the ceremony was over, he found that his son was alive and well. The dedication was followed by a prodigy, decisive of the question which seemed now to hang in doubt, whether the Romans or the Etruscans should prevail. Tarquin had ordered a chariot of clay to be moulded by the artists of Veii, to surmount the temple. It swelled so much in the baking, that the furnace had to be pulled down in order to remove it; and the Etruscan soothsayers promised empire to the possessors of the chariot. The Veientes now refused to give it up, as being the property of Tarquin. A few days after, a charioteer, who had just won a prize in their races, was carried off by his horses at full speed, and dashed down lifeless at one of the gates of Rome. The Etruscans obeyed the will of the gods, thus plainly declared, and delivered up the chariot, which was placed on the summit of the Capitol.

For the present, however, Rome seemed destined to subjugation by the Tuscans. The war with Porsenna represents an historical event, though obscured by the utter confusion of the chronology, and by the poetic legends under which the Romans disguised their defeat. The early date of the war—in the second or third year of the republic—seems a device to keep up the fiction that it was waged for the sake of the Tarquins, though the success of Porsenna was not followed by their restoration. We must forego the pleasure of recounting the well-known legend, how

“ Lars Porsena of Clusium
By the Nine Gods he swore,
That the great house of Tarquin
Should suffer wrong no more .”*

how he marched upon Rome, at the head of the united force of the twelve Etruscan cities, and seized the suburb of Janiculum :—

“ How well Horatius kept the bridge
In the brave days of old :”—

and how the self-devotion of Mucius Scævola, and the gallantry

* The Roman poets are divided as to the quantity of the name, *Porsēna*, *Porsēna*, or *Porsenna*. Virgil's learning, and the recent investigations into the Etruscan language, are in favour of the long penult. Legendary as is the story of Porsenna, there is no reason to doubt his having been king of Clusium (*Chiusi*), a city in the central hill-country of Etruria, on an eminence overlooking the river Clanis and the Lacus Clusinus.

of Clœlia and her fellow maidens, won from the fear and magnanimity of Porsenna an honourable peace. The attempt to conceal defeat by occupying attention with a few heroic actions, real or imaginary, proves the high spirit, as well as the ingenuity, of the Roman annalists.* There is generally some unguarded point in such fables, at which the truth peeps out; and the writers who represent the offering of the insignia of royalty to Tarquinius Priscus by the Etruscan states, as a token of subjection, tells us that the like present was sent by the Romans to Porsenna, in acknowledgment of his generosity.

But, before relating what we know of the real truth, we may glance at the final scene in the legend of the Tarquins. The last champion of their cause was the Latin prince, Octavius Mamilius, the dictator of Tusculum, who led out the confederacy to a new war with Rome, and perished in the great battle won by the dictator Aulus Postumius Albus, at the lake Regillus, with the aid of the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), who rode at the dictator's right hand on their white horses, and appeared the same evening at Rome to announce the victory. The gigantic print of a horse's hoof was shown in the rock on the margin of the lake, and the festival of the Twin Sons of Jove was kept on the anniversary of the battle, the Ides of Quinctilis (July 15, B.C. 498 or 496).† Titus Tarquinius, and, as some say, Sextus, died on this battle-field; and the aged king found shelter with Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumæ, where he died wretched and childless (B.C. 496).‡ Between the war with Porsenna and the battle of the lake Regillus, the annalists place a war with the Sabines, in which P. Valerius, consul for the fourth time, gained a great victory and the surname of Maximus, and in which the Sabine Attus Clausus seceded to Rome with all his clients, and founded the great patrician house of the Appii Claudii (B.C. 504).

The Battle of the Lake Regillus may be regarded as the close of

* The device is not unknown in a more sober age of history. By filling up his narrative of the battle of Trafalgar with one or two gallant combats of ship against ship, M. Thiers comes to the conclusion that there remained with England a dear-bought victory, with France the glory of a *dévouement* unparalleled in the history of nations.

† The ancient writers, who give these dates, confess the uncertainty of the chronology. For the poetical view of the battle, see Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

‡ According to the popular chronology, this was 120 years from the time when his father ascended the throne in mature age! Tarquinius Superbus must have been 118 years old at his death, two years after he had fought in person by lake Regillus, and 75 when, in his youthful vigour, he hurled Servius down the steps of the senate-house! These are by no means all the chronological absurdities of the story.

the distinctly mythical period of Roman history, though the vein of poetical fable often reappears during the ensuing century, down to the story of Camillus. We cannot pass from this legendary period without quoting the summary of the brilliant writer, who, himself a great historian, has contributed so much to the poetical illustration of the early Roman annals:—"The early history of Rome is indeed far more poetical than anything else in Latin literature. The loves of the Vestal and the God of War, the cradle laid among the reeds of Tiber, the fig-tree, the she-wolf, the shepherd's cabin, the recognition, the fratricide, the rape of the Sabines, the death of Tarpeia, the fall of Hostus Hostilius, the struggle of Mettus Curtius through the marsh, the women rushing with torn raiment and dishevelled hair between their fathers and their husbands, the nightly meetings of Numa and the Nymph by the well in the sacred grove, the fight of the three Romans and the three Albans, the purchase of the Sibylline books, the crime of Tullia, the simulated madness of Brutus, the ambiguous reply of the Delphic oracle to the Tarquins, the wrongs of Lucretia, the heroic actions of Horatius Cocles, of Scævola, and of Clælia, the battle of Regillus won by the aid of Castor and Pollux, the defence of Cremera, the touching story of Coriolanus, the still more touching story of Virginia, the wild legend about the draining of the Alban lake, the combat between Valerius Corvus and the gigantic Gaul, are among the many instances which will at once suggest themselves to every reader." *

And now, what was the real condition of Rome in the fifteen years that elapsed from the expulsion of the Tarquins to the beginning of the long conflict between the patricians and plebeians? The great external fact of her history is her conquest by the Etruscans, and the loss of the whole territory on the right bank of the Tiber, which had been won by the enterprise of the kings, and quietly held during the long period of their Tuscan alliance. Even later writers knew the truth which Livy had chosen to conceal under the old poetic fables. Tacitus expressly says that the city was surrendered to Porsenna. Pliny quotes the treaty, by which the Romans were debarred from the use of iron, except for agriculture. The price which Rome paid for peace,—the loss of one-third of her territory,—is attested by the reduction of the country tribes from 26 to 16, making the whole number 20 instead of 30. The invasion, which the legend ascribes to Lars Porsenna's espousal of the cause of Tarquin, seems to have

* Macaulay, *Lays of Ancient Rome*. Preface, pp. 4, 5.

originated in one of these great movements of the Etruscans southwards, which, as we have already seen, brought them into conflict with the Greek cities of Italy about this time.* It appears to have been a great check sustained before Aricia that prevented their overrunning the whole of Latium. The story goes, that, after the campaign of Porsenna against Rome, his son Aruns attacked Aricia. The cities of the Latin confederacy joined to raise the siege; and, with the aid of Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumæ, they defeated the Etruscans, and drove them back beyond the Tiber. Rome, in consequence, regained her independence; but it was long before she recovered the lost lands beyond the Tiber. This account would imply also the recovery of independence by the Latins; and accordingly we find Rome making a new league with the confederacy a few years later (B.C. 493). Upon the whole, it seems that, within a few years of the expulsion of the kings, Rome was thrown back almost, if not quite, within the limits of her original territory; but still with the advantage of that previous recognition of her headship of the Latin confederacy, which would furnish a starting point for its recovery on the first opportunity. Whether the legend of the battle of Regillus represents a partially successful effort to regain supremacy in Latium, before the Latin states had time to reorganize their confederacy, can only be a matter of conjecture. The loss of territory in Etruria, and of influence in Latium, was but slightly compensated by the voluntary accession of a Sabine clan, which raised the diminished number of the tribes to twenty-one. For the next century and a half, Rome was engaged in reconquering what she had lost by her revolution.

The most important constitutional matter alluded to in the legendary history of these years is the appointment of a *Dictator*. The first dictator is said to have been Titus Lartius, in the tenth year of the republic (B.C. 501), the second, Aulus Postumius, in the year of the battle of Regillus. The office was, in fact, a temporary restoration of the full power which formerly resided in the king, whenever the limitations of the consular power might endanger the public safety. Of such an emergency the senate were the judges, and the appointment was made by the consul, without even the form of popular election. The well-known title of this officer, *Dictator* (that is, Commander), was borrowed from the Latins, but his proper Roman appellation was "Master of the People" (*Magister Populi*). His appointment at once superseded

the authority of the ordinary magistrates, who became entirely subject to his control. He had for a deputy the "Master of the Horse," who answered to the *Tribunus Celerum* under the Monarchy. His judicial power, like that of the king, was limited by no right of appeal to the people, except by his own permission. The obvious danger, that the office might be converted into an actual royalty, was guarded against by its strict limitation to six months; and such was the good faith of those appointed to this power, that they generally laid it down as soon as their work was done, without waiting for the expiration of that term. This revival of the full regal power, at any moment, proved more than once the salvation of the state; but it was also a ready instrument by which the senate could supersede the constitution at seasons of popular ferment, until a plebeian consul ventured to appoint a plebeian dictator, in B.C. 356. There was another mode in which the senate took upon themselves to revive the regal power, without the appointment of a dictator, by passing the decree "that the consuls should see to it, that no harm befel the Republic."

The constitution of the Senate itself remained unaltered in theory. Like the council of the Homeric kings, its chief function had been to advise the supreme magistrate, without taking any direct part in the administration. This function was continued in relation to the consuls, while the great power was gained of initiating the motions to be laid before the Comitia. On the other hand, a large popular element was introduced into the Senate by the admission of the heads of plebeian houses to supply the vacancies which Tarquin had left unfilled. It is said that no less than 164 (a clear majority of the 300 members) were added as "conscripts" to the roll of the ancient senators.* But it would be a mistake to infer that a regard for plebeian interests gained at once a preponderance in the senate. Bodies of men have, like individuals, a character which easily becomes traditional, and which is wont to absorb, in a marvellous degree, the individuality of what would seem the most heterogeneous elements. At Rome, as elsewhere, we have distinguished examples of "new men" talking the most loudly of "our order." The possession for life of a dignity, which was originally founded on a patrician basis, and which could only be threatened from below, formed the strongest common bond; and, besides, the plebeians now enrolled were no doubt chosen for their wealth.

* See above, p. 161. Before this time, plebeians had been admitted only individually, and that rarely.

The consuls—though not, as such, members of the senate, but only its official presidents*—had the power of appointing new members, which had originally belonged to the Gentes, but had also been exercised by the kings. This power was afterwards shared by the consular tribunes and the censors. The selection, however, was not arbitrary, and it became the custom to admit to the senate all who had passed the curule offices, unless there were some special reason for their exclusion. The lists were revised every fourth year, at first by the consuls, and afterwards by the censors, who had the power of “passing over”—by simply not entering them in the new lists—the names, not only of the ex-magistrates as new members, but of actual members of the senate.† Besides their elevation to the senatorial order in their own persons, the curule magistrates were regarded as the founders of a new order, not indeed invested with any power in the state, but possessing the vast influence of social rank. Their families became the Nobility (*nobiles*, the known), an order which succeeded to much of the exclusiveness of the old patricians, and regarded the commonalty‡ in the same spirit in which these had looked down upon the plebeians. The chief outward distinction of the nobles was the privilege of setting up in their houses the images of their ancestors, which were displayed on festive days and carried forth in funeral processions; a right like that of coats-of-arms among ourselves, when armorial bearings had still a meaning.§ One who had no such signs of ancestry, on attaining to the honours of the state, was called a “new man,” and had to maintain a constant conflict with the pride which boasted of being “the accident of an accident.” It was at the period of the Second Punic War that the nobles attained their highest power, and were able to exclude all “new men” from the consulship, except a very few of the highest merit, like Marius and Cicero, both, by a remarkable coincidence, natives of the same Latin town, Arpinum. But, further still, the second order in the state, that of the Knights, composing the rich middle class, though not without frequent grounds of quarrel

* All the curule magistrates, as well as the Pontifex Maximus and the Flamen Dialis, belonged to the “Senatorial Order,” and had seats in the senate *ex officio*, with the right of speaking, though not of voting. They possessed, however, the curious privilege of going over to join either party, when the division had taken place, whence they were called *Senatores Pedarii*, or senators of the foot.

† Those so degraded were called *præteriti senatores*.

‡ *Ignobiles*, the unknown.

§ The right was called the *jus imaginum*. The images were figures with masks of wax, painted to resemble the person represented.

with the nobles, threw its weight into their scale as against the common people; and the two orders, under the assumed name of *Optimates*,* formed a compact conservative aristocracy, in which the old distinction between patricians and plebeians was so completely lost, that the term *Plebs* itself came to be applied to the mass of the common people.

Such was the final development of that aristocratic character of the Roman constitution, which appeared at first in the preponderance of the patricians, and the rich citizens enrolled in the highest class, over the body of the plebeians, and in the conservative spirit with which old institutions were maintained, especially the religious ceremonies of the *gentiles*, and the exclusion of plebeians from intermarriage with patricians. The disqualification of the plebeians for the higher magistracies was a consequence of their being allowed no part in the religious rites which were essential to their inauguration; and such disabilities, resting on such a basis, could not but be felt as a standing wrong, to be redressed on the earliest opportunity. The exclusion had been less felt, when the chief magistrate was disposed to favour the plebeians as a counterpoise to the patrician order, and when he held for life a power which enabled him effectually to protect them: but the more restricted power of the consuls was exercised under the direct control of the patrician body, from which they were raised, and into which they returned after a tenure of office too brief to give them real political power. If, as often happens in every patrician body, a magistrate were disposed to make a popular use of his power, the means were at hand to check him, by the authority of his colleague, and by the interposition of the colleges of priests, and if all else failed, he might be superseded by a dictator. The annual change of officers, combined with the privilege of initiating all the measures to be laid before the *Comitia*, threw into the hands of the senate the control of all the business of the state which extended beyond a single year, and especially the management and distribution of the public lands. The same body obtained the control of the public purse, which had formerly been under the management of the king. The annual election by the *Comitia Centuriata* of the two *Quæstors*, to manage the finances (an institution ascribed to Valerius Poplicola), might seem to have placed the power of the purse in the hands of the popular assembly; but in fact the *quæstors* became mere paymasters under the direction

* That is, like "aristocracy," the *party of the best*. In the conflicts of the later republic, they are found constantly assuming the appellation of the *Good (boni)*.

of the senate, without whose authority neither the consuls nor even the dictator could draw money from the treasury. In short, the government was more aristocratic than before the revolution; but the plebeians were constituted an organized opposition within the body of the citizens. The Servian constitution had done little more than subject them to a share of the public burthens; but the rights they now obtained, though narrowly restricted, contained the germ of their future power. "Hitherto the *metœci** had been politically nothing, the old burgesses had been everything; now that the former were embraced in the community, the old burgesses were overcome; for, much as might be wanting to full civil equality, it is the first breach, not the occupation of the last post, that decides the fall of the fortress. With justice, therefore, the Roman community dated its political existence from the beginning of the consulship."

The struggle, which lasted for two centuries (B.C. 500—300) before the plebeians were admitted to an equality of civil rights, did not, however, begin on any abstract question of politics, but from the more imperious demands of material hardship. Poverty and hunger are great quickeners of the sense of political oppression. The new government made various economical regulations—according to the economical lights of those days—to promote the growth of wealth, and to relieve poverty. The port dues were lowered; corn was bought up by the state when its price was high, and the salt-works at the mouth of the Tiber were kept in the hands of government, that these necessities might be supplied to the citizens at reasonable prices. Limits were set to the fines which the magistrates could impose. But capital was fostered more than poverty was relieved; and an impulse was given to the formation of a class of capitalists by the system of farming the revenue. The selfish interests of the nobles were adverse to the middle class of small landholders. In the management of the public lands, the allotments of the plebeians were withheld, and the dues of the patricians to the state were negligently exacted. By this default an unfair portion of the taxes was thrown upon the plebeians, while their means for bearing the burthen were narrowed. The losses suffered in the wars that followed the establishment of the republic fell, of course, chiefly on the smaller landholders, whose all lay in the farms of which they were stripped by the invaders. The taxes and forced labour which these wars entailed, the necessity of rebuilding their houses and restocking their farms, compelled them

* This is the Greek term which Dr. Mommsen chooses to apply to the plebeians. The quotation is from his *History of Rome*, vol. i., p. 272.

to incur debts, which were exacted with all the severity of the Roman law. Not only the possessions, but the persons of the debtor and his family, became the property of his creditor, who, from self-interest rather than mercy, held him in a position "in which he knew nothing of property but its burthens," or, when he became too poor for any more to be wrung out of him as a tenant, sent him to grind in the horrible dungeons which the great houses used as prisons. In no point is the oppression of a wealthy aristocracy more conspicuous, than in the old Roman law of debt. The borrower was bound by contract to repay the loan by a stated day, and in the absence of such an agreement the patrician judge fixed the day of payment. In case of default, he was assigned as a bondsman to his creditor; and, if thirty days passed without payment, his master might throw him into prison, and feed him with bread and water. At the lapse of another month, he might sell the debtor for a slave, or, if he pleased, put him to death. If there were several creditors, they might divide his body among them; and the law provided with merciless ingenuity against the humane evasion immortalized by Shakspeare, by enacting that "whether a man cut more or less than his due, he should incur no penalty." Unprofitable as such cruelty was, it is not unlikely to have been practised in the spirit of vindictiveness, or in the wanton sense of power. These sufferings were aggravated by the sight of the wealthier plebeians, who should have been the natural protectors of the poor of their own order, identified with the order of their oppressors by their admission into the Senate, and by the advantages bestowed on capital. Such is the picture which the annalists draw of the state of the plebeians in general, as early as the fifteenth year of the republic.

One resource remained to the plebeians for resisting this intolerable tyranny—their place in the military organization of the state. The contest broke out (according to the common chronology) in the fifteenth year of the republic (B.C. 495), when the consuls were Publius Servilius and the proud Sabine nobleman who had lately come to Rome, where he distinguished himself by the haughty contempt for the lower orders which marked the name of Appius Claudius through many a generation,—

"For never was there Claudius yet, but wished the Commons ill."

Inflamed, as the story goes, by the appeal of an aged veteran, who pushed into the Forum, loaded with chains, red with stripes, squalid and emaciated with imprisonment, the people burst forth into such a storm of indignation, that Claudius fled and hid him-

self, and Servilius promised to plead their cause with the senate. Just at this crisis, the levy of the state had to be called out to meet an invasion of the Volscians; and it was feared that the plebeians would refuse to serve. The consul Servilius suspended the obnoxious law, and gave orders for the liberation of the imprisoned debtors. The plebeians followed the popular consul to victory; but the senate refused a triumph to Servilius, and his colleague Appius Claudius enforced the law again in all its rigour. The following year (B.C. 494), the enemy appeared again; and the plebeians refused to be cajoled with promises a second time. It was not till the senate appointed Manius Valerius dictator, that the malcontents yielded to the authority of his office and the popularity of his name. He again suspended the laws of debt during the war; and on his return as a victor, he laid before the senate a proposal for their amendment. But the patrician party, headed by Appius Claudius, again prevailed; and Valerius indignantly laid down his office. As soon as the news reached the army, which awaited the result outside the city walls, they abandoned their general, and, headed by the military tribunes, the legions marched away to the district between the Tiber and the Anio. There they took up their position on a hill, on which they threatened to build a new plebeian city, commanding the most fertile part of the Roman territory. The patricians, thus abandoned by the farmers who tilled their lands, were compelled to yield, in spite of the boast of Appius, that they and their clients could carry on the state without the base aid of the plebeians. Valerius was sent to make terms with the seceders, accompanied by another ex-dictator, Titus Lartius, and by an aged senator, Menenius Agrippa, who is said to have overcome the obstinacy of the people by the famous apologue of "the belly and the members." The terms insisted on by the people involved a vital change in the constitution. Besides temporary measures for the relief of their present distress, by the cancelling of old debts and the foundation of military colonies, they required the appointment of two permanent officers of their own body, to be elected annually, like the two consuls. These were the TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS (*Tribuni Plebis*), a name taken either from the existing office of the tribunes of the thirty Servian tribes, or from the military organization of the people under the military tribunes at the time of the appointment. The office itself was purely civil, its design being to act as a counterpoise to the power of the consuls and the senate, by protecting the plebeians from the oppression of the

patrician magistrates, and in case of need punishing their oppressors. Their prerogatives may be summed up under the two heads of "intervention" and "jurisdiction." By the former, the tribune might cancel any command issued by a magistrate affecting a citizen, on a protest made in person by the appellant, who might thus obtain exemption from a military levy or from arrest for debt. To give every aggrieved person an opportunity of placing himself under the tribune's protection, it was enacted that the latter must not leave the city, and that his house should be open day and night. The "jurisdiction" of the tribunes extended over every citizen, even over the consul while in office, and embraced the power of imprisonment, fines, and death. From all their sentences there was an appeal to the people, not in the *Comitia Centuriata*; but in the *Comitia Tributa*, before whom the tribunes must appear to defend their sentences. This assembly, in which plebeian influence was made predominant, by the absence of the artificial gradations of suffrage by centuries, became the great sphere of action of the plebeian tribunes. By their jurisdiction, the new principle was introduced of making magistrates personally responsible for acts done in their official capacity, and that not according to any fixed law, but at the pleasure of a populace excited by the leaders of their party. The right of the tribunes to address the people in defence of their judicial sentences was naturally extended to a general licence of speaking in the assembly; and hence arose the right of initiating in the *Comitia Tributa* those resolutions of the plebs (*plebiscita*), which at a later period acquired the force of law.* Thus the tribunes obtained a share in the legislative power which had formerly been exercised by the consuls under the direction of the senate.

As it was foreseen that these powers, so adverse to the patrician order, would expose their possessors to constant danger, it was enacted that their persons should be inviolable (*sacrosancti*) within the city and that space around it which was exempted from the consular *imperium*. Beyond that limit, they were subject to the authority of the magistrate, like any other citizen; nor were their powers of any avail against his authority. Against a dictator, they were equally powerless within the limits of the city. It is still a matter of dispute whether they were elected by the Centuries or by the *Curiae*: the latter is the more probable; and at all events, their election at first required the confirmation of the

* By the "Icilian Law" (B.C. 492?) the interruption of a tribune in addressing the *Comitia Tributa* was made punishable with death.

Curiae. They did not receive the *imperium*, nor were they regarded as magistrates. Invested with none of the regal insignia, and seated on a plain stool, instead of the ivory curule chair, their office was contrasted with the consulate as much by the absence of external pomp as by the unlimited reality of power. Its first purpose, of protecting the commonalty from oppression under a particular law, was but partially accomplished, inasmuch as the evil lay in the law itself, not merely in its administration; nor did the power thus placed in the hands of the plebeians give the poor any adequate protection against the rich, many of whom were of their own order. The real effect of the institution was to give to the discord between rich and poor a legal recognition and organization. After the time of the decemviral legislation, the office originally instituted for the protection of individuals from oppression grew into a constitutional but irresponsible *veto* vested in the leaders of the opposition. The increase of the number of the tribunes from two to five, and afterwards to ten—combined with the change which transferred the right of intervention from the majority of the college to each individual—not only led to a more arbitrary and obstructive exercise of their power, but often enabled the nobles to use some tribune to neutralize the policy of his colleagues. It cannot, however, be denied that the office had its use in giving a legitimate character to the popular opposition, and in preventing those perpetual alternations of exile, and those murderous conflicts, which were the common incidents of party contests among the Greeks.

The law for the appointment of the Tribunes of the Plebs was carried by the dictator Valerius, who caused every citizen to take an oath to observe it. It was deposited in the temple of Vesta—which became the special sanctuary of the plebeians, as that of Saturn was of the patricians—under the charge of the two plebeian *Ædiles*.* These magistrates, who were elected annually, first by the Centuries or Curiae, and afterwards by the Comitia Tributa, were associated with the tribunes as their attendants and assistants, and stood in much the same relation to them, as the *quæstors* to the consuls. Their functions were afterwards greatly enlarged. They were made the keepers of the resolutions of the senate as well as of the plebs (B.C. 446). To them was entrusted the superintendence of all buildings, both public and private, the supply of water, and the whole sanitary police of the city; the distributions of corn to the poorer citizens (*annone*); the care

* Their title was derived from the house (*ædes*) of the goddess.

of the public lands; the superintendence of the markets and of weights and measures; the ordering of and presidency over the public festivals: and, lastly, the duty of seeing that no new deities or rites were introduced. The office of the Curule Ædiles was not instituted till B.C. 365. While the plebeians obtained the permanent protection of their tribunes and ædiles, their present distress was in part relieved by the sending out of a military colony to Velitræ, a town conquered from the Volscians. Such were the very momentous results of the famous Secession to the *Sacred Mount*, for such was the name by which the commons celebrated the position they had taken up on the hill in the lands of Crustumerium.

The first year after this great political victory of the plebeians is marked in the Roman annals by two famous names, the one of a bitter enemy of the order, the other of a friend, who sealed his devotion with his blood. CAIUS MARCIUS CORIOLANUS, who had already distinguished himself, as a youth of seventeen, at the battle of the Lake Regillus, where he received from the dictator the "civic crown"—an oaken wreath—for saving the life of a fellow-citizen, and who gained his surname this year by his exploit in taking the Volseian city of Corioli, is the hero of a legend, in illustrating which our own greatest poet has vied with the old Roman bards. We may assume that those who have not read the story as told by Livy are familiar with the tragedy of Shakspeare; but, if there be any historic basis for it at all, we must not fail to notice the bitter and pertinacious hostility to the plebeians implied in the proposal of Coriolanus, to extort the surrender of the tribunate as the price of saving them from famine.

Of SPURIUS CASSIUS, Dr. Arnold has well said, that "by a strange compensation of fortune, the first Roman, whose greatness is really historical, is the man whose deeds no poet sang, and whose memory the early annalists, repeating the language of the party who destroyed him, have branded with the charge of treason and attempted tyranny. Amidst the silence and the calumnies of his enemies, he is known as the author of three works, to which Rome owed all her future greatness: he concluded the league with the Latins in his second consulship; in his third, he concluded the league with the Hernicans, and procured, although with the price of his own life, the enactment of the first agrarian law." * The treaty with the Latins, concluded in B.C. 493, was preserved at Rome on a brazen pillar down to the time of Cicero. Its terms of perfect equality prove how completely the Latins had regained their

* Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. i. pp. 151, 152.

independence; and the names of the thirty cities indicate within what narrow limits the Roman territory had been thrown back.* The language of the treaty, as quoted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, affords an interesting example of the style of such instruments at that early age:—"There shall be peace between them so long as the heaven shall keep its place above the earth, and the earth its place below the heaven; they shall neither wage, nor cause to be waged, any war against each other, nor give to each other's enemies a passage through their land; they shall aid each other, when attacked, with all their might,* and all spoils and plunder won by their joint arms shall be shared equally between them." After a clause for the settlement of private disputes between citizens of the two states, it was agreed that when their armies were in the field together, the command should be given in alternate years to the Roman and the Latin general.

These stipulations evidently point to a common danger from some enemy, whose attacks were the chief motive for the union of the two states. The legendary stories, confirmed so far by the subsequent history, enable us to find that enemy in the warlike peoples of the Volscians and the Æquians, two branches of the Umbro-Samnite race.* The former, as we have already seen, occupied the south of Latium; the latter had their seats in the Apennines, on the upper Anio. Their attacks at this period on the Latins and the Romans may be probably ascribed to the pressure of the Etruscans, who were extending their power through Central Italy and down into Campania.† The long wars with these tribes, and with the Etruscans, form the sum of the foreign history of Rome down to the Gallic invasion; and the varying fortunes of those wars bear a close relation to the internal history of the city.

The league was strengthened, seven years later, in the third consulship of Spurius Cassius, by the accession of the Hernicans, a Sabine people who dwelt in that high valley of the Apennines which extends from the break in the chain at Præneste to the upper course of the Liris, and whose position, between the Æquians on the north and the Volscians on the south, was peculiarly dangerous (B.C. 486). No stronger proof could be given of the wisdom of the foreign policy of Spurius Cassius than the fact that his league with the Latins remained unbroken for a full century, till the Gallic invasion; and yet his accusers charged him with sacrificing the interests of Rome to those of the Latins. Party

* The occurrence of Corioli among these names is a significant commentary on the legend of Coriolanus, which makes it a Volscian town.

† See p. 143.

jealousy can always forge weapons of attack equally out of success or failure. That active hostilities were carried on, especially with the Volscians, during these seven years, is implied in the legend of Coriolanus, which (under its poetical veil) confesses the repulse of the enemy after great danger to Rome. This inference agrees with the ascription of two triumphs to Spurius Cassius, and with the fact that a new division of public land had to be made.

The consul seized the opportunity to strike a blow at the great iniquity which lay at the root of the civil dissensions—the system of occupation of the public land by the patricians, and the withholding assignments of it from the plebeians. He proposed to the *Comitia Centuriata* the first of those famous, but grievously misunderstood measures, known as *AGRARIAN LAWS*. To the illustrious Niebuhr is due the merit of dispelling the popular misapprehension, that the principle of an agrarian law consisted in the resumption by the state of its supposed natural right to all the land under its protection, and its redistribution to the citizens, rich and poor alike, on equal terms. No such confiscation of private property was dreamt of in these laws. They dealt solely with the *ager publicus*, the nature of which has already been explained; and their primary object was to secure for the plebeians those allotments of arable ground, and that fair share in the use of the pasture land, which the cupidity of the patricians had withheld, and to exact from the occupiers of the remainder their stipulated rent. Spurius Cassius proposed that the public domain should be measured, a part of it leased for the benefit of the state, and another portion distributed among the needy citizens. The popularity of the consul and the fear of another secession prevailed over the violent opposition of the patricians, headed by his colleague, Proculus Virginius.* The measure was carried through the assembly of the Centuries, and confirmed by the *Curie*; but the patricians watched for an opportunity to destroy the man whom they regarded as a traitor to his order, and the plebeians themselves were dissatisfied because the Latins were to have their fair share in the distribution of the land, according to the recent treaty. Cassius was succeeded in the consulship by Servius Cornelius and Quintus Fabius; and another member of the Fabian house, which now begins to distinguish itself by its high patrician politics—Kæso Fabius, the consul's brother—was one of the two judges of capital crimes (*quæstores parricidii*). These officers

* Throughout the whole duration of the Patrician Republic, any consul who favoured the people generally had as a colleague one of their violent enemies.

could bring at once before the people any case in which an appeal would lie from their judgment; and thus Kæso arraigned Spurius Cassius before the Comitia Curiata on the charge of trying to make himself king. It might have been supposed that the decision lay legally with the Comitia Centuriata; but the Curiae assumed the right of judging a fellow patrician; and Spurius Cassius was scourged and beheaded, and his house levelled with the ground. "There was some truth in the charge that he had usurped regal power, for he had endeavoured, like the kings, to protect the free commons against his own order. His law was buried along with him; but its spectre thenceforth incessantly haunted the eyes of the rich, and again-and-again it rose from the tomb against them, till the conflicts to which it led destroyed the commonwealth."* Meanwhile the triumph of the patricians is attested by the appearance of a Fabius as one of the consuls for seven successive years (B.C. 485—479). But the ascendancy of the Fabian house brought an unexpected aid to the popular cause.

These seven years were a period of incessant war with the Æquians and the Veientes, and of continual dissensions in the city. Successive tribunes attempted to protect citizens in the refusal to enlist; and it is even said that the soldiers of the haughty Kæso Fabius, who was hated almost as bitterly as Appius Claudius, suffered themselves to be defeated rather than follow him to victory. At length, the valour of the Fabii in a battle against the Veientes, followed by their kind treatment of the wounded soldiers, conciliated the people (B.C. 480); and, in the following year, Kæso himself proposed the execution of the Agrarian Law of Spurius Cassius. Scorned by their fellow patricians as recreants, the Fabii resolved to quit Rome in a body, with their clients, as the Claudii had left Regillus a quarter of a century before. They established themselves on the little river Cremera, which runs into the Tiber from the Tuscan side, a few miles above Rome; but within two years the whole colony, to the number of 300, were surprised and put to the sword by the Veientes. One youth alone escaped, having been left behind at Rome, and became the ancestor of the Fabii who were so famous in after years (B.C. 477). In the next year, the Veientes stormed the Janiculum, and two years later a truce was made between Rome and Veii for forty years (B.C. 474).†

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol i. p. 289.

† With characteristic falsification, the annalists represent the Veientes, after all their successes, as suing for this peace.

These disasters supplied the tribunes with grounds for attacks upon the patrician magistrates; and the consuls of two successive years were impeached for permitting the massacre of the Fabii and the loss of the Janiculum. The precedent was next extended to political offences, and the consuls of B.C. 474 were impeached, on the expiration of their year of office, for their opposition to the demand of the tribunes for the execution of the Agrarian Law. Their accuser, the tribune Genucius, was found dead in his bed on the night before the trial. This violation of the sacred person of a tribune, the more odious because of the freedom of access to his house, was followed by other assassinations, which struck terror into the popular party; till the courage of a single man rallied the plebeians and raised the tribunes one great step in power.

This man was Publius Volero, who, being chosen tribune, in consequence of his resistance to an arbitrary levy made by the consuls, proposed the celebrated "Publilian Law," that the tribunes of the plebs and the plebeian ædiles should be elected by the plebeians themselves in the Comitia Tributa (B.C. 472). Every device was employed to postpone the Comitia of the Tribes, to whom the proposal was at first made as a *plebiscitum*. The patricians appeared in the Forum with their clients, and provoked personal conflicts with the plebeians, and a fatal epidemic helped to drive over the business to the following year. Both parties prepared for a decisive contest. The patricians chose for their consul Appius Claudius, the son of their old leader; Volero was re-elected tribune, with a still more bold and resolute colleague, Caius Lætorius; and the scope of the proposed resolution was enlarged. The day of meeting came. Appius Claudius declared that he would resist the voting by force; Lætorius vowed that he would carry the law before night, or lay down his life in the Forum. Appius kept his place, surrounded by his lictors, when Lætorius called the tribes to vote, and bade all strangers to withdraw from the Forum. The tribune sent his officer to insist on the consul's departure; and a fray ensued between the lictors and the multitude, in which the sacred person of Lætorius was severely wounded. The commons stormed the Capitol; and for several days the citadel of Rome was held by them as by an enemy. At length the senate listened to the wiser advice of the more moderate consul, Titus Quinctius. They adopted the *plebiscitum*, and proposed it to the Comitia Curiata, whose sanction converted it into a law, which has been called the second great charter of Roman liberties. Some say that the number of the tribunes was now first raised to five. Be this

as it may, five plebeian tribunes were elected by the assembly of the tribes in the following year (B.C. 470). Their names are preserved; and the absence of that of Lactorius from the list has been thought to imply that he died, as he had said, from the wounds he received in the Forum. Nor was Appius Claudius suffered to escape punishment. His army refused to fight, when he led them against the Volscians; and the stern consul inflicted on them that terrible penalty of *decimation*,* which has since passed into a proverbial expression. For this act of severity, and for his lawless conduct in his consulship, he was impeached by two of the new tribunes, and only avoided a certain condemnation by suicide. Another account, however, says that he died of sickness (B.C. 470).

We know in fact that Rome suffered terribly about this time from the ravages of pestilence, which in one year carried off both the consuls, two of the four augurs, and the Curio Maximus (the head of the *curiæ*); and the only magistrates left were the plebeian *ædiles*, who carried on the government under the control of senatorial *interreges* (B.C. 463). All the accession of political power gained by the tribunes had been of little material help to the plebeians, who were again overwhelmed with distress and debt. Their most substantial relief was from the foundation of a colony at the important port of Antium, on the coast of Latium, which was taken from the Volscians (B.C. 468), and by the division of its lands among the colonists. At length the demands of the commons rose to a complete reform of the existing order of the commonwealth; and, in B.C. 462, the tribune, C. Terentillus, proposed a law for the restraining of the powers of the consuls, and for the appointment of ten commissioners,† chosen equally from both orders, to draw up a new code of laws. This proposal contained the first germ of the decemviral legislation, which was carried into effect as a compromise after a violent conflict for eight years (B.C. 462—454). The plebeians elected the same tribunes for five successive years. The younger patricians organized clubs for the perpetration of every kind of violence; and among these, Kæso Quinctius, the son of the celebrated Cincinnatus, brought upon himself an impeachment by the tribune, Aulus Vir-

* That is, the choice of every *tenth man*, by lot or otherwise, for execution. The moral effect of this punishment may be said to be increased tenfold by the fear of every man that the choice may fall on him.

† *Decemviri*. It was the custom of the Romans to name colleges or committees, whether permanent or special, by the number of their members. The celebrated political *triumvirates* were an ironical application of this nomenclature.

ginius (B.C. 461). Kæso fled into Etruria before the day of his trial. A conspiracy was formed for effecting his return; and in the following year a band of exiles and slaves, led by a Sabine, named Appius Herdonius, surprized the Capitol by night, and kept possession of it in arms, demanding the restoration of all political exiles. The consular power was, as usual, divided between an eager partisan of the patricians and a favourer of the people, an Appius Claudius and a Valerius Poplicola. The latter led the allied forces of the Latins and Hernicans to the assault of the Capitol. The consul was killed, but the post was carried, and the insurgents were put to the sword or afterwards executed. Kæso Quinctius, who is not expressly mentioned, seems to have fallen in the conflict. But the patricians proved their unyielding obstinacy by electing in the place of Valerius the father of the rebel Kæso, the stern L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, who was as conspicuous for his enmity to the commons as for the republican simplicity which has shed a lustre upon his name. The annalists ascribe to him a scheme for obtaining the revocation of all the popular measures by summoning the army, in virtue of their military oath, to meet him at the Lake Regillus, where the protection of the tribunes would have been of no force against the consular *imperium*. The worst scenes of civil conflict that disgraced the Greek republics were enacted at Rome, which seemed given over to internal war. There is even a tradition, though scarcely clear enough to be recorded as a fact, that nine eminent men of the popular party were burnt alive in the Circus Maximus; such being the punishment provided by an old law for the worst traitors. The state seems only to have been saved from anarchy by the moderating influence of the senate, and the pressure of foreign war.

For the Æquians and Volscians were again bearing hard upon Latium. The citadel of Tusculum, which had been surprized by the former, was indeed recovered, but Antium was retaken and held by the latter (B.C. 459). A brief truce with the Æquians was followed by the war which is illustrated by the celebrated legend of Cincinnatus. In the year B.C. 458, the consul L. Minucius had suffered himself to be surrounded by the enemy in a defile of Mount Algidus.* Five knights escaped from the army, and brought the news of its danger to Rome. The consul, C. Nautius, summoned the senate, and it was resolved that L. Quinctius Cincin-

* This range, which lay between Præneste and the Alban hill, was a sort of advanced post of the Æquians in their wars with Rome.

natus should be named dictator. Though sharing, as we have seen, the strongest prejudices of his order against the plebeians, Cincinnatus was one of a class of patricians which did not die out for many generations, who, amidst the growth of wealth and avarice, preserved the simple frugal life of the olden times, when each burgess had his modest share of the narrow territory of the city.

"Hunc et incomptis Curium capillis
Utilem bello tulit et Camillum
Sæva paupertas et avitus apto
Cum lare fundus."

He lived on his little farm of four *jugera* beyond the Tiber, which he cultivated with his own hands.* When summoned to assume the consulship two years before, he had said to his wife, "I fear, Racilia, our little field must remain this year unsown;" and now he was found by the deputies of the Senate digging in the field, with his toga laid aside on the ground. They bade him put on his dress to receive the message of the Senate in a fitting manner, and hailed him as Master of the People, to deliver the consul and his army from the ambush of the Æquians. Having appointed for his master of the horse L. Tarquinius Placcus, a citizen poor and frugal as himself, who had not the census of a knight, Cincinnatus summoned all the people to the Forum, and ordered the shops to be shut and all business to be suspended, till the consul and his army should be rescued. He summoned every man of military age to meet him in the Campus Martius before sunset, each provided with rations for five days, and twelve stakes.† The old men prepared the food, while the soldiers cut the stakes where they pleased; and before midnight the dictator and his levy had reached Mount Algidus. Having reconnoitred the enemy's position, Cincinnatus ordered his soldiers to lay down their baggage, and to surround the hostile camp with a ditch and the palisade he had provided. They began their work with a shout that announced their presence to the consul and his army, who forthwith made an attack which occupied the Æquians all the night, and allowed them no leisure to turn against the new enemy. So they found themselves in the

* Four *jugera* is about 2½ acres. The farm was probably in the suburb of Janiculum, as Rome had not yet recovered her territory beyond the Tiber. The cognomen of Cincinnatus is said to have been derived from his crisp curling locks (*cincinnati*).

† Three or four stakes for the palisade of the camp formed a regular part of the load which a Roman soldier carried on the march; but these were designed for a special purpose.

morning hemmed in between two Roman armies, and had no resource but to surrender at discretion. Cincinnatus made them all pass beneath the yoke, as the symbol of subjection*: and led the Æquian general Gracchus, and his chief officers, in triumph back to Rome, which he had left within twenty-four hours, followed by the consul's army, to whom he allowed no share of the spoil. The poetic beauty of the story is somewhat marred by its sequel. Cincinnatus did not lay down his office till he had avenged his son Kæso by the condemnation and banishment of the chief witness against him on a charge of perjury. But he made no further political use of his power; and he retired to his farm, after holding the dictatorship for only sixteen days.

The connection of this family legend of the Quinctii with the real history of the Æquian and Volscian wars is admirably described by Dr. Arnold:—"In such a warfare as that of the Romans with the Æquians and Volscians, there are always sufficient alternations of success to furnish the annalists on either side with matter of triumph; and by exaggerating every victory, and omitting or slightly noticing every defeat, they form a picture such as national vanity most delights in. But we neither can, nor need we desire, to correct and supply the omissions of the details of the Roman historians: it is enough to say that, at the close of the third century of Rome, the warfare which the Romans had to maintain against the Opican nations was generally defensive: that the Æquians and Volscians had advanced from the line of the Apennines, and established themselves on the Alban hills in the heart of Latium: that of the thirty Latin states, which had formed the league with Rome (in B.C. 493), thirteen were now either destroyed or were in the possession of the Opicans: that on the Alban hills themselves Tusculum alone remained independent; and that there was no other friendly city to obstruct the irruptions of the enemy into the territory of Rome. Accordingly, that territory was plundered year after year, and, whatever defeats the plunderers may at times have sustained, yet they were never deterred from renewing a contest which they found in the main profitable and glorious. So greatly had the power and dominion of Rome fallen since the overthrow of the monarchy."†

So little was the victory of Cincinnatus decisive, that in the

* The yoke, formed of two spears set upright and one across, was an imitation of the instrument which served draught cattle for a collar, and which may still be seen where oxen are used for ploughing.

† *History of Rome*, vol. i. pp. 203, 209.

very next year we find the Æquians joining with the Sabines to ravage the rich territory between the Tiber and the Anio. These wars, and the continuance of the pestilence at Rome, had the effect of still postponing the Terentilian law. Meanwhile, the popular party aimed at other objects. The number of the tribunes, already enlarged to five, was now doubled; a worse than doubtful benefit, as it increased the chance that one of so large a number might become the tool of the patricians (B.C. 457). A far greater gain was effected by the law of the tribune Icilius, assigning the Aventine as a residence for the Plebeians. The surface of the hill was parcelled out among them into building sites; and its steep sides made it capable of defence (B.C. 456). Lest this law should be obstructed in its passage, like the Terentilian, by the disorderly interruptions of the patricians and their clients, it was not proposed in the Comitia Tributa, but laid as a petition before the Senate by the tribune, who demanded to be heard in its behalf; and thus the tribunes gained indirectly what amounted to the privilege of initiating measures in the Senate. That body adopted the law as a compromise: it passed the assembly of the centuries; it was confirmed with solemn oaths in the presence of the Pontiffs; and was inscribed on a brass pillar in the temple of Diana on the Aventine. Still the Terentilian law was pressed on by the tribunes, who were re-elected for the fifth time, and as resolutely opposed by the patricians. At length, in the three-hundredth year of the city, an agreement was effected under the auspices of the consuls, who were both of the moderate party. A commission of three (*triumviri*) was sent to Greece, then in the height of her glory, in the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars, to inquire into the Greek laws, especially those of Solon, and to report which of them seemed likely to be advantageous to the state (B.C. 454). It was during the year of their absence that the pestilence, under which Rome had long suffered more or less, broke out with the frightful violence already noticed, aggravated by a famine (B.C. 453). The city would seem to have lain at the mercy of her enemies, had they not suffered equally by the same plague, which may be regarded as a wave of that mysterious disease which desolated Athens twenty-three years later.* The exhaustion caused by it seems to have checked the attacks of the enemies of Rome for several years.

In the following year, the pestilence abated; the commissioners returned from Greece; both parties agreed to appoint a Committee

* See Vol. I., pp. 498—500.

of Ten * with full power, not only to draw up new laws, but to administer the whole government of the republic, both civil and military, till the new code should come into force. Meanwhile, all the ordinary magistracies were to be suspended, including not only the consulate, but the tribuneship.† The patricians insisted that all the Ten should be of their own body, and, after a severe struggle, the plebeians were compelled to yield the point.‡ They seem to have relied on the understanding, that the new legislation was to be a thoroughly healing measure, framed to establish, for ever, equal justice to both orders; and, strange as it appears in the light of the past and of the future, they reposed full confidence in Appius Claudius, who, as consul elect, was to be, with his colleague Titus Genucius, at the head of the college. For this Appius Claudius, the son and grandson of the Claudii who have already figured in the annals of the republic, had professed to espouse the cause of the people. Three members more were furnished (as Niebuhr supposes)§ by the Warden of the City and the Quæstores Parricidii; and the other five were elected by the Comitia of the Centuries (B.C. 452).

With the new year, the consuls elect went through the form of abdicating their office, and the DECENVIRS entered on their unbounded power, limited only by the obligation of laying it down at the expiration of the year. The administrative government was vested, just as during an Interregnum, in each member of the college for a day. But it was soon found that Appius Claudius, from the prestige of his great name, from his determined will, and from his great popularity, eclipsed his colleagues, and wielded a power little short of regal. Nor did he at first belie the confidence of the people. He seems to have possessed one of those ardent and self-willed natures which apply their force admirably to a worthy object, and then, in the pride of success, expecting to

* Their full title was *Decem Viri consulari potestate legibus scribundis*.

† Such is the statement of Livy and Dionysius; but Niebuhr doubts its truth respecting the tribunate, which, however, he admits to have been suspended under the second decemvirate.

‡ This statement describes the actual fact with reference to the first decemvirs, not the essential nature of the office. That the "decemvirate with consular power," like the subsequent "military tribunate with consular power," was legally open to both orders, is argued by Dr. Mommsen, both on other grounds and decisively from the names of five of the members of the second decemviral college, who unquestionably belonged to plebeian *gentes*.

§ He regards the first decemvirs as the *decem primi* of the Senate; but the second as a representative college resembling, and probably framed in direct imitation of, the Attic Archons, as a result of the commission sent to Greece.

command all around them, are shipwrecked upon their own selfish desires. While the Decenvirs were engaged in their great work of legislation, and moved with the desire of reconciling all parties, their government was moderate and just.

Meanwhile their special work made rapid progress. Their study of the Greek laws was aided by an Ionian sophist, Hermodorus of Ephesus, whose services were commemorated by the erection of his statue in the Comitium. By the end of the year, they had prepared and laid before the people a complete code of laws, which were engraved upon ten tablets of brass, and affixed to the rostra in front of the senate-house. The very number of these tables, corresponding to the number of the Decenvirs—a number so familiar to the Latins—furnishes a decisive confirmation of what we might assume from all the circumstances, that the Ten Tables were designed for a complete code. The statement that the Decenviral office was prolonged for another year, in order that the code might be made more complete, is the more suspicious from the fact that, with the exception of Appius Claudius, the two lists of Decenvirs were composed of different persons. It is one of those bold conjectures, which were the fruit of Niebuhr's almost intuitive sagacity, that the decemvirate was meant to be a permanent committee of government, in place of the old magistracies. It seems unquestionably to have been the object of the new legislation to substitute the safeguard of written law for the irregular protection which had been afforded by the tribunitian power, at the cost almost of a chronic civil war. "Beyond doubt," says Dr. Mommsen, "when the plebeians desired a written code, the patricians replied that in that event the legal protection of tribunes would be superfluous." But it is scarcely probable that the plebeians would have surrendered the tribuneship, trusting to the letter of a law the administration of which was left to the patrician magistrates; and the equal division of the second decemvirate among the patrician and plebeian members looks like a permanent compromise between the orders, an idea which seems to be carried out in the whole constitution of the college. We learn from Dionysius that six of the Ten were military tribunes, three patrician and three plebeian; and these were commanders in war. Of the remaining four, Niebuhr regards two as invested with censorial power and with that of the Warden of the City, combined with the presidency of the Senate, while the other two had the authority of *questors*; there being one patrician and one plebeian in each of these two pairs. Niebuhr also states that "the second election was

quite different from the first, the noblest, like the lowest patricians, canvassing for the votes of the plebeians (canvassing herè appears for the first time), so that the election was perfectly free.”

Be this as it may, the Decemvirate was renewed for the year B.C. 450, and two more tables were added to the ten former, thus completing the celebrated LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES, the foundation of the majestic system of Roman jurisprudence.* Appius Claudius was the only member re-elected of the former college. The common story ascribes this distinction to his favour with the people, which excited the jealousy of the patricians, the most eminent of whom, including Cincinnatus and another Quinctius, were themselves candidates for the office. The Senate appointed Appius to preside at the new elections, as an indirect mode of disqualification; but he scrupled not to receive votes for himself, and was again invested with an almost despotic power. The history of the second Decemvirate is one of the points most obscured by the character of the sources from which it comes. They are commonly said to have abused their power and ruled tyrannically, and all the complaints against the decemviral legislation refer to the two last tables. But when Cicero, for example, calls these laws unjust, he is speaking on behalf of the aristocratic party. Of the laws themselves we know too little to decide upon their real tendency; but they seem to have embodied in a written form the existing mass of customary law, with scarcely any material alterations. They were in fact a compromise between the two orders, based on the existing rights of both. Even the laws against insolvent debtors seem to have been left in force, though a maximum of legal interest was fixed (probably ten per cent.), and severer penalties were enacted for usury than for theft. The distinction between the orders was still perpetuated by the prohibition of intermarriage. The right of appeal to the *Comitia Centuriata* was guaranteed; but the exclusion of any appeal to the *Comitia Tributa* is one of the indications of a design to perpetuate the suspension of the tribunate itself. The great point gained was not in the contents of the Tables so much as in their very existence and publication, as a code the rules of which all magistrates must henceforth observe in their administration of the law, in the presence of a public who knew its contents as well as themselves. The question still remained—most critical at the time, and very difficult for the historian—what those magistrates were to be.

* It is curious to observe, in the numbers of the Tables, another example of the conflict between the decimal and duodecimal systems of notation.

Thus much is clear, that, when the year expired, and it only remained for the Decenvirs to promulgate the laws, and to conduct the election of their successors (whoever those successors might be) they refused to make the demission of their office, and were driven from power by an insurrection, provoked by the outrageous insolence of Appius Claudius. The old annalists represent the tyranny of the decenvirs as another instance of aristocratic misrule, and the popular professions of Appius as affectation from the first. But there is another view, which furnishes a better explanation of his whole conduct, while it is more consistent with the fact that half the college were plebeians. Invested with a new power, before which the old magistracies had given place, and surrounded by insignificant or obsequious colleagues, Appius may have aspired to royal power, leaning on the support of the plebeians; but, unable to control his passions, he outraged those who should have supported him against the opposition of the nobles, and so fell before a rebellion of both orders. In this case we could easily understand the sudden revival of the old offices, from whose antagonism an escape had been sought in the decemvirate; for, when this new device of government fell before the indignation of both parties, the plebs would once more claim the tribunate, as a check on the re-established consulship. That the poetic legend of the fall of the Decenvirs recognizes only the wrongs and the resistance of one party, is a simple consequence of its being one of the plebeian lays.

We know, in fact, that there was a party in the Senate headed by the old liberal houses of the Valerii and the Horatii—which demanded the abdication of the decenvirs. The question seems to have been postponed by a new outbreak of war; and the decenvirs were permitted to levy two armies against the Sabines and the Volscians. In the former army there was a centurion who had been a tribune of the plebs, L. Sicinius Dentatus. He had fought in more than a hundred battles, and had eight times slain an enemy in single combat. His valour was attested, above the many crowns he had won, by forty-five wounds, all of them in front. But his opposition to the patricians in his tribunate, and his supposed enmity to the decenvirs, brought upon him a treacherous death. It was given out that he had fallen in an ambush of the enemy. Such a man would sell his life dear; but the slain Romans who were found about his corpse betrayed the manner of his death. His pompous funeral had soothed, without satisfying, the agitation of the one army, when a new outrage drove both to open mutiny. It is needless to relate, for the hundredth time, the story of Virginia,

especially since it has been told by him who sang how the despairing father, left with his darling daughter before the merciless tribunal of Appius Claudius, when the lictors had hurled back the sympathizing crowd, snatched the knife from the fleshier's block, and used the moment's pause for a last farewell :—

“ ‘Then clasp me round the neck once more, and give me one more kiss ;
And now, mine own dear little girl, there is no way but *this* :’—
With that he lifted high the steel, and smote her in the side,
And in her blood she sank to earth, and with one sob she died.” *

While Virginius rushed forth from the Forum with his bloody knife to the army, from which he had hastened at the news of his daughter's danger, Icilius, her betrothed, carried the tidings to the other camp, already in a ferment at the fate of Dentatus. Both abandoned their generals, and marched to Rome. Thence, having rallied round them the whole plebeian order, they went forth in military array to the Sacred Mount. This second secession was as decisive as the first, forty-five years before † ; but not till the plebeian army had advanced to the Aventine, and a civil war was threatened in the heart of Rome. Then at length the Senate insisted on the abdication of the decemvirs, and sent L. Valerius and M. Horatius to make terms with the insurgents. It was agreed that the old constitution should be restored, but with a great extension of the privileges of the Comitia Tributa and of the plebeian magistrates. Ten tribunes were elected—the number which remained till the end of the republic—among whom were Virginius and Icilius. Appius Claudius and the knife of Virginius had done for the tribunate what Sextus Tarquinius and the dagger of Lucretia effected for the consulship, which was now restored under its new name. Valerius and Horatius were the first who bore the title of *CONSULS*, instead of *Prætors* ; and their first act was to move the ratification of the new agreement by the *Valerian and Horatian Laws*. The first of these enacted that the votes of the plebs, passed in the Comitia Tributa (*plebiscita*), should be binding on the whole people, provided they were confirmed by the Senate and the Assemblies of the Centuries and the *Curia*, a confirmation which became more and more a matter of form. This law was re-enacted by the Publilian law, in B.C. 339, and by the Hortensian law in B.C. 287. The second

* The exquisite pathos and vehement fire of the *Lay of Virginia* should not tempt the reader to overlook the admirable introductory remarks of Lord Macaulay, on the conflict with reference to which he feigns the ballad to have been composed.

† In B.C. 494. See p. 231.

revived the right of appeal to the *Comitia Centuriata*, established by *Valerius Poplicola*, and afterwards confirmed by *M. Valerius*, the consul of B.C. 300, and made the pledge to observe it a condition of the election of future magistrates, including even the dictator. The frequent re-enactments of these fundamental securities for the liberties of the plebeians have been well compared to the repeated confirmation of *Magna Charta* by the *Plantagenets*.

The third of these laws renewed most solemnly the personal inviolability of the tribunes and the plebeian *ædiles*, and of certain officers, of whom we now first hear, the *judices* and *decemviri*, ministers (it would seem) of the jurisdiction of the tribunes. All offenders against the second and third laws were to be regarded as outlaws, who might be killed with impunity. A vital addition was made to the influence of the tribunes by giving them a deliberative voice in the Senate, though without a vote. The dignity of the order would not indeed suffer them to take their seats with its members; so a bench was placed for them at the door; but this very distinction must have marked all the more clearly their formidable presence. With this footing in the Senate, added to their right of speech in the *Comitia Centuriata*, and their sway in the *Comitia Tributa*, they gradually acquired the privilege of arresting the action of every part of the state by their veto (*intercessio*), by which the acts of the dictator alone could not be cancelled. They retained the judicial power of driving their enemies out of the pale of the constitution by the infliction of fines, their sentences being confirmed by the *Comitia Tributa*, which was virtually the assembly of the plebeians. The laws of the *decemvirs* had indeed caused the patricians and their clients to be enrolled among the *Servian tribes* (if they were not so before), but without materially affecting the predominance of the plebeians in the assembly, where the mode of voting gave no advantage to rank or wealth.

The ill-will left by the recent contest was manifested in the way in which the state settled down to its ordinary working under the new laws. The march of the armies back to Rome to overthrow the *decemvirs* had left the war to be carried on by the Latin and Hernican allies; but now the popular consuls held a levy, and the people willingly followed them to the field. They returned victorious to the *Campus Martius*, where they waited, as the law required, to enter the city in triumph. But when the jealousy of the Senate withheld the necessary decree, the tribune *Icilius* convened the people in their tribes, and carried a vote for the triumph,

which the Senate dared not but confirm. The next step was to take vengeance upon the decemvirs. Appius Claudius was impeached by Virginius, and thrown into prison, where he put an end to his own life. His fate was shared by his friend and chief supporter, Spurius Oppius, one of the plebeian decemvirs.* The other eight were suffered to go into exile; and it became the custom to allow political offenders (except in extreme cases) this means of escaping the extreme capital penalty, before sentence was actually pronounced. An attempt to continue the same consuls and tribunes in office was checked, like the further prosecution of the decemvirs, by the moderation of the tribune M. Duillius, and of the consuls, who declined the proposed honour. Thus ended this memorable year, in which the plebeian opposition was finally organized, with powers which went on growing, till scarcely any other check upon them remained to the nobles, but the device of securing tools among the tribunes themselves, or the use of open violence. The failure of the compromise attempted in the decemvirate had already sown the seeds of civil war and anarchy in the constitution.

From this moment the equalization of the orders became but a question of time, and the plebeians lent all their increased strength to its achievement. It appears that the plebeian nobility, whose interests had united them to the patricians during the social conflict between rich and poor, now saw that the full establishment of the tribunate gave them a means of obtaining political equality. So the united strength of the order was directed against the two distinctive patrician privileges, exclusive intermarriage, and exclusive tenure of the higher magistracies. Though powerless against such an union, the patricians only submitted after a third secession,—this time to M. Janiculus. The tribune Canuleius had proposed two votes in the *Comitia Tributa* for granting the *connubium* and a share in the consulship to the plebeians. The first became a law by the sanction of the Senate and the people; but on the second a compromise was effected. The patricians objected to admit the plebeians to the consulship, an office invested not only with the tradition of the regal dignity, but with the sanctity of the patrician religion. For any but patricians to take the auspices and offer sacrifices was held to be positive desecration.† As a device therefore for sharing the chief magistracy

* Another account is that Oppius was impeached by the tribune Numitorius, found guilty, and executed.

† Another reason has been sought in their unwillingness to give up the *jus imagi-*

between the orders, they reverted to the military organization of the state, in which every citizen liable to serve, whether patrician or plebeian, might rise to the rank of *Military Tribune*, or chief officer of the legion.* This, then, was the name adopted for the new chief magistrates, who, with the power of the consuls, received only, as Dr. Mommsen puts it, "the status of a simple staff-officer."† They were called MILITARY TRIBUNES WITH CONSULAR POWER.‡ It is supposed that the intention was, that they should be six in number, like the military tribunes in each legion, and that they should be chosen equally from the patricians and the plebeians. But the actual number was sometimes *three*, sometimes *four*, and sometimes *six*; numbers which prevailed respectively in the early, the middle, and the latter part of the duration of the office, which lasted at intervals to the taking of the city by the Gauls (B.C. 360). We say, at intervals, for it was left to the decision of the people in each year, whether they would have consuls or military tribunes. In the very first year (B.C. 444), the election of three military tribunes was annulled by a defect in the auspices, and they were replaced by consuls; and it is not till eight years later (B.C. 438), that we again find three military tribunes in office. These irregularities are, in fact, the indication of a conflict, annually renewed, between the plebeians and the old nobility, who tried every expedient to defeat the compromise they had made. Such, too, was their influence in the Comitia, that it was not till B.C. 400 that any plebeians were actually elected as military tribunes. Not content with this policy of wearing out the opposite party, they devised a scheme for depriving the military tribunes of a most important part of the power of the consular office. The revision of the lists of citizens, which had hitherto been made by the consuls every fourth year, was now committed to two new magistrates, whose title became famous in after years, the CENSORS (*censores*, i.e. *valuers*).§ They were

num, which belonged only to those who had held curule offices. A triumph was never granted: a military tribune.

* There were six military tribunes (*tribuni militum*) to each legion, appointed by the commander-in-chief, that is, at first the king, afterwards the consul or dictator. With reference to the fullest complement of the legion, each military tribune may be regarded roughly as the commander of 1000 men, the *centurions* (the next grade below them) being commanders of 100.

† *Tribuni Militum cum Consulari Potestate*.

‡ The censors were first elected in B.C. 443. Their chief functions have been mentioned incidentally at pp. 201 and 227. Niebuhr thinks that they were originally elected by the Curie.

chosen exclusively from the patricians by the *Comitia Centuriata*. They seem to have been appointed originally for a *lustrum* (five years), a sacred period in the Roman religion; but their tenure of office was soon limited to eighteen months, the election still taking place every five years. The censors ranked in dignity above all other magistrates, except the dictator, and the office formed the great stronghold of the aristocracy; though that supervision of the morals and reputation of the citizens, which has given to the word *censorship* its peculiar meaning, was only gradually acquired in the course of time. The attempts which seem also to have been made to bring the finances under the more direct control of the patricians, by transferring the appointment of the *quæstors* from the consul to the *Comitia Centuriata*, ended in a popular victory, which secured the election of those officers for the *Comitia Tributa*. They were still, however, chosen from the patricians, till B.C. 421, when the office was thrown open to the plebeians, and formed for them a new path to the senate.

The patricians did not scruple to conduct the conflict by acts of downright violence, which proved that they wanted only the power, not the will, to effect a counter-revolution. The most striking case is that of *Spurius Mælius*, a wealthy knight, who, in a great famine (B.C. 439), employed his own resources to supply the poor with corn at a price much lower than the state distribution.* He was accused by the patricians of aspiring to royalty; and the aged *Cincinnatus*, who was appointed dictator to quell the popular agitation, summoned Mælius before his tribunal. Knowing the fate in store for him, Mælius refused to obey, and *C. Servilius Ahala*, the master of the horse, killed him on the spot. The party of the *Optimates*, including Cicero, always speak of this as a great act of courageous justice. But the popular party at the time regarded the deed as a murder, and Ahala found it necessary to evade their indignation by voluntary exile (B.C. 439).

It is time to turn from these internal conflicts to the foreign relations of Rome, which are summed up in two series of wars; on the one hand with the *Volscians* and *Æquians*, on the other with the *Etruscans*. Of the latter we shall speak presently. The former enemies were kept at bay with the aid of the Latin and Hernican allies; but so systematic was the falsification of the annals, that the very years in which we read of triumphs may have been signalized by defeats. The most famous campaign was that of the year B.C. 431, when the combined power of the enemy was

* This was called *annona*, and was made by an officer named *Præfectus Annonæ*.

broken in the decisive victory of Mount Algidus. It was on this occasion that the dictator, Aulus Postumius, gave an example of the stern Roman discipline, by putting his own son to death for engaging the enemy against his orders, though he had gained the victory; an example followed in the more famous case of Titus Manlius Torquatus, nearly a hundred years later. We read of other great victories over the Æquians in B.C. 418 and B.C. 414, in the first of which years the town of Lavici, in the second that of Bola, were taken and colonized. On the latter occasion another of the Postumii fell a victim to a military insubordination as conspicuous as it was rare. An agrarian law was proposed, for the division of the lands of Lavici and Bola; and M. Postumius Regillensis, one of the military tribunes of the year, threatened to use his *imperium* to punish any of his soldiers who supported the proposal. But when he backed this threat by refusing them their share in the plunder of Bola, the army rose in mutiny and stoned him to death. The only advantage of this outrage was gained by the reactionary party. For all but two years out of the last thirteen (B.C. 426—414) the chief magistrates had been military tribunes; but consuls were appointed for the five succeeding years. A defeat by the Volscians, which the Roman annals confess, in B.C. 407, and their recapture of Anxur (Terracina) at the time when the Romans were engaged in the siege of Veii (B.C. 402), prove that they were still formidable enemies; but their power was already waning before that of the kindred SAMNITES, who fill so large a space in the history of the next century. They had taken the city of Vulturnum, in Campania, in B.C. 423, and were now hemming in the old Opican races on the side of the Apennines. Notice should here be taken also of the progress made by the native Italians at the expense of the Greek colonies, the oldest of which, Cumæ, having resisted several attacks from the Etruscans, was taken by the Campanians in B.C. 420. The Volsci reappear after the taking of Rome by the Gauls, and were not finally subdued till the conquest of Latium in the great Latin war (B.C. 338).

On the side of Etruria, we have already seen that the great enemy of Rome was the powerful city of VEII, the territory of which embraced most of the plain of Southern Etruria, from the right bank of the Tiber (as far as its mouth) to the great Ciminian Forest, which divided it from the hill country. The Roman annalists have not noticed the very interesting coincidences of the wars between the Romans and Etruscans with the blows that the

latter people sustained from the Greeks. As allies of the Carthaginians, the Etruscans bore an indirect part in the great attempt of Xerxes against the liberties of Greece; and their share in the defeat of the Carthaginians by Gelo at Himera was followed by the war with Rome, which ended in the disaster of the Fabii (B.C. 480—477). This war was concluded by a truce with Veii for four hundred months, that is, forty years of the ancient standard of ten lunar months, preserved as a sacred mode of computing a treaty. The Roman annalists make the statement, which seems inconsistent with the previous disasters of the war, that the Veientes gave up Fidenæ, the city which we have seen as their constant ally and *tête-de-pont* on the bank of the Tiber, about six miles above Rome; and they connect the renewal of the war, at the expiration of the truce, with a new revolt of Fidenæ (B.C. 438).^{*} They tell us how the Veientine king, Lars Tolumnius, led the forces of several Etruscan states to the support of Fidenæ; how the dictator, Mamercus Æmilius, with L. Quinctius Cincinnatus for his master of the horse, conquered the Veientes and retook Fidenæ; and how the military tribune, Aulus Cornelius Cossus, slew Lars Tolumnius with his own hand, and dedicated the *spolia opima* in the Capitol (B.C. 437), an honour only obtained before him by Romulus, and after him by M. Valerius Corvus.[†] But the war was not ended; for only two years later, the dictator Q. Servilius Priscus obtained the surname of the Fidenatian (*Fidenas*) by the capture of the city, which was colonized afresh, but only to be the scene of a new revolt nine years later, when the murder of the Roman colonists was avenged by the total destruction of Fidenæ, in the third dictatorship of Mamercus Æmilius.[‡] The Etruscan inhabitants were sold for slaves, and the Romans finally obtained the important territory on their own side of the Tiber, which had been contested since the times of Romulus and Hostilius (B.C. 426). A truce was again concluded with Veii for twenty years, or two hundred months (B.C. 425).

At the expiration of this truce, the Romans, who had just retrieved a defeat sustained from the Volscians in the preceding year, by the capture of Anxur (Terracina), declared war against the Veientes. This renewal of the war coincides with another

^{*} The running out of these truces to their term contrasts strongly with what we have seen among the Greeks, and speaks well for the good faith of the Etruscans.

[†] Corvus won his *spolia opima* in B.C. 349.

[‡] In his second dictatorship he had limited the tenure of office by the censors to eighteen months.

critical epoch in the relations between the Etruscans and the Greeks. To the injuries inflicted on the Sicilian cities by Tyrrhenian corsairs and by their league with the Carthaginians, had been added the mortal offence of the aid given to the Athenians in their expedition against Syracuse. When Dionysius obtained the tyranny (B.C. 406) he made it his settled policy to supplant the colonial empire of the Etruscans in the Adriatic, and before long he began attacks on the coast of Etruria itself. At the same time the Gauls were threatening the country from the North. When, therefore, the Veientes appealed to the confederacy for aid, a solemn meeting held at the temple of Voltumna resolved to leave them to their own resources; and a war began, which could only be ended in the destruction of Rome or Veii. The contest was not so unequal as it might appear, for the Latin allies of Rome seem to have been too much occupied with the Volscians and Æquians to have been willing to cross the Tiber. The history of this great conflict, the first in which Rome contended for supremacy with a city as powerful as herself, is obscured, as much as its picturesque interest is increased, by the romantic details engrafted on it by the Roman poets. War was declared against Veii in B.C. 406, the epoch at which the Roman soldiers first received regular pay by a decree of the Senate. The siege of Veii, which lasted the same time as that of Troy, was formed in B.C. 405; and the following year is memorable for the first solar eclipse recorded in the annals of the Roman Pontiffs.

VEII, one of the most ancient, and apparently the largest of the twelve confederated Etruscan cities, stood on the river Cremera, about twelve miles from Rome, in the midst of beautiful glens, which break the table-land of the Campagna. Dionysius states that it was equal in size to Athens; and its ruins prove its circumference to have been about seven miles. Its strong citadel was perched on a hill, the precipices of which sink down to the surrounding ravines on all sides, except where a narrow ridge united it to the city. Its magnificence, and the advantages of its site, are attested by the desire formed by the Romans to transfer their abode to it after the destruction of their own city by the Gauls, a design from which they were only turned aside by the persuasions of Camillus. Whether from the superiority of the Romans in the field, or from deliberate policy, the Veientes from the first shut themselves up in their city. The progress of the siege seems to have depended greatly on the alternations of success and failure in the Volscian war, and, among other calamities which protracted

it, may be reckoned the great pestilence of B.C. 399, which gave the first occasion for the form of supplication called *lectisternium* (the *covering of couches*). The investment of the city seems to have been formed, like that of Plataea by the Lacedæmonians, by a double line of circumvallation, the inner to blockade the city, the outer to repel any attempts of the other Etruscan states to raise the siege. The only allies that thus came to the rescue were the people of Capena and Falerii; but their temporary success proved what might have been done by the whole force of the confederacy. The defeat of two military tribunes caused an alarm, both in the lines round Veii and at Rome, that the armies of all Etruria were approaching; the temples were filled with crowds of suppliant matrons; and the Senate decreed the appointment of a dictator, whose name at once recalls the legendary character which the story of the siege assumes. The dictator was M. FURIUS CAMILLUS, and his master of the horse was P. Cornelius Maluginensis.*

How strangely the spirit of fable can find an entrance among hard material facts is proved by the celebrated legend of the draining of the Alban lake. In the seventh year of the siege, when the Romans were depressed by prolonged failure, a panic was caused by a sudden rising of the Alban lake about the end of the summer, till it overflowed its banks.† The stratagem of a Roman centurion secured the person of an old Etruscan soothsayer, who had derided the siege, telling the Veientes that their city would never be taken till the waters of the Alban lake found a passage to the sea. His prediction was confirmed by a response which the Romans obtained from Delphi; and, like a practical people as they were, they set to work to fulfil the prophecy by constructing a tunnel to discharge the superfluous waters of the lake into the Anio.‡ The tunnel exists to this day, bored for nearly three miles through the hard volcanic rock, and with the ruins of the regulator at its outlet, to convince of the truth of the legend those who hold that “seeing is believing.”

The decree which the soothsayer had read from the book of fate was fulfilled; and, while the Veientes made vain offers of capi-

* According to the Fasti, it would seem that the dictator was not appointed till the last year of the siege (B.C. 396).

† The lake is the crater of an extinct volcano.

‡ Another such outlet (*emissarium*) for the waters of the Lacus Fucinus (*Lake of Calano*) among the Æquian hills, was constructed under the Emperor Claudius; but the Alban emissary was of unknown antiquity, as is proved by the invention of a legend to account for its construction.

tulation, it occurred to Camillus that an army might be led into the city by the same means by which water could be drawn out of a lake. He constructed a mine beneath the rock of the citadel, and sent for the people of Rome to share the expected booty. The king of Veii was sacrificing to Juno, when the Romans, in the mine beneath, heard the soothsayer make the apparently safe promise, that the victory would be his, who should complete the sacrifice. At that moment Camillus gave the signal; the Roman soldiers sprang up through the pavement of the temple; the king and the people about him were slain; and the sacrifice was finished by the dictator. The statue of Juno was reverently carried from the citadel, and, in accordance with a sign given by herself, set up in the temple on the Aventine. Camillus, returning to Rome with an enormous booty, went up in triumph to the Capitol in a chariot drawn by four milk-white steeds (B.C. 396).

The fall of Veii was followed by the submission of her allies,* and of all the Etruscan cities south of the Ciminian forest, including the wealthy emporium of Caere. Nor did the arms of the conquerors stop at the Ciminian range. Their victory over the forces of Volsinii (*Bolsena*) was followed by a truce for twenty years with the Etruscan confederacy (B.C. 393). In the same year the lands of the Veientes were distributed among the whole people, at the rate of seven jugera to every householder. The consent of the patricians to this agrarian law is said to have been a compromise or reward for the rejection, by a majority in the Comitia Tributa, of a proposal made by the Tribune Sicinius, that the people should be divided between Rome and Veii;—a measure which would have reduced both cities to insignificant Latin towns, probably in jealous hostility with one another.

It only remained to complete the poetical legend by the fate of the hero whose success had roused the jealousy of gods and men. In his pride of victory, and patrician scorn of the people, Camillus required each man to give up the tenth of his share of the booty, as he had vowed a tithe to Apollo in the hour of victory. The vow was treated as a pretence to rob the plebeians of the spoil they had won with their blood, and a charge of peculation was raised against the commander so generous with the property of

* The chief of these was Falerii, the city of the Falisci, a people probably akin to the Volsci, though settled in Etruria. All know the legend of the treacherous schoolmaster of Falerii, whom Camillus had flogged back into the city by the noble boys whom he had delivered to the Romans.

others. The Tribune, L. Apuleius, impeached Camillus for having taken for himself the great bronze gates of the city; and, though his Clients and fellow *gentiles* would have paid for him any fine that might have been inflicted, they were unable to procure his acquittal. So he went into exile, and took up his abode at Ardea; praying, as he left the city, that his country might soon have cause to regret him (B.C. 391). His prayer was answered; for the GAULS had already poured over the Apennines and laid siege to Clusium, and the interference of Rome was about to bring her to the verge of destruction. But she was destined to rise again, with renewed life, from beneath the torrent which overwhelmed the civilization of her ancient rival; and the same blow which levelled her for a moment prepared for her an easy conquest in Etruria. The decline of that great nation continued steadily after the Gauls had retired from Rome, chiefly in consequence of the maritime successes of Dionysius of Syracuse. His capture of Pyrgi, the port of Cere, gave a fatal blow to the naval power of the Tuscans. His maritime empire, indeed, ceased with his death; but the Carthaginians were strong enough to exclude their old allies from the benefit of the change; and the co-operation of Tuscan ships of war with Agathocles marks the complete rupture of the league, to which both had owed so much of their naval power, and which Aristotle mentions as in full force down to the death of Alexander (B.C. 323).

CHAPTER XXII.

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WARS WITH THE LATINS AND SAMNITES,
FROM THE TAKING OF ROME BY THE GAULS TO THE END
OF THE SAMNITE WARS. B.C. 390 TO B.C. 290.

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“*Majora jam hinc bella et viribus hostium et longinquitate vel regionum vel temporum
spatio quibus bellatum est dicentur.*”—LIVY.

—♦—

THE REMOTER NATIONS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD—THE CELTIC RACE—THEIR MIGRATION FROM THE EAST IN HISTORIC TIMES—THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND MILITARY HABITS—TRANSITORY EFFECTS OF THEIR ENTERPRISES—THEIR EARLY SETTLEMENTS IN ITALY—CISALPINE GAUL—COMMON STORY OF THE INVASION—SIEGE OF CLUSIUM—INTERFERENCE OF THE ROMANS—BATTLE OF THE ALLIA—PREPARATIONS AT ROME—SELF-DEVOTION OF THE FATHERS—CAPTURE AND SACK OF THE CITY—THE CAPITOL SAVED BY M. MANLIUS—RANSOM OF ROME—RETREAT OF THE GAULS—LEGEND OF CAMILLUS—SUBSEQUENT ENCOUNTERS WITH THE GAULS—RESULTS OF THE INVASION—DISTRESS AT ROME—WARS WITH THE ETRUSCANS—SETTLEMENT OF CISALPINE GAUL—DISRUPTION OF THE LATIN ALLIANCE—WARS WITH THE LATINS AND VOLSCIANS—INTERNAL DISSENSIONS—CONDEMNATION OF MANLIUS—THE LICINIAN ROGATIONS—PLEBBIANS ADMITTED TO THE CONSULSHIP—INSTITUTION OF THE PRÆTORSHIP AND CURULE ÆDILESHIP—UNION OF THE ORDERS—DEATH OF CAMILLUS—RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION, TO THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE POPULAR CONSTITUTION—RENEWED WARS WITH THE ITALIANS—NEW LEAGUE WITH THE LATINS AND HERNICANS—GREAT SAMNITE AND LATIN WARS—ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE SAMNITES—FIRST SAMNITE WAR—MUTINY AT CAPUA—GREAT LATIN WAR—BATTLE NEAR VESUVIUS, AND SELF-DEVOTION OF P. DECIVS—BATTLE OF TRIFANUM—DISSOLUTION OF THE LATIN CONFEDERACY—ROMAN COLONIES IN LATIUM—SECOND OR GREAT SAMNITE WAR—PAPIRIUS AND FABIUS—THE ROMANS DEFEATED AT THE CAUDINE FORKS—SUCCESSSES OF THE ROMANS—DEFEAT OF THE ETRUSCANS AND SAMNITES—ROMAN CONQUESTS—COALITION OF ETRUSCANS AND ITALIANS AGAINST ROME—THIRD SAMNITE WAR—VICTORY OF SENTINUM—TRUCE WITH ETRUSCAN CITIES—DEFEAT OF THE YOUNGER AND VICTORY OF THE ELDER FABIUS—END OF THE SAMNITE WARS.

♦

THE general course of Ancient History has been well described as the history of civilization among the nations lying around the Mediterranean. Though belonging to races strikingly distinct in their languages and ethnic affinities, their position round that great pathway of maritime intercourse, the advantages of their climate and the general conformation of their shores, and the presence amongst them of the highest sources of civilization, grouped together into one historic whole peoples that belonged to the three divisions of the ancient world. Accordingly, since the stream of primeval history was divided at the dispersion of the nations, we have been engaged with its five main divisions—the history of the chosen family, the early civilization of the Cushite race in Egypt and Chaldæa, the great Semitic monarchies of Assyria and Babylon, the Aryan empire of the Medes and Persians, and the

growth of the kindred Hellenic and Italian peoples of the West. Glimpses more or less distinct have presented themselves of the outlying nations, with which these came into contact from time to time; and we have met with cases in which great peoples have burst the boundaries that seemed to divide them from the nations already civilized. Now, however, we have reached a point, where one of the chiefest of those irruptions calls on us to look beyond the Alps, and inquire into the origin of that mighty race which, under the name of CELTS or GAULS, overspread Western Europe at the earliest ages of recorded history.*

The whole region, from some indefinite boundary in Central Europe (apparently from the western frontier of the Scyths) to the Pillars of Hercules, was known to Herodotus as the *Land of the Celts*.† The Celts were already intermixed with other races in parts of that vast region, as, for example, with the Iberians in Spain; but they unquestionably formed the great bulk of the population west of the Rhine and the Alps. They were a branch of the great Aryan or Indo-Germanic race; and, like all the European nations of that family, they undoubtedly migrated from the East, at a period of unknown antiquity. The occurrence among them of names etymologically identical with that of the great Cimmerian people, of whom we have had occasion before to speak, points to an ethnical affinity.‡ If this were established, the inference would seem probable, that the same great movement of the Scythians from the East, which displaced the Cimmerians from the shores of

* Cæsar distinguishes the two names in the well-known passage (*B. G.*, I. 1), "ipsorum lingua *Celte*, nostra *Galli* appellantur." All English readers are familiar with the name of "the *Gael*," as that of one important branch of the race in our own islands; and it appears also in the appellation of *Gallia*. *Celte* (Κέλται) and *Galatæ* (Γαλάται) were modifications of the native name, first used by the Greeks, whose colony of Massalia made them acquainted with the people, and adopted by the Romans, who much more commonly, however, use the name of *Galli*. In modern usage, CELTS is the generic name for the whole of this great branch of the Aryan race. We make no attempt to adopt the form *Kelt*, which is indefensible in English, unless we were prepared to talk of the *Kentuurs* and the *Kykhops*, forms which even Mr. Grote's authority has failed to naturalize.

† Η Κελτική. It is very remarkable that Herodotus had no distinct knowledge of the Germans as a separate race.

‡ See Vol. I. p. 255. Examples occur in the name of *Cymry* or *Cumri*, as that of the people who formerly inhabited Britain, and are now found in Wales and Cumberland; in the *Cimbrica Chersonesus* (Jutland), which, though inhabited by Teutons in historic times, may have been first peopled by Celts; and in the *Cimbri*, probably the original inhabitants of that peninsula, who invaded Italy with the Teutons towards the close of the second century B.C.; for the attempts to prove these *Cimbri* a Teutonic people are unsatisfactory.

the Euxine, was that which drove the Celts westward. Whether the Teutonic races, whom the Romans called by the name of *Germans*, shared this movement, or whether they followed it, and displaced the Celts from the country known as Germany, we have no means of deciding. In either case, the Celts passed beyond that great central region of mountains, forests, and morasses, across the Rhine, which thenceforth formed their eastern boundary.

The civil history of the world is only concerned with nations which have reached the **state of social communities**. It leaves to the antiquarian and the ethnologist the speculations about an "age of stone" and an "age of iron" and the still earlier time when human beings are supposed to have led a life like that of beavers in huts raised on piles above the surface of Swiss lakes; only taking care, however, to maintain the truth, derived from the authentic records of man's primitive condition, that, if parts of Europe were ever peopled in this manner, it was not the original condition of the inhabitants, but a state into which they had declined from their primitive civilization. The true history of the Celts begins at the period when their migrations brought them into contact with the nations of Italy and Greece. That collision was the result, so to speak, of a great reflex movement in a direction opposite to their original migration, whether they were impelled by want arising from the increase of population, or tempted by a happier soil and climate, or moved by the mere restlessness of a people who were but slightly attached to their native country. For the Celts were a pastoral people; and so little taste had they for agriculture, that Cicero says it was esteemed disgraceful for a free Celt to till the ground with his own hands. They were more addicted than either the Germans or Italians to congregating in towns and villages; but they had not the steady purpose, and the earnest public spirit, which created the city life of the Greeks. In no branch of the human family have better and worse qualities been more strangely mingled, or the former more strikingly neutralized by the latter. The pictures drawn of them by the most ancient writers describe their character to the present day. "Gaul for the most part," said Cato the Censor, "pursues two things most perseveringly—war, and talking cleverly." The great modern historian of the people, Thierry, depicts their character in the following words:—"The prominent qualities of the Celtic race were personal bravery, in which they excelled all nations; an open impetuous temperament, accessible to every impression; much intelligence, associated with extreme volatility; want of perseverance; aversion

to discipline and order; ostentation and perpetual discord—the result of boundless vanity.”

Their part in the history of the ancient world is admirably described by Dr. Mommsen: “Such qualities—those of good soldiers and of bad citizens—explain the historical fact, that the Celts have shaken all states and have founded none. Everywhere we find them ready to rove, or, in other words, to march; preferring moveable property to landed estate, and gold to everything else; following the profession of arms as a system of organized pillage, or even as a trade for hire, and with such success that even the Roman historian Sallust acknowledges that the Celts bore off the prize from the Romans in feats of arms. They were the true ‘soldiers of fortune’ of antiquity, as pictures and descriptions represent them, with big but not sinewy bodies, with shaggy hair and long mustachios—quite a contrast to the Greeks and Romans, who shaved the upper lip; in variegated embroidered dresses, which in combat were not unfrequently thrown off; with a broad gold ring round their neck, wearing no helmets, and without missile weapons of any sort, but furnished instead with an immense shield, a long ill-tempered sword, a dagger and a lance—all ornamented with gold, for they were not unskilful in working in metals. Everything was made subservient to ostentation, even wounds, which were often enlarged for the purpose of boasting a broader scar. Usually they fought on foot, but certain tribes on horseback, in which case every freeman was followed by two attendants, likewise mounted: war-chariots were early in use, as they were among the Libyans and the Hellenes in the earliest times. Many a trait reminds us of the chivalry of the middle ages, particularly the custom of single combat, which was foreign to the Greeks and Romans. Not only were they accustomed in war to challenge a single enemy to fight, after having previously insulted him by words and gestures; in peace also they fought with each other in splendid equipments, as for life or death. After such feats, carousals followed in due course. In this way they led, whether under their own or a foreign banner, a restless soldier-life; constantly occupied in fighting, and in their so-called feats of heroism, they were dispersed from Ireland and Spain to Asia Minor. But all their enterprises melted away like snow in spring, and they nowhere created a great state, or developed a distinctive culture of their own.” Such were the people who now almost terminated the existence of Rome, and were afterwards with difficulty repulsed from Greece; who became masters of the

most fertile part of Italy, and of a fair province in the heart of Asia Minor; who, after their Italian province had been subdued,* inflicted disastrous blows on successive Roman generals, and were only at last subjugated by Cæsar himself in nine critical and sometimes most dangerous campaigns (B.C. 51).

It is now generally agreed that the Celts had a closer affinity to the Hellenic and Italian races, than any other members of the Indo-Germanic family. Recent investigations tend to show that this affinity was nearer with the Italians than with the Greeks, and it has even been maintained that the great stock, to which all three peoples belonged, branched off first into Greeks and Italo-Celts, and that the latter division was again subdivided into Italians and Celts. There are, at all events, clear indications of a Celtic element in the languages of the Umbro-Samnite stock, the oldest known inhabitants of the great plain between the Alps and the Apennines; and several ancient writers held the opinion that the Umbrians sprang from the old Gauls (*Galli Veteres*), as they call the Celtic people whom they suppose to have inhabited that region before the age of recorded history. At all events, the Celtic names of places furnish irrefragable proof of the presence of the race in the peninsula long before all historic times. We might therefore perhaps be justified in using, from the very beginning, the well-known name which it is convenient now to introduce as a geographical term, of "Gaul within the Alps" (*Gallia Cisalpina*).† for the whole of the great plain which, from an early period of Roman history, was in the complete possession of the Gauls, who had driven out the Etruscans.

The ordinary Roman historians, who know nothing of an earlier Celtic population of Cisalpine Gaul, place the great immigration about the time of Tarquinius Priscus. Livy tells us that the Bituriges (about *Bourges*) in the basin of the Loire, were the dominant people in Transalpine Gaul. Pressed by excessive population,—or, as others say, by civil commotions—they resolved on a great emigration. Two immense bodies set out,

* Gallia Cisalpina was reduced to a Roman province after the First Punic War, in B.C. 222.

† The prefixes *Cis* (on this side) and *Trans* (beyond) in the words *Cisalpine* and *Transalpine* are used with reference to Rome. Our language adopts the opposite phraseology in speaking, for example, of "Ultramontane Catholicism." It may be well to mention that Cisalpine Gaul was divided by its great river into two parts, *Cispadane* and *Transpadane*, the former between the Po and the Apennines, the latter between the Po and the Alps.

under the nephews of the king Ambiatius, for the banks of the Danube and the Po. The one horde, headed by Sigovesus, entered the Hercynian forest, in the heart of Germany, where Gallic settlements are mentioned by Cæsar. The other, led by Bellovesus across the Graian Alps (the *Little St. Bernard*)* into the plain of Northern Italy, gained a victory over the Etruscans, and formed the canton of the *Insubres*, whose capital was Mediolanum (*Milan*). Soon afterwards another host formed the canton of the *Cenomanni* around Brixia (*Brescia*) and Verona.† Other streams followed, of Celtic invaders mingled with Ligurians, till the whole country north of the Po was overrun, and the Etruscans for the most part driven out. But still did Gaul pour forth her teeming hordes. The *Roi*i—that wide-spread tribe, who were both distinguished in the history of Transalpine Gaul, and one of whose migrations gave the country of Bohemia its name—crossed, with the *Lingones*, over the Pennine Alps, by the *Great St. Bernard*, and, passing the Po on rafts, began to expel the Etruscans and Umbrians from the region between that river and the Apennines. Their capital was the old Etruscan Felsina, under the new name of Bononia (*Bologna*). They were followed by the *Senones*, from the banks of the *Seine*, who settled along the shore of the Adriatic between the rivers *Uti*s (*Montone*) and *Æ*sis (*Esino*), from Rimini to Ancona. A few of the old Etruscan cities, such as Mantua, held out against the invaders: others which bear Celtic names, as Mediolanum, were probably in existence before, as these wandering pastoral tribes are not likely at first to have built new cities. The epoch of the complete ascendancy of the invaders over the Etruscans is traditionally marked by the fall of the rich city of Melpum, in the Milanese, on the very day on which Camillus took Veii (B.C. 396). However little these traditions may be worth in detail, they represent the undoubted historic fact of a great movement of the Celtic race, which overpowered the Etruscans in the region between the Alps and the Apennines, and confined their confederacy within the limits of Etruria Proper, at the very time when the Romans were attacking them on the south, and the Samnites and other Italians stripping them of their possessions in Campania.

* The older opinion is that they crossed the Alps by the pass of *Mont Cenerve*, the *Taurinus Saltus*.

† For the discussion of these alleged migrations, and their relation to the tribes of Transalpine Gaul, on the one hand, and the older Celtic settlements in Italy, on the other, see Mr. Long's article *Gallia Cisalpina*, in *Smith's Dictionary of Geography*.

After the fall of Melpum, the Gauls pressed on over the Apennines into the heart of Etruria, and the tribe of the Senones laid siege to Clusium. In their extremity, the Etruscans sought aid from Rome, and an opportunity seemed to be offered, at once to repel the barbarian invaders and to reduce the Etruscans to the level of protected allies. But the Romans had already formed the idea, that it was for them to command and for other nations to submit; or rather, their annalists—whose account of the whole campaign is imbued with fable from beginning to end—choose to represent them as adopting this tone, and boast of the bad faith with which they sustained their arrogance. Three envoys were sent to bid the Gauls not to molest the allies of Rome. Arriving at Clusium, they joined the besieged in a sally, and one of them slew a Gaulish chief. The enemy—says Livy—soon perceived that three of the bravest and noblest of the Roman youth were fighting in the van of the Etruscans, with whom they could not be confounded. Deputies were sent to Rome to demand the surrender at least of him who had killed a Gaul, when there was no war between the nations. The Senate would have complied; but the father of the offender, a military tribune, appealed to the people, and the demand was rejected. It is even said that the three envoys were elected as military tribunes for the ensuing year, the more plainly to show contempt of the barbarians.

Indignant at this adoption of the envoys' breach of faith by the Roman people, the Gauls, who numbered 70,000 fighting men, broke up the siege of Clusium, and marched straight for the devoted city. To the astonished people of the towns which they passed by without attacking, their forbearance was explained by the reiterated cry, "For Rome! for Rome!" So say the annalists; but in truth the invaders, whose one object was plunder, would not stay to besiege the walled cities of Etruria, when the rich plains of Latium invited their cupidity. They did not, in fact, march direct for Rome, but crossed the Tiber into the Sabine territory, and began to ravage the fertile country between that river and the Anio. The military tribunes, who had expected to see them on the right bank of the river, marched out in haste with the whole levy, amounting to 40,000 men, and met the enemy on the banks of the little river ALLIA, a confluent of the Tiber, within eleven miles of Rome.* Still possessed with the idea, that the

* According to Livy, the exact spot was eleven Roman miles from the city, on the high road (the Via Salaria). Notwithstanding this precise description, there is a difficulty in identifying the river, and the choice lies between what are now two

barbarians were a despicable foe, the Romans neglected their usual precautions of fortifying a camp and providing for a retreat. They prepared for their first encounter with the Celts with that confidence in superior discipline, which has possessed regular armies in many a later conflict with the same race. But there is no evidence of that extreme carelessness, by the imputation of which the family bards magnified the want of Camillus on that day. A defensive position was taken up behind the Allia, the broken water-course covering the front. The right, composed of the worse armed class of the poorer citizens, had the advantage of the higher ground; the main body filled the space between the hills and the Tiber; the left rested on the river. The Gallic chieftain led his bravest warriors against the Roman right, which gave way before the desperate valour and the sweeping broadsword of the Gael. The fugitives, making for the river, spread disorder into the ranks of the legions; the Gauls pressed on in their furious charge; and the rout became general. Some fled to Rome; others found shelter in a thick wood till night; while the mass of the fugitives, in their eagerness to seek safety beyond the Tiber, tried to swim the river and escape to Veii. A fearful slaughter was made upon the bank and in the stream; and the flower of the Roman youth perished there. The rest escaped to the right bank, and left open the road to Rome. The 18th of July, in the 364th year of the city (B.C. 390), was ever after distinguished in the Roman calendar by the blackest mark, as the Day of the Allia.*

The victors rested for a whole day on the field of battle, collecting the trophies of the slain, to be the memorials of each warrior's valour. On the third day the victors entered the open gates of Rome. This brief delay gave time to remove or bury many of the most sacred objects, and to prepare for the defence of the citadel. Many of the citizens had found shelter at Veii, where they would naturally revive the interrupted scheme of founding a new capital. Many more seized the opportunity to disperse, with their moveable

little brooks, running through deep ravines from the hills to the Tiber. One of these, the *Scolo del Casale*, crosses the road at a spot called the *Fonte di Papa*, about twelve miles from Rome. Its precipitous banks answer exactly to Livy's description of the Allia.

* The day was called that of the *Clades Alliensis*. According to the Roman reckoning it was A.D. xv. *Cal. Sextil.*, which is frequently rendered, by an oversight, the 16th of July. There seems also to be an error in the year, in consequence of the disorder into which the Roman calendar fell. The Greek date is Ol. 98. 1, a year which began at the Midsummer of B.C. 388.

effects, to other neighbouring cities of Etruria and Latium. But it was resolved not to abandon the ancient seat of the three great deities upon the Capitol, the spot to which sure omens had foretold the empire of the world. Still, to provide against the worst, the Flamen of Quirinus and the Vestal Virgins were sent to Cære, with the sacred things over which they watched. The procession had crossed the Tiber, and was mounting the slope of the Mount Janiculus on foot, when they were overtaken by a plebeian named L. Albinus, who was conveying his wife and children in a waggon. He pronounced it to be a shame that he and his should ride, while the sacred virgins went on foot; and, making his family dismount, he placed them, with the holy fire, in the carriage, and escorted them safe to Cære.

Meanwhile, the Capitol was hastily provisioned, and none were admitted within its precincts but such as could take part in its defence. There were still left a number of aged citizens, ministers of religion and heads of the old patrician houses, who were unable to render military service, and unwilling to abandon the homes of their forefathers and their gods. They met together and recited, by the mouth of the chief pontiff, M. Fabius, the impressive formula, by which the lives of their enemies were devoted, with their own, to the gods beneath the earth and to the spirits of the dead. For such was the Roman faith, that the citizen who did not shrink from the solemn devotion of himself acquired a power over the fate of his country's enemies. Then they parted, and each sat down in the porch of his house—pontiffs, priests, senators, and former curule magistrates, all invested with the insignia of their rank, and seated in their curule chairs. The Gallic hordes poured into the undefended city. The chieftains occupied the houses of the patricians on the Palatine, while their followers were dispersed plundering and destroying in the streets. With profound astonishment they beheld the venerable men seated in calm dignity, and took them at first for gods. Presently a Gaul went up to the priest Papirius, and began reverently to stroke his long white beard. Indignant at this profanation of his sacred person, Papirius smote the Gaul upon the head with his ivory sceptre. With the quickness of his race to resent a blow, the barbarian cut down Papirius with his broadsword; the sight of his blood dissolved the spell; and the other fathers of the city shared his fate in a general massacre.

The Gauls now attempted to storm the Capitol by the slope *

* The *clivus Capitolinus*.

which then formed its only approach, the other sides being guarded by high precipices. Failing in this assault, they formed a blockade, and occupied themselves in ravaging the lands of Latium. Some accounts represent them as carrying their ravages far into the south of Italy. Meanwhile, the spirits of the Romans in Veii began to revive, and plans were proposed for the succour of the besieged. A youth named Pontius Cominius volunteered to open a communication with the Capitol. The outer face of the hill was left unenclosed, as we have seen, by the walls of Servius, and the envoy, having swum down the Tiber, climbed up this way by night, and returned in safety. But in the morning, the marks of his passage suggested to the Gauls a means of surprising the citadel. In the dead of the following night a party scaled the cliff. There was neither wall nor sentinel in their way: the very dogs seemed miraculously silent, as if resigning the honour of that night to other guardians. In the precinct of the three great deities were kept some geese, sacred to Juno; and these birds had been spared in the famine, from which the garrison had begun to suffer. They now cried out and flapped their wings. The noise roused M. Manlius, who dwelt close by. Rushing to the cliff, he dashed his shield in the face of the foremost Gaul, who fell back, overthrowing those behind him. A panic seized the assailants. Dropping their arms to cling to the rock, they fell an easy prey to the Romans, who had now caught the alarm. The Capitol was saved. Manlius was rewarded with a share of the daily ration of each of the defenders, and his name was enrolled among the worthies of the Roman state, though he was soon destined to fall a victim to patrician jealousy. Such legends fill up an acknowledged historic void with more than merely fictitious beauties: for they show the faith of the Romans in the unconquerable spirit of their ancestors, even in the hour of their deepest distress.

The blockade of the Capitol had lasted for seven months,* during which the city had been reduced to ashes and the surrounding country devastated, when famine drove the defenders to purchase the retreat of the barbarians by a heavy ransom. At this crisis, the Gauls received tidings that the Veneti, an Illyrian tribe, whose name still survives in Venice, had invaded their recently acquired possessions on the Po. They consented to accept a thousand pounds' weight of gold, which the besieged collected from the treasures of the Capitoline temples and from

* The old annalists found no difficulty in believing that the Romans had been able, in one day, to stock the citadel with seven months' provisions.

the private wealth that had been carried into the citadel for safety. But Brennus,—as the Romans call the Gallic chieftain, mistaking a title for a proper name*—insulted the conquered by a proof of their helplessness. When the military tribune, Sulpicius, complained that the Gaulish weights were unfair, the chieftain threw his heavy broadsword into the scale, with the exclamation, *Væ Victis*,—"So much the worst for the vanquished!" But the more lasting loss fell upon the conquerors. "The scornful throwing down of the Gallic sword, that it might be outweighed by Roman gold, indicated very truly how matters stood. The iron of the barbarians had conquered; but they sold their victory; and by selling lost it."† It is in the usual course of things that the backward movement of such a barbarian host, laden with plunder and disordered by their own excesses, should be harassed by the people they had wasted in their advance. Among such stories, one was that the Etruscans of Caere cut off the party which had advanced into Southern Italy, as they were marching to rejoin the main body; and the victory was swelled by tradition into one over the main body itself, involving the recovery of the ransom-gold of Rome. The Roman fabulists claimed the victory for Camillus, who was said to have defeated the Gauls while they were besieging a city in alliance with Rome, and so to have recovered the spoil. At last the legend was magnified into the absurd fiction that Camillus appeared at the head of the forces that had been reorganized at Veii, at the very moment when Brennus had uttered his insolent boast; drove out the Gauls in an ignominious defeat; and the next day gained a victory, of which not one of the Gauls was left to carry back the tidings. The sole residuum of truth appears to be the recall of Camillus from exile, and his reappointment as dictator to restore order in the recovered city. Various bands of the invaders remained in Central Italy, or returned from time to time: and the annals of Rome record several battles fought with them during the fourth century B.C. The veteran Camillus gained a great victory over them at Alba, in his fifth dictatorship (B.C. 367). Six years later the Gauls, having advanced as far as the bridge of the Anio, within five miles of Rome, were met by the dictator, Titus Quinctius Pennus; and, as the two armies were encamped opposite each other, Titus Manlius, the son of L. Manlius

* *Brennus* is *bran* (a *dealer*). The leader of the Gauls in the subsequent assault on Delphi is called by the same name (B.C. 279). See p. 110.

† Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 343.

Capitolinus, killed a gigantic Gaul in single combat, and handed down to his family the surname of Torquatus, from the gold chain or ring (*torques*) which he took from the neck of his foe (B.C. 361). The Gauls drew off to Campania, without venturing a battle; and on their return in the following year, the dictator, Q. Servilius Ahala, repulsed them outside the Colline gate (B.C. 360). They were again defeated by the dictator, C. Sulpicius Peticus, two years later (B.C. 358); and in B.C. 350, a party of Gauls, who were leagued with Greek pirates in plundering the coasts of Latium, were dislodged by the dictator, L. Furius Camillus (a son of the great Camillus), from their position on the Alban Mount. Camillus, as consul in the following year, defeated them again; and it was on this occasion that M. Valerius gained the surname of Corvus (the *Raven*) from his single combat with a gigantic Gaul. The Gaul probably bore that epithet, which was transferred to his victor; but the legend told how a raven perched on the helmet of the Roman and aided him in the fight by striking his beak and wings into the face of the foe. The victory of L. Camillus was heard of by Aristotle at Athens. "These predatory expeditions"—says Dr. Mommsen—"formidable and troublesome as they may have been, were rather incidental misfortunes than events of historical importance; and the main result of them was that the Romans were regarded, in their own country and beyond it, ever more and more as the bulwark of the civilized nations of Italy against the assaults of the dreaded barbarians—a view which tended, more than is usually thought, to help forward their subsequent claim to universal empire."

Great as was the catastrophe, the news of which was carried as far as Græce, and permanent as were its memorials,* the destruction of Rome by the Gauls was not one of those events which change the face of history. It was like a fearful inundation, from which men are glad, for the time, to escape with their lives; but, when it subsides, as suddenly as it rose, they rebuild their ruined houses, resume their former habits, and soon obliterate the traces, though not the remembrance, of the desolation. A renewal of the proposal to transfer the abode of the Roman people to Veii was defeated by the spirited remonstrances of Camillus, and the materials for the rebuilding of the city seem to have been obtained in part by stripping the houses of Veii of their roofs.

* For example, the conquest of the city was an epoch from which years were dated; and there was a law annulling all exemptions from military service in the case of a Gallic invasion.

The narrow and irregular streets of Rome, like those of London after the great fire, testified to the haste with which the city was rebuilt. The sites of the temples were retraced by the augurs amidst the ruins, and the ancient monuments were diligently sought for. Among those recovered were the Laws of the Twelve Tables, and some old laws of the regal period, the treaty with Carthage, and other treaties with foreign states;—so erroneous is the oft-repeated statement, that all the ancient documents perished in the conflagration of the city. It is characteristic of the spirit of the patricians, that, while the civil laws were again set up in public places, the religious law was not promulgated, but reserved for the sole knowledge of the pontiffs.

The period immediately following the retreat of the Gauls must have been one of frightful distress. The people, decimated by the slaughter of the more helpless and by the loss of many who were carried captive into Gaul, besides those who had fallen in battle, returned to a city of which little remained but the Capitol and its glorious recollections, and looked out from the hills crowned with the ruins of their temples and houses, over the devastated surface of the Campagna. The rich farms of the patrician possessor and the humble homesteads of the plebeian landholder were involved in a common ruin, and it was only the wealthy that could speedily renew their stock and buildings. The pressure of distress was aggravated by the injudicious haste with which a tribute was imposed to replace the sacred treasures of the Capitol. Money-lenders were attracted to Rome by the extension of the limit of usury allowed by the Twelve Tables. These men carried on business in the names of the patricians whose clients they became; and the intolerable burthen of debt once more weighed down the poorer classes. All that had been done in the last century to reconcile the patricians and plebeians seemed to be again undone, and the discord between the orders threatened to break out anew under the two leaders who had done most to save the state, Camillus and Manlius.

Meanwhile, the energy of Camillus reorganized the military force of Rome, to meet the dangers that beset her on every side. The Latins and Hernicans renounced the treaty made just a century before by Spurius Cassius; but, as some compensation, the power of the Æquians seems to have been finally broken by the Gauls. The Etruscans had taken advantage of the distress of Rome to make an assault on Veii, which proved unsuccessful; and to punish this attack was the first great military enterprise of the

restored state. In the course of two years all southern Etruria was subdued as far as the Ciminian Forest, and the conquered territory was formed into four new tribes (B.C. 387). Another view is that these tribes were formed out of the region previously won from the Veientes and their allies. At all events this part of Etruria was completely Romanized, and covered with Roman colonies, before the middle of the fourth century B.C. About the close of that period a great effort to revolt was made by the cities of Tarquinii, Cære, and Falerii, and 307 Roman prisoners, who were taken in the first battles, were slaughtered in the marketplace of Tarquinii (B.C. 358). After an obstinate war, Cære was reduced to the state of a dependent ally, under the form of a truce for 100 years, and its people were admitted to a modified citizenship (B.C. 353). But the Romans were not yet prepared to effect the conquest of central and northern Etruria, and they were content to make a truce with Tarquinii for forty years (B.C. 351).

The Etruscans still, however, maintained a well consolidated power in the hilly region, comprising the greater part of Etruria Proper, between the Apennines and the Ciminian Forest. On their northern frontier, they were no longer assailed by the Gauls, whose irruptions across the Alps for some reason ceased, and who settled down quietly in the great valley of the Po. But even here they had not such exclusive occupation as to drive out the former masters of the country. Their desultory mode of establishing themselves left many of the most important cities in the hands of the Etruscans, whose retention of the port of Adria, for example, made their corsairs formidable in the Adriatic down to the end of the fourth century B.C.; and Mantua, protected by its marshes, remained an Etruscan city to the time of the empire. The Etruscans maintained themselves in what was perhaps the cradle of their nation, the Alpine region of Rætia,* and the Umbrians still held the valleys on the northern slope of the Apennines; and the Celtic settlements seem to have occupied the level plain along the Po, their chief tribes being the Insubres and Cenomanni on the north of the river, the Boii on the south, and the Senones along the coast of the Adriatic. The north-eastern part of the valley was occupied by the Illyrian Veneti, and in the west the Ligurians not only held the Maritime Alps, but a large part of the Apennines, thus forming a barrier between the Celts and the Etruscans. It was probably to the influence of the Etruscans who remained amongst them that the Celts of

* See p. 141.

Cisalpine Gaul owed the higher degree of civilization, which distinguished them from their brethren beyond the Alps, and prepared them to live in contentment under the government of Rome. But even while they communicated this civilizing impulse, the Etruscans themselves were rapidly degenerating. The cities were overwhelmed by debasing luxury at the very time that their power was declining abroad. Civil dissensions arose between the people of the several states and the oligarchies which superseded the old patriarchal monarchies, till the nobles were obliged to call in the power of Rome, which put an end to their factions by their subjugation. The last struggles of the Etruscans for independence are connected with the more powerful efforts of the nations of the Italian stock.

On the side of Latium, Rome was threatened with the loss of all the greatness which had been growing ever since the treaties of Spurius Cassius with the Latins and the Hernicans. By the close alliance of a hundred years, the Sabines, Æquians, and Volscians had been curbed, and the territory of Rome extended at their expense. But these very successes induced the proud republic to assume a more and more decided authority over her allies; and some striking instances are recorded of her injustice and oppression. The decrease of the common danger removed the strongest motive for union, and, even before the capture of Rome by the Gauls, Latin volunteers fought in the ranks of the Volscians. After the retreat of the Gauls, the alliance was openly renounced; and the republic became involved in war with some of the chief Latin cities; but fortunately for her safety, they did not yet unite in a common scheme of revolt. During the ten years which succeeded the departure of the Gauls, victories were gained successively over Lanuvium, Præneste, and Tusculum; and the last city furnished the earliest case of the political incorporation of a whole state into the Roman commonwealth, retaining only its own municipal administration (B.C. 381). The details of these struggles, and of the severer contest with the revolted Hernicans, need not be further dwelt on at present. The conflict resulted in the restoration of the old league; but on terms which secured to Rome a greater supremacy than before (B.C. 358). From the obscure and no doubt exaggerated incidents of these wars, and of those with the Volscians, it is time to turn to the constitutional struggles which were renewed within the republic.

The distress of the lower classes, in consequence of the ravages of the Gauls, soon became intolerable. Their debts rapidly accu-

mulated, and the rate of interest was such, that in some cases the principal is said to have been paid several times over, in usury within the first five years after the invasion. The old laws of debt, which had never been repealed, were enforced with the same merciless severity that had provoked the first secession to the Sacred Mount. The commons found a champion in M. Manlius, the saviour of the Capitol, whom the patrician annalists accuse of jealousy towards Camillus, the leader of their own order, in such a way as to admit that the one had been neglected, while every honour had been heaped upon the other. While Manlius was in this state of mind, he one day saw a centurion who had served under him dragged off in irons to his creditor's grinding-house. He paid the veteran's debt upon the spot, and vowed that while he had a pound of brass no debtor should be imprisoned. The sale of the estate allotted to him from the lands of Veii enabled him so to keep his word, that he is said to have advanced money, free of interest, to no less than four hundred debtors; and thus he earned the title of "Father of the Commons" (*Pater Plebis*). The patrician fathers could not brook so dangerous a rival. In the year B.C. 385, Aulus Cornelius Cossus was named dictator, as much against Manlius as against the Volscians and Etruscans; and he summoned Manlius to prove the charge, which he was said to have made against the patrician magistrates, of embezzling the tribute raised to replace the treasures of the Capitol. Manlius was thrown into prison, but released by a decree of the senate when the dictator's office had expired. The accounts of the seditious violence with which he used his liberty would go far to justify his enemies, if we could believe in their impartial truth. At length, like Spurius Cassius, he was arraigned before the centuries in the Campus Martius for aspiring to the kingdom. He appeared there, surrounded by the debtors he had released, and the witnesses to his deeds in war. He showed the spoils of the thirty enemies he had slain in battle, the forty rewards of valour he had received from generals on the field of battle, and the scars of wounds upon his breast. Then, turning to the Capitol, he invoked the help of the gods whose temples he had saved, and bade the people give judgment as in their sight. His acquittal was secure, had not the tribunes, who were in the interest of his accusers, interposed to dissolve the assembly. Brought to trial again before the Curiae, who were purposely convened at a spot where the Capitol was hidden from their view, Manlius was condemned to the death of a traitor. By a refine-

ment of ingratitude, he was hurled from the Tarpeian rock, a cliff of the same hill down which he had hurled the Gaul, and his house, in which he had been the first to hear the alarm that warned him to save the Capitol, was razed to the ground. The part taken by the tribunes in his condemnation has been urged as a proof of his guilt; but, besides that the patricians may have already begun their policy of securing tools among the tribunes, it seems not at all improbable that these official protectors of the commons were jealous of Manlius's officious but most effective interposition; and he may have made enemies by that uncompromising sternness which was so conspicuous in others of his race, and so well expressed by the family name of *Imperiosus*. But his fate was only the failure of a premature movement for a reform which could only be postponed (B.C. 384). Meanwhile the power of the nobles was only the more confirmed, and the distress of the commons grew deeper. But the determination of the patricians to confine the dignities of the state to their own order once more threw the strength of the plebeian nobility and men of wealth into the opposite scale, and provoked a political reform in place of the mere redress of practical grievances. Such is the blind selfishness by which, in every age, oligarchies have served the cause of liberty, teaching those who only asked for justice that freedom must first be won.

The year B.C. 376 is memorable for the first tribunate of C. Licinius and his kinsman L. Sextius, who submitted the celebrated LICINIAN ROGATIONS to the assembly of the tribes. These were three in number, aiming at equality of political rights, the fair apportioning of the public lands, and the relief of the intolerable burthen of debt. The first proposed the abolition of the military tribunate, which, though created as a compromise between the orders, had proved the means of securing power to the patricians: the consulate was to be restored, with the condition that one of the consuls must always be a plebeian. The second enacted that no citizen should possess* more than 500 *jugera* of the public lands, or pasture on it more than 100 head of large and 500 of small cattle, under penalty of a heavy fine. The third provided that all interest already paid on loans should be deducted from the principal, and that the balance should be discharged by instalments spread over three years. * The last proposal may seem to our ideas to be tainted with the quality of confiscation; but Niebuhr has shewn that, while involving no

* See the explanation of *possessio* on p. 187.

real injustice to creditors, it was the only alternative to the loss of the public services of a large body of free citizens, who had or soon must have become bondsmen to their creditors.

The constitution of the tribunician college enabled the patricians to stop the progress of the measure by the "intercession" of some of their number. But Licinius and Sextius had also their veto on the election of the magistrates; and for five years, during which they were successively re-elected, they prevented the holding of the consular comitia (B.C. 375—371).^{*} It was only on the necessity created by an attack of the Latins upon Tusculum—now, as we have seen, a subject ally of Rome—that the tribunes permitted the election of six consular military tribunes for the year B.C. 370, among whom was M. Fabius Ambustus, the father-in-law and supporter of Licinius, and two Valerii, whose adherence to the popular traditions of their house balanced the patrician zeal of such colleagues as a Cossus and a Cincinnatus. Three of the new tribunes of the plebs sided with Sextius and Licinius; and the other five, who were in the interest of the patricians, no longer dared to interpose a direct veto to the Rogations. They only insisted on delay, upon the plea that a large number of the citizens were absent before Velitræ, the siege of which place had been formed by the Roman army, after the Latins had been repulsed from Tusculum. But Licinius met this opposition with a new demand. His fourth rogation, to transfer the custody of the Sibylline books from the patrician Two (*Duumviri*) to a college of Ten, composed equally of patricians and plebeians, was a first step to the admission of the plebs to those religious privileges which formed the sacred citadel of patrician exclusiveness.

For two years more the popular tribunes were re-elected, and no opposition was made by them to the appointment of military tribunes. The powers of patrician resistance were coming to an end, and the continuance of the war with Velitræ furnished a pretext for bringing out the last weapon in their armoury, the appointment of Camillus as dictator for the fourth time. But the veteran's zeal outran his discretion. His call for the whole military levy

^{*} Such is the statement of the *Fasti Capitolini* (the fragments of the old lists of magistrates, found in the Capitol), of Livy and Dionysius, and by implication, of Polybius. Diodorus reduces the interval to a year, evidently to avoid the difficulty of a five years' anarchy. But the constitution entrusted the executive government to the tribunes and ædiles while the curule magistracies were from any cause in

to follow him to the field—whether only to gain time, or for the purpose, formerly ascribed to Cincinnatus, of holding the Comitia where his *imperium* would have been supreme—was utterly disregarded. The Senate compelled him to abdicate, and nominated a successor expressly to compose the existing troubles, whose name, P. *Manlius* Capitolinus, is equally significant with his choice of C. *Licinius* Calvus for his Master of the Horse. More than this, the rogation for the custody of the Sibylline books was carried this year (B.C. 368). *Licinius* and *Sextius* were elected tribunes for the tenth and last time. To ensure the success which was now within their grasp, they combined the three rogations in one vote;* and they were carried in the year B.C. 367, after a contest of ten years, but one neither disgraced by bloodshed nor envenomed by secession. The patricians obtained a compensation for the loss of half the consular power by the institution of a new *curule* magistracy, to be held by patricians only, dignified with the original name borne by the consuls (when they were called PRÆTORS),† with the lictors and fasces and other royal insignia, and invested with the regal prerogative of administering justice in the city. The Prætor had also the *imperium*, and might be placed in command of an army: in fact, the title of his office was strictly military, handed down from the time when the republic was essentially an army. At first one Prætor only was appointed, usually a consul of the preceding year. His position as a sort of third consul was marked by his being called “the colleague of the consuls;”‡ but he was subject to their orders.

The passage of the Licinian Rogations into Laws seems to have been distinguished from former victories of the plebs by the spirit of concord in which they were accepted by both orders. The tribune L. *Sextius* was chosen as the first plebeian consul; and the new prætorship was conferred on *Spurius*, the son of the great *Camillus*, who is said himself to have crowned his heroic deeds by acting the part of a mediator. It seemed that a sure pledge was given of future union, when the veteran hero of the patricians, now dictator

* A similar case has lately occurred among ourselves, in the inclusion in one bill of all the financial measures forming the budget of the year, to prevent the rejection of a part of them by the House of Lords

† See p. 218.

‡ *Conlega consulibus*. A second prætor was appointed in B.C. 246, to administer justice where foreigners were concerned. The two were then called *Prætor Urbanus* and *Prætor Peregrinus* respectively. As foreign provinces were acquired, the number of prætors was increased. For these and all other details see the ordinary works on Roman Antiquities.

for the fifth time, and fresh from his new victory over the Gauls at Alba, founded the temple of Concord on a lower platform of the Capitoline hill, overlooking the Forum, to commemorate the reconciliation of the orders.* A fourth day was added to the Great Roman Games, as if to give the plebeians an equal part in them with the three ancient tribes; and the Curule Ædiles were for the first time appointed to preside over them, the office being held by patricians and plebeians alternately.†

The general result of this great peaceful revolution is thus summed up by Dr. Mommsen:—"With the election of the first non-patrician consul, the gentile aristocracy ceased both in fact and law to be numbered among the political institutions of Rome.

. . . The religious consecration of the new concord of the community was the last official act of the old warrior and statesman, and a worthy termination of his long and glorious career.‡ He was not wholly mistaken. The more discerning portion of the *gentes* evidently from this time forward looked upon their exclusive political privileges as lost, and were content to share the government with the plebeian aristocracy. In the majority, however, the patrician spirit proved true to its incorrigible character. On the strength of the privilege which the champions of legitimacy have at all times arrogated, of obeying the laws only when these coincide with their party interests, the Roman nobles on various occasions ventured, in open violation of the stipulated arrangement, to nominate two patrician consuls. But when, by way of answer to an election of that sort for the year B.C. 343, the community in the year following formally resolved to allow both consular positions to be filled by non-patricians, they understood the implied threat, and still perhaps wished, but never again ventured, to touch the second consular place."§ The remaining patrician offices could not long be withheld from the plebeians. The mastership of the horse had been conferred on a plebeian, C. Licinius Calvus, in B.C. 368; and twelve years later the first plebeian dictator, C. Marcius Rutilus, gained a great victory over the Etruscans (B.C. 356). The same man was the first plebeian

* This temple became a frequent place of meeting for the senate. It overhung the Comitium, or part of the Forum where the Curie used to meet.

† Respecting the tenure and functions of this office, see the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*.

‡ Camillus died in the great pestilence of B.C. 365.

§ Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i. pp. 305, 306. The concession referred to was extorted by the pressure of the First Samnite War, which broke out in B.C. 343.

censor in B.C. 351; and the prætorship was thrown open in A.C. 337. Two years before this, the political revolution was completed by the Publilian Laws, so called from the dictator, Q. Publilius Philo, who proposed them. The first enacted that the resolutions of the Plebs should be binding on all the people: the second required the Curiae to give their previous sanction to all laws and elections of the centuries: the third excluded the patricians from one of the two censorships, as they had been already excluded from one of the two consulships. Thus, as the result of this long conflict, the patricians were distinguished from the plebeians, so far as office was concerned, rather by disabilities than privileges; having only an equal part in the curule offices, and being entirely excluded from the tribunate and plebeian ædileship. It naturally took longer for the plebeians to obtain a share in the religious colleges. Some of the priestly offices, which were of peculiar sanctity and of little political influence, remained in the hands of the patricians, especially those of the three great Flamens, the Rex Sacrorum, and the Salii. But the colleges of the pontiffs and the augurs, who had a controlling power over the whole machine of government, were thrown open to the plebeians by the Ogulnian Law in B.C. 300.

It was far less easy to accomplish the social amelioration, for which these constitutional changes had been chiefly desired. The strictness with which the Licinian law respecting the public land was for some time enforced, and the natural tendency to its evasion—not by the patricians only, but the wealthy plebeians—are alike attested by the fact, that Licinius himself was fined for exceeding the legal maximum of possession (B.C. 357). The usury laws of the Twelve Tables were not only renewed, but the legal rate of interest was reduced to five per cent. (B.C. 347), and the absurd attempt was even made to forbid usury altogether (B.C. 342). But no such legislation could create that which was the great want of Rome, as of all the commonwealths of antiquity, an independent middle class. Besides all other hindrances, the fatal institution of slavery prevented that expansion of free industry on which such a class is based. The rich grew richer: the poor grew poorer: distress and debt gave a new impulse to political agitation. The nobles made new attempts to regain the ground they had lost. The privileges of the plebeians were not finally secured without repeated conflicts from time to time; and the Publilian Law, giving legislative weight to the

* *Ut Plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent.*

resolutions of the plebs, which, as we have seen, was itself but the re-enactment of one of the Valerian and Horatian Laws of B.C. 449, was again re-enacted by the dictator Q. Hortensius, in B.C. 286, after the last secession which the plebeians made to the Janiculum, under the impulse, like the first secession, of the pressure of their debts. This Hortensian Law, which was passed only a few years before the war with Pyrrhus, is always referred to as that which conferred the legislative power on the *Comitia Tributa*. The *Lex Mania*, re-enacting the other Publilian Law,—that the patricians should give their previous assent to the acts of the *Comitia Centuriata*,—was probably passed in B.C. 287.

Thus the final settlement of the popular constitution may be regarded as about contemporary with the epoch of Rome's complete dominion over Italy. From that epoch foreign wars and conquests, varied by the one great struggle for the very existence of the republic, followed one another with a rapidity which fully occupied men's minds, while the conquered territory, had it been fairly apportioned, furnished ample means for providing against the chief causes of discontent. At length there came a pause in the career of conquest, when Rome had become mistress of Carthage, Macedonia, Greece, and the richest part of Asia Minor; and the people had leisure to enquire which of the orders had gained the lion's share. The troubles under the Gracchi broke out in the very year in which Attalus, King of Pergamus, bequeathed the province of Asia to the Romans (B.C. 133). But the intervening period of more than a century was almost entirely free from civil dissensions. Still, it must not be supposed that the division of feeling between the orders was healed. The old patrician houses clung to their pride of caste, the more since the offices once their exclusive right were "polluted by plebeian filth." The new aristocracy, having surmounted the barrier that had shut them out from political power, were eager in the assertion of their superiority to the commonalty of their own order. It was no longer the plebeians, as such, but the common people, that were treated as an inferior caste. Thus were formed a new aristocracy and a new democracy. But still civic equality was secured; and while public virtue reposed on the foundation of simple agricultural habits, some of the worthiest leaders were found among the poor. "The fall of the high-born Fabius would not have been more lamented by the whole community, than the fall of the plebeian Decius was lamented alike by patricians and plebeians; and a poor husbandman from Sabina, Manius Curius, could conquer King Pyrrhus in the field of battle,

and chase him out of Italy, without ceasing to be a simple Sabine farmer, and to cultivate in person the grain which gave him bread.”*

Returning to the epoch at which Camillus inaugurated the concord of the two orders, it remains to trace the steps by which Rome overcame the hostility of the surrounding peoples, and became the undisputed mistress of all Italy. Of other events, we need only notice the stories of famine and pestilence as a natural result of the ravages of the Gauls, and the romantic legend of the self-devotion of Curtius to close the yawning chasm which an earthquake had opened in the Forum, as an indication that the mythical vein is still to be traced in the Roman annals (B.C. 363). Enough has been already said of the conflicts which resulted in the subjugation of Southern Etruria and the renewal of the old league with the Latins and Hernicans (B.C. 358). The Volscians were still formidable neighbours; but they were now driven back from the lowlands of the Campagna, and the Pomptine region was made Roman territory, adding two to the number of the tribes. Ten years later the treaty with Carthage was renewed, and by it Rome was recognized as the mistress of the coast of Latium (B.C. 348). Two years afterwards, the second celebration of the great “Secular Games,”—a special festival, held at long intervals in some great national crisis,†—formed the prelude to the greatest conflict in which Rome had been yet engaged—the *Wars with the Samnites*, which lasted, with brief intervals, for more than fifty years (B.C. 343 to 290), involving as an episode the *Great Latin War* (B.C. 340 to 338), which ended in the complete subjugation of Latium to Rome. Livy has marked this epoch as that from which the historian has to write of wars greater than any before, both in the strength of the enemy, the remoteness of the scene, and the duration of the contest. The contests with the Volscians and Æquians had been defensive wars against tribes chiefly formidable for their near neighbourhood; and the victories gained in them scarcely enlarged the territory of the republic. But now large armies encountered each other on both sides, well matched in arms, discipline, courage, and heroic perseverance. Nor were the Samnites much inferior to the Romans in the political virtues which give a nation a distinguished place in history; their chief weakness

* Mommsen's *History of Rome*, vol. i. pp. 313, 314. For a further discussion of the social and political state of Rome in the fourth and third centuries B.C., the reader is referred to the third chapter of the second book of Dr. Mommsen's work.

† See the article *Ludi Sæculares* in the *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

was that their tribes were not united into one compact state. It was now to be decided, which of the two great races of Central Italy should gain the supremacy in the peninsula. The defeat of the Samnites left Rome without a rival among the Italian nations, and besides the addition of a most valuable territory, gave her the first step towards the conquest of the world. And, though the field on which the Samnite Wars were waged seems narrow in comparison with the vast enterprises of later years, never was Rome engaged in a conflict more interesting for the heroic valour displayed both by her sons and by her enemies.

The SAMNITES were a branch of the Sabine nation, who had separated themselves from the parent race, and moved southward to the mountains between Campania, Lucania, and Apulia. Their own legends connected their migration with the Sabine custom of the Sacred Spring.* A vow made by the nation during a war with the Umbrians, dedicating to the gods the year's offspring, both of man and beast, had been violated in part by keeping back the children, when the cattle were either sacrificed or redeemed; and they were visited by a dearth. So all the youth of that year were devoted to the god Mamers (Mars): and, as soon as they reached the military age, they were sent forth to seek new abodes. A bull appeared to guide them on their way, and it first lay down to rest when they reached the land of the Opicans. The wanderers accepted the sign, offered the bull in sacrifice to Mamers, and drove out the Opicans, whose scattered villages gave them no refuge or stronghold.† The historical fact thus indicated is the subjugation of the southern Opican highlanders by their hardier kinsmen of the Sabine mountains. The date of the migration falls during the regal period of Rome.

In this mountain region, between the head waters of the Vulturnus on the one side and the streams that flow into the Adriatic on the other, the Samnites were pent up for a time by more powerful neighbours, who held the lowlands and the coast to the east, west, and south. The Greeks and Etruscans kept their ground in Campania, the Daunians in Apulia,‡ and the Lucanians in the great southern plain. But the decline both of the Etrus-

* See p. 172.

† The bull was the device of the Samnites, as the wolf was of the Romans. A coin struck by the Italians during the great Social War (B.C. 90—88) represents a bull goring a wolf.

‡ The Daunian town of Arpi, with its port of Salapia, had become a flourishing emporium, and was an important ally of the Romans in the Samnite Wars.

cans and the Greeks, during the latter part of the fourth century B.C., invited the Samnites to the beautiful bays of the Mediterranean. Capua, the capital of the mixed race called Campanians, amongst whom the Etruscans predominated, was taken by them in B.C. 424, and they wrested Cumæ from the Greeks four years later (B.C. 420). Their inroads upon the Greeks were greatly aided by the simultaneous progress of the Lucanians and Brutians; and their power rapidly spread from sea to sea. But it was wanting in that firm hold on the conquered cities, which characterized the progress of the Romans in Latium and southern Etruria. Not only did the Greek cities remain Greek under the Samnite rule, but towns essentially Samnite became Hellenized, in constitution as well as in manners. Their language was developed by Greek influence into greater delicacy and clearness, though they preserved their own alphabet, instead of abandoning it for the Greek, like the Lucanians and the Brutians. The fragments of beautifully painted pottery, and the ornaments of gold and amber, found in their tombs, attest at once their fondness for Greek art, and their departure from the simplicity of their ancestors. An influence still more injurious to the hardihood of the nation was bequeathed, as a fatal legacy, by their Etruscan predecessors in Campania. Capua, which seemed worthy to vie with Rome for the supremacy of Italy, fell into that deep debasement of mingled sensuality and cruelty, which marks the last stage in the decline of an oligarchy. It was here that the shows of gladiators were so eagerly gloated over, as to form part of the amusements of banquets; and the martial spirit of the Campanian youth only survived to make them notorious as soldiers of fortune in Italy and especially in Sicily. Thus there came about a wide division between the Campanians and the Samnites of the highlands, who had preserved the hardy manners of the old stock, and who now formed the effective Samnite confederacy. The latter even treated their more civilized kinsmen as enemies, like the Greeks and the Etruscans; and it was the application of the Samnites of Campania for help from Rome that led to the *First Samnite War* (B.C. 343).

The story of this war in the Roman annals is a tissue of exaggerations and improbabilities. The Sidicini of Teanum, a city in the north-west of Campania, being attacked by the Samnites, applied for aid to Capua: and the two cities united in seeking the protection of Rome from the forces that threatened to overwhelm them both. The successes of the Romans against the

Volscians had already brought them into contact with the Samnites on the Liris, and the two states had proved their respect for each other's strength by a treaty (B.C. 354). The Romans, therefore, at first rejected the petition of the Campanians; but the offer of the rich city of Capua—which was already besieged by an overpowering Samnite army—proved a temptation too great for their good faith, and both consuls were sent into Campania. At the foot of Mount Gaurus, Valerius Corvus obtained a victory which was hailed as an omen of future triumphs over all the enemies of Rome; and his colleague, Cornelius Cossus, was equally successful, after his army had been rescued from annihilation in a narrow pass by the courage of the military tribune, Publius Decius. The fabulous character of this victory may be inferred from the failure of the consuls to penetrate into Samnium; and as little credit is due to the third and decisive victory at the "Caudine Forks" near Suessula, where 40,000 Samnite shields were picked up on the field of battle. Campania was however wrested from the Samnites, and part of the Roman army remained in winter quarters, to guard the most important towns.

This prolongation of foreign service through the winter brought to a climax the discontents which were rife both in the army and in the city, because of the continued pressure of debt upon the commons. The political crisis that followed is related in two different accounts, the one making it a mutiny of the army, the other a secession of the plebeians at home. The common story attempts to reconcile both in the following manner. Surrounded by the delights of that exquisite climate, and with all the wealth of the Campanian cities before their eyes, the Roman soldiers might well be tempted to revive the project formerly entertained at Veii, and to make Capua the chief city of a new plebeian state. An attempt was made to anticipate the revolt by sending large detachments home. The first body had reached the pass of Lautulæ, near Tarracina, when they broke out into open mutiny, and the flame spread through all the garrisons of Campania. The legions mustered at Capua, and advanced in a body towards Rome. On their march they released the debtors whom they found working as bondsmen in the fields. With their numbers thus swollen to 20,000 men, they fortified a camp on the Alban hills, and began to plunder the country. The commons in the city now marched forth to a post about four miles from the walls; and each party of insurgents forced a patrician to become their leader.

With their old mixture of firmness and moderation, the senate created a dictator, but the office was conferred on the greatest favourite of the commons, M. Valerius Corvus, who, though not yet thirty years of age, had already been three times consul, and was now in all the glory of his late campaign against the Samnites.* The dictator went out against the mutineers, with the clients of the patricians and such other citizens as remained faithful to the government; but the time was not yet come when Romans could meet one another in civil war. No sooner did the two armies stand front to front, than they rushed into each other's arms. An act of amnesty to the revolters was passed; and a pledge was given to the soldiers that those once enlisted should not be struck off the roll without their own consent, and that a man who had held the office of military tribune should not be required to serve as a centurion. The military tribunes were for the most part plebeians; and this would be a sort of security for their dignity. The political crisis was ended by the Genucian Laws, as they were called from their proposer, the tribune Caius Genucius. As the frequent re-elections to the consulate had tended to limit the actual powers of government to a few great families,† it was enacted that no one should be re-elected to the same magistracy till after an interval of ten years. Both consulships were thrown open to the plebeians. Lastly, all usury was forbidden, an act which was naturally inoperative. By another law, the existing obligations of insolvent debtors were cancelled, and all citizens who had become bondsmen (*nexi*) to their creditors were released,—a measure justified by the absolute necessities of the commons (B.C. 342). Amidst the confused accounts of the foreign relations of Rome during these political convulsions, all that can be certainly made out is, that the growing disaffection among the Latins was a chief cause of the willingness of the Romans to come to terms with the Samnites. A peace was made, by which Teanum was given to the Samnites, and Capua to the Romans; and the two nations formed a close alliance (B.C. 341).

The following year saw a strange inversion of the recent position of the different nations. In the GREAT LATIN WAR the Romans and Samnites were ranged against the Latins and the

* Altogether M. Valerius was six times consul: in B.C. 348, 346, 343, 335, 300, and 299; and twice dictator, in B.C. 342 and 301. He was twenty-three years old at the time of his first consulship.

† This applies to the plebeians as well as the patricians. The plebeian consul for this very year, Q. Marcius Rutilus, held the office for the fourth time.

Campanians. The annals are still confused and inconsistent; and a refusal of the claim of the Latins to a share in the consulship—that is, by implication, to the full privileges of citizenship,*—is alleged as the immediate cause of a revolt which seems to have been, in fact, a great confederacy of Latins, Volscians, and Campanians, to resist the domination alike of Rome and of the Samnites. Even the Latin cities most closely connected with Rome—like Tusculum, which had received the franchise—joined in the revolt, and the noble houses of Rome and Latium, long connected by personal ties and marriages, were ranged against each other, as if in a civil war. But the Roman colonies in Latium remained faithful, and the aristocratic party in Campania took part with the Romans, doubtless to preserve their political ascendancy. Nor did the Hernicans desert their old alliance. It was a great decisive conflict for supremacy in Latium and Campania; and the Roman senate and people, their consuls and their armies, proved worthy of the crisis. The consuls of the year were T. Manlius Torquatus, who had won the golden collar from the Gallic giant, and P. Decius Mus, who had saved an army in the First Samnite War. The war began in Campania, by an attempt of the confederates to dislodge the Samnites from Teanum and the other territory they had won. The Romans made a circuit through the territories of the Marsians and Pelignians† to join the Samnites, and the hostile armies came in sight of each other before Capua. It was here that Titus Manlius, the consul's son, was beheaded by his father's order, for engaging an enemy in single combat, in disobedience to the strict injunction of the consuls against all skirmishing. The consul's cruelty was execrated, but the discipline of the army was saved. The scene of the first great battle is laid at the foot of Mount Vesuvius. The night before the engagement, it was revealed to both consuls in a dream, that the gods had doomed to destruction the general on the one side, and the army on the other. They agreed that whichever of them first saw his division wavering should devote himself to death in the form prescribed by the chief pontiff. It fell to the lot of the plebeian consul to perform the act of self-devotion. The Romans and Latins were drawn up over against each other, equal in discipline

* *Civitas optimo jure.*

† It is thus that the annalists attempt to explain a strategic movement which would seem to have been impossible when all Latium was in arms. Modern critics doubt whether the campaign was anything more than a successful effort of the Roman garrisons in Campania to extricate themselves from their isolation.

and tactics, and—in spite of Livy's arrogant assertion of the contrary—not differing in courage; the Samnites and Hernicans were opposed to the kindred nations of the Campanians and Volscians. The Roman right, commanded by Manlius, firmly held its ground; but the left no sooner began to waver, than Decius called for the chief pontiff Valerius, and, having repeated after him the formula by which he offered his own life to Janus, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, the Lares, and all the gods of his fatherland and of the dead, if they would strike terror and dismay into the enemy and cause them to share his fate, with his toga wrapt about his head in sacrificial folds,* he mounted his horse, and rushed into the thickest of the Latin army, among whom the well-known rite would spread a religious terror. But the fall of Decius did not at once decide the conflict; and the Romans had begun again to waver, when Torquatus secured the victory by a masterly use of his reserves; and the Latins, who had exhausted theirs, were cut down almost without resistance. Nearly three-fourths of their army were slain or taken prisoners. The annalists are silent about the share of the Samnites in the victory.† The conquerors were too exhausted to pursue the enemy, who rallied at Minturnæ on the Latin side of the Liris, and advanced again to Mount Massicus. After both armies had received reinforcements, a second and decisive victory was gained at Trifanum by the consul Manlius, who then overran and plundered Latium. Most of the Latin cities were subdued and deprived of their lands (B.C. 340). In the following year, they tried the fortune of war once more, and were defeated by the consul and dictator Publilius, the same who proposed the celebrated laws in favour of the plebeians (B.C. 339). The cities that still held out, both of the Latins and the Volscians, were reduced in a third campaign. The Latin confederacy was dissolved, and the new settlement of Latium was conducted on the principle of isolating the several cities, which were no longer allowed freedom of marriage or of commerce with one another. The full Roman franchise was restored to Tusculum and granted to Lanuvium; their lands were incorporated with the territory of the republic, and two new tribes were formed. Other Latin cities

* The *cinctus Gabinus*, the form in which the toga was worn by a sacrificing priest.

† Dr. Arnold makes the apposite remark, that of this part of the battle "there was no Samnite historian to tell, and no Roman annalist would tell truly. Nor need we wonder at this; for if we had only certain English accounts of the battle of Waterloo, who would know that the Prussians had any effectual share in that day's victory?"

received a restricted franchise as Roman *municipia*. Tibur and Præneste, which had become the most powerful cities of the League, and had taken a leading part in the war, were compelled to cede portions of their territory to Rome, but were allowed a nominal independence. The walls of Velitræ were demolished, and its principal citizens deported to Etruria. Colonies were settled in Antium and others of the chief Volscian towns. The Campanian cities were reduced to dependence upon Rome. The most important conquest yet made by the republic was commemorated by the erection of the statue of Caius Mænius, consul and dictator for the last year of the war, in the Forum, and by the decoration of the platform, from which orators addressed the people when assembled there, with the beaks taken from the surrendered galleys of the Antiates. Hence it was that the platform received the memorable name of *ROSTRA*.*

The vast importance of this war consists in its fusion of the Latin nationality into one powerful state under the city which had made good its claim to the supremacy. That this should have been effected by a temporary coalition between the Romans and the Samnites is a striking indication of the means by which the course of the world's history is governed. The Samnite alliance could never have furnished a secure basis for the union of Italy. Dr. Arnold has well said that between that people and the Romans "the struggle could end in nothing short of absolute dominion on one side, and subjection on the other. The Samnites were complete foreigners, remote in point of distance, with a different language and different institutions; they and the Romans were not likely to form one people, and neither were willing to be the other's mere subjects. But between Rome and Latium nature had given all the elements of union; and the peculiar circumstances of the Latins precluded that mischievous national pride which has sometimes kept two nations apart, when nature, or rather God speaking in nature, designed them to be one. Had Latium been a single state, like Rome, neither party would willingly have seen its distinct nationality merged in that of the other; but the people of Tusculum or Lanuvium felt no

* The *rostra* formed a sort of long gallery, with parapets, raised on arches between the *comitium*, or upper part of the Forum, which was the meeting-place of the *curiæ*, and the *forum* proper, where the tribes met, so that an orator could turn to either division; but its front, to which the *rostra* were affixed, was towards the *comitium*. Its length allowed an orator to walk backwards and forwards while speaking. The origin of the word shows the absurdity of the modern corruption *rostrum*.

patriotic affection for the names of Tibur or Præneste; they were as ready to become Romans as Tiburtians; and the one or the other they must be, for a mass of little states, all independent of each other, could not be kept together; the first reverses, appealing to the sense of separate interest in each, inevitably shattered it to pieces. Those states that received the full Roman franchise became Romans, yet did not cease to be Latins; the language and the manners of their new country were their own. They were satisfied with their lot, and the hope of arriving in time at the same privileges was a prospect more tempting even to the other states than anything which they were likely to gain by renewed hostilities.”* But the full establishment of these relations was of course a work of time. The first natural dissatisfaction found vent in the revolt of Privernum, the story of which is expanded by the annalists into an interesting romance. The Roman citizens settled on its forfeited lands and on the Falernian territory in Campania were formed into two new tribes (B.C. 318); and the strong colonies of Cales (B.C. 334)† and Fregellæ (B.C. 328) were planted in the Campanian plain, and at the passage of the Liris. “Rome pursued her purpose with undeviating steadfastness, and displayed her energetic and far-reaching policy, more even than on the battle-field, in the securing of the territory which she gained by enveloping it in a political and military net whose meshes could not be broken.”†

The conquest of Latium and northern Campania, coinciding with the renewed concord of the orders under the Publilian Laws, and followed by peace with the Gauls (B.C. 335), formed a new starting-point for the extension of the Roman power. At the same epoch events were taking place in a distant part of the world, which throw another stream of light on the Supreme Ruler's direction of the course of human history. The year of the dissolution of the Latin confederacy was also that of the battle of Chæronæa (B.C. 338). The question seemed to be fairly raised, whether the supremacy of the Italo-Hellenic race was reserved for the conquerors of Latium or the subjugator of Greece. A very few years later, Philip's kinsman, Alexander of Epirus, crossed over into Italy to aid the Greeks of Tarentum against the Lucanians and Samnites, and the Romans made an alliance with him. His expedition, after some successes, ended in his defeat

* Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. pp. 165, 166.

† Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 369.

and death in the battle of Pandosia (B.C. 326). Meanwhile, his great namesake was in the full tide of that wonderful career, which promised to unite all the resources of the East for the subjugation of the Western world. Among the nations which confessed the probable result, by the homage they hastened to pay to the conqueror at Babylon, were not only the maritime Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, but also the Lucanians and Bruttians, whose embassy the Samnites may not improbably have joined. The actual relations of these peoples to the Romans furnished a ready pretext for intervention in Italy; and the power which was all but crushed by the Samnites had no prospect of resisting the might of Alexander. It seems strange that the Roman annalists make no allusion to the imminence of the danger which was averted by Alexander's death. Their attention was probably absorbed by the great contest of the SECOND SAMNITE WAR, which broke out three years before that epoch (B.C. 326), and only ended in B.C. 304, three years before the decision of the quarrels of the *Diadochi* at the battle of Ipsus. Well was it for Rome that the generals of Alexander were thus occupied during her greatest struggle in Italy.

The subjugation of Latium left the Romans and Samnites face to face, committed to an inevitable contest for the supremacy of Italy. The progress of Rome in Campania could not but rouse the jealousy of the Samnites; and direct causes of complaint were found in the colonization of Sora and Fregellæ (B.C. 328). But it seemed from the beginning, as throughout the whole career of Rome, that her enemies were fated to lose the favourable moment for attack. It was owing partly to the war with Alexander of Epirus and the Greek cities, and partly to the uncertain policy of their confederacy, that the Samnites stood by while the Romans conquered Campania.

The great conflict, which was sure to have been fought out sooner or later, began from a collision of Rome with a Greek community. The cities of Magna Græcia had now been all but politically extinguished by the attacks of the Etruscans, Samnites, and Lucanians, and the blows inflicted on them by a Greek, Dionysius of Syracuse. Almost the last that retained their independence were the twin cities of Palæopolis and Neapolis (*the Old and New City*), of which the latter has perpetuated its name to the present day in Naples (*Napoli*). They were founded by the Cumæans on the site of an older city which was named after the nymph Parthenope, an appellation fondly preserved by

the Roman poets ; * and the distinction between the Old and New City is believed to have dated from the time when the colony gave a refuge to the people of the mother city on the capture of Cumæ by the Samnites. Palæpolis † became involved in a quarrel with the Roman settlers in the recently allotted territory of Capua (B.C. 327). The Roman annalists tell how, on a herald being sent to demand satisfaction, the Greeks, like a people valiant only with the tongue, returned an insulting answer. They relied on the support of the Samnites, who, as the Romans soon learnt, were sending troops (or, as they themselves admitted, volunteers) to their aid, and tampering with the subject cities. So, while the two consuls marched against Palæpolis, heralds were sent to demand satisfaction of the Samnites. They were met by recriminations and a challenge to fight out their quarrels on the plains of Campania. The Roman herald replied that the Senate and people would send their armies where they pleased, and the consul L. Cornelius Lentulus at once crossed the frontier of Samnium.

Meanwhile, his distinguished plebeian colleague, Q. Publilius Philo, lay encamped between Palæpolis and Neapolis so as to cut off their communication, when his year of office came to an end. To enable him to finish the campaign, the Senate prolonged his command under the title, afterwards so famous, of PROCONSUL (i.e. *pro consule*, in place of the consul). He took Palæpolis, in which there was a Samnite garrison, and received the voluntary submission of Neapolis (B.C. 326). The Sabelian cities of southern Campania, though at first disposed to side with the Samnites, were ultimately gained over to Rome through their aristocracies ; and a vital breach was made in the Italian cause by the defection of the Lucanians to the Roman alliance. This people, as soon as the death of Alexander of Epirus had removed the pressing necessity for their alliance with the Samnites, chose rather to

* As, for example, in the celebrated lines :—

“ Illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti.”

† “Dionysius, in all his account of these affairs, makes mention only of Neapolis ; the name of Palæpolis does not once occur in his narrative. In the Roman story, Palæpolis holds the more prominent place ; for no other reason, apparently, than because Palæpolis was conquered by force, and enabled Publilius to obtain the honour of a triumph, while Neapolis entered into a friendly treaty with Rome. But Palæpolis must really have been a very insignificant place, for it followed almost as an infallible rule, that whenever a new town (*Neapolis*) was founded in a more advantageous situation, the old town (*Palæpolis*) went to decay.”—Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 186 (note).

devote all their resources to an attack upon Tarentum, than to play a secondary part in the war with Rome. The Apulians took the same course; and, instead of the opportunity being seized for a great confederacy of the Italians against Rome, the Samnites were left to bear the brunt of the war almost without allies. The Lucanians, however, afterwards changed sides.

The GREAT SAMNITE WAR began in B.C. 326 with the advance of the two consuls from Capua up the valley of the Volturnus. They took some towns in Samnium, but gained no decisive success. Next year, the adhesion of the Vestinians to the Samnite cause at once endangered the communications with Apulia, and threatened a league of the Sabellian tribes to the north of Samnium. They were completely reduced by the consul Decimus Junius Brutus; but the illness of his colleague, L. Furius Camillus, made it necessary to appoint a dictator for the conduct of the war in the Samnite country. With his usual fondness for picturesque detail, Livy turns aside from the progress of the campaign to relate the quarrel between the commander and his deputy. The dictator, L. Papirius Cursor, being recalled to Rome by a defect in the auspices, which could only be taken afresh in the Roman territory, left his master of the horse, Q. Fabius Maximus, with a strict charge to remain on the defensive. But Fabius hazarded an engagement, and gained a decisive victory. Hastening back to the camp at this news, Papirius ordered his disobedient lieutenant to be seized and put to death. The soldiers, flushed with the recent victory, interposed tumultuously to protect Fabius, who escaped during the night to Rome, whither Papirius followed, and gave orders to the lictors to arrest him. M. Fabius, the father of the offender, invoked the intercession of the tribunes to allow him an appeal to the people. It is impossible to believe that the constitution sanctioned either the tribunical interference, or that of the *Comitia Centuriata*, against the dictator's sentence. The tribunes hesitated to set so fatal a precedent, and the people found an escape from the difficulty by praying the dictator to forgive Fabius. His authority being thus saved, the dictator yielded; and Livy observes that discipline was no less firmly established by the peril of Q. Fabius than by the death of T. Manlius. The truth is, that the act of old Torquatus would not bear repetition.

Papirius regained the affections of the soldiers by personal attentions to their welfare, and led them on to successes which were continued in the year following, when his dictatorship was prolonged instead of the election of consuls (B.C. 324). The following year

was marked by an armed rising of the Tusculans and Privernatians who had already been admitted to all the private rights of citizenship, to obtain the full political franchise.* In the absence of both consuls with their armies in Apulia and Samnium, it was found necessary to yield; and the Tusculan leader, L. Fulvius Curvus, who had almost surprised the city, was elected consul for the succeeding year. This concession to the Latins seems to have brought new strength to the arms of Rome; and the Samnites were reduced to sue for peace. They sent back all their prisoners, with the body of Brutulus Papius, the leader of the war party, who had put himself to death rather than be given up alive. But all this was nothing so long as they refused to be the subject allies of Rome (B.C. 322).

The Samnites renewed the war with the desperation of a brave people driven to extremities, and chose for their commander C. Pontius, of Telesilla, whose generalship earned the title of the Samnite Hannibal, while he was far superior to the Carthaginian in generosity and culture. The Samnite nobles were brought within the influence of Greek learning, particularly at Tarentum, and the father of C. Pontius is said to have held philosophical conversations, not only with Archytas, but with Plato himself. He was probably, as Arnold observes, more advanced in cultivation of mind than any Roman general of that age; and we shall soon see how far he surpassed the whole Roman people in generosity and good faith. He had to defend Samnium against the united Roman armies, as the insurrection in Apulia had been subdued. But, just as the campaign was about to open, he spread a report that the whole force of the Samnites had marched into Apulia, to besiege Luceria. The consuls, Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius, who were already in Campania, resolved to march to the scene of action across the whole Samnite territory, a plan rash enough had the news been true, and doubtless adopted for the sake of expedition. They entered the first rampart of the Apennines by the pass of the "Caudine Forks" (so named from the village of Caudium), now called the valley of Arpaia, on the road from Naples to Benevento. The pass is of a form very common at the entrance to chains of mountains. A watery meadow, enclosed on all sides by steep wooded hills, is entered from below and from above by deep defiles. The surrounding woods afforded an ambush to the whole Samnite army, which the Romans believed to be on the other side of the Apennines. Without resistance or suspicion, they passed up the

* The *suffragium* and *honores*.

lower defile into the grassy mead ; but on reaching the upper pass, they found it blocked by felled trees, and guarded by a strong force. Meanwhile the entrance to the valley was occupied in the same manner ; the Samnites closed on every side about the beleaguered foe, and inflicted on them a disastrous defeat. The fall of night saved the Romans from destruction, and the Samnites retired to the hills, guarding every track and repulsing every sally of the enemy. Famine soon drove the Romans to surrender ; they placed their lives and liberty at the mercy of the victors, only praying that their bodies might be saved from insult. In his eagerness to seize the opportunity for an honourable peace, Pontius overlooked the advantage of detaining them as prisoners of war and finishing the negotiations at Rome. He trusted that terms made with the consuls would bind the senate and people ; and the consuls raised no doubt of the ratification of their acts. Not one of the sacred heralds was present with the Roman army, as the Samnites were to have been conquered and not treated with ; but the moderate terms imposed by the victors were sworn to not only by the consuls and the surviving military tribunes, but by two of the tribunes of the plebs, who might well be regarded as the special representatives of the people. Those terms were the razing of the fortresses of Cales and Fregellæ, and the restoration of the equal alliance between the two nations. Six hundred knights were kept as hostages. All the other soldiers, even the consuls, were stripped of their arms and armour ; and, clothed only with the sort of kilt called *campestre*, they marched out of the valley beneath the “yoke,” an indignity which was the common fate of captive armies. So far from showing any unusual insolence to the vanquished, Pontius generously provided the army with all necessary supplies, and with carriages for the wounded, till they crossed the Liris. The Campanians remained faithful to the Romans in their misfortune, supplying all their wants, and placing their own lictors and fasces at the disposal of the consuls. In deep dejection the troops marched on to Rome, where they dispersed to their homes in the country, or stole into the city by night. The consuls were received with the signs of a public mourning ; all public and private festivals were suspended, and the only business transacted was the election of new consuls, under the presidency of an interrex, after the nomination of a dictator had been twice set aside by the augurs. The election fell upon men who had already rendered the greatest services to the state, Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius Cursor.

On the meeting of the senate to decide upon the recent treaty,

the late consul, Sp. Postumius, was the first to propose that its ratification should be refused, and that himself and his colleague, with the military tribunes who had sworn to it, should be given up to the Samnites, to abide the consequences of having exceeded their powers. The senators at once accepted the sacrifice, though most of them had doubtless relatives among the six hundred hostages, whose fate must now be considered as sealed. Stripped as when they had passed under the yoke, and with their hands bound behind them, the victims were delivered up to the Samnites by a herald; and, as soon as the surrender was made, Postumius smote the herald with his knee, exclaiming, "I now belong to the Samnites,* and I have done violence to the sacred person of a Roman herald and ambassador. Ye will rightfully wage war with us, Romans, to avenge this outrage." The superstitious device, by which the grossest breach of faith was placed under the sanction of religion, was scorned by Pontius. Having refused to accept the surrender, and ironically demanded that the Roman army should be placed where it was at the capitulation, he gave back the prisoners to the herald. By keeping the six hundred hostages uninjured, Pontius threw still more completely upon the Romans the whole responsibility of their breach of faith. Striking as is the contrast between his magnanimity and their treachery, it is clear that he had committed a grave political error in expecting such a treaty to be ratified. Moderate as were its terms, the circumstances under which it was made were too humiliating to leave a doubt that it would be evaded on any pretext that could be found; and the consuls had in fact usurped a power which belonged only to the civil authorities. There can be little doubt that they did this with the set purpose of the treaty's being repudiated, and that the senate and people adopted their treacherous artifice. The treaty was one of that sort which, if ratified, must have been torn to pieces on the first prospect of a successful renewal of the war; but this does not excuse the hypocritical perfidy of the whole transaction. The rejection of the treaty was at once a political necessity, and a proof that political necessity was henceforth the only rule of Roman honour. The war was renewed with all the exasperation arising from the humiliation and conscious wrong of the one party, and the indignant disappointment of the other (B.C. 320).

Before the Romans were in a condition to take the field, Pontius

* That is, as a surrendered person (*deditus*), who had lost all rights of citizenship at Rome.

had executed what he had before pretended, the capture of Luceria. But the scale was soon turned by Papirius Cursor, who retook Luceria, with the six hundred hostages and all the Roman arms and standards, and passed 7000 Samnite captives half-naked under the yoke. This complete reversal of the disaster of the Caudine Forks is doubtless an exaggeration of the annalists, with whom Papirius is a veritable hero of romance. "His remarkable swiftness of foot, his gigantic strength, his enormous capacities for food, and the iron strictness of his discipline, accompanied as it was by occasional touches of rough humour, all contributed to make his memory popular, somewhat in the same way as Richard Cœur de Lion has been admired amongst us; and his countrymen boasted that he would have been a worthy champion to have fought against Alexander the Great, if Alexander had ever invaded Italy."^{*} In spite of all exaggeration, however, the Romans had an almost uninterrupted current of success for the first three years of the renewed war, chiefly in recovering the places around Samnium, which had been lost by the Caudine disaster, till a truce was made with the Samnites for two years (B.C. 318).

The renewal of the war was attended with Samnite successes and defections among the allies, which imperilled the Roman cause in Campania and on the upper course of the Liris. But the lost ground was recovered by the military energy of Rome and her policy in binding some of the cities by favourable treaties, as in the case of Nola, and terrifying others by severe examples, as when two hundred of the chief citizens of Fregellæ were beheaded in the Forum (B.C. 313). By the fifteenth year of the war the Roman domination was completely established in Apulia on the one sea and Campania on the other; and chains of forts linked Rome with the Adriatic, severing Upper from Lower Italy. Campania was connected with the capital by the first of those magnificent roads, which still form the most enduring monument of Rome's greatness through the whole extent of her vast empire. The name of the censor Appius Claudius Cæcus (the Blind) is immortalized by the *Via Appia*, which he constructed from Rome to Capua, carrying it through the Pomptine marshes on an embankment (B.C. 312). The road was afterwards prolonged to Brundisium, and became the great highway for travellers from Rome to Greece. It was now evident that Rome was embracing all Italy within her grasp, and the immense advantages of

* Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 226.

her central position and her consolidated government were producing their natural fruits. The nations of the north and centre awoke to the danger just as they were effectually severed from the Samnites. The Etruscans, whose forty years' truce with Rome (B.C. 351) had now expired, made a vigorous diversion by attacking the frontier fortress of Sutrium, beneath the walls of which the Romans sustained heavy losses under the consul Q. Æmilius, while his colleague, C. Junius, was successful in Samnium (B.C. 311).

The Etruscan campaign of the following year brought immortal honour to the consul Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, the same whose life had nearly been forfeited fifteen years before for his disobedience to the dictator Papirius. Finding the lines of the besiegers round Sutrium too strong to storm, Fabius made an advance through the Ciminian forest into the heart of the enemy's country. This movement was the more daring as it left Rome uncovered on the side towards the Umbrians, whose fidelity was but doubtfully secured by the consul's emissaries; and Fabius is said only to have prevented the disapproval of the senate by his rapid advance. But his boldness was justified by his success, the accounts of which, however, vary between a mere predatory incursion and the decisive defeat of the united armies of Etruria, in a battle the scene of which is placed by some as far up the country as Perugia. Thus much is clear, that Fabius gained a great victory over the Etruscans at the Vadimonian lake, near where the eastern extremity of the Ciminian forest abuts upon the Tiber. This battle put an end, for the time, to all danger on the side of Etruria, and several of the most powerful cities made truces with Rome for 300 and 400 months (B.C. 310—309).

The division of the Roman forces, however, enabled the Samnites to inflict a great defeat on the other consul, C. Marcius Rutilus. When the news reached Rome, the senate turned again to Papirius Cursor, and the consul Fabius, to whom a deputation was sent in Etruria, magnanimously nominated to the dictatorship the man who, in that office, had condemned him to death. No consuls were elected. Papirius gained a decisive victory over the Samnites, and exhibited, in his splendid triumph on the 15th of October, B.C. 309, the insignia which attested the destruction of their two sacred bands, who were bound by a vow to conquer or to die. The one, which held the right wing in battle, wore white tunics and carried silvered arms and shields; the other bore gilded shields and parti-coloured dresses, which, with the lofty

plumes of both bands, suggest a resemblance to the equipments of the Scottish highlanders, in keeping with the Celtic element that has been traced in the people of the Umbro-Samnite stock. The last alarm at seeing the power of the Samnites completely broken roused the kindred people of the north and centre to efforts which would have been effectual at the proper time. But Q. Fabius Maximus, who was again elected consul, led the army destined for Samnium to the north, and, having dispersed the Umbrians, routed the Marsians and Pelignians (B.C. 308). The same year witnessed the fall of Nuceria, the last city of Campania that adhered to the Samnites. With his command continued as præconsul, Fabius compelled the surrender of a Samnite army at Allifæ, and, while dismissing the Samnite prisoners, he gave an example of terror to those disposed to aid them by selling all the other captives as slaves, except a number of Hernicans, who, as traitors to their alliance with Rome, were placed at the disposal of the senate (B.C. 307). Their fate may be inferred from the revolt of Anagnia, the chief city of the Hernicans, a diversion which, even thus late, brought a gleam of success for the Samnites. But the rapid advance of the Romans under the consul Q. Marcius Tremulus drove the Hernicans not only to accept a truce, but to furnish the army with supplies. Marcius formed a junction with his colleague; the united armies gained a decisive victory; and Samnium was ravaged for nearly five months (B.C. 306).

Though virtually conquered, the Samnites revenged themselves during the winter by predatory inroads upon Campania. But, with the return of summer, both consuls penetrated from opposite sides into the heart of Samnium, and formed a junction before its chief city, Bovianum. The general, Statius Gellius, was defeated and taken prisoner in a last effort to relieve the place, the fall of which ended the resistance of the Samnites. The battle cost the life of the consul Tiberius Minucius; but his successor, Marcus Fulvius, joined his colleague L. Postumius in recovering the towns lately lost upon the Liris, the chief of which were Sora and Arpinum (B.C. 305). It was not, however, till the consuls of the following year had advanced again into their country that the Samnites sued for peace; an example which was followed by the Marsians, Pelignians, and other Sabellian tribes that had been concerned in the war. The terms granted were in accordance with the steady but unvindictive policy of Roman aggrandizement. Livy, who seems incapable of conceiving that

an equal league could ever have existed between the Romans and other peoples, says that the old alliance was restored to the Samnites; * but Dionysius more correctly represents the Samnites as submitting to become the dependent allies of Rome. The other Sabellian tribes were admitted to an equal alliance, some of them ceding portions of their territory. The chief acquisitions were from the forfeited domain of the Hernican cities, and from the incorporation of the territory of the Æquians, who were finally subdued, after a brief but fierce struggle, in B.C. 302. Their lands formed two new tribes, the *Aniensis* and *Terentina* (B.C. 299). But the real gain of Rome was far greater than that of any territory. The whole power of the Samnites and their Sabellian allies had been arrayed against her in vain. The Etruscans had mingled in the conflict, only to prove that Rome need no longer fear their rivalry. The Lucanians, who might have turned the scale by a hearty co-operation with the Samnites, had divided the force of that people by needing garrisons to overawe them; and the removal of those garrisons gave the Romans an ascendancy in Lucania which helped them to secure an advantageous peace with Tarentum.† Thus the republic assumed her place as the leading power of Italy.

The defeated nations would not, however, submit to Rome's supremacy without one last struggle, for which they called in the aid of the common enemy, the Gauls. A desultory warfare had continued in Etruria and Umbria after the peace with the Samnites; and the fortress of Nequinum, on the Nar, was only taken after an obstinate resistance. A colony, planted on its site, under the name of Narnia, formed the key of the position where the Nar was crossed by the great military road (*Via Flaminia*) which was constructed through Umbria, severing the Samnites from the Etruscans (B.C. 299). Just at this time, new hordes of Gauls crossed the Alps, and, passing through Etruria, unopposed and probably aided by the people, fell upon the Roman territory. They speedily recrossed the Apennines with their plunder, and almost destroyed each other in a quarrel about its division; but meanwhile the Samnites had seized the opportunity to invade Lucania, an act which the Romans resented by a declaration of war. Thus began the *Third Samnite War*, which lasted nine years (B.C. 298—290).

* "*Fœdus antiquum Samnitibus redditum.*"

† We shall have occasion to review the relations of Tarentum with Rome in the next chapter.

In the first and second campaigns, one Roman army marched through Samnium, gained a victory at Bovianum, and pacified Lucania; while another army defeated the Etruscans at Volaterræ. Separate negotiations had already been commenced between Etruria and Rome, when the Samnite general, Gellius Egnatius, induced the Etruscans to hold out by offering to come to their aid in their own country. While leaving one army to continue the war in Samnium, and raising another for an invasion of Campania, he led the main body of his forces through the Marsian and Umbrian territories, and formed a junction with his allies in Etruria (B.C. 296). Thus the Romans saw their plans for severing northern and southern Italy frustrated; and they were threatened by a new invasion of the Gauls, whom the Etruscans had taken into their pay. To join the invaders before they crossed the Apennines, the forces of the coalition were directed towards Umbria, and thither the Romans marched to meet them with 60,000 men, partly recalled from Campania, and partly raised by great efforts at Rome. Two armies of reserve were formed, the one under the walls of the city, the other at Falerii, to occupy the Etruscans with a diversion, which succeeded in drawing away the bulk of their forces from the decisive battle. The consuls were the veteran Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, and P. Decius Mus, who, already rivalling his colleague in military reputation, repeated the self-devotion of his father, and so decided the great victory of Sentinum over the confederates. The Roman left, which had been disordered by the war-chariots of the Gauls, rallied at seeing the self-sacrifice of the consul; the Campanian cavalry completed the defeat of the Gauls; and the Samnites on the other wing, already weakened by the defection of the Etruscans, gave way after a resistance so determined that 9000 Romans were left upon the field. Umbria at once submitted: the Gauls dispersed: the Samnites retreated in good order; but they were unable to prevent the Romans from recovering Campania (B.C. 295). The chief Etruscan cities made a truce with Rome for 400 months (B.C. 294). The Samnites, resisting with the courage of despair, gained some successes in Campania; but they were again defeated with great loss by the consul, L. Papirius Cursor (B.C. 293).^{*} Their general, Gellius Egnatius, had fallen in the battle of Sentinum; and the veteran Caius Pontius (or, as some suppose, his son) cast a last ray of glory over the Samnite arms by the total defeat of the consul, Q. Fabius Maximus Gurgus, who made a rash advance from Cam-

^{*} It is recorded that the first sun-dial was set up at Rome in this year.

pania into Samnium. Public indignation at Rome suggested the unprecedented course of deposing Fabius from the consulship ; * but his aged father Rullianus interposed his authority by offering to serve as lieutenant under his son, whose life he saved, as well as his reputation, in the decisive battle that ensued. Pontius was taken prisoner with 4,000 Samnites, and 20,000 more were slain (B.C. 292).

Quintus Fabius was continued in his command, as proconsul, for another year, during which the Samnites prolonged a hopeless resistance ; and the first Roman colony was founded in their territory, at Venusia, on the borders of Apulia (B.C. 291). Before the close of the summer, the proconsul returned to Rome, and sullied his splendid triumph by the cruel revenge he took for his former defeat by the great Samnite. The act cannot be better told, or more justly judged, than in the words of Dr. Arnold :—

“ While he was borne along in his chariot, according to custom, his old father rode on horseback behind him as one of his lieutenants, delighting himself with the honours of his son. But at the moment when the consul and his father, having arrived at the end of the Sacred Way, turned to the left to ascend the hill of the Capitol, C. Pontius, the Samnite general, who with the other prisoners of rank had thus far followed the procession, was led aside to the right hand to the prison beneath the Capitoline hill, and there was thrust down into the underground dungeon of the prison, and beheaded. One year had passed since his last battle ; nearly thirty since he had spared the lives and liberty of two Roman armies, and, unprovoked by the treachery of his enemies, had afterwards set at liberty the generals who were given up into his power as a pretended expiation of their country's perfidy. Such a murder, committed or sanctioned by such a man as Q. Fabius, is peculiarly a national crime, and proves but too clearly that in their dealings with foreigners the Romans had neither magnanimity, nor humanity, nor justice.”†

The war now virtually at an end, was formally concluded in the following year, when both the consuls invaded Samnium. The Samnites sued for peace, and were again made the dependent allies of Rome. They were subjected to no harsh or humiliating terms, nor was their last renewal of the war punished by any loss of territory. Too politic to exasperate a brave nation, which ought

* The only example of such a deposition in the whole course of Roman history is the case of Cinna, in the Marian civil wars (B.C. 87).

† Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 365.

henceforward to be an element of their strength, the Romans pursued the wiser course of securing the coasts of both seas, by fortresses, such as those of Minturnæ and Sinuessa in Campania and Hatria on the Adriatic, while the strongholds of the Apennines were penetrated by their great military roads.* The western shore of Italy, from the Ciminian forest to Capua, was now added to the territory of Rome, and the eastern and southern plains were commanded by the outposts of Luceria and Venusia. The latter, especially, placed on the confines of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania, and on the high road to Tarentum, served to command the south. About this time, too, the Sabines were finally conquered, and their lands included in the Roman territory. It is not enough to say that Rome was now the first of the Italian states ; she already held the supremacy of the peninsula.

* It was no doubt at this time that the Via Appia was continued to Venusia.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE WAR WITH PYRRHUS, AND THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.
B.C. 290 TO B.C. 266.

"He left a name, at which the world grew pale,
• To point a moral, or adorn a tale."—JOHNSON.

STATE OF ITALY AFTER THE SAMNITE WARS—THE ETRUSCANS AND GAULS IN THE NORTH—THE LUCANIANS AND BRUTTIANS IN THE SOUTH—LUCANIA AND THE GREEK CITIES—THE ROMANS PROTECT THURII—NEW ITALIAN COALITION—WAR IN ETRURIA—IRRUPTION OF THE GAULS—A ROMAN ARMY DESTROYED BEFORE ARRETIIUM—DEFEAT AND EXTINCTION OF THE SENONES—DEFEAT OF THE ETRUSCANS AT THE VADIMONIAN LAKE—SUCCESSSES OF FABRICIUS IN LUCANIA—TARENTUM—ITS INFLUENCE IN ITALY—CALLS IN AID FROM GREECE—ARCHIDAMUS—ALEXANDER OF EPIRUS—CLEONYMUS—ALLIANCE WITH ROME—"THE TARENTINES ATTACK A ROMAN FLEET AND SEIZE THURII—OUTRAGE ON THE ROMAN AMBASSADOR POSTUMIUS—PYRRHUS INVITED TO ITALY—HE BECOMES MASTER OF TARENTUM—MARCH OF THE ROMANS TO MEET HIM—THEIR DEFEAT AT HERACLEA—MISSION OF CINEAS TO ROME—APPIUS CLAUDIUS CECUS IN THE SENATE—IMPRESSION MADE ON CINEAS—ADVANCE OF PYRRHUS TO FRÆNESTE—THE ETRUSCANS MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE—PYRRHUS RETREATS TO TARENTUM—EMBASSY OF FABRICIUS—CAMPAIGN IN APULIA—BATTLE OF ASCULUM—STATE OF THE SICILIAN GREEKS—LEAGUE OF ROME AND CARTHAGE—SIEGE OF SYRACUSE—PYRRHUS PASSES INTO SICILY—HIS FIRST SUCCESSSES AND REPULSE AT LILYBÆUM—HIS RETURN TO ITALY—HIS DEFEAT AT BENEVENTUM AND FINAL DEPARTURE—CAPTURE OF TARENTUM, RHEGIUM, AND BRUNDISIUM—SUBMISSION OF PICENUM, LUCANIA, AND THE BRUTII—CONQUEST OF ITALY COMPLETED—NAVAL AFFAIRS—POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATE OF ITALY AND ROME.

THE last act in Rome's long contest for the supremacy of Italy is also the first in the great drama of her conflict with the world. "Towards the end of the fifth century of the city, those nations which had been raised to supremacy in their respective lands began to come into contact in council and on the battle field; and, as at Olympia the preliminary victors girt themselves for a second and more serious struggle, so on the larger arena of the nations, Carthage, Macedonia, and Rome now prepared for the final and decisive contest."* The conquest of the Samnites had left two great Italian nations still unsubdued, the Etruscans in the north and the Lucanians in the south. In each quarter, too, there were other races which had obtained a footing on the Italian soil. At one extremity of the peninsula, the Gauls were ever ready to pour down, not only in predatory incursions on their own account, but at the instigation of the Etruscans; and, at the other, the Greek

* Mommsen's *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 393.

cities, which might have fallen like ripe fruit into the lap of Rome, were too inviting a prey to others not to precipitate a conflict for their possession. It was from this source that Rome became involved in fresh wars, first against a new Italian coalition, and then with her powerful antagonist, Pyrrhus, King of Epirus.

The whole of the southern extremity of Italy,—below those branches of the Apennines which diverge from the knot formed near Venusia, to the promontory of Minerva (*C. Campanella*) on the west coast, and the Iapygian promontory (*C. di Leuca*) at the “heel” of the peninsula—the whole of this region, except the possessions of the Greek cities along the coast, was now in the possession of two kindred peoples of Samnite origin, the Lucanians and Bruttians. Their settlement in these regions was the consequence of the great and continued movement of the Sabellian races to the south, and the Bruttians are said to have separated from the Lucanians by an act of rebellion, which obtained for them their distinctive name.* The country of the Bruttians extended from the straits of Messina to the little river Laus (*Law*), being formed throughout by the last chain of the Apennines; and the people were a wild race of mountain shepherds, whose character and habits have been handed down to the Calabrians. The limits of Lucania along the west coast were from the Laüs to the Silarus, which divided it from Campania. On this side it was a highland country, like Bruttium, but east of the Apennines it embraced the great plain which lies at the head of the gulf of Tarentum. It was thus an agricultural as well as a pastoral region, and it was rich in the vine,† the olive, and other fruit-trees. The vicinity of the Greek cities, while tending greatly to civilize the Lucanians, held out to them a prize, to grasp which became the leading object of their policy.

The aid which the Lucanians rendered to Rome in the Samnite wars appears to have been purchased by leaving those cities at their disposal. But when, on the restoration of peace, they began to take possession of the prize, and laid siege to Thurii, the Greeks applied for aid to Rome, just as the Campanians of Teanum and Capua had asked her help against the Samnites. As in that case, so in this, the temptation proved irresistible. The Romans set

* *Bruttii* or *Brettii* is explained by the Roman antiquarians to mean *rebels* in the Lucanian language.

† The luxuriance of the vine in this whole southern region is supposed to have given origin to its Greek name *Enotria*, that is, the *land of wine*.

little value on the friendship of a people whom the possession of Venusia would enable them to subdue, and commanded them to respect the Thurians as the allies of Rome. The spirit of Italian independence was once more roused. All that remained of a national party among the Samnites were induced to join with the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Etruscans in a new confederacy; and even in Tarentum the anti-Roman party was strong enough to prepare to break off the Roman alliance. While these preparations were going on, the Romans had the wisdom to compose those internal dissensions which broke out anew after the Samnite Wars. It has already been related how the last secession of the plebs achieved the triumph of their order, which was embodied in the Hortensian and Mænian laws; * and thus the republic presented a united front to the last attack of the combined nations of Italy.

The war began in Etruria seven years after the conclusion of peace with the Samnites (B.C. 283). Arretium, the only Etruscan city which had refused to take part with the other states, was besieged by the whole force of the confederacy, and by hordes of the Gallic Senones, whom they had taken into their pay. The new consuls had not yet had time to bring their levies into the field, † but L. Cæcilius Metellus, the consul of the last year and now prætor, was still in Etruria with his army. He hastened to the relief of Arretium, and suffered there a most calamitous defeat, he himself being slain, with seven military tribunes, and 13,000 men, and the rest of his army were made prisoners. The army was, in fact, cut off by the Senones, who were serving with the Etruscans, though they were then at peace with Rome; and the heralds sent to complain of this breach of faith were murdered at the instigation of the chieftain Britomaris, whose father had fallen in the battle. But a signal vengeance was taken by the consul, P. Cornelius Dolabella, who was already on his march into northern Etruria. On hearing of the disaster at Arretium, he turned aside into the territory of the Senones, easily defeated the few warriors who were left in the country, and began to devastate the land and massacre all who were able to bear arms. The Gauls who were with the Etruscan army, failing to persuade their allies to march upon Rome, returned to defend their country. They were met by Dolabella and defeated with immense slaughter, the survivors falling by their own hands. The result of the campaign

* B.C. 286. See p. 286.

† At this period the consuls came into office about the middle of April.

was nothing less than the utter extinction of the nation of the Senones. Their women and children were sold as slaves. Those of the people who escaped destruction were driven from the land, and probably went to swell the hordes that soon afterwards poured down upon Greece and Asia Minor.* Their territory was soon occupied by Roman settlements.

The first colony was immediately founded at Sena (*Senigaglia*); and the Adriatic waters, of which the Tyrrhenians had previously been masters, witnessed the presence of a Roman fleet to protect the newly acquired coasts, and to prepare against the great attack which already threatened them from Epirus. Meanwhile the people of Cisalpine Gaul resolved to avenge their brethren's fate; and the great nation of the Boii joined the army of the Etruscans, with the design of marching on to another sack of Rome. But the consul Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus met their united forces at the passage of the Tiber, and gained a decisive victory at the Vadimonian lake, which lies near the right bank, a little below the confluence of the Nar. This defeat, in which the flower of the Etruscan nation perished, and from which they never recovered, concluded the campaigns of the eventful year B.C. 283. In the following year, the broken forces of the Gauls and Etruscans were again defeated by the consul, Q. Æmilius Papus, and the Boians concluded a separate peace with Rome (B.C. 282).

The desultory warfare, which the Etruscans maintained for two years more, did not hinder the Romans from devoting their almost undivided attention to the south. Their small auxiliary force had been content hitherto to maintain itself at Thurii against the Lucanians and Bruttians; but now the consul, C. FABRICIUS LUSCINUS, who has left one of the brightest names in the Roman annals, marched to the relief of the city. The Lucanians were defeated in a great battle, and their general, C. Statilius, was taken prisoner. The victory was followed by the voluntary submission of most of the Greek cities, except those of Dorian origin, which adhered to Tarentum; and, besides, Thurii, Locri, Croton, and Rhegium received Roman garrisons. Their occupation of the last of these cities appears to have anticipated the designs of the Carthaginians: and from the station they had at last reached at the extremity of the peninsula, they seemed to challenge those two great foreign powers, the Hellenic and the Punic, whose conflicts with Rome occupy the following century of her annals. Once more the good fortune of Rome was conspicuous in having

* See chap. xviii. p. 110.

to deal with her enemies apart; for the conquest of Italy was finished two years before the Punic wars began; and the ambitious designs of Pyrrhus were not resumed by Philip of Macedonia till the Romans were relieved from the worst pressure of the Second Punic War.

TARENTUM now remained the sole obstacle to Rome's entire mastery of Italy. Situated on a splendid harbour west of the river Galæsus, at the bottom of the Gulf of Tarentum, and adjacent to the fertile plain of Lucania, this ancient city had enjoyed a pre-eminence among the states of Magna Græcia almost from the time of its colonization by the Lacedæmonian Phalanthus. It grew rich by commerce, and possessed land and sea forces sufficient to defend it alike against the Etruscans and the more fatal enemy of the Greek cities in Italy, Dionysius of Syracuse. The philosopher Archytas, a native of the city, gave it a code of laws (about B.C. 400), and it became famous as the resort of learned Greeks. Meanwhile, however, it had entirely abandoned the old Dorian simplicity; and the transference of the government from the many to the few was followed by a strange mixture of restless energy in the pursuit of wealth with licentious frivolity in its use. The Tarentines have been called "the Athenians of Italy," but while they caricatured the levity of the Athenians to a childish degree, they vied with the Etruscans in degraded luxury. . Plato, who visited Tarentum about B.C. 389, saw the whole city drunk at the time of the Dionysia. The reader of Athenæus will remember at least one striking case of their prostitution of art to licentiousness; and literature was equally degraded by the invention of the burlesque or "merry tragedy," at the very time when the Samnites were making their great stand against the advancing power of Rome. The demagogues who directed their government proved totally incompetent to make use of a crisis which might have delivered the city from its difficult position among the contending parties. Their thoughts were chiefly occupied with the danger nearest at hand, from the growing pressure of the Lucanians, and their appeals for aid first brought over armies from the continent of Greece to Italy. Archidamus, the son of Agis, fell fighting in their cause (B.C. 338). In the interval between the first and second Samnite wars, the people of Tarentum invited Alexander of Epirus, the uncle of Alexander the Great, to assist them against a joint attack by the Lucanians and the Samnites (B.C. 332). This prince remained in Italy for nearly seven years, but the details of his campaigns are unfortunately lost. The Tarentines soon quarrelled

with him, probably because they perceived his design of making himself king of Italy. He then continued the war on his own account, and made a league with the Romans. After a career marked by considerable successes, the treachery of some Lucanian emigrants, who wished to make their peace with their countrymen, brought on him a defeat, in which he lost his life, near Pandosia, on the river Acheron (B.C. 326). In this same year, the breaking out of the Great Samnite War gave the Tarentines an opportunity to form a league which might have repulsed the Romans from Southern Italy. But while they left the Samnites to maintain a single-handed struggle for Italian independence, the Tarentine demagogues claimed to assume the position of umpires; and when the disaster at the Caudine Forks seemed to present a safe opportunity for insulting the Romans, they summoned both belligerents to lay down their arms (B.C. 320). The Romans replied by an immediate declaration of war, which seems at once to have quelled the rash confidence of the Tarentines; for, instead of using their fleet to co-operate with the Samnites in Campania, they sent it to support the aristocratic party in the cities of Sicily against Agathocles. Their armies were occupied in hostilities with the Lucanians, whose policy was equally fatal to the Samnite cause. At length, warned by the approaching end of the war that they might soon have to deal with the Romans as well as the Lucanians, they again looked for help to Greece. The adventurer who came this time to their aid was Cleonymus, the son of Cleomenes II., king of Sparta, who brought with him 5000 mercenaries and raised as many more in Italy. He compelled the Lucanians to make peace with Tarentum; and, had he possessed the spirit of a Pyrrhus, he was strong enough to have headed a great confederacy of the Italians and the Greek cities against Rome. But his ambition was of a far more vulgar type; and, after wasting time at Metapontum, and talking of aiding the Sicilian cities against Agathocles, he suddenly departed for Coreyra, and made that island his headquarters for piratical incursions upon Italy and Greece. Thus the close of the Second Samnite War found the Tarentines defenceless against the Romans, who granted them favourable terms of peace (B.C. 304).

That peace had remained formally unbroken to the present time; and the Tarentines, yearly more and more enervated by luxury, had looked on while the Samnites and Etruscans were crushed and the Senones extirpated. But their secret hostility to Rome was now intensified by fear; and an opportunity occurred for the inso-

lent display of their maritime power at her expense. There were old treaties which bound the Romans not to sail to the east of the Lucanian promontory (*C. Nau*), the western headland of the Gulf of Tarentum. The Romans were not likely to observe a restriction which would have severed them both from their garrison at Thurii and from their new possessions on the Adriatic. Whether in good faith, or from the characteristic assumption to "decree what should be right," a fleet of ten ships of war, sent to protect Thurii, and probably also to watch the Tarentines, appeared suddenly off Tarentum (B.C. 282). It was the Dionysiac festival, and the whole people were gathered in the theatre in a condition like that in which they had been seen by Plato, when from the raised seats, which looked out to the sea, they beheld the Roman ships making evidently for the harbour. Incited by a demagogue, who urged them to take instant satisfaction for the violated treaty, they rushed down and manned their ships, and sailed out to meet the Romans, who, surprised and outnumbered, sought safety in flight. Only half their fleet escaped: four ships were sunk with all their crews; a fifth was taken; the soldiers on board were put to death, and the rowers were sold for slaves. Such an outrage upon an ally so powerful could only spring from that recklessness with which weak passion commits itself to a course which it is conscious of not having the strength to carry through. As for the treaty, it was both obsolete and inapplicable to the present state of things; and the Tarentines clearly put themselves in the wrong by attacking without first warning off the Roman fleet. Flushed with their easy victory, they marched to Thurii and took the city by surprise. The Roman garrison was suffered to retire uninjured; but their partisans were driven into exile; the existing government was overthrown; the city was plundered; and the Thurians were bitterly reproached for bringing the Romans into the Gulf of Tarentum among the Hellenic cities, by the very state which had forced them to that course by abandoning them to the Lucanians (B.C. 282).

The Romans took their wonted precautions to place themselves in the right. They sent L. Postumius to Tarentum at the head of an embassy, to demand satisfaction. On their first landing the envoys were beset by a rabble, jeering at their purple-bordered togas. It happened that the citizens were again assembled in the theatre at the season of a festival, and the ambassadors were conducted thither for their audience. The whole assembly seemed possessed with a spirit of wanton levity. When Postumius began

to address them in Greek, they laughed aloud at his accent and his mistakes. He was still proceeding, with unmoved gravity, to state the senate's moderate demands—the release of the captives, the restoration of Thurii, and the surrender of the authors of the outrage—when a drunken profligate came up to him and bespattered his white toga with the most disgusting filth, amidst the laughter, applause, and obscene songs of the whole assembly. “Laugh while ye may,” exclaimed Postumius, holding up his sullied robe, “ye shall weep long enough hereafter, and the stain on this toga shall be washed out in your blood.” Even after this insult, it was with some reluctance that the senate declared war. The consul, L. Æmilius Barbula, who was already in Samnium, advanced into the Tarentine territory; but he did not begin to ravage it till the former offers of peace had been again refused; and then he sent back several noble prisoners unhurt. The Romans hoped for the restoration of peace through the aristocratical party; and for a moment the government fell into its hands; but the democracy had already taken measures, at once to protect the city and to secure their own ascendancy by foreign aid.

The petulance of the Tarentine democracy was, in fact, not so irrational as it appears; and the Romans had a special reason for their moderation. We must glance back to that point in the Greek annals at which we saw the noble-minded Epirot, PYRRHUS, meditating to place his name on a level with that of Alexander, by founding an empire in the West.* Since the enterprise of his ancestor Alexander, half a century before, Tarentum had been, as it were, an open gate into Italy; and now the prospect was held out of measuring his strength, not with the barbarian Lucanians, but with worthy rivals for imperial dominion. The Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians might be relied on for a last united effort under such a leader. The Tarentines had already sent an embassy to Pyrrhus, who had the wisdom to demand powers which would make him independent of their vacillating councils; and they had to make the simple choice between submitting to the Romans or receiving the Epirot for a master. The two parties were very nearly balanced; but the more patriotic course of taking a Greek for their leader was enforced by apprehensions of Roman vengeance. The clemency of the Roman consul had, however, produced such an effect, that Agis, the leader of the aristocratic party, had been chosen general, when all was changed by the return of the envoys from Epirus, bringing a treaty ratified by Pyrrhus.

* See chap. xviii. p. 107.

It gave him the supreme command of the Tarentines and their Italian allies, with the right of keeping a garrison in the city till the independence of Italy should be secured. The envoys were accompanied by Cineas, the favourite minister of Pyrrhus. His general, Milo, soon followed, with 3000 men, and, by taking possession of the citadel, put an end at once to the government of Agis, and to all prospect of peace with Rome. The consul *Æmilius* retired into winter quarters in *Apulia* (B.C. 281).

It was still the depth of winter when Pyrrhus himself landed on the Messapian coast with a force which had suffered greatly from a stormy voyage, and marched overland to Tarentum, whither his scattered ships gradually followed. The army he brought with him numbered 20,000 soldiers of the phalanx, 2000 archers, 500 slingers, 3000 cavalry, and 20 elephants, an animal now for the first time seen in Italy.* It was for the most part raised from various nations subject to his rule on the western coast of Greece,—*Molossians*, *Thesprotians*, *Chaonians*, and *Ambraciots*; but it also included, besides his own household troops, some Macedonian infantry and Thessalian cavalry, furnished by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*. This small body,—as large, however, as that which Alexander had led into Asia—was but the nucleus of his intended force. The Tarentine envoys had promised him 350,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry of the confederates. Finding that this force still remained to be raised, Pyrrhus at once set about enlisting mercenaries at the expense of the Tarentines, and, what was far more distasteful, he compelled the citizens to serve in person. His measures transformed the city of frivolous idlers into a severely ordered garrison; the assembly and the clubs were suspended; the theatres and promenades were closed; and when the citizens attempted to fly from this irksome discipline, his guards prevented their passing the gates without the king's permission. On the first symptoms of disaffection, the demagogues and leading men were put to death or deported as hostages to Epirus. Whatever might be the case with Italy, Tarentum at least had found a master, who knew how little its free alliance was worth; and Pyrrhus was too good a soldier to begin the campaign without securing the city which formed his military base.

* Hence its proper Latin name, "the Lucanian ox" (*bos Lucas*), from the country in which the Romans first saw it. We still unconsciously call the elephant an ox, for the name is but the Greek form of the Semitic *aleph* or *eleph*, an *oe*. It is needless to multiply examples of the popular application of familiar names to newly-discovered animals.

The Romans strained every nerve to march against Pyrrhus before he could gather the forces which as yet the confederacy did not possess. In fact, all Italy, except Tarentum itself and the adjacent parts of Lucania, lay at their command, if they could but anticipate the advance of Pyrrhus. The Samnites and the bulk of the Lucanians were kept in check by the colony of Venusia; and the Bruttians would have been overawed by the garrisons of the Greek cities, but for the defection of the Campanian garrison in Rhegium, who rose and seized the city for themselves, with results of which we have afterwards to speak. From this example it may be inferred that the Campanians were for the most part employed in garrison duty, and that they were generally disaffected. The crisis was indeed one to try the temper of all the Italians, and especially of the recently subdued Sabellian nations, when they heard that the greatest captain of Greece had crossed the sea to head an effort for their liberation; and there can be little doubt that a rapid march of Pyrrhus up the central highlands would have been attended by a universal rising. How dubious was the fidelity of some even of the Latins, and how stern the resolution of the Romans to crush disaffection, is proved by the fate of some of the leading citizens of Præneste, who were suddenly carried off to Rome, cast into prison, and afterwards put to death. Even the *proletarii* were called out and armed, probably to form the army of reserve which covered Rome. An army was sent under the consul Coruncanius against the Etruscans, who were already scarcely able to keep the field; while the main forces of the republic were despatched under the other consul, P. Valerius Lævinus, through Samnium into the Tarentine territory. This army consisted of four legions, with the auxiliary troops of the allies. Its total force, amounting in all to 50,000 men, is so much greater than an ordinary consular army* that we must suppose Lævinus to have formed a junction with the troops which had wintered in Apulia under Æmilius. At the lowest calculation, the Roman army must have considerably outnumbered the enemy.

The attempt of Pyrrhus to gain time by offering to mediate between the Romans and the Italians was met by an indignant refusal; and he marched out of Tarentum to meet the enemy. Lævinus had directed his march to the western shore of the Gulf of Tarentum, and was encamped on the right bank of the Siris (*Sinno*) when Pyrrhus hastened forward to protect the important

* The greatest ordinary force of a consular army was 20,000 foot and 2,400 horse.

city of Heraclea at the mouth of the Aciris (*Agri*). The plain between the two rivers was favourable for the king's cavalry and elephants, and here he drew up his forces, with his left resting on Heraclea and his right towards Pandosia. The BATTLE OF HERACLEA is memorable in military history as the first in which the two great systems of the phalanx and the legion were brought into collision.* The attack was begun by the Romans. They passed the Siris under cover of their horse, who crossed first on the two wings, threatening to surround the enemy. Pyrrhus himself led a furious charge of cavalry, but the Romans sustained the shock, in which the king was thrown, his horse being killed by a brave Frentanian, and his horsemen fled at seeing him fall. The incident taught Pyrrhus caution; and he exchanged his arms and purple cloak with an officer of his guard, named Megacles, while he brought the phalanx into action. Seven times did the legion and the phalanx drive one another back: seven times did either force reconquer its lost ground. The conflict still hung in doubt, when Megacles, whose borrowed splendour had made him a universal mark, was struck down dead. His fall was almost as fatal as if he had been really the king. Lævinus seized the opportunity to bring up his last reserve, a chosen body of cavalry, which he threw on the flank of the phalanx, while it wavered for a moment. But the column rallied at the sight of Pyrrhus, riding with bare head along its front; and the king, in his turn, brought up his reserve, those formidable beasts, whose unwieldy strength

* The Roman legion, as we have seen, was at first arrayed as a phalanx; but, at the time of the great Latin war, it had been remodelled into that more open order, for a full account of which the reader is referred to the works on Roman antiquities. It was drawn up in three lines at moderate intervals, called the *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*; but the last line was triple, so that there were really five lines in all. The *hastati*, in the front line, were the youths who were making their first experience of war; the *principes*, those in the full vigour of manhood; and these two formed the van, under the common name of *Antepilani*, "those before the *pilani*," (javelin-men), another name for the *Triarii* or third rank. The latter were the main body, consisting of veterans, of whom those best tried formed the front line of *veterani* or *triarii* proper; behind them were the *rovarii*, of younger and less famous soldiers; and last of all the *accensi*, or supernumeraries. The central line, of *triarii* proper, may be regarded as the nucleus of the whole force, with two lines in front, that could fall back between its open columns if driven in, and two other lines in the rear, to advance to its support. Each line was formed of fifteen maniples or companies (*manipuli*), consisting of 60 privates, 2 centurions or captains, and an ensign (*vexillarius*). The maniples were drawn up with a space between them on each side, and were formed in open order, each man having a free space to wield his weapons. This open order, in which so much scope was given to the powers of the individual soldier, the system of separate lines, supporting each other at intervals, and the greater breadth of front, formed the great distinctions between the legion and the phalanx.

the Romans had not yet learnt to despise, and whose strange forms their horses could not be brought to face. The cavalry which was to have decided the victory fled, carrying confusion among the legions: the elephants pursued, trampling down all before them; and the charge of Pyrrhus with his Thessalian horse made the rout complete. It is said that the Roman army would have been cut to pieces, had not a certain Caius Minucius wounded one of the elephants, which turned back upon the pursuers, causing a confusion which gave the fugitives a momentary respite, and showed how these terrible beasts might be made dangerous to their own employers. As it was, the Romans escaped over the Siris, but without staying to defend their camp. Their loss in killed and wounded was reckoned at 15,000 men, of whom 7000 were left dead upon the field, and 2000 were taken prisoners. The battle cost Pyrrhus 4000 slain, including so many of his best men and officers as to have called forth from him the celebrated saying, that such another victory would be his ruin. Lævinus drew off his routed army into Apulia, and found a rallying place at Venusia, which remained faithful to Rome, while environed by the enemy. The rest of Apulia, with Lucania, Samnium, the Bruttii, the Greek cities, in a word, the whole south of Italy, were the prize of the victory; but the Latins were steadfast, and Pyrrhus learnt with what sort of men he had to deal by the refusal of his offer to the prisoners to take service in his army.

Well weighing the price that his victory had cost, and trusting to its immediate effect upon the Romans, he offered terms of peace. His aim was to establish a Greek power in Southern Italy, embracing the Italian states as dependent allies; an arrangement which might be sufficient at least till he should have subjugated Sicily. He demanded the freedom of all the Hellenic cities, including those of Campania, and the restitution of all territory and places (Luceria and Venusia among the rest) that had been taken from the Samnite nations. The bearer of these proposals was the minister Cineas, a philosopher and orator who had heard Demosthenes in his youth, and who was said to have won more cities by his tongue than Pyrrhus had taken by his sword. He was instructed to lavish professions of respect and admiration on the republic; but he was furnished with other means of persuasion, to be used in private. His blandishments were not without effect. A party in the senate were inclined to impose upon themselves with the fallacy that a present concession might draw Pyrrhus on

to his ruin. But the old statesmen, who had guided the republic through the Samnite and Latin wars, and had seen her take the first step to sovereign dominion, knew full well that the question was of her relinquishing all she had gained and subsiding into the chief city of Latium, a mere province of a Greek kingdom. The blind and aged Appius Claudius, who in his censorship had laid down the road by which the Roman armies had so often marched to their victories in the south, appeared in the senate, after a long retirement, to infuse into a new generation the spirit by which their fathers had conquered. The story of how he was carried through the crowded forum in a litter, and led by his sons and sons-in-law to his place, and heard with breathless silence by the senate, irresistibly recalls that great scene of our own history, the last appearance of Chatham,—a comparison which Dr. Arnold has drawn with a very pardonable exaggeration:—"We recollect how the greatest of English statesmen, bowed down by years and infirmity like Appius, but roused like him by the dread of approaching dishonour to the English name, was led by his son and son-in-law into the House of Lords, and all the peers with one impulse arose to receive him. We know the expiring words of that mighty voice, when he protested against the dismemberment of this ancient monarchy, and prayed that if England must fall, she might fall with honour. The real speech of Lord Chatham against yielding to the coalition of France and America will give a far more lively image of what was said by the blind Appius in the Roman senate than any fictitious oration which I could either copy from other writers or endeavour myself to invent; and those who would wish to know how Appius spoke should read the dying words of the great orator of England."* Not content, with rejecting the king's overtures, the senate declared the principle that Rome could never negotiate with a foreign enemy on Italian ground; and Cineas returned to tell his master that "to fight with the Roman people was like fighting with the hydra, so inexhaustible were their numbers and their spirit. The city was like a temple, the senate was an assembly of kings." Such expressions might well have been used by a spectator of the actual state of Rome; but they were probably placed in the mouth of

* Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 497. It is a remarkable coincidence that the painter of the modern scene should have given life to a son who, at an age as great as that of Appius, and in spite of infirmities like Chatham's, was wont to entrance the House of Lords, with pleadings as eloquent as those of either, for the true dignity of England in the cause of European liberty.

Cineas by the Greek rhetorical historians. At all events they had no effect in checking the course of Pyrrhus.

The Romans prepared to meet him in a spirit worthy of their proud answer to his overtures. Two new legions were raised to reinforce Lævinus, who followed the march of Pyrrhus into Campania, and saved Capua and Neapolis. Having laid waste that rich province, the king ascended the valley of the Liris into Latium, as far as Fregellæ, which he took by surprise, thus securing the passage of the river. His march was now directed straight upon Rome along the great Latin road. The Hernicans of Anagnia, who were still the unwilling subjects of Rome, and the Prænestines, smarting under their recent cruel chastisement, opened their gates at his approach, but the Latin cities in general showed no inclination to revolt from Rome. He had advanced six miles beyond Præneste, to the spot where the road emerges from the mountains into the Campagna, across which he could see the city at the distance of only eighteen miles, when he found that his onward march had reached its limit.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts since their defeat at the Vadimonian Lake, and probably unwilling to have the war carried into their country, the Etruscans made a separate peace with Rome at this very crisis, and the army of the consul Coruncanius was set at liberty to operate against Pyrrhus, while the dictator, Cn. Domitius Calvinus, covered Rome with his army of reserve. With such a force in his front, and that of Lævinus hanging on his rear, Pyrrhus had no choice but to retreat. He carried off his immense booty into Campania unmolested by Lævinus,* and thence retired into winter quarters at Tarentum (B.C. 280). The fruits of his victory at Heraclea had been in a great measure lost by the defection of the Etruscans and the firm attitude of the Latins, and the Italian confederates complained of the burthens of a war in which the insolence of the foreign soldiery was ever reminding them of their secondary part.

It was during this winter that the Romans sent that embassy to Pyrrhus, which the annalists have adorned with their celebrated stories of the unflinching courage and incorruptible integrity of Fabricius. The object of the mission, to ransom or exchange the Roman prisoners, was refused by Pyrrhus unless the terms of peace already offered by Cineas were accepted; but he allowed them to

* The Roman annalists tell one of their usual romances, about the army of Lævinus frightening off the Greeks with their shouts, when Pyrrhus was preparing for an attack.

go to Rome to celebrate the Saturnalia, on their word of honour to return, a pledge to which the senate added force by proclaiming the penalty of death for any one who loitered a day behind the appointed time.

At the beginning of the summer of B.C. 279, Pyrrhus opened the campaign in Apulia, and the Roman consuls marched to the relief of Asculum, to which he had laid siege. The two armies were equally matched, both in their numbers and composition. Each contained about 70,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry; the select troops being 16,000 Greeks and Epirots on the one side, and 20,000 Romans on the other; but to counterbalance this slight disparity, Pyrrhus had his elephants, now reduced to nineteen. His allies were the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites, with the civic force of Tarentum, distinguished by their white shields: those of the Romans were the Latins, Campanians, Volscians, Umbrians, Sabines, and the kindred Sabellian tribes. The armies were drawn up in such a manner as to prove that on neither side were the allies fully trusted. Pyrrhus arranged his wings so as to meet the open order of the Romans, who, on their part, had invented a peculiar sort of war-chariot to use against the elephants. The real battle of Asculum was preceded, the day before, by an indecisive engagement, in which Pyrrhus, attacking on broken ground, suffered some disadvantage; but on the following day he drew the Romans into the plain, where his phalanx had room to form and his elephants free scope for action. The Romans exhausted their desperate valour upon the even front of the phalanx without being able to penetrate within the line of spears; till, wearied and disordered, they were routed by a charge of the elephants. They escaped to their camp behind the river, with the loss of 6000 men. How entirely the victory was due to the phalanx is proved by the loss of 3505 of the king's other troops. We are fortunate in possessing the trustworthy account of the battle of Asculum, copied by Plutarch from Hieronymus of Cardia, an historian who flourished from the time of Alexander to that of Pyrrhus, and made use of the king's own commentaries. The Roman annalists claimed the victory; and, in a political sense, they were not far wrong. Pyrrhus had not succeeded in completely crushing a Roman army and giving the allies of Rome an opportunity to revolt; and the Italian confederacy was held together and to him by ties loose from the first, and long since weakened by mutual disgust. His own Greek troops, on whom alone he placed reliance, melted away with every battle, and the irruption of the Gauls into Greece precluded the

hope of reinforcements. He abandoned the campaign, leaving the Romans in possession of Apulia, and retired into winter quarters at Tarentum (B.C. 279).

Here he was invited to a scene of action more congenial to a Greek, and promising a better vantage ground for some future attack on Italy. Agathocles had been dead ten years, and the Sicilian Greeks had been left, without any common leader, to the demagogues and despots of their several cities. Meanwhile the Carthaginians had made rapid progress in the island; Agrigentum had fallen, and Syracuse was now threatened. The Syracusans applied to Pyrrhus, who had a sort of claim, as the son-in-law of Agathocles, to be their natural leader, and they offered him the sovereignty of their city. They were seconded by envoys from the other states, who promised to make him master of the whole island. At the same juncture, the Romans and Carthaginians, who had hitherto been connected only by commercial treaties, concluded an offensive and defensive league against Pyrrhus and the Greeks. By this treaty, the Romans secured the aid of the Carthaginian fleet to operate upon the coast of Italy, and especially to blockade Pyrrhus in Tarentum, and the Carthaginians hoped to detain the king in Italy while they obtained the complete mastery of Sicily. It might well appear that, by at once meeting them on the latter field, Pyrrhus would best promote his ultimate success in Italy.

Early in B.C. 278, the Carthaginian fleet of 120 sail, under Mago, sailed from Ostia to the straits. They were received at Messina by the Mamertines, of whom we shall soon hear more; but Rhegium was successfully defended by the revolvers, who could hope for no mercy from the Romans. Syracuse was next blockaded, while a powerful army formed the siege by land. Meanwhile the Romans opened the campaign in Italy under the new consuls, of whom Fabricius was one. This simple yeoman seemed to have been raised up to overcome Pyrrhus by a magnanimity like his own before Curius conquered him in arms. He sent warning to the king that one of his servants had offered to poison him if he were well paid. Pyrrhus responded to the generous act by dismissing all his Roman prisoners without ransom, and seized the opportunity to re-open negotiations. Cineas was once more sent to Rome; but the senate remained firm to the Carthaginian alliance, and adhered to its former terms. It was now needful above all things to save Syracuse. Disregarding alike the remonstrances of the Italians, and the piteous appeal of the Tarentines, that, if he must desert them, he would at least restore to them their city, Pyrrhus left Milo with a garrison at

Tarentum, and his son Alexander at Locri, and set sail with his main force for Sicily. If the Carthaginians had left a squadron at Messina, it was too weak to oppose his passage, and he disembarked at Tauromenium (*Taormina*), near the northern foot of Etna.

The two years which Pyrrhus had spent in Italy, so brilliant in victories and so fruitless in their results, foreshadowed the bright promise and the bitter disappointment of his two years' campaign in Sicily. He was at once successful in relieving Syracuse, and all the Greek cities recognized his leadership. Their union turned the tide against the Carthaginians, who were almost entirely driven from the field, and lost their fortress of Eryx in the west. It was only the strength of their fleet that enabled them to hold the two great ports of Messina and Lilybæum at the opposite extremities of the island. The Romans, engaged in recovering the south of Italy, showed no disposition to come to their help; and the Carthaginians offered Pyrrhus a separate peace, with supplies of men and money, if he would leave them in undisturbed possession of Lilybæum. They hoped, of course, that he would return to Italy, leaving the Greek cities once more at their mercy. Pyrrhus rejected the proposal, and set to work to supply his greatest want, by building a fleet, which might enable him not only to take Lilybæum, and to keep open his communications between Epirus, Italy, and Sicily, but even to carry the war into Africa with that adequate force for the want of which Agathocles had failed. By the middle of B.C. 278, the fleet was ready in the harbour of Syracuse. But in the mean time disaffection had broken out among the Greeks. Trained at the court of Ptolemy, Pyrrhus had imbibed oriental ideas of government thoroughly distasteful to the citizens of free republics; nor did he scruple to put down opposition by severity. His failure to take Lilybæum had injured his prestige with the Greeks, and, when they saw his new fleet sail for Tarentum instead of Lilybæum, they believed that he had finally abandoned them. They refused all his demands for reinforcements and supplies, and, in one word, the kingdom of Sicily was lost.

It appears, indeed, that Pyrrhus was led by his generous nature into a political mistake. Had he completed the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily, and then established his government there with something of the sternness of a Dionysius or an Agathocles, he might have returned as the undisputed sovereign of the island, to finish his work in Italy. The successes of the

Romans had indeed been great; and even Locri had been lost, the citizens having massacred the Epirot garrison. But the Lucanians and Samnites were not yet entirely subdued; and Tarentum, held by the garrison under Milo, kept open the entrance into Italy. Pyrrhus could have afforded to wait; but he seems to have felt himself bound to respond to the cry of the Italians before they were quite crushed; and his attempt to relieve them cut him off from his surest resources. "The enterprize of Pyrrhus was wrecked; and the plan of his life was ruined irretrievably: he is henceforth an adventurer, who feels that he has been great and is so no longer, and who now wages war, not as a means to an end, but in order to drown thought amidst the reckless excitement of the game, and to find, if possible, in the tumult of battle, a soldier's death."* The state of his mind was revealed by an incident to be related presently. He began operations for the recovery of the Greek cities, while the consuls were engaged in Samnium and Lucania. Locri was taken by surprise, and the inhabitants punished for the slaughter of the garrison; but the Campanians in Rhegium repelled his attack, with the help of the Mamertines of Messana. Eager as the Italians had been to seek his aid, they seemed to give him but a cold welcome, and offered none of the supplies he needed. On his return from Rhegium, he was persuaded by some of his followers to plunder the temple of Proserpine at Locri of a treasure which had been buried out of mortal sight for untold generations. But the ships which were conveying it to Tarentum were wrecked, and the treasure was cast back on the Locrian shore. In vain did Pyrrhus restore it to the temple, and seek to propitiate the goddess with the lives of his advisers. His constant sense of being haunted by her displeasure proved that his impulsive nature had succumbed to despondency. Alexander was not free from superstition, but he knew how to propitiate the gods by assuming that they were always on his side. Pyrrhus was not cold-blooded enough for a great conqueror, and the saying is literally true of him, which is the deepest irony when applied to Cæsar:—

"Ambition should be made of sterner stuff."

Even the Romans, who were little deficient in this material, were seized with religious terror at the renewal of the war, attended as it was by unheard of prodigies. The thunderbolt of Jove decapitated his own clay statue on the summit of the Capitol, and the

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 421.

head was only found after a diligent search in the river's bed at the very spot indicated by the augurs. The new levy was not raised till the consul Manius Curius Dentatus had made a severe example of the first defaulter. At length Curius took the field in Samnium, and his colleague Lentulus in Lucania (B.C. 275).

The army of Pyrrhus at Tarentum was by this time reduced to 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, of whom his veteran Epirots formed but a small proportion. Of the forces of the Samnites and Lucanians we have no account, except that both nations were almost exhausted by the successes of the Romans during the last two years. A Roman army had wintered in Samnium; and the first object of Pyrrhus was to relieve the Samnites before they were completely crushed. Despatching a body of Samnite auxiliaries to make head against Lentulus in Lucania, he hastened with his main body into Samnium, where Curius lay near Beneventum, waiting for the junction of his colleague, and for favourable omens. A night attack on the consul's camp was disconcerted by some of Pyrrhus's troops losing their way in the darkness; and the rough ground on which the attack was made was in favour of the Romans. Encouraged by the repulse of the night assault, Curius led down his army into the plain. The Romans, victorious on one wing, were on the other driven back before the charge of the elephants, when the guards of the camp poured in such a shower of arrows, that the galled beasts turned round and ran full upon the phalanx. The Romans, rushing in through the openings in the array of spears, plied their short swords almost unresisted within the enemy's guard. The flower of the Epirot army was destroyed: the camp of Pyrrhus fell into the victors' hands: and, in addition to 1300 prisoners, they took four elephants, the first that were ever seen at Rome. The wonder always excited by the animals when seen for the first time must have been mingled with deep suggestions of oriental conquest, when the Romans saw the strange beasts waving their trunks before the triumphal car of their rustic consul. The immense booty of the royal camp was afterwards used for the construction of the aqueduct which conveyed the water of the Anio to Rome (*Anio Vetus*).

Clinging to his enterprise to the last, Pyrrhus applied to his allies in the East for the indispensable reinforcements, but without success. His enemy, Antigonus Gonatas, reigned in Macedonia and threatened Epirus itself, and the kings of Syria and Egypt were busy with their own affairs. The expedition was at an end; and Pyrrhus returned to his own country to reap his brilliant and

profitless victories for the last time (B.C. 275). Landing in Epirus with only 8000 foot and 500 horse, he was soon strong enough to recover the crown of Macedonia from Antigonius, but only to perish the next year by a woman's hand in the streets of Argos (B.C. 272).^{*} But even at his final departure, he was so loth to relinquish all hold upon Italy, that he left a garrison under Milo in Tarentum, and, while he lived, this shadow of his presence prolonged the resistance of the south.

Milo discharged his duty like a man of sense and spirit. The resistance of Italy was virtually ended, and the peace party recovered the political government of Tarentum. Those who chose were suffered to leave the city and to build a separate fort, which they surrendered to the Romans without opposition from Milo; but he refused to give up the city itself. It was not till a Carthaginian fleet appeared in the bay, and the Tarentines were about to yield the city to them, that Milo, released from his allegiance by the death of Pyrrhus, admitted the Romans into the citadel (B.C. 272). It is not easy to exaggerate the influence of this step on the destinies of the world; for the possession of a port like Tarentum might probably have reversed the issue of the Punic Wars. As it was, the Carthaginians protested that they had come in all friendship, to aid the Romans in accordance with the treaty. Tarentum was suffered to retain its self-government on surrendering all its means of defence; and the Lucanians and Bruttians made their submission.

Some isolated enterprises still remained, to complete the subjugation of Italy. The first was the reduction and punishment of the revolted Campanian garrison of Rhegium, who had now held out for ten years against the Romans, the Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus. The city was taken after a long and desperate resistance, and the survivors of the original mutineers were scourged and beheaded in the market place at Rome (B.C. 270). In this war we first find Hiero of Syracuse giving the Romans that support which he so faithfully maintained throughout his long life. Hiero undertook on his own account the reduction of those kindred pirates, the Mamertines of Messina, with results of which we have to speak in the next chapter. The final effort of the Samnites, in the shape of a desultory guerilla warfare, was crushed by the united armies of both consuls in the following year (B.C. 269). But at the very time when the last sparks of Italian independence were trampled out in its ancient focus, a new war was begun by a

^{*} See Chap. XVIII. pp. 107, 108.

people of whom we have barely heard before. These were the Picentines, on the Adriatic coast, between Umbria and the Sabine country. They had been the faithful allies of Rome ever since the outbreak of the Third Samnite War; and their present revolt arose probably from the design of removing many of them to colonize the old Samnite coast on the Gulf of Salernum. They were speedily subdued, and the new colonies of Ariminum and Beneventum added security to the Adriatic coast and the Samnite mountains (B.C. 268). Last of all, the Roman arms were carried beyond Tarentum into the Iapygian promontory, which forms the "heel" of Italy, and was peopled by the Messapians and Salentines. The latter, who were settled about the extreme headland (*C. di Leuca*) claimed to be a Greek colony, founded by the Cretan Idomeneus after the Trojan War. By their subjugation, the Romans secured the port of Brundisium, a place of the greatest importance to hold in case Alexander, the son of Pyrrhus, should revive his father's projects, and afterwards the chief point of departure from Italy to Greece (B.C. 267). It was connected with Rome by the extension of the Appian road from Capua, through Beneventum, Venusia, and Tarentum.

The whole of Italy was intersected by military roads, and military colonies (several of which have been already mentioned) were established at the most commanding points, to keep the country in subjection, and to guard against irruptions of the Gauls on the north and north-east, where Ariminum was the key of the frontier. Those of the new colonies, as well as many of the older settlements, which were planted on the sea-shore, were charged with the special duty of guarding the coasts, their colonists being exempted from military service by land. For Rome, though a maritime city from the first, had not yet obtained naval supremacy in her own waters. The fleets of the Carthaginians, Etruscans, Massaliots and Syracusans, had long held the dominions of the seas, from which Rome might easily have been excluded but for her wise policy of commercial treaties with Carthage. The time was not remote when the piratical galleys of Antium had commanded the Latin coast, and we have seen Tarentum setting limits to Roman navigation. Some progress had been made during the last fifty years. The reduction of Antium and the surrender of its fleet was a first step to the formation of a navy, the importance of which was justly commemorated by the *Rostra* in the Forum (B.C. 338).*

* See p. 288.

The conquered cities of Magna Græcia (beginning with Neapolis, B.C. 326), contributed certain numbers of ships to the Roman navy, which was organized in B.C. 311 by the appointment of two admirals (*duoviri navales*). Meanwhile the decline of the Etruscans had compelled them to yield to Carthage the maritime supremacy they had once divided with her, and the continued success of the Carthaginians in Sicily had brought down Syracuse from the proud position which Dionysius had secured for her on the sea. The Massaliots scarcely appeared on the coast of Italy, being content to preserve the mastery of their own waters, and to protect their commerce against Carthaginian and other interlopers. Thus the supremacy of Carthage was no longer disputed, and her relations to Rome are clearly defined by the commercial treaty of B.C. 306. The older treaty (B.C. 348), of which this was a renewal, had bound the Romans not to sail beyond *C. Bon*, on the Carthaginian coast, but now, besides the superfluously jealous exclusion from the Atlantic, on the shores of which Carthage had begun to found settlements, they were prohibited from trading with Sardinia or the cities of the African coast, so that Carthage itself and Sicily alone remained open to their commerce. Such an increase of jealousy contained the seeds of new dissension, which must have been fostered by the selfish policy of Carthage in carrying out the military convention against Pyrrhus. That alliance was the last friendly connection, in presence of a common danger, of the two republics, whose interests were clearly shown to be irreconcilable by the very pretence of concerted action. The contrasted attitudes of the Carthaginian fleet off the harbour of Tarentum and the army of Papirius outside its walls, each watching for the coveted prize, was an omen of the approaching rivalry for the dominion, first of Sicily and then of the world; and the preference given to the Romans over their dangerous allies furnished them with a new centre of maritime power and a new motive for using it to the utmost. By the conquest of Bruttii in the same year, they obtained in the immense forest tract of Sila, which contained a vast variety of timber and produced the best pitch then known, the materials for building a fleet. The maritime organization of the whole coast was provided for by the appointment of the four Quæstors of the fleet (*Quæstores Classici*), whose stations were at Ostia, the port of Rome, to command the Etruscan and Latin coasts; at Cales, for Campania and Magna Græcia; at Ariminum, for the Adriatic coast; but the station of the fourth is not named. Together with these preparations at

home, the republic sought for alliances among the Greek maritime states which had long been at enmity with Carthage. The close friendship which had long bound her to Massalia may perhaps be taken as another sign of the Hellenic element in the Roman state. The Greek merchants of that city, who had made a collection to aid in the restoration of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, received special commercial privileges, and a place at the games next to that of the senators.* A treaty was made in B.C. 306 with Rhodes, which had now established its independence in the midst of the eastern monarchies, and another with the Corinthian colony of Apollonia on the Illyrian coast.

Thus, on the eve of the completion of her five-hundredth year, Rome had extended her dominion over all Italy, and was preparing to contend for the empire of the world. The confederated Latins, the wealthy cities of Etruria, the hardy races of the Sabellian stock, were each as unfit to take her place at the head of a united Italy, as they had proved unable to arrest her advance. Whatever sympathy may be felt with nations struggling for their independence, whatever disgust at the heartless selfishness and bad faith which marked so many steps of the republic's progress, it is clear that Rome's aggrandizement was an essential part of that great plan, which is gradually developed at every step in the history of the world, and which is no more dependent on man's virtues than it is frustrated by his faults. The good will ever tend to work out good, the evil to retard it, and the choice between them is of infinite consequence to our own moral responsibility; but the Supreme Ruler is ever teaching us how puny are our best efforts to give an impulse to His work, how powerless our worst opposition to resist it. The historian has no need to palliate the wrongs which Divine Providence overrules to its own designs; and he must ever feel how partial and short-sighted are his most careful judgments of the character and motives of the actors. When he has done his best to exalt self-sacrificing virtue, when he has poured out his indignation alike against the despot and the meanness which is dazzled by despotism, when he has stripped the veil from the selfish wrongs which are so often excused by the pretext of patriotism, he still shrinks from assuming the authority of a judge, and leaves every man to stand or fall to his own Master. It is his more grateful task to trace, by the light of faith in God's government of the world, the unfolding of the great scheme in which use is made of the cruel despotism, the baughty and selfish

* It was called *Græcostasis*, that is, the Greek platform.

aristocracy, the headstrong and turbulent republic, as well as of the best ordered forms of free but stable government ; to see how each agent has been fitted for his work, and how each part of the work has been assigned to the agent best able to do it. Rome was the power most fitted to unite Italy in one great state, preparatory to the union of the civilized world in one vast empire. The Romans alone, of all the Italian nations, added to the highest courage and the most unflinching perseverance the profoundest respect for law and discipline. Rome alone possessed the secret of welding the fragments successfully brought together by conquest into a political whole, in which municipal freedom was reconciled with the unity and supremacy of the central power ; while her internal struggles had resulted in a constitution which, though containing, like all others, the seeds of dissolution, had enough of vitality and permanence to enable her citizens to present a united front to the world. The external and internal conflicts of five centuries, like the fierceness of the blast-furnace, and the perpetual blows of the hammer, had given her the strength of that metal, which is her prophetic symbol, and prepared her to do in the political world that universal work which it does in the material. "The fourth kingdom shall be strong as iron ; forasmuch as iron breaketh in pieces and subdueth all things : and as iron that breaketh in pieces all these, shall it break in pieces and bruise." *

The successive steps by which Rome advanced to this position have been traced at each stage of the narrative. It only remains to take a summary view of her present constitution, in its relation to the empire she had established in Italy. Of the extent and nature of that empire, an excellent general idea is given by Dr. Arnold :—"Thus the whole extent of Italy, from the Macra and the Rubicon to Rhegium and Brundisium, was become more or less subject to Rome. But it was not merely that the several Italian nations were to follow in war where Rome might choose to lead them ; nor yet that they paid a certain tribute to the sovereign state, such as Athens received from her subject allies. The Roman dominion in Italy had wrested large tracts of land from the conquered nations in every part of the peninsula ; forests, mines, and harbours had become the property of the Roman people, from which a large revenue was derived, so that all classes of Roman citizens were enriched by their victories : the rich acquired a great extent of land to hold in occupation ; the poor

* Daniel ii. 40.

obtained grants of land in freehold by an agrarian law; while the great increase of revenue required a greater number of persons to collect it, and thus, from the quæstors to the lowest collectors or clerks employed under them, all the officers of government became suddenly multiplied.* These state possessions and administrative functions secured to the central government a supreme authority, which was felt in its ramifications throughout the whole peninsula; and, while the several peoples retained their own language and national existence, their own laws and internal administration, they were constantly becoming more and more Romanized. The republic was a more compact state than its rival Carthage, or than the great eastern monarchies had ever been.

It is not, however, easy to define the precise limits between the political supremacy of Rome and the rights that were left to the Italian states. The sovereign prerogatives of making war in which all the subject nations must lend their aid, of concluding treaties by which they were all bound, and of coining money which circulated through the whole peninsula, belonged of course to the sovereign city.† “It is probable,” as Mommsen points out, “that formally the general rights of the leading community extended no further: but to these rights there was necessarily attached a prerogative of sovereignty that practically went far beyond them.” One of the most powerful means of extending that sovereignty was the incorporation of the subject states more or less closely with Rome, while they were debarred from exercising among themselves those rights which were granted them in relation to the sovereign state. We have seen, from time to time, how the Romans conferred on their conquered subjects or their voluntary allies various degrees of their own political and social privileges. The result was that the states of Italy came under three distinct classes:—the *Roman Citizens*, the *Latin Name*, and the *Allies*.‡ The first class, as the name implies, contained all that had been

* Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. pp. 532, 533.

† It was in B.C. 269 that the Romans first added to their old cumbersome and copper money a silver coinage, conformed to that of the Greek states. The *denarius* (nominally equal to ten asses or pounds of copper) was intended to be equal to the Greek *drachma*, and was worth nearly 9*d.* This was the chief current coin throughout Italy. The Romans kept their own accounts in *sestercies* (*sestertii*). The *sestercie* was a small silver coin, of the nominal value of two and a half asses, and really equal to one-fourth of the *denarius*, or 2½*d.* It represented the original value of the *as*, when it was really a pound of copper, *as libralis*. See further, on the whole subject, the author's articles on Roman weights and money in the *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

‡ *Cives Romani*, *Nomen Latinum*, *Socii*.

admitted to the full Roman franchise, by the extension of which Rôme had been enlarged from an urban community to a wide-spread territory. From the Ciminian forest in Etruria to beyond the Liris in Campania, large tracts of land had been included in the domain of the republic, and added to the number of the Roman tribes, which were thus made up to thirty-three. Veii (with its chief allies), the Sabines, the Latins, the Volscians, Æquians, and other Sabellian tribes, and a great part of the Campanians, had been thus incorporated, with a few exceptions even in Latium, such as Tibur and Præneste, from which the full citizenship was withheld. On others it was only conferred in its social, to the exclusion of political, rights.* To the cities included in this public domain, the boundaries of which cannot be accurately defined, must be added some of the Roman colonies throughout Italy; but the greater number of the colonies fell under the next head. With reference to the formation of this class of Roman citizens, it should be borne in mind that the admission of the people of a foreign state into the dominant civic body was originally regarded as a gain to the latter rather than to the former, who lost the rights of citizenship in their own states, in order that Rome might be relieved from the rivalry of independent neighbours. It was not till she had become the mistress of a great empire that the enjoyment of her citizenship could be prized as the highest privilege; and a native of Tusculum, for example, must long have regarded the change with a regret like that of an Irish patriot for the parliament on College Green. From this point of view we can understand the eagerness of Rome to confer her citizenship on the people of other states, nay even to impose it as the penalty of defeat in war. But when she became a sovereign state, she began to restrict what was now truly a privilege, and to place those who would in earlier days have been full citizens in one of the two classes that are still to be described.

The *Latin Name* must not be confounded with the Latin cities, nearly all of which, as we have just seen, possessed the full Roman franchise. It originated from the time when Rome, having recently become the head of the states of Latium, joined the Latins in sending out colonies, besides those founded by herself alone. These "Latin colonies"—as they were called in contradistinction to those purely Roman—enjoyed only such civic rights as were at first granted to the conquered cities of Latium; the most important being the freedom of trading and inheriting pro-

* This was called the *civitas sine suffragio*.

perty within the Roman state, and the privilege of any of their citizens to be enrolled in one of the Roman tribes on migrating to Rome. By the increasing jealousy with which, as we have just seen, the Romans afterwards guarded their citizenship, this privilege of becoming citizens by migration was confined to those who had held magistracies in a Latin state. *Long before the present period, these colonies had ceased to have any connection with the Latins, and the name was perpetuated to describe a certain position of restricted civic privilege, which was granted to colonies sent out by Rome herself, and which the colonists were content to accept in consideration of the lands allotted to them. Most of the Roman colonies, in fact, belonged to this class.

These colonies, whether "Roman" or "Latin," formed a vital part of the system by which the Roman empire was extended. They were in Italy, what Cicero calls the later colonies in distant lands, "bulwarks of the empire" (*propugnacula imperii*); and in return they leant for support upon the force of the mother city. They were at first founded in conquered districts, to keep the people in subjection; and the colonists received a share—usually a third—of the conquered territory, from the cultivation of which, whether by themselves or the dispossessed proprietors as their tenants, they derived the name ever since used to describe such settlers.* No Roman colony could be composed of mere adventurers, going out at their own pleasure; but each was sent forth by the vote either of the senate, or the centuries, or the plebs.† Leaders, usually three in number,‡ were appointed to conduct the colonists, who were entirely volunteers. The law defined each man's allotment of land. They marched to the appointed place in martial array and under military discipline.§ There a city was marked out by the plough, and the boundaries of its territory were carefully drawn; and a number of functionaries, who accompanied the colony, proceeded to the work of land-measuring, building, organizing, preparing records, and providing for the administration of the law. The government of the colony was modelled on that of the parent state. There was a popular assembly, which chose the magistrates, and might even make laws, provided they did not clash with those of Rome. There

* *Colonus* from *colere*, to till.

† By a *senatus consultum*, a *lex*, or a *plebiscitum*.

‡ *Triumviri ad colonos deducendos*. There were also *decemviri*, *quinqueviri*, and *vigintiviri*, that is, ten, five, or twenty leaders.

§ "*Sub vexillo*," that is, under the standard.

was a senate, the name of which recalled the old constitution of Rome.* There were chief magistrates, corresponding to the Roman consuls, and in a few instances called by the same name, but commonly designated by their number, which was usually two, but not unfrequently four (*duumviri* or *quattuorviri*). Their office was annual, and; as all great questions of policy were decided at Rome, their functions were chiefly judicial. In some of the Italian cities they were replaced by a *prefect* sent out annually from the capital.

All the communities, which had neither the "Roman citizenship" nor the "Latin name," were included under the name of *Allies* or *Allied States*,† beneath which their subject condition was carefully veiled. Their relations to Rome were as various as the treaties by which they were admitted to her alliance. The Hernicans, for example, nominally possessed their ancient equal league with Rome, though they would have asserted equal rights at their peril; while the states last subdued, such as Tarentum and the Samnites, had scarcely a semblance of liberty left. Their alliance with Rome involved the dissolution of their old national leagues, which it was the constant Roman policy to break up; and in some cases the members of the ancient confederacies were forbidden to intermarry with each other. While the Roman army was still held to consist of the levy of the Roman and Latin citizens, the allies were bound to furnish contingents, apparently on a scale prescribed by treaty; but in case of necessity their whole force would be at the disposal of Rome. Each state bore the expense of its own contingent, and the taxes raised for this purpose were enforced, if necessary, by Roman officers. The most costly munitions of war were provided by the Latin cities and the allies; and the contingent of allied cavalry was thrice that raised by the Romans and the Latins. The Greek maritime cities, in the same way, furnished contingents to the fleet. Thus the allies added to the strength of Rome, while sharing none of the privileges of her citizens, except the material benefits of her government and her powerful protection from foreign foes.

In the political government of the allied states, Rome pursued her great system of making her power the surer by moderation in its use, and preferring indirect influence to direct coercion. Like Sparta, she everywhere favoured the aristocratic party, and the result of this policy was seen in a striking case, when Capua

* It was called *curia* or *ordo decurionum*: its members were *curiales* or *decuriones*.

† *Socii*, *Fœderatæ Civitates*, or *Fœderati*.

refused to join the Samnites. In no Italian state were the people reduced to a condition like that of the Lacedæmonian helots, nor does tribute seem to have been exacted, except from the Celtic cantons, which were probably regarded as mere settlements of barbarians within the limits of the empire. Indeed, the first designation by which the Italians were recognised as a united people, "the men of the toga" (*togati*), was used to distinguish them from the Celts, "the men of the hose" (*braccati*);* and the distinction corresponded to the great geographical division between Gaul and Italy in the proper sense.† Within the latter limits, the *toga* became more and more the mark of Roman influence; in other words, Italy became more and more Latinized. And the more successfully this process was carried on, the more impossible did it become to maintain the allied states in their inferior position. Such a condition was natural enough for newly conquered nations in a newly conquered land; but when the Italians saw the Roman empire overspreading the world, extended by their own toil and blood, they must have felt that the seat of that empire was no longer Rome, but Italy, and that all Italians ought to have an equal share of privilege. The assertion of these claims was postponed while the subject states were rushing on side by side with the Romans in the career of victory; but at length they had to be conceded, and the Lex Julia conferred the full Roman citizenship on the Allies as well as on the Latins, whose cities were included under the general name of *municipia* (B.C. 90).

Thus within ten years of the departure of Pyrrhus from Italy, the country had become united, at the expense of the liberties of its several states, and Rome had grown to a truly sovereign power. The changes which had meanwhile taken place in her own constitution, though giving a vast increase of power to the popular element, had not deprived her of that concentrated force which is wielded by an aristocracy. The growth of great families among the plebeians reinforced the upper classes; and, though the exclusive aristocracy of birth had been broken down, the aristocracy of wealth possessed an overwhelming influence. A stable centre for that influence was provided in the senate, whose initiative in receiving ambassadors and in all questions of war and peace, gave it a pre-

* It is curious that the Celts of Italy should have been distinguished by an article of attire so "conspicuous by its absence" in those of our own island. In fact, some sort of pantaloons seem to have been worn by all the nations that surrounded the Greeks and Italians, from the Persians to the Gauls.

† See Chap. XIX. p. 134.

ponderating weight during the long career of military conflict on which Rome had embarked. The constitution of this august body was now finally settled, and a path was opened to its honours for every citizen who had the wealth to conduct a successful canvass, by making its membership a direct and necessary result of an election to the first of the higher magistracies. It was in B.C. 268 that the number of the quæstors was increased to eight; and about the same time the discretion of the censors in excluding a past magistrate from a seat in the senate—except for “infamy”—was abolished. On the expiration of their office, the quæstors entered the senate with the right of speaking, and vacancies were filled up from their number on the next censorial revision. The assembly, thus frequently recruited from a class whom the people had recently elected, became the representative of all orders in the state, and the august majesty with which it spoke to foreigners was the true voice of the Roman people. Compared with this power, that of the consuls, who held office only for a year, was really insignificant.*

On the minor political changes of this period it is unnecessary to dwell. The attempt of the censor Appius Claudius to increase the influence of the great families by allowing their freedmen (the emancipated slaves) to enrol themselves in any tribe they pleased (B.C. 312) was reversed by the censors Fabius and Decius, who confined them to the four city tribes (B.C. 304). The distinction between the country and city tribes was still marked by a difference of manners and occupations, which we could wish to have better means of tracing. The members of the country tribes were still rustics, though fully sensible of their stake in the greatness of the city and their share in her glory. They went up to Rome to take part in the elections and in voting upon important measures, to present themselves at the military levies, or to transact law and other private business. “With these exceptions, and when they were not serving in the legions, they lived on their small properties in the country; their business was agriculture, their recreations were country sports, and their social pleasures were found in the meetings of their neighbours at seasons of festival; at these times there would be dancing, music, and often some pantomimic acting, or some rude attempts at dramatic dialogue, one of the simplest and most universal amusements of the human mind. This was enough to satisfy all their intellectual

* We have not space to describe the details of the senate's constitution, a subject which is admirably treated in Dr. Mommsen's History.

cravings; of the beauty of painting, sculpture, or architecture, of the charms of eloquence and of the highest poetry, of the deep interest which can be excited by inquiry into the causes of all the wonders around us and within us, of some of the highest and most indispensable enjoyments of an Athenian's nature, the agricultural Romans of the fifth century had no notion whatsoever."* But the life of a nation is more than the most refined pleasures; and, while the polished and philosophical Athenians were yielding their liberty to tyrant after tyrant, and worshipping Demetrius Poliorcetes as a god, the Latin and Sabine farms were rearing such men as Fabricius and "Curius with his unkempt locks," to conquer kings in dignity as well as in arms.

The Romans of the city, enjoying that higher intellectual activity which is purchased at so great a cost of serene pleasure, and sometimes of profounder energy, had some scope for their powers in the conduct of political affairs, like the Athenians. But practical politics can never engross the mind of a thoughtful man, and it was well for after ages that the most masculine minds of Rome found a special field for those speculative energies which the Greeks devoted to literature and philosophy. There seems to have been something in the character of the people, and there was very much in the working of the constitution, to turn their thoughts to the study of law. It was part of the inheritance handed down by their patriarchal constitution, that the heads of families must be able to adjust and defend the rights of their clansmen and their clients by knowledge as well as power; and the hall of every Roman nobleman was a waiting room, thronged with friends and dependents who came to consult him on his first appearance in the morning. There were some families, in particular, that sought in legislation and civil administration the fame which most of their compeers won by arms. Such was the Claudian house, which could boast of the Decemvir and the Censor, of the Laws of the Twelve Tables and the Appian Road. Tiberius Coruncanius, the colleague of Lævinus in the first campaign against Pyrrhus, appears to have been the first of those "*counsel learned in the law*" (*jurisconsulti*) who devoted themselves to the task of directing all who came to seek their advice, and whose opinions constituted that great body of unwritten law, "the answers of skilled lawyers" (*responsa prudentium*). A remarkable step was taken towards the general publication of such learning by Gnæus Flavius, the secretary of the censor Appius Claudius, who pub-

* Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. ii. pp. 448, 449.

lished a book describing the technical forms of pleading and the rules for fixing the sittings of the courts—matters which the patricians had hitherto kept as the secrets of their order. Though the son of a freedman, Flavius was enrolled by his patron in the senate, and elected Curule Ædile by the people. His work appears to have been the first that was written on Roman law.

Of general literature, except the Pontifical Annals and the genealogical registers of great families, there was an absolute dearth; for the Hellenic impulse, to which all Roman literature owed its origin, with one remarkable exception, only appears for the first time in the tragedies of Livius Andronicus, himself a Greek, after the First Punic War. The only approach to dramatic composition was in the *Fabulæ Atellanæ*, already mentioned as borrowed from the Oscans of Campania,—a rude, coarse dialogue on some ludicrous subject. There was another form of indigenous poetry, not yet dignified with the name of literature, but destined to receive a brilliant development. *Satire* has been well described as a hardy, prickly shrub of genuine Latin growth, and by far the best product of the soil. It originated with the strolling minstrels or ballad singers, who went from town to town and from house to house, dancing to the music of the flute and chanting the medleys (*saturæ*),* which they either improvised or had previously composed on any subject suggested by their own fancy or suited to their hearers, in a peculiar metre called the *Saturnian*, which survives in the fragments of Nævius, and in some epitaphs of the age we are now describing. These ballads formed a part of the entertainments provided for the Roman people, in conjunction with musicians, dancers, rope-walkers, jugglers, and Etruscan pantomimists, at the Great Games, besides the chariot races which were the proper business of that great national festival, the origin of which is referred to the age of the Tarquins. Those games, preserved with religious reverence, and converted from an occasional into an annual festival,

* The etymology of this word is still in dispute; but there seems no good reason for rejecting the obvious explanation derived from its use as a common noun. When Tennyson calls his "Princess" a *medley*, no one hesitates to seek (though not every one succeeds in finding) his meaning in the common sense of the latter word. So when we find *saturæ*, derived from *satur* (full), signifying a dish of various sorts of food, and when we are besides told by Dionysius that the poetical *saturæ* was made up of various kinds of poems, we can hardly doubt whence the satirists obtained the name of the dish they set before their hearers. There is no direct connection with the Greek Satyrs and Satyric Drama, though it is quite possible that the latter name came ultimately from the same root.

when the curule ædiles were appointed to superintend them (B.C. 367), furnished the nucleus of a national theatre, especially when a stage was erected in the Circus Maximus, and a sum provided by the state for the exhibitions just referred to (B.C. 364). But, though a century had elapsed since that time, there was still a prejudice against the performers, both rooted in public feeling and embodied in the law. The art of the poet and mimist seems to have been despised as generally practised by low foreigners, Oscan and Etruscan, feared as an instrument of the enchanter, and disapproved as a weapon aimed at public order and private character. The Twelve Tables forbid alike the incantations of the sorcerer, the dirges of hired mourners, and the personal attacks of the lampooner; and Cato tells us that "in former times the trade of a poet was not respected; if any one occupied himself therewith, or addicted himself to banquets, he was called an idler;" and the practice of such arts for pay was held as a special degradation. Performers were excluded by the censors from the army and the comitia. The magistrates sat in judgment on their performances; and the actor who presumed on the grudging patronage of the state might pay for his want of success with imprisonment and stripes. Such discouragements effectually postponed the rise of a national dramatic literature. None but persons of a low class would become performers; and these were for the most part Etruscans.

On the other hand, the chariot races were held in the greatest honour, and presided over by the highest magistrate present at Rome. At first two chariots ran at a time, their drivers being distinguished by colours, which were supposed to have reference to the seasons, the *white* for the winter snow, the *red* for the summer heat: two others were afterwards added, the *green* for spring, and the *blue* or *grey* for autumn. Each colour had of course its own eager partisans; but it was not till the time of the empire that they became symbols of political factions, and at last the emblems of those feuds which deluged the circus of Constantinople with blood. The games of the circus must not be dismissed without a mention of that fatal symptom of degeneracy, the first exhibition of gladiatorial shows in the first year of the Punic Wars (B.C. 264) as a part of the solemnities at the funeral of D. Junius Brutus. The practice is said to have been borrowed from the Etruscans, as a substitute for the human sacrifices offered from time immemorial at the funerals of great men, as for example at that of Patroclus in the *Iliad*, that the deceased might not depart un-

attended by the souls of enemies or followers. It is supposed that the victims on this occasion were the Etruscan prisoners from Volsinii, the conquest of which city in this year completed the subjugation of Etruria.

Such, in brief outline, was the condition of the republic at the close of what has well been called the spring-time of its existence. And it is most important to notice that Rome achieved the conquest of Italy just at the time when the kingdoms founded by the successors of Alexander in the East had reached their highest pitch. The place of Rome was now clearly acknowledged, as one of the great powers of the world, by the chief among those kingdoms. As the Italian expedition of Pyrrhus had derived its impulse from the conflicts that had been waged for half a century for the dominion of Greece and Asia, so his repulse naturally brought his conquerors within the sphere of Grecian politics. While the Epirot was exciting new alarm by his victories in Greece, an embassy arrived at Rome from Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, to propose an alliance with the republic (B.C. 273). The Romans, in return, sent an embassy of three of their most distinguished senators to Alexandria—then at the height of its political power and literary glory. The envoys would not have been Romans, if the sight of all this splendour, following upon their victory over Pyrrhus, had not roused in their minds the prophetic anticipation of an approaching struggle with the Hellenic race for the dominion of the world. But, before the decision of that question between the two branches of their common race, a long war had to be waged for life and death with the great Semitic power, which was the common enemy of both. Rome had to conquer Carthage in a struggle which brought herself to the brink of ruin; before she was prepared to subdue the kindred Greeks.

BOOK VI.

THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF CARTHAGE
AND GREECE.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PUNIC WARS TO THE
ACQUISITION OF THE PROVINCE OF ASIA.

B.C. 265—130.

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CHAPTER XXIV.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. B.C. 264 TO B.C. 241.

“*Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni
CARTHAGO, Italiam contra Tyberinaque longè
Ostia; dives opum, studiisque asperrima belli.*”—VIRGIL.

SICILY THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ROME AND CARTHAGE—ITS CONNECTION WITH ITALY, GREECE, AND CARTHAGE—SEIZURE OF MESSANA BY THE MAMERTINES—THEY ARE BESIEGED BY HIERO—AID VOTED TO THEM BY THE ROMANS—BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR—SUCCESSSES OF THE ROMANS—THEY ARE JOINED BY HIERO—THEIR VICTORY AT AGRIGENTUM—HISTORY OF THE PHENICIANS—THEIR PROPER NAME CANAANITES—THEIR LANGUAGE SEMITIC—TRADITION OF THEIR MIGRATION FROM THE RED SEA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN—THE CITIES OF PHENICIA—HISTORY OF TYRR AND SIDON—THEIR COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION—COLONIES OF THE PHENICIANS—CARTHAGE—LEGENDS OF ITS FOUNDATION—ITS DOMINION IN AFRICA—ITS MARITIME AND COLONIAL EMPIRE IN SPAIN, SARDINIA, AND SICILY—RIVALRY WITH THE GREEKS AND ALLIANCE WITH THE TYRRHENIANS—THE CARTHAGINIAN CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION—RELATIONS WITH ROME TO THE TIME OF THE PUNIC WARS—HISTORY OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR RESUMED—ATTACKS ON THE COASTS OF ITALY—THE ROMAN FLEET—NAVAL VICTORY OF DULIUS—CAMPAIGNS IN SARDINIA, CORSICA, AND SICILY—NAVAL VICTORY OF REGULUS—HIS SUCCESSSES IN AFRICA—HIS DEFEAT AND IMPRISONMENT—THE WAR RESUMED IN SICILY—VICTORY OF PANORMUS AND SIEGE OF LILYBÆUM—REGULUS AT ROME—WRECK OF THE ROMAN FLEET—EXPLOITS OF HAMILCAR BARCA IN SICILY—ROMAN VICTORY OFF THE ÆGATIAN ISLANDS—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR—SICILY A ROMAN PROVINCE—REVOLT AND RECONQUEST OF THE FALISCI—POPULATION OF ROME.

WHEN Pyrrhus sailed from the shores of Sicily, he is reported to have exclaimed, “How fine a battle-field are we leaving to the Romans and Carthaginians!” That island has been described as geographically belonging to Italy, as truly as the Peloponnesus belongs to Greece; and that a political division at the straits of Messina is as unnatural as the partition of Italy itself, is proved by the fact that Sicily and the South of Italy have generally been held by the same or kindred nations. The Siceli, from whom the island received its name, were, as we have seen, the same people as the Itali of the peninsula. The Hellenic settlements studded the shores alike of Magna Græcia and of Sicily. By the events now about to be related, the natural union of the island with the peninsula was established by the Romans; and it was preserved under their Gothic successors. When the kingdom of the Lombards was founded in Italy in the sixth century, the Greek empire held Sicily, in conjunction with the duchies of Naples and Rome, under the exarchate of Ravenna. Rent from Italy by the Arabs in the ninth century, as it had nearly been by the Carthaginians, Sicily was reunited to the peninsula by the Norman adventurers of the eleventh century; and the union of the island

with Southern Italy was perpetuated (with some interruptions) in the kingdom of the two Sicilies; till in our day the hero who created the new Italian kingdom began his work in Sicily.

But the very configuration of the island seems to indicate the fate which has made it, in every age, the prey of adventurers from diverse quarters. Severed from Italy by the straits, it is exposed to be torn from its connection by a superior maritime power. If its northern coast faces the peninsula, its eastern shore looks towards Greece, and its southern towards Africa: and we have already seen how these aspects were significant of its destinies thus far. For centuries, the Greek republics and the power of Carthage had been contending for its possession. The decline of the former had brought the latter up to the very straits; and across them Rome and Carthage now eyed each other with a jealousy about to break out into an internecine war, in which the Greeks, now represented only by the rule of Hiero at Syracuse, were unable to take more than a subordinate part. The conflict was brought on by a cause apparently insignificant.

While the war was raging between Pyrrhus and the Romans, it happened by a strange coincidence that the cities of Rhegium and Messina, on the opposite shores of the straits, fell into the hands of independent freebooters, alike the enemies of both. We have seen how the Campanian mercenaries, who garrisoned Rhegium for Rome, revolted on the first successes of Pyrrhus. Their massacre of the Greek inhabitants would make them as odious to Pyrrhus as their revolt was unpardonable by the Romans. They were encouraged to defy both, and to hold the city for themselves, by the example of their kinsmen on the other side of the strait. A body of Campanian mercenaries, who had served under Agathocles, having been marched to Messina, on their way back to Italy, rose upon the citizens, who had received them hospitably, massacred all the males, and took possession of their wives and property (about B.C. 284). By assuming the title of *Mamertini* (children of Mamers, or Mars) they likened themselves to the chosen bands which had been sent forth by their Sabellian ancestors in their "sacred spring." Both cities thus became nests of robbers, preying on the adjacent territories; and, while the garrison of Rhegium were strong enough to make war on Locri, the Mamertines of Messina carried terror as far as the gates of Syracuse. The first business of the Romans after the capture of Tarentum was, as we have seen, to punish the revolters of Rhegium (B.C. 271).

Meanwhile the Mamertines were maintained against Pyrrhus by the help of the Carthaginians. On his retreat they formed a third power in Sicily, occupying the north-eastern part, while Syracuse possessed only a small territory in the south-east, and the Carthaginians held the rest of the island. But a new impulse was given to Syracuse by the election of Hiero, the son of Hierocles, to succeed Pyrrhus as general of the Greeks (B.C. 275). Though at first raised to power by the soldiers against the will of the citizens, he soon won over the latter by his wise and moderate government. He got rid, by a treacherous stroke, of the mercenaries who had been the tools of former Syracusan tyrants, and, having remodelled the citizen army, he led them out to extirpate the nest of robbers at Messana. By a great victory, he gained the title of king of the Sicilian Greeks, and shut up the Mamertines in the city (B.C. 270).

After the siege had lasted for five years, the Mamertines, reduced to the last extremity, and hopeless of mercy from Hiero, saw that their only resource was surrender either to Carthage or to Rome. The majority decided that to give Rome a footing in Sicily would constitute a perfect claim upon her gratitude; and envoys were sent to the Senate, to offer the surrender of the city. It seemed at first impossible that the Romans could accept such a gift from the partners in guilt of those they had just so severely punished, and punished by the aid of that very ally against whom the Mamertines asked their protection. The suggestions of cautious policy, too, tended the same way as the dictates of good faith. To give the assistance asked, must not only precipitate a war with Carthage, but would lead the Romans beyond the boundaries of Italy. But on the other hand, it was certain that on their refusal the city would be given over to the Carthaginians, whose attempt to seize Tarentum seemed to justify the Romans in gaining a footing on the coast of Sicily. The Senate, as the representative of the moderate and cautious party, still hesitated, when the consuls referred the question to the comitia of the centuries. That assembly, subject to the impulses by which masses of men are moved, heard only the voice that called them to new conquests beyond the shores of Italy and bade them not to suffer the Carthaginians to seize a post within sight of their shores. Aid was voted to the Mamertines; and a device was invented to bring that aid within the semblance of public law. They were treated with, not as revolted mercenaries, but as Italians established at a foreign post, and were received, just like the other Italians, into the con-

federacy of Rome, who proclaimed herself the protector of the Italians beyond the seas. A mandate was despatched to Hiero, requiring him to desist from attacking the allies of Rome; and an embassy was sent to Carthage, to prepare an indirect justification of the war, by demanding an explanation of the attempt to seize Tarentum seven years before. The Carthaginians did not scruple to purge themselves from the charge by an oath; and their answers, to other causes of complaint, which were raked up to strengthen the Roman case, were studiously moderate; for it was not their policy to precipitate an open war (B.C. 265).

These hollow negotiations were still in progress, and the Roman preparations to cross the straits were all but complete, when news arrived that the Carthaginians had appeared before Messana in the character of mediators and concluded a peace between Hiero and the Mamertines; and that then the anti-Roman party had surrendered the citadel and harbour to the Carthaginian forces under Hanno. Still the consul, Appius Claudius, would not abandon the enterprize. His advanced ships were warned back by the Carthaginians; and a few of them were taken, but these were sent back to avoid a cause of war. A second attempt was more successful. Claudius, the consul's legate, landed at Messana, and called a meeting of the citizens, at which Hanno, who was present in the character of a friend, was seized, and consented to evacuate the place. He was punished with death by the Carthaginians, who sent a great armament, under Hanno the son of Hannibal, to besiege Messana by sea and land; while Hiero, who had withdrawn at the bidding of the Romans, renounced their alliance for the time, and returned to the attack. The siege was speedily raised by the consul Appius Claudius, who eluded the Carthaginian fleet and transported his whole army from Rhegium under the cover of night. He kept the field throughout the summer, inflicting several blows on the enemy, and even advancing to the gates of Syracuse, and then led his army back in safety, leaving a strong garrison in Messana (B.C. 264). The following year was marked by a similar but still more successful campaign. Both consuls crossed the straits unopposed, and defeated the Carthaginians and Syracusans in a battle which had the most important political results. For Hiero, finding the issue now fairly raised, whether the Romans or the Carthaginians were to be masters of Sicily, wisely chose the friendship of the former, and remained their firm ally during the rest of his life and reign, which was protracted to nearly fifty years (B.C. 263). His example was

followed by all the Sicilian Greeks; and thus, besides the strength of their alliance, the Romans gained the all-important posts of Syracuse and Messana. With such a basis, they had little difficulty in driving back the Carthaginians, in a third campaign, to their fortresses on the coast. The only inland city at which a stand was made was Agrigentum, into which Hannibal, the son of Gisco, threw himself with 50,000 men. The Romans blockaded the city for seven months, reducing the besieged to the utmost distress; but their own case became little better, when Hanno landed at the port of Heraclea, and cut off their supplies. Both parties resolved on a battle, as the only relief from their embarrassments. The Romans felt for the first time the superiority of the terrible Numidian horse, but their legions secured them a dear-bought victory, which left them too exhausted to prevent the escape of the Carthaginians from the city to their fleet (B.C. 262).

Thus the FIRST PUNIC WAR had opened with three campaigns which had nearly given the Romans the coveted prize of Sicily. But they had only just entered on the long conflict of four-and-twenty years. While Hamilcar, the successor of Hanno, entrenched himself in the maritime fortresses, by his sallies from which alone hostilities were continued in the island, the Romans had to prepare, for the first time in their history, to sustain the burthen of a maritime war with the power that was mistress of the sea. This pause in the operations affords an opportunity for casting back a glance on the previous history of the Carthaginians, and of the Phœnician race from which they sprang, and of which they were now the chief representatives.*

The PHŒNICIANS claim a conspicuous place in the history of the world, not so much from any influence they had on the great movements of political events, as from their unexampled activity in commerce and colonization. Hence it is that, in the past course of our narrative, they have only occasionally appeared as conducting the commerce which enriched the nations of Western Asia and supported the magnificence of Solomon,—as resisting, with truly Semitic obstinacy, the attacks of conquerors, such as Nebuchadnezzar and Alexander,—and as affording to the Persian empire the assistance of their powerful marine. It remains to take a

* The Romans preserved the memory of the Phœnician origin of the Carthaginians by the name of *Pœni* (with its derived adjective *Pœninus*) which they applied to them indifferently with that of *Carthaginienses*. The adjective *Punic* signifies *Phœnician* by etymology, but *Carthaginian* by usage.

brief connected view of their gradual growth in that commercial greatness, which had its centre in the ancient cities of Phœnice,—Sidon, Tyre, and their sisters,—and of that system of colonization which carried them over the western coasts of the Mediterranean, and beyond the pillars of Hercules to the shores and islands of the Atlantic.

Like so many other peoples, both of the ancient and modern world, the Phœnicians are commonly known by a name different from that by which they called themselves. *Phœnicé* is a Greek word, signifying “the land of the date-palm;” but various ancient writers have recorded the fact, that the native name of the country was *Chna*, that is, *Canaan*. On a coin of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, the Syrian Laodicea is entitled “a mother city in Canaan”; and St. Augustine tells us that the African peasants of his bishopric of Hippo (a colony of the Phœnicians), when asked of what race they were, would reply in the Punic dialect “Canaanites.” All this agrees with the statement in the tenth chapter of Genesis, which makes Sidon the first-born of Canaan, and places him at the head of the various tribes that overspread what is commonly known as the land of Canaan, and the extent of whose settlements is defined as reaching from Sidon to the cities in the plain of the Dead Sea.* *Canaan* is, in fact, a geographical term, signifying “lowland,” as opposed to *Aram*, “highland” (the Hebrew name of Syria), and it is applied both to the Mediterranean coast, and to the great plain which extends from the Dead Sea up the valley of the Jordan and through Cœle-Syria to the valley of the Orontes. How closely the different tribes of Canaanites or “lowlanders” were connected with one another is proved by the leagues of the Sidonians and Hamathites with the nations of Palestine in the time of Joshua.

But this use of a common geographical name by no means necessitates the conclusion, that all the tribes that bore it were of the same race; nor does the occurrence of Sidon among the descendants of Ham necessarily imply that the Phœnicians of the historic age were a Hamite race. We have already seen that, in the ethnical genealogies of Scripture, the recurrence of the same name in different pedigrees indicates the succession of different races in the same regions. Now the evidence is complete, that the dialects both of Phœnicia and Carthage belonged to the Semitic family of languages, and were closely akin to the Hebrew. The fact is distinctly testified by the fathers Augustine and Jerome,—who knew

* Genesis x. 15—19.

Hebrew well, and were able to compare it with Punic, which was then a living dialect,—that the languages differed little from each other. The proper names are easily explained by Hebrew etymologies; and the legends on Phœnician coins, and the fragments of the Carthaginian dialect preserved by ancient writers, are intelligible to the Hebrew scholar; nay, the very name of the citadel of Carthage, *Byrsa*, is the Hebrew *Boxrah*, that is, a fortress.* If then we are to believe, on the authority of the scriptural genealogy, that the primeval settlements of the Hamite race in Southern Canaan extended to the Phœnician coast, it would seem necessary to suppose that these were afterwards overrun by a Semitic immigration, which would necessarily adopt something of the character of the older population. The religion of Phœnicia, especially, seems to bear distinct traces of Hamitic superstitions.†

To the question, whence that tide of Semitic immigration flowed, the Phœnicians themselves gave a very interesting answer, which is preserved by Herodotus. Visiting the temple of Hercules (Melcarth) at Tyre, to learn if he could reconcile the conflicting accounts of the Greeks and Egyptians concerning that deity, he was informed that the Tyrians had settled on that coast and built their city 2300 years before his time (more than 2700 B.C.), and that they had come originally from the shores of the Red Sea.‡ The same tradition is preserved in various forms by other ancient writers; and some of the most diligent modern enquirers into primeval history have come to the conclusion, that the migration of the Phœnicians from the shores of the Red Sea was connected with the great movement of the Semitic tribes up the valley of the Euphrates, which brought the family of Abraham into the land of Canaan.§

Be this as it may, the Phœnicians are found, in the earliest ages of recorded history, occupying the narrow strip of coast between Lebanon and the Mediterranean, west of Cœle-Syria and Galilee, from about the 35th parallel of north latitude to Mount Carmel. Here they founded great maritime cities, originally independent of each other, of which the most ancient were Arvad (Aradus) in the north, and Sidon and Tyre on the south. To these were afterwards

* In fact, the Hebrew seems to have derived its existing form from the influence of the Canaanite dialects, and hence it is called in Scripture "the language of Canaan."—Isaiah xix. 18.

† From the mention of Sidon alone, of all the Phœnician cities, in Genesis x., we may perhaps infer that the Hamite element was most distinctly marked in that city; and that this was one cause of its rivalry with Tyre for supremacy.

‡ Herod., ii. 44; comp. i. 1, vii. 89.

§ Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. iv. Essay ii. On the Migrations of the Phœnicians.

added Berytus, Byblus, and Tripolis. The "rock-built" Tyre* disputed the honour of antiquity with Sidon, "the city of fishermen," which claimed to be its mother-city. When Palestine was conquered by the Israelites, the latter was important enough to be called "great Sidon," and was the northernmost city included within the bounds of the Holy Land. It was assigned, with the "strong city Tyre," to the tribe of Asher, who, instead of subduing their part of Phœnicia, became tributary to the Phœnicians.†

These notices show us the two chief cities of the Phœnicians at a high degree of power as early as the middle of the fifteenth century B.C. Besides these settlements on the coast, the kingdom of Hamath, on the Upper Orontes, seems to have been of Phœnician origin, and it took an active part in the wars against the Israelites under Joshua. In the time of the Judges, the Sidonians are mentioned among the oppressors of Israel. In the Homeric poems we often meet with Sidon, Sidonia, and the Sidonians, as flourishing in wealth and art, especially in the manufacture of beautiful woven fabrics, carrying on an extensive commerce, both in goods and in slaves, and characterized by cunning in their dealings. The absence of the very name of Tyre from Homer is hardly a decisive proof of its insignificance; for the Greeks may naturally have denoted the country and people by the name of the city with which they became first acquainted. The mythical stories of Greece, and the traditions of the Phœnician colonies in the west, point to the twelfth and eleventh centuries as the period when the Phœnicians had already become active colonizers. Utica, on the African coast, was said to have been founded 200 years before Carthage, and Gades or Gadeira (Cadiz), outside the straits of Gibraltar, a few years earlier. The worship of the Tyrian Hercules (Melcarth) at the latter place is supposed to furnish a proof that Tyre was its mother city; and the legend of Cadmus also points to Tyre as the leading city of the Phœnicians. The historian Justin has preserved an interesting tradition, that, a year before the Trojan war, the Sidonians were defeated by the king of Ascalon and the greater part of the inhabitants of Sidon took refuge in Tyre, which became from that time the chief city of Phœnicia. Such a collision between the Phœnicians and the Philistines is not improbable during the time of Israel's servitude

* The Hebrew *Tsor* and the Greek *Tóπος* are dialectic varieties of the Phœnician name *Sur* or *Sor*, which the spot still retains. The word probably signifies a *rock*. Berytus and Byblus also claimed very high antiquity.

† Joshua xi. 8; xix. 28, 29.

to the latter people ; and a common hostility to them would furnish one motive for the close alliance between David and the Phœnicians.

With the formation of that alliance, in the latter half of the eleventh century B.C., we again reach safe historic ground. Tyre is now without dispute the leading city of Phœnicia. She places at the disposal of David and Solomon all the resources of art as well as wealth for the building of the temple, the grandest edifice which the world had yet seen, and the monument, not only of the piety of Israel, but of the riches and civilization of Phœnicia. Hiram, king of Tyre, was master of Lebanon and its forests. His ships not only commanded the commerce of the Mediterranean, but he joined with Solomon in naval enterprises in the Indian Ocean from the port of Elath (Ælana) in the Red Sea. The treaty made by the two kings furnishes a very interesting example of the relations between a commercial and agricultural people. From Abibal, the father of Hiram, down to the foundation of Carthage, Josephus has preserved a chronological list of kings, furnished by the Tyrian histories of Dius and Menander. The burthens imposed upon the people by Hiram, to support his foreign enterprises and his magnificent works at Tyre, entailed a series of revolutions and assassinations of rulers, till Ithbaal or Ethbaal, a priest of Astarte, usurped the crown and founded a sacerdotal dynasty, embracing Sidon as well as Tyre. The origin of his power throws light upon the fanatical attempts of his daughter Jezebel to establish the worship of Baal in the kingdom of Israel. The native annals of his reign recorded the great drought which forms so conspicuous a part of the story of Ahab and Elijah. In the reign of his great grandson Pygmalion, the brother and oppressor of Dido, we have a point of contact between the native annals and the legends of the classic poets, to which we shall recur presently in relation to the foundation of Carthage. The whole story seems to indicate a conflict of the royal and hierarchical powers.

The superior interest attached to the colony seems to have diverted the attention of compilers from the annals of the mother city, and our next mention of Tyre and Sidon occurs in the complaints of the prophets Joel and Amos of their inroads on the coasts of Judah, whence they carried off wealth to dedicate in their temples, and young men and maidens to sell as slaves to the Grecians.* The slave-trade of the Phœnicians is also

* Joel iii. 4—8 ; Amos i. 6, 9. This introduction of Jewish slaves into Greece by

noticed in those wonderful descriptions of Tyre by the prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel, which form an almost ideal picture of commercial greatness. "Slaves and the souls of men" are enumerated among the chief articles of her merchandise; and those Scriptures, which have been falsely said to sanction slavery, mark this abominable traffic as one of the sins that were preparing terrible judgment for the proud city that said, "I am of perfect beauty: I am a god: I sit in the seat of God in the midst of the seas."* These prophetic pictures, illustrated by the light of history, reveal one feature of the deepest interest in the progress of civilization. "The luxury that enfeebles" is one of the commonplaces of moral philosophy, which history is supposed invariably to confirm. This may be true of nations whose greatness is founded on agriculture or on successful war; but in a purely commercial state it is quite possible for wealth to produce luxury and insolence, and at the same time to call forth a display of almost superhuman strength. The energy which is kept active in the pursuit of gain is ready to be expended in defence of wealth; and self-interest has often proved a more potent stimulus than patriotism. No city ever withstood her enemies more pertinaciously than Tyre. The successive conquerors of Western Asia made the acquisition of the Phœnician ports a chief object of their policy. Sargon succeeded so far as to unite the other cities in a confederacy against Tyre, which is said even to have been joined by the ancient city on the mainland, which was distinguished by the name of "Old Tyre." For Tyre had by this time become a double city, the new town which was built on the island opposite to its ancient site, having naturally become the stronghold. Its navy defeated the united fleets of its former subjects, and the city was besieged in vain for five years by Sargon (B.C. 721—717). The interval of 150 years, between this siege and that by Nebuchadnezzar, seems to have been a period of steady prosperity, during a part of which at least Phœnicia was in close alliance with Egypt. It was by the aid of a Phœnician fleet that Neko is said to have achieved the circumnavigation of Africa (about B.C. 610).† The Phœnicians had soon to feel the whole weight of the new Babylonian power. Nebuchadnezzar overran Phœnicia and took Sidon by storm; but only became master of Old Tyre after a siege of thirteen years (B.C. 598—585).‡

the Phœnician merchants, as early as the beginning of the eighth century B.C., is a fact deserving of more attention than it has received.

* Isaiah xxiii.; Ezekiel xxvii., xxviii.

† See Vol. I. p. 133.

‡ See Vol. I. p. 233.

Though the insular city still preserved its independence under its own kings, its power had received a severe shock. Cyprus, its most ancient colony, was taken by Amasis, king of Egypt. But, at the accession of Cyrus, Tyre and Sidon still appear as commercial states, conveying the cedars of Lebanon to Joppa, to aid in the rebuilding of Jerusalem (B.C. 538).^{*} The Phœnician cities made a voluntary submission to Cyrus or his son, if that should not rather be called an alliance, which permitted them with impunity to refuse Cambyses the services of their navy for his projected expedition against Carthage. That navy formed the chief maritime strength of the Persian empire. By its aid Cyrus was enabled to subdue the Ionian cities, and it served against the Greeks in the Persian wars with varying success, till the Phœnicians were signally defeated by the Athenians off Salamis in Cyprus (B.C. 449). In the wars between the Grecian states, the Phœnician fleet was employed in aiding, first the Spartans and afterwards the Athenians, according to the varying policy of Persia. By their aid Conon secured the ascendancy over Sparta which enabled him to build the Long Walls of Athens, and Phœnician sailors aided in the work. These services led to a friendship between Phœnicia and Athens. A decree of the Athenian senate made Strato, king of Sidon, a public guest, and immunities were granted to Sidonian merchants settling in the city, where Phœnician inscriptions have been found of a date about B.C. 380. During all this time the Phœnician cities were left under the government of their own kings, profiting themselves and enriching the empire by their commercial prosperity. In the war with Evagoras of Cyprus they suffered severely for their fidelity to Persia; and Tyre is even said to have been taken by the insurgent prince. At this period Sidon appears as the chief of the Phœnician cities. The Persian king had a palace there, though the city was governed by its own prince.

Under the cruel despotism of Artaxerxes Ochus, the oppression of the Persian satrap and military commanders at Sidon became so intolerable that a congress of the Phœnician cities at Tripolis decided on a general revolt (B.C. 352). The royal palace at Sidon was sacked, the Persians massacred, the fleet burnt to render escape impossible, and an alliance formed with Nestanebo II., king of Egypt, who sent a garrison of 4000 Greeks to aid in the defence. We have already had occasion to relate the disastrous issue consequent on the treachery of Tennes, king of Sidon, and

^{*} Ezra iii. 7.

of Memnon, the leader of the Greek mercenaries.* Even this blow did not destroy the prosperity of Sidon; but it effectually alienated her people from Persia, and they were the first to submit to Alexander when he entered Phœnicia after the battle of Issus. We have seen how the resistance of Tyre brought down upon her the penalty of utter destruction;† but the Carians, with whom Alexander repeopled the city, fell into the habits of its former population, and both Tyre and Sidon recovered much of its commercial greatness. After a long struggle between the kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, Phœnicia was finally secured to the latter by Antiochus the Great (B.C. 198). But the commercial rivalry of Egypt proved more serious even than political subjection; and the foundation of Berenice on the Red Sea diverted to Alexandria much of the oriental commerce that had previously flowed through Tyre and Sidon. But still they did not succumb to their younger rival. Under the Romans, to whom Phœnicia was subjected with Syria, Tyre was still the first commercial city of the world. The Arab conquest secured for it new prosperity under the gentle government of the Caliphs, till it finally succumbed to the dominion of the Turks (A.D. 1516), and to the blow inflicted on the whole commerce of the Levant by the discovery of the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope. Thus, if we should accept the supposed date of the migration of the Phœnicians from the shores of the Red Sea, we should have a period of 4,000 years for the existence of the nation; and it may safely be affirmed that their prosperity reached back to a point as long before the Christian era as that to which it extended after it, making up in all a space of not less than 3000 years.

The causes which chiefly contributed to this long career of commercial greatness are to be sought partly in the geographical position of the people, and partly in their national character. As a mixed race—for in this light we have already seen reason to regard them—they united the enterprize and inventive genius of the Hamite race with the tenacity of purpose and love of gain which have always distinguished the Semitic. Pent in between a coast possessing several fine harbours and the lofty chain of Lebanon, whose terraces produce little but the cedar and the date-palm, they became of necessity a nation of mariners; and their lot was cast at that very spot of all the ancient world from which maritime activity could be most profitably pursued. At the junction of the three continents, accessible from the remote east by the

* See p. 41.

† See pp. 58—60.

easy route which crosses the northern part of the Syrian Desert, and from the Red Sea and Egypt through Palestine and along the coast, looking out westward over the Mediterranean, and connected with the shores of Asia Minor and Greece by the stepping-stones, so to speak, of Cyprus, Crete, and the islands of the Ægæan, Phœnicia may well be called the commercial focus of the ancient world. To the south and east lay the highly civilized and productive regions, where

“Egypt with Assyria strove In wealth and luxury,”

backed by all the wealth of India and Arabia; to the west, the extensive coast-line of Europe and Africa, here peopled with races whose native energy only needed the touch of commerce to adorn their freedom with the graces of civilization, and there offering virgin tracts of unsurpassed fertility to the enterprize of the colonist. And every new step in prosperity added the impulse of necessity to a people whose numbers must soon have outgrown their narrow territory.

Accordingly, from a very early age, we find the Phœnicians acting as carriers of the produce of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon. Homer tells us of their traffic in the metal trinkets and woven fabrics which were produced abundantly in those countries, as well as in slaves. We have seen how they joined Solomon in distant voyages of as much as three years' duration, which produced “gold and silver, ivory, apes, and peacocks.”* The plain interpretation of the much disputed text is that these objects were brought home by the navy that sailed periodically to Tarshish, that is, the south of Spain, and which would visit the African coast, whence the ivory, apes, and peacocks could be obtained. The eastern voyage to the shores of Africa and Arabia beyond the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, which produced the gold of Ophir, was performed by Phœnician mariners on board the ships of Solomon;† and it was probably by a similar combination that much of the traffic of the oriental monarchies in the Indian Ocean was carried on. In that vivid picture, which Ezekiel draws of the Tyrian trade in the age of Nebuchadnezzar, we read of frankincense and spices from the eastern coast of Africa, and of cotton fabrics and “bright iron” or steel, which came doubtless from India. Most of their Indian traffic passed probably through the great emporium of Babylon, which also furnished embroidered “Babylonish garments” and other manufactures. From Egypt they

* 2 Chron. ix. 21.

+ 1 Kings ix. 27 ; 2 Chron. viii. 18.

obtained its staple manufacture of linen, as well as their chief supplies of corn. Palestine too provided them with corn, wine, oil, honey, and balsams; Damascus with white wool and wine; and the pastures of the Arabian Desert with sheep and goats. From the highlands of Armenia they obtained horses and mules; and the natives of Georgia and Circassia were doomed then, as in later times, by the fatal gift of beauty, to feed their slave trade. It is to be observed that Ezekiel speaks of the nations as bringing their goods to the Phœnicians. The caravan trade was conducted by the nomad tribes of Syria and Arabia, such as those to whom Joseph was sold; but the Phœnicians had also factories and markets in various cities, as at Alexandria and Jerusalem.

Their own commercial energy, however, was chiefly engaged in distributing over the shores of the Mediterranean the wealth which they collected from the east, and thus they were the chief agents in the commercial civilization of the western world. As a matter of course, one of the many traditions respecting the origin of navigation ascribes its invention to the Phœnicians. With greater probability they are said to have been the first who steered their ships by observations of the stars, and they were thus able to venture into the open sea on distant voyages, while other mariners crept along the shore. They employed the *penteconter*, or swift low vessel of fifty oars, suited both for trade or piracy, the larger *trireme*, or galley of three banks of oars, and the round ship for stowage, which took its significant name from a milk-pail (*gaullos*). The first was their usual craft in the earliest times; and the voyages which they performed in such vessels excite an astonishment like that we feel when reading of the mere smacks in which our own early navigators ventured into the Polar Seas. It was no slight advantage to the Phœnicians that they had to deal with the calmer waters and clear skies of the Mediterranean; but they also ventured out into the Atlantic, skirting the African coast as far as Senegal and the Canaries (the *Fortunate Islands* of the ancients), and at a later age venturing to the south-western shores of Britain, the *Cassiterides*, or tin-islands. The tin procured at first from Spain, and afterwards from Britain, supplied the demand of the nations on the Mediterranean shores for one ingredient of the bronze, of which their arms, their ornaments, and most other objects of metal-work were composed. The silver mines of Andalusia provided the Phœnicians with such quantities of the precious metal, that they are said to have used masses of it for anchors. Their active commerce with Greece

forms one of the earliest known facts in the history of that country; and whatever may be the truth concealed beneath the legends respecting Phœnician settlements on its shores, its alphabet bears witness, to the present day, that it derived the rudiments of letters from the Phœnicians.

Besides the products of other countries, the Phœnicians traded in some great manufactures of their own, especially the Sidonian embroideries, such as Homer mentions as carried to Troy by Paris, the glass for which Sidon was also famous, and the celebrated Tyrian purple. In the manufacture of their glass, the Sidonians used the fine sand of the beach beneath Mount Carmel; and an old tradition ascribes the invention of glass to an accident on this very spot. Some mariners, in kindling a fire upon the shore, propped up their cauldron with lumps of the *natron* (native carbonate of soda) which formed their cargo, from the fusion of which with the sand a stream of molten glass ran out! But in fact the monuments of the Egyptians prove their possession of the art as early as the fourth dynasty, a time not very different from that of the alleged migration of the Phœnicians from the Red Sea; and the abundance both of sand and natron confirms the probability of its invention in Egypt.* The Sidonians used the blowpipe, the graver, and the lathe; they cast glass mirrors; and they seem to have made imitations of precious stones in coloured glass. The still more famous Tyrian purple was obtained from the juice of marine molluscs of the genera *buccinum* and *murex*, of which the former was found on the rocks along the coast, and the latter had to be dredged in deep water. Each animal yields only a small drop of the precious fluid, from a canal which follows the spiral convolutions of the shell. When first extracted, by means of a sharp point, it is of cream colour, and has the smell of garlic. Exposure to the light changes it successively to green, blue, red, and deep purple; and a fabric steeped in it, and then washed with soap, assumes a permanent dye of bright crimson. The molluscs that produce the dye are almost peculiar to the coast of Phœnicia, and the Tyrians seem to have possessed some chemical secrets of the manufacture. Under the Romans they held the sole privilege of making the imperial purple, down to the taking of Constantinople by the Turks.

While the voyages by which this vast commerce was conducted would tempt the more adventurous to form permanent settlements

* See Vol. I., p. 83.

on the shores they visited, the prosperity derived from it would cause a growth of population far too great for such a region as Phœnicia, and so make colonization a necessity. It has been suggested that the conquest of Palestine by Joshua must have driven back whole nations of the Canaanites upon their kinsmen in Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria, causing an emigration like that of the Ionians when thrust out by the Dorians from Peloponnesus into Attica. In the story of Joshua's victories over the northern Canaanites, we read repeatedly of their defeated hosts being chased into these very regions; and the traditional date of the commencement of Phœnician colonization has a near approximation to that of the Jewish conquest. A similar impulse is supposed to have been given by the victories of David at the very period when the prosperity of Tyre, under the father of Hiram, gave it the means of successful colonization. That the dissensions and revolutions which followed the reign of Hiram tended to the same result, is strikingly proved by the story of the foundation of Carthage.

But, from whatever cause a colony might be sent forth, its foundation was conducted with the same regard to political and religious organization as among the Greeks; and, like theirs, the Phœnician colonies were models of the parent state. Thus, for example, the religion and polity of Carthage faithfully represent those of the mother city, Tyre. The fragments of native history furnish no distinct accounts of the progress of the Phœnicians in colonization; but we are not without traditions and landmarks, by which to trace their advance round the shores of the Mediterranean. Cyprus, lying within sight of the Phœnician coast, would naturally be first occupied. Their presence here is attested by numerous inscriptions, and their settlement of Citium preserved the name by which the island is designated in Scripture, *Chittim*. Its foundation was ascribed by a legend to a Sidonian king, Belus, whose name, and the Baal-worship from which it is derived, are indications of the ancient connection of the Phœnicians with the nations on the Euphrates. The corresponding female deity, Ashtoreth, or Astarte, who was worshipped especially at Sidon, had her celebrated fane at Paphos,

“ And thence her lustful orgies she enlarged ”

to the shores of Greece and Italy, under the name of Aphrodite Urania, or the Heavenly Venus. The legends of Io, of the rape of Europa, and of Dido, seem to have been connected with the diffusion of her worship.

The passage from Cyprus to Asia Minor is as easy as that from Phœnicia to Cyprus, and the presence of Phœnician settlers along the shores of Cilicia, Lycia, and Caria, in Rhodes and Crete and the islands of the *Ægæan*, and on the peninsula of Greece, may be traced by legends of unknown antiquity, and in many cases by more substantial memorials. Their track may be followed by similar evidence into the *Euxine*, as far as the shores of Bithynia. At the gold mines of Thasos, Herodotus was shown the traces of immense works ascribed to the Phœnicians, who seemed, as he expresses it, to have turned a mountain upside down; and they are said to have worked the gold mines on the opposite shore of Thrace. From Eubœa they crossed over to make that settlement in Bœotia, the memory of which seems to be preserved in the legend of Cadmus. The rocky shores of Attica and the Peloponnesus presented few temptations to permanent settlements; but the Phœnicians frequented them as traders and as pirates; and the legend of Io, for example, indicates their presence at Argos in both characters. At the southern extremity of the peninsula, Cythera afforded a resting-place between Phœnicia and the West; and the worship of Aphrodite, for which this island was as celebrated as Cyprus, is traced by Herodotus to the Phœnicians.* On the west side of Greece, the Paphian inhabitants of Cepallenia claimed descent from the Phœnician Cadmus.

The next step of their westward progress carried the Phœnicians to Sicily, a migration which seems to be indicated by the fable of the flight of Dædalus from Crete; and by the worship of Venus at Eryx and Egesta. Thucydides expressly states that they took possession of the promontories and small islands on the coast for the purpose of trading, and that they were driven by the Greek colonists from all these positions except Panormus (*Palermo*) and some others at the western extremity of the island, which they were enabled to hold through their proximity to Carthage. For even the latest date assigned for the foundation of Carthage is before the earliest of the Hellenic settlements in Sicily. These accounts, which are in every way probable, point to the establishment of mere factories and not colonies, except at the western

* Another legend ascribes it to *Æneas*, whose fabled birth from Venus and connection with Dido may perhaps indicate the influence of a Phœnician element among the Trojans. The god Melicertes, who was worshipped with infant sacrifices at Tenedos, is unquestionably the Tyrian Melcarth. In the same way, the settlement of Eryx and Egesta in Sicily is ascribed to the Trojans under *Æneas*.—*Thuc.* vi. 2.

extremity of the island. There are distinct traces of Phœnician settlements in Melita and Gaulus (*Malta* and *Gozo*) and Cossyra (*Pantellaria*), which lie like stepping-stones between Sicily and Africa, as well as in Sardinia and Ebusus (*Iviza*). By such stages the Phœnician mariners were conducted to the shores of Spain, if indeed they did not reach them at an earlier period by a more direct route; for Tarshish is mentioned in the earliest list of the nations in the tenth chapter of the Book of Genesis. In the most flourishing period of Phœnician commerce, the voyages to these distant regions employed a peculiar class of vessels, "the ships of Tarshish," which doubtless became like our "Eastindiamen" a generic name for the largest ships of their commercial marine.

Known to the Greeks only by Phœnician reports, this region, under the name of Tartessus, was connected by them with very vague ideas. Sometimes it seems to denote all Spain; sometimes a part or the whole of Andalusia; sometimes the region near the mouth of the Bætis (*Guadalquivir*), which was itself called by the same name, and in the Delta of which some writers place a city Tartessus.* In short, both the Tarshish of the Hebrews, and the Tartessus of the Greeks, may be taken to include all they knew of Spain, and perhaps of the western regions within and without the Straits.† At all events, there were Phœnician settlements along the coast of Andalusia, some of which—as Malaca (*Malaga*) and Carteia—can be distinguished from the later Carthaginian colonies; and these were their great emporia for the silver, iron, tin, and lead, which they obtained from the mines of the interior. The working of those mines must have brought them into close contact with the natives beyond the coast, whose superior civilization was evident down to later ages. These settlements led them on to those straits, at which the fabled columns set by up Hercules (Calpe, *Gibraltar*, on the European shore, and Abila, *Apes' Hill*, on the African) marked the limits of geographical knowledge and enterprise to the early Greeks. But centuries before the time when the Greek poets were still repeating their fable of the earth-encircling river Ocean, which the mariner entered as soon as he left the Mediterranean, the Phœnicians had

* Professor Key has suggested an ingenious etymological connection between *Tartessus*, *Carteia* or *Carpe* or *Calpe* (*Gibraltar*), and the *Carpetani*, a people found in the centre of the peninsula, having probably been driven from the neighbourhood of their old capital (*Calpe*) by irruptions across the Straits.

† Dr. Davis urges some ingenious arguments for the identification of Tarshish with Carthage.

not only sailed beyond the Straits, but had founded the great colony of Gades, which retains its ancient name to the present day.* Besides the tradition already mentioned as placing the foundation of *Cadiz* before that of *Utica*, and consequently about 1100 B.C., its antiquity is attested by its preservation of the oldest form of the worship of the Tyrian *Hercules* (*Melcarth*). His temple was without an image, the only symbol of the god being a perpetual fire. The fact, that the Phœnician colonies were rather commercial factories than centres of political power, is indicated by the dealings of the Phœcæans with *Arganthonius*, king of *Tartessus*, in the reign of *Cyrus the Great*.†

Gades was a station from which mariners so enterprising as the Phœnicians would explore the adjacent coasts both to the north and south; and stories are related of their trading as far as the shores of the Baltic, and bringing home its amber. There can be little doubt that they worked the tin and lead mines of *Cornwall* and the *Scilly Islands*, and it was from them that *Herodotus* derived his knowledge of these "Tin Islands" (*Cassiterides*). *Aristotle's* information about the British Islands in general—which he names respectively *Alb-ion*, in Celtic the *White Island*, and *Ier-ne*, that is, *Eri-* or *Ire-land*—may have come by the overland route across Gaul to *Massalia*, or by way of *Carthage*. We have no distinct evidence that the Phœnicians had dealings with any but the western extremity of Great Britain, the only part that produced the commodities they valued. The traces of Phœnician influence in Ireland, for which some writers have strenuously contended, are at best very doubtful. Besides the British Isles, the Phœnician navigators from *Tartessus* traded to others in the Atlantic, called the *Ostrymnides*, which are probably the *Azores*, though the different groups of islands were doubtless often confounded. To the south of the Straits; the north-western coast of Africa was occupied at several points by their settlements.

A passing notice must suffice for the very interesting question, whether the Phœnician mariners ventured out into the wide Atlantic, and whether among those who may have been wafted to the opposite shores by accident or bold adventure, any returned to tell of the existence of America. There are some curious


* The genuine form of the name, as found on coins of the old Phœnician period, is *Agadir* (אגדיר), or, with the definite article, *Hagadir* (הגדיר), signifying a strong enclosure or edifice. The omission of the initial breathing gave *Gadir* or *Gaddir*, the Phœnician form, according to the classical writers; whence came the Greek *Gadira* and the Latin *Gades*.

† See Vol. I., p. 276.

statements bearing on this point; but their interpretation is a matter of mere conjecture. Avienus, a Latin poet of the fourth century of our era, in his work on the shores of the Mediterranean, compiled from Phœnician authorities, quotes from the Carthaginian Himilco, who had made a voyage of nearly four months westward, the assertion that the Atlantic could be crossed. From what follows, it seems that Himilco had sailed as far as what the ancients called the "Sargasso Sea," from the shoals of *sargassus* or floating sea-weed, which abound off the Azores; and it is not even suggested that he had reached the opposite shore. Other stories might be cited; but the most remarkable of all is the legend related by Plato about *Atlantis*, an island larger than Asia and Libya together, in the sea west of Gades and the Straits. A powerful dynasty of kings reigned over this and the smaller islands between it and the continent, and conquered Libya up to Egypt, and Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. They had gathered their forces for the subjugation of the remaining countries round the Mediterranean, when the Athenians, though deserted by all their allies, repulsed them in a decisive battle, and restored the freedom of all the countries within the Straits. The victory was followed by great earthquakes and floods, which swallowed up the combatants on both sides; and the island of Atlantis, engulfed beneath the waters, left only shoals of mud which rendered that sea unnavigable. All this happened 9000 years before the time of Solon, to whom it was related by the Egyptian priests of Sais, as an instance of the ignorance of the Athenians respecting their forefathers' exploits. It is superfluous to observe that such a legend, coming from such a source, can have no historical value. But may its existence be taken as any argument, when confirmed by other evidence, for the knowledge of lands beyond the Atlantic? The safest reply is a candid confession of our ignorance. Who shall venture to draw the line between truth and fiction in the travellers' tales of those remote ages? Even after making the most liberal allowance for their good faith, all that is credible in their statements may be accounted for on the supposition that, after long beating about in the storms of the Atlantic, they reached some of the nearer islands, or some unknown parts of the shores of Europe or Africa, which they mistook for lands beyond the Ocean. The utmost that can be affirmed is the possibility of the discovery.*

* A fuller discussion of the question will be found in the articles "*Atlantis*" and "*Atlanticum Mare*" in the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*.

Returning through the Straits, we come to those famous settlements of the Phœnicians on the northern coast of Africa, which



MAP OF ZEUGITANA.

- 1 Tusca Fl. : *Wad Zain*; boundary towards Numidia.
2. Candium Pr. : *C. Blanco*.
3. Hippo Diarrhytus or Zaritus : *Bizerta*.
4. *Ras Sidi Bou Shusha*, or *C. Zibeb* : Pr. *Pulcrum*?
5. Apollinis Pr. : *Ras Sidi Ali-al-Mekhi*, or *C. Farina*.
6. Bagradas Fl. : *Wady Mejerda*; showing, at and near its mouth, its present course.
7. Ancient course of the river near its mouth (the dotted line).
8. *Utica* : *Bou-shater*.
9. *Castra Cornelia* : *Ghella*.
10. Ancient coast-line (the dotted line).
11. Present coast-line.
12. *Ras Ghamart*, or *C. Camart*.
13. *Ras Sidi Bou Said*, or *C. Carthage*.
14. SITE OF CARTHAGE, and ruins of the Roman city : the oval line marks the site of *El-*

Mera.

15. *Tunos* : *Tunis*.
16. Lagoon or Bay of *Tunis*.
17. *The Goletta*.
18. Aqueduct of *Carthage*.
19. *Jebel Zaghwān* : one source of the aqueduct.
20. *Maxula* : *Rhades*.
21. *Aquæ Calidæ* : *Hamam l'Enf.*
22. *Carpis* : *Gurbos*.
23. *Ægimurus I* : *Zowamour*, or *Zembra*.
24. *Aquilaria* : *Athouareah*, quarries.
25. *Mercurii Pr.* : *Ras Admar*, or *C. Bon.*
26. *Clypea*, or *Aspis* : *Aklibiah*.
27. *Curubis* : *Kurbah*.
28. *Neapolis* : *Nabat*.
29. *Horæ Opilia* : *Herklah*.
30. *Hadrumetum* : *Sousah*.
31. *Ænus Carthaginienis*.
32. *Sinus Neapolitanus*.*

* Besides exhibiting the colonies now spoken of and the whole neighbourhood of Carthage, this map will serve to illustrate the Roman campaigns in Africa, and those of Agathocles, which have been related towards the end of Chapter XVIII.

we have reserved till the last on account of their connection with Carthage. They extended all along the shores of Barbary, from the Straits to the Greater Syrtis; but they were naturally the most numerous in that part which has formed successively the territory of Carthage, the Roman province of Africa, and the Regency of Tunis. Stretching out from the line of the coast towards Sicily, and with its eastern front looking in the direction of Phœnicia, this region invited colonization by its splendid harbours and unsurpassed fertility; and we can scarcely doubt that Tyre drew supplies of corn from its abundance, though not to the same extent as the Carthaginians and Romans, who afterwards had more complete possession of the country. The most favourable district for colonization was the great bay between *Cape Farina* and *Cape Bon* (the ancient promontories of Apollo and Mercury), the shores of which, abounding in natural harbours, are adjacent to the fertile plains watered by the Bagradas and some smaller rivers,—forming the ancient Zeugitana, or the northern division of *Africa*, in the original sense of the word, which corresponds nearly to the modern Regency of Tunis. Nearly all the cities on this coast were colonies of Tyre. The most ancient was Utica (or Itacé), near the mouth of the western arm of the Bagradas and close under the promontory of Apollo.* Next in importance was Tunes (*Tunis*); at the bottom of the lagoon at the mouth of which Carthage stood. It is needless to enumerate the other settlements, some of which are exhibited on the annexed map, while others lay to the west along the coast of Numidia, as far as the Straits, and to the east round the shores of the Lesser Syrtis; but we must not omit to name Hippo Zaritus (*Biserta*), celebrated in the annals of chivalry, and Hippo Regius (*Bonah*), less famous as the residence of the Numidian kings than as the bishopric of St. Augustine. On the coast between the two Syrtes, Leptis Magna (*Lebdah*) was an emporium for the caravan trade across the desert. The eastern limit of the Phœnician settlements is not accurately known. How the boundary was afterwards fixed between the Carthaginians and the Greeks of Cyrene at the bottom of the Great Syrtis, has been previously related.† Before proceeding to speak of Carthage, the last and greatest fruit of Phœnician colonization, it is important to enquire

* Its ruins are seen near the holy tomb of *Bou-shater*. It may be mentioned here, once for all, that the existing *surface* ruins of all these African cities, including those of Carthage itself, are chiefly of the Roman period. The remains of the Phœnician cities have to be sought underground.

† See Vol. I., p. 366.

what lasting gain the nation derived from this vast system of commerce and colonization, and what was her influence upon human civilization?

This question cannot be better answered than in the words of Dr. Mommsen:—"The Phœnicians are entitled to be commemorated in history by the side of the Hellenic and Latin nations; but their case affords a fresh proof, and perhaps the strongest proof of all, that the development of national energies in antiquity was of a one-sided character. Those noble and enduring creations in the field of intellect, which owe their origin to the Aramæan race, did not emanate from the Phœnicians. While faith and knowledge, in a certain sense, were the especial property of the Aramæan nations, and reached the Indo-Germans only from the East, neither the Phœnician religion nor Phœnician science and art ever, so far as we can see, held an independent rank among those of the Aramæan family. The religious conceptions of the Phœnicians were rude and uncouth, and it seemed as if their worship was meant to foster lust and cruelty rather than to subdue them. No trace is discernible, at least in times of clear historical light, of any special influence exercised by their religion over other nations. As little do we find any Phœnician architecture or plastic art at all comparable even to those of Italy, to say nothing of the lands where art was native. The most ancient seat of scientific observation and of its application to practical purposes was Babylon, or at any rate the region of the Euphrates. * * * The Phœnicians no doubt availed themselves of the artistic and highly developed manufactures of Babylon for their industry, of the observation of the stars for their navigation, of the writing of sounds and the adjustment of measures for their commerce, and distributed many an important germ of civilization along with their wares; but it cannot be demonstrated that the alphabet, or any other ingenious product of the human mind, belonged peculiarly to them, and such religious and scientific ideas as they were the means of conveying to the Hellenes, were scattered by them more after the fashion of a bird dropping grains than of the husbandman sowing his seed. The power which the Hellenes and the Italians possessed, of civilizing and assimilating to themselves the nations susceptible of culture with whom they came into contact, was wholly wanting in the Phœnicians. In the field of Roman conquest, the Iberian and the Celtic languages have disappeared before the Romanic tongue; the Berbers of Africa speak at this present day the same language

as they spoke in the times of the Hannos and the Barcides. Above all, the Phœnicians, like the rest of the Aramæan nations as compared with the Indo-Germans, lacked the instinct of political life,—the noble idea of self-governed freedom. During the most flourishing times of Sidon and Tyre, the land of the Phœnicians was a perpetual apple of contention between the powers that ruled on the Euphrates and on the Nile, and was subject sometimes to the Assyrians, sometimes to the Egyptians. With half the power, Hellenic cities had achieved their independence; but the prudent Sidonians calculated that the closing of the caravan routes to the east, or of the ports of Egypt, would affect them more than the heaviest tribute; and so they punctually paid their taxes, as it might happen, to Nineveh or to Memphis, and even gave their ships, when they could not avoid it, to help to fight the battles of the kings. And as at home the Phœnicians patiently submitted to the oppression of their masters, so also abroad they were by no means inclined to change the peaceful career of commerce for a policy of conquest. Their colonies were factories. It was of more moment, in their view, to traffic in buying and selling with the natives, than to acquire extensive territories in distant lands, and to carry out the slow and difficult work of colonization. They avoided war, even with their rivals; they allowed themselves to be supplanted in Egypt, Greece, Italy, and the east of Sicily, almost without resistance, and in the great naval battles, which were fought in early times for the supremacy of the western Mediterranean at Alalia and at Cumæ, it was the Etruscans and not the Phœnicians that bore the brunt of the struggle with the Greeks.* If rivalry could not be avoided, they compromised the matter as best they could; no attempt was ever made by the Phœnicians to conquer Cære or Massilia. Still less, of course, were the Phœnicians disposed to enter on aggressive war. On the only occasion, in earlier times, when they took the field on the offensive, namely, in the great Sicilian expedition of the African Phœnicians, which terminated in their defeat at Himera by Gelo of Syracuse,† it was simply as dutiful subjects of the Great King, and in order to avoid taking part in the campaign against the Hellenes of the east, that they entered the lists against the Hellenes of the west; just as their Syrian kinsmen were, in fact, obliged in that same year to share the defeat of the Persians at Salamis. This was not the result of cowardice; navi-

* B.C. 538—474. See Vol. I., p. 276, and Vol. II., p. 143.

† B.C. 480. See Vol. I. p. 433.

gation in unknown waters and with armed vessels requires brave hearts; and that such were to be found among the Phœnicians, they often showed. Still less was it the result of any lack of tenacity and idiosyncrasy of national feeling; on the contrary, the Arameans defended their nationality with spiritual weapons and with their blood against all the allurements of Grecian civilization and all the coercive measures of eastern and western despots, and that with an obstinacy which no Indo-German people have ever equalled, and which to us, who belong to the west, seems to be sometimes more, sometimes less than human. It was the result of that want of political instinct which, amidst all their lively sense of the ties of race, and amidst all their faithful attachment to the city of their fathers, formed so marked a feature in the character of the Phœnicians. Liberty had no charms for them, and they aspired not after dominion; 'quietly they lived,' says the Book of Judges, 'after the manner of the Sidonians, careless and secure in the possession of riches.' " *

It was the destiny of CARTHAGE to form a conspicuous exception to this peaceful and submissive policy; and the reason of the difference may be expressed in a few words, which form the key to her whole history. As the head of the Phœnician colonies in the West, she was compelled to assume a warlike attitude, in order to prevent her commerce and theirs being driven from the seas. The compromise made with the despotisms of the East would not satisfy the Greek republics of Sicily and Massalia, or the rising power of Rome. Founded by a fresh colony, when Tyre had reached the height of her prosperity, the "NEW CITY"† occupied a position the most favourable for supremacy in the western half of the Mediterranean. Placed at that central point of the African

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii., pp. 4—6. The leading authorities for the history of the Phœnicians are Gesenius, *Monumenta Phœnicia*; Heeren's *Researches*, &c.; Mövers, *Die Phœnizier*; Kenrick's *Phœnicia*; and Mr. Dyer's article *Phœnicia* in Dr. Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*.

† Solinus tells us that the ancient name of Carthage was *Carthada*; "quod Phœnicum ore exprimit *Civitatem Novam*." In Hebrew there is a poetical word *Kereth* or *Carth*, signifying a *City*; and the coins of Panormus, a chief possession of Carthage in Sicily, bear the legend *Kereth-hadeshoth*, or *Carth-hadtha* (i.e., the *New City*), the *Carthada* of Solinus. By changing the first and second dentals respectively into gutturals, the Greeks obtained *Carchadôn* (*Καρχιδών*) and the Romans *Carthago*. As in all similar cases, the "*New City*" points to an *Old City* on or near the same spot. This is commonly explained as referring to *Utica*, which means *Old City*; but Niebuhr thinks it unlikely that such a site as that of Carthage should have been left unoccupied for nearly 300 years, and he supposes the *Old City* to have been on the same spot, and to be represented by *Byrsa*, the citadel of Carthage.

coast, where the projecting shore approaches so near the western extremity of Sicily as to divide the great inland sea into two basins, and within a moderate distance of Sardinia, she looked almost due north to the mouth of the Tiber.*

The site of Carthage has long been known by tradition and by its existing ruins; but it is only lately that its exact topography has ceased to be one of the most vexed questions of ancient learning. Far within the deep bay terminated by the headlands of Mercury and Apollo (*C. Bon* and *C. Farina*), and on its western side, is a rocky promontory or peninsula, connected with the level plain of the Mejerdah by an isthmus, the breadth of which is chiefly due to the encroachments of the land. Along the whole space from *C. Farina* to the peninsula, the alluvial deposits of the Mejerdah, aided by the north-west winds, which incessantly throw floods of sand upon the shore, have converted what was once a bold sweeping bay into a succession of salt-marshes and dry land, which have filled up the roadstead once formed on the northern side of the peninsula, though its memorial still exists in the village of *El-Mersa* (the harbour), adorned with the country-houses of the Tunisians. On the southern side of the peninsula, what was once a splendid basin, forming the port of Tunes, has been converted by similar causes into a lagoon of only six or seven feet deep, connected with the sea by a narrow entrance called in Arabic *Halk-el-Wad* (the throat of the river), and in Italian *Goletta* (the Gullet). Along the northern margin of this basin runs a line of land, which once formed a narrow isthmus, gradually rising till the rocks culminate in *Ras Sidi Bousaid*, or *C. Carthage*, a headland nearly 400 feet high, forming the eastern point of the peninsula. Between this and the somewhat lower headland of *Ras Ghamart*, or *C. Camart*, the eastern face of the peninsula opposes its breastwork of rocks to the full force of the storms that break into the gulf. On the lower eminences sheltered by these heights, and along the shores between *C. Carthage* and the lagoon of Tunis, stood the famous city; and on this side the water sweeping round *C. Carthage* has so encroached upon the land as to cover large portions of the ruins of the ancient quays.

The fabled visit of Æneas to these shores, at the very time when Dido was building the new city, has afforded Virgil the opportunity for a description, as faithful as it is poetic, of the aspect which

* The distance from *C. Bon* to *Marsala*, the ancient Lilybæum, is less than 90 miles: from Carthage to Lilybæum is about 150; and the same to Caralis (*Cagliari*) in Sardinia: from Carthage to the mouth of the Tiber is under 400 miles.

the spot may be supposed to have presented to a voyager landing on the northern side of the peninsula. It is passing strange that the most learned of poets should have been suspected of drawing a purely imaginary picture of a spot so well known to the Romans of his age; and stranger still that not only commentators, but such a traveller as Dr. Shaw, should have supposed the landing-place of Æneas to have been at *Alhowareah* (the ancient Aquilaria), close to *Cape Bon*, a distance of sixty miles from Carthage, and resembling none of the features of Virgil's description.*

That description of an imaginary approach to the peninsula of Carthage gives an admirable idea of its actual appearance about the time supposed. Driven out of his course from Sicily to Italy by a storm, which the jealousy of Juno prevails on Æolus to raise, Æneas at length makes the shore of Libya, with the remnant of his scattered ships, at a point described in the following terms:—

“ Within a long recess there lies a bay :
 An island shades it from the rolling sea,
 And forms a port secure for ships to ride :
 Broke by the jutting land, on either side,
 In double streams the briny waters glide
 Betwixt two rows of rocks : a sylvan scene
 Appears above, and groves for ever green :
 A grot is formed beneath, with mossy seats,
 To rest the Nereïds, and exclude the heats.
 Down through the crannies of the living walls,
 The crystal streams descend in murr’ring falls.
 No hulcers need to bind the vessels here,
 Nor bearded anchors ; for no storms they fear.
 Seven ships within this happy harbour meet, . . .
 The thin remainders of the scatter’d fleet.
 The Trojans, worn with toils, and spent with woes,
 Leap on the welcome land, and seek their wish’d repose.”†

Commentators, with only books and maps to guide them, may be more easily excused than travellers to the spot, for seeking the

* The choice of *Alhowareah* involves, as Dr. Davis has pointed out, the inference, that Achates performed the journey of sixty miles on foot three times in the course of a single day—an example of “fidelity” to his chieftain’s behests not to be matched by a Highland gillie.

† *Æneis*, i. vv. 159—169. The passage is given in Dryden’s classical translation, for the English reader; but to follow the description with minute accuracy, it is necessary to subjoin the original:—

“ Est in secessu longo locus : insula portum
 Efficit objectu laterum ; quibus omnis ab alto
 Frangitur, inque sinus scindit sese unda reductos.
 Hinc atque hinc vaste rupes, geminique minantur
 In cœlum scopuli ; quorum sub vertice latæ
 Æquora tuta silent : tum silvis scena coruscis
 Desuper, horrentique atrum nemus imminet umbræ :

"island" of Virgil in the little rocky "Altars of Ægimurus" (the *Islands of Zowamour*), in the very mouth of the great Gulf, which lay remote from Carthage, and, so far from making a safe harbour, shipwrecked some of the vessels during the storm. Nor have they perceived that Æneas was embayed within the gulf when he made the land. The natural explanation, which makes all else clear, is that the "island" was the peninsula of Carthage itself, and that "the port made by it" lay on the northern side of the isthmus, which then formed a deep bay, where is now the salt lake of *Sokra* and the suburb of *El-Mersa*.* Here Æneas would be sheltered by *C. Camart* from the E.S.E. wind that had driven him to the shore; and here, even since the alteration of the coast, the description of the poet is borne out by the present aspect of the land. "On nearing the coast from a direction west of *C. Camart*, the land, or rather the isthmus, is very low, and covered with lakes, which are so swelled in extent by heavy gales, that the peninsula of Carthage has every appearance of a sea-girt island. . . . Again, on approaching the coast in the same direction, the lofty double-peaked mountain of *Hamam l'Enf*—to this day called by the Arabs 'the possessor of two horns'—seems to tower above the vast rocks which flank the little

Fronte sub adversâ scopulis pendentibus antrum;
Intus aque dulces, vivoque sedilia saxo;
Nympharum domus: hic fessas non vincula naves
Ulla tenent; unco non alligat ancora morsu."

In the interpretation of this passage, and in the whole account of Carthage, a special acknowledgment is due of the information derived from the work of Dr. N. Davis, "*Carthage and her Remains*," being an account of the Excavations and Researches on the site of the Phœnician Metropolis in Africa, and other adjacent places, conducted under the auspices of Her Majesty's Government." Lond. 1861. 8vo.

Dr. Davis has since published a supplemental volume, entitled "The Ruined Cities within the Numidian and Carthaginian Territories." Lond. 1862. 8vo. The British Museum is enriched with many of the fruits of his discoveries. The praise due to Dr. Davis for his researches must not prevent the greatest caution in following his opinions and interpretations. His zeal has given him a constant predisposition to find Punic remains, where calmer critics consider him to have discovered none but Roman. Less doubtful traces of Punic Carthage have been reached by M. Beulé, whose discoveries are described in his *Fouilles de Carthage*, 1861. 4to. For the existing-topographical details of the site the best authority is the Danish officer Falbe, *Recherches sur l'Emplacement de Carthage*. Paris, 1833.

* This opinion was formed long before the publication of Dr. Davis, who may be said to have proved it to demonstration. We have still some hesitation in accepting his explanation of the "gemini scopuli" as the double peaks of *Hamam l'Enf*, at the very bottom of the Gulf, far beyond the lagoon of Tunis; though the impressions of a traveller are most likely to be the faithful reproduction of those made on an

bay west of C. Camart, into which the Trojan vessels entered. . . . Once in this little harbour, they were perfectly safe, particularly during the prevalence of the E.S.E. wind, the force of which is first broken by C. Carthage, then by C. Camart, and finally by the eastern rocky projection of the harbour itself."* The Nymph's Grotto may well have been an imaginary scene, which the poet required for a subsequent purpose; and the caves of these sea-beaten rocks may have been swept away by the violence of the north-west winds, or covered by the sea. "But notwithstanding this," adds the traveller, "I am able to point out the remains of a cave with 'living water' dripping from the solid rock, and that only a few hundred yards from where the vessels were at anchor."

While his followers kindle a fire, and dry and pound their corn, Æneas ascends a rock which commands a wide prospect over the sea, but not a word is said yet of any view of Carthage. This is doubtless *C. Camart*, from which the city would be hidden by the intervening height of *Jebel Khawi*, or the "Hill of the Catacombs." He looks in vain for his scattered ships; but to landward he sees a herd of deer, seven of which are soon shot down for his seven ships. Turning from the poet to the traveller, we read:—"For miles around the secluded spot of Camart there are, even now, 'groves black with frowning shade,' and here the dales and valleys were, no doubt, anciently teeming with herds of stags. These timid animals were not only driven from their native wilds by the accumulation of human dwellings, but by the incessant havoc caused among them by the numerous huntsmen of a populous city in such close proximity. Other wild beasts, such as the wolf and the hyena, living in caves and hollows in the rocks, have retained their original strongholds, and some are even now occasionally killed by the indifferent Arab sportsmen." The next morning Æneas again mounts the hill with Achates, and advancing through the wood he meets his divine mother, disguised as a Tyrian huntress, who points out Carthage, and relates the adventures of Dido:—

"Punica regna vides, Tyrios, et Agenoris urbem;
Sed fines Libyci, genus intractabile bello."

ancient voyager approaching from the same direction. The "twin rocks" of Virgil certainly seem to be those at the very base of which "the safe waters are hushed"—which would apply rather to *C. Camart*, with *C. Carthage* seen beyond it; and the "minantur in cœlum," said of headlands only 300 and 400 feet high, may pass as a poetical exaggeration. Dr. Barth (*Wanderungen, &c.*), who is a very high authority, conjectures that the whole isthmus is of late formation, and that these two headlands were once separate rocky islands. At all events *C. Camart* may well have been an island, when the land of *El-Mersa* was under water.

* Davis, *Carthage*, chap. xv. "The African Landing-place of Virgil's Horo."

This must have been a general view from the summit of *Jebel Khani*, at the distance of about four miles. Venus bids Æneas and his companion proceed straight forward :—

“ No more advice is needful ; but pursue
The path before you, and the town in view.”*

Following this direction, they mount another eminence, from the slope of which they obtain a view of the whole scene of busy work :—

“ They climb the next ascent, and, looking down,
Now at a nearer distance view the town.
The prince with wonder sees the stately towers,
Where late were huts, and shepherds' homely bowers,
The gates and streets ; and hears, from ev'ry part,
The noise and busy concourse of the mart ”†

“ The height Virgil now alludes to,” says Dr. Davis, “ is that called *Sidi Bousaid*, or *Cape Carthage*. It is the most prominent eminence on the whole of the peninsula, being 393 feet above the level of the sea, and strictly ‘overhangs the city.’ It is only one mile from the Byrsa, the citadel, whose towers were directly opposite to it. From its heights the Trojans could clearly distinguish the gates and the various edifices. The din and noise of the workmen were perfectly audible, particularly as it is more than probable that stones from the very hill on which they stood were then actually being quarried for building some of the public edifices of the rising city. There are plain indications which prove that the hill of Sidi Bousaid was anciently quarried, and this is corroborated by the affinity between the formation of this vast rock and some of the stones dug up at our excavations. Besides, the city actually extended towards this hill, and the wall was scarcely half a mile from it, as is amply apparent from the remains of the sea-gate, which is almost at its foot.”

From the point thus defined, that part of Carthage which may be called the city proper, lay to the S.W., along the south-eastern shore of the peninsula, with the principal public buildings upon the heights behind, which form the prolongation of Cape Carthage. The extent of this city,‡ as determined partly by the few remains of the walls, and partly by the great cisterns, which are known to

* “ Perge modò, pater, quæ te ducit via, dirige gressum.”—v. 401.

† “ Corripuere viam interea quæ semita monstrat.

‡ *Jarque ascendebant collem, qui plurimus urbi
Imminet, adversasque aspectat desuper arces.*

Miratur molem Æneas, magalia quondam ;

Miratur portas, strepitumque, et strata viarum. —Vv. 418—422.

‡ It is now established, by most convincing proofs, that Roman Carthage was built

have been outside of them, was only about two miles long by one broad, the original limits having doubtless been sacredly preserved;* but to the north-west lay the suburb of Megara or Magalia, covering almost the whole surface of the peninsula (the circuit of which is twenty-four miles), and defended by a triple line of walls drawn right across the isthmus, which is three miles wide.† These gigantic fortifications rose to the height of thirty cubits, with towers four stories high at intervals of 200 feet. Behind each line of wall were two stories of vaulted casemates, the lower containing stabling for 300 elephants, and the upper for 4000 horses, with ample space for their food. Between the walls were barracks for 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, with magazines and stores. Thus there was a complete fortified camp upon the isthmus. A line of wall ran along the margin of the lake of Tunis, to the S.W. angle of the city proper, where a long narrow tongue of land, called the *Tœnia* (that is, *fillet*) jutted out between the lagoon and the sea. By establishing themselves on this spit, the Romans, in the Third Punic War, were able to attack the S.W. angle of the wall, where it was low and weak; and the possession of this point gave Scipio the opportunity of making his celebrated mole to block up the entrance to the harbours, which opened from a small bay outside the base of the *Tœnia*.

These harbours, which can still be traced with tolerable clearness close behind and parallel to the sea-shore, were two in

on the exact site of the Punic City, as indeed Pliny expressly says—"in vestigiis Magnæ Carthaginiis." Falbe discovered that the straight Roman roads, which are totally different from the crooked lanes used by the Mohammedans, divide the space occupied by the suburb of Megara into exactly 30 rectangles, each containing 100 allotments (*heredia*) of two *jugera*, the precise quantity for the 3000 colonists with whom Augustus peopled his new city. This, then, was the land (*ager*) belonging to the Roman city, and lying outside its walls.

* In the story of Dido, a circuit of twenty-two stadia, or above two miles and a half, is assigned to the city, probably the measurement of the land side.

† This, the least width of the isthmus, agrees with the length of the blockading wall which Scipio drew across it; but Strabo makes the whole circuit of the fortifications thirty-six geographical miles, of which he assigns six to the wall towards the land, extending—as he expressly says—from sea to sea. The only explanation at all satisfactory that has been proposed to explain this excess of the land wall over the width of the isthmus seems to be that it was thrown back further within the peninsula, and also that allowance has to be made for deviations from the straight line. The second hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that Strabo's length for the whole circuit of the walls is just fifty per cent. above that of the peninsula; and perhaps he may take in the inner wall of the city proper. A careful examination of the contours of the ground, with the aid of the able constructor of our map, has suggested the probability that the triple wall ran along the edge of the declivity by which the higher land of the peninsula falls down to the plain. (See the map.)

number: the outer for merchant vessels, the inner for men-of-war. The former was a basin of an oblong shape, 1160 feet by 420, approached by a channel 850 feet long by about 70 wide, with a second narrow channel 175 feet long, leading to the inner or naval harbour. This was of an oval shape, with an island in the middle, raised to a considerable height, so as at once to mask the view of the inner part of the harbour from the sea, and to afford a commanding station for the port-admiral, whose house was built upon it. The island was called *Cothon*, a name which was transferred to the harbour itself. It occupied just half the diameter of the whole basin, which now measures 960 feet across. Both sides of the ring were lined with quays and docks, for 220 ships of war. There was originally no separate entrance to the inner harbour from the sea; but when Scipio drew his mole across the mouth of the merchant harbour, the Carthaginians cut a new channel direct from the naval harbour, whence they sailed out with their fleet. It was only their own want of decision that prevented the surprise from being most disastrous to the Romans.* Besides these harbours, there was a spacious quay on the sea-shore, beyond the city walls, where merchant ships could receive or discharge their cargoes under the shelter of C. Carthage. The existence of such a quay is proved by substructions similar to the clearer remains at Leptis Magna. Besides, the lagoon supplied a vast enclosed roadstead for vessels of small draught.†

Between the harbours and the foot of the headland of C. Carthage, and along the heights parallel to the coast-line, which connect that promontory with the isthmus, is the ground once occupied by the buildings both of Punic and Roman Carthage. The present aspect of its surface does but too faithfully testify to those peculiar circumstances in the history of the city which have rendered its topography, like its history, one of the most obscure, though most interesting, questions in the annals of the world. It is in vain that the enquirer regrets the want of a native history of Carthage. When she succumbed to the ruthless sentence *Delenda est Carthago*, which doomed all her edifices to obliteration, and pronounced a

* The fact that Scipio saw from Tunis the Punic fleet sailing out of the new opening is decisive against the opinion of Shaw, Estrup, and Rutter, that the harbour was on the opposite side of the peninsula,—a position, moreover, which the furious north-west winds would have made most dangerous.

† Avoiding all topographical controversies, we do not stay to expose the error of taking the lagoon itself for the harbour of Carthage; but, as an indication of its subsidiary value, we may mention that *Misua*, the port of Carthage under the Vandals, was on its shore.

curse upon him who should attempt to rebuild the city, she left her reputation in the hands of her relentless enemies. The ungenerous animosity of Livy and the confused details of Appian prove how little the Roman and Greek writers cared either for historical impartiality or descriptive fidelity. With an ingenuity far more effectual than that of scattering a victim's ashes to the winds, the Roman conquerors dispersed the precious memorials contained in the libraries of the city, among the Numidian princes, reserving for translation into Latin none but ~~the~~ thirty-two books of Mago on Agriculture, as the only work useful to the republic.* Of the records laid up at Tyre concerning this greatest of her colonies, but one fragment has been preserved for us by Josephus.† Even had the Roman authors, and the Greeks who wrote of Roman affairs, been disposed to do Carthage justice, they only knew her after she had passed her meridian splendour. For the early period of her history, we grievously miss the lively and faithful details of Herodotus, from whose plan Carthage was excluded; but he has incidentally preserved some precious fragments of her history. The Carthaginian constitution attracted the particular attention of Aristotle, whose brief notice of it in his "Politick" serves to show how irreparable is the loss of the fuller discussion in his great work on the ancient polities. Diodorus Siculus is our chief authority for the contests of the Carthaginians and the Greeks in his native island. The historians who have treated of the Punic Wars scarcely extend their notices of Carthaginian history beyond those limits; but we owe a few invaluable facts to Polybius. As the friend of the younger Scipio, and his companion at the taking of Carthage, he enjoyed all the means of information accessible to the Romans, without sharing their political animosity. • He is as far above Livy in careful research as in impartial calmness. Appian seems chiefly to follow Polybius, adding details from other sources; but the carelessness of the compiler often makes his fuller particulars a new source of confusion, especially as to the topography of the city. We look in vain to the accurate geographer Strabo to correct these errors, as in his time the city had lain

* As governor of Africa under Cæsar, the historian Sallust had access to these literary treasures, and the disposition to make use of them. Of the important results we should have obtained from these Punic sources, we may judge by the fragment upon the peopling of North Africa from the East, which Sallust tells us was translated to him from the Punic books of Hiempsal, king of Numidia (Jugurtha, 17).

† This is the important statement, that Carthage was founded 148 years and 8 months after the building of Solomon's temple, which Josephus expressly says that he derived from Phœnician documents preserved in his time at Tyre.

in ruins for a century and a half, and his notices are few and brief. The only author who has attempted a continuous history of Carthage is Justin, the epitomator of Trogus Pompeius, whose statements can only be accepted after careful criticism. When we turn to the ruins of the city, to see what information they can add, we find them in a state that at first seems hopeless.

The curse pronounced by the vote of the Roman Senate on the site of Carthage, after its destruction by Scipio (B.C. 146), was rigidly respected for exactly a century, with the exception of the abortive attempt of C. Gracchus to found a colony there under the name of Junonia (B.C. 122). Meanwhile such ruins as remained after the rigour with which the sentence of destruction was carried out, were ransacked and rifled by the people of the surrounding cities, and doubtless by some of the outcast inhabitants themselves. How thoroughly this process was carried on is proved by the fact that the recent excavations have brought to light scarcely any specimens of coined money, and none of those ornaments in the precious metals which are so abundant in the ruins of Assyria and Babylonia. Nothing could have been left but the solid substructions of the more important buildings and of the quays; and these were resorted to as a quarry, when Augustus at length carried out the plan, which Julius Cæsar had formed exactly a century after the destruction of the city (B.C. 46), of building a Roman Carthage on the site of the ancient city. This Roman city, destroyed in its turn by the Arabs (A.D. 647), covered deep below its ruins what remained of Punic Carthage, and furnished a similar quarry to the people of Tunis and the surrounding villages. "Whatever yet remained of Carthage," says Gibbon, "was delivered to the flames, and the colony of Dido and Cæsar lay desolate above two hundred years, till a part, perhaps a twentieth, of the whole circumference was repeopled by the first of the Fatimite caliphs. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the second capital of the West was represented by a mosque, a college without students, twenty-five or thirty shops, and the huts of five hundred peasants, who, in their abject poverty, displayed the arrogance of the Punic senators. Even that paltry village was swept away by the Spaniards whom Charles V. had stationed in the fortress of Goletta. The ruins of Carthage have perished; and the place might be unknown if some broken arches of an aqueduct did not guide the footsteps of the inquisitive traveller."

Since the great historian wrote these words, the site of Carthage has been adorned with a monument of the most interesting

event in its medieval history. Louis IX. of France, whose pure devotion fed those last flames^{*} of chivalry that burnt in his life, landed at Carthage in July 1270, to prosecute the latest of the crusading enterprizes—that against Tunis. While he waited for his brother, the king of Sicily, his army was decimated by an epidemic, to which Louis himself fell a victim. The spot where he expired in his tent is now marked by a chapel, bearing an inscription which records its erection in 1841 by Louis Philippe, king of the French, in memory of his ancestor St. Louis. The hill surmounted by this monument, and now called the Hill of St. Louis, commands a wide prospect over the peninsula of Carthage, and the hills which are seen through the brilliant atmosphere across the blue waters of the bay; and the traveller tells us how he was admiring the various points of beauty with which nature has adorned the spot, when his Arab attendant exclaimed, “Verily, this world is transitory; the next alone is durable! Look how vast a city this Carthage must have been! What ingenuity and wealth its numerous inhabitants must have possessed! How great was its strength, and yet how paltry are the remains of its former grandeur and glory!” As the eye sweeps over the surface of the peninsula, it sees only the petty hamlets of Sokrah, Camart, Moolkah, and Sidi Daoud, and the villas and gardens of El Mersa, amidst which the lofty piers and broken arches of the great aqueduct carry the eye to the spot where once the city stood. The few fragments of ruin, which are still visible above ground, may be pronounced, as a general rule, to be remains of Roman Carthage; those of the Punic city are to be sought beneath the surface of the soil.

The spot which affords this commanding view appears to have been the same from which Scipio watched the progress of his troops at the close of the fearful struggle of six days and nights, during which they fought their way from the Cothon to the Byrsa.* The Hill of St. Louis has been identified by most topographers with this BYRSA,† the citadel of Carthage, and without doubt the original city itself. A merely elementary knowledge of Oriental languages at once reduces to the class of myths invented from fancied etymologies the well-known story—how Dido outwitted the natives by purchasing as much land as could be covered with an ox-hide (*bursa*), which she then cut into thin strips, and so

* It is in fact the *only* eminence answering to Appian's description of the hill ascended by Scipio, *near the Forum*. C. Carthage is too distant.

† It has already been stated that this word is the Semitic *Borzah*, a fortress.

enclosed space enough for a fortress. But the fable is not without its value as a confession of the principle of fraud which has in all ages governed the dealings of civilized with savage peoples. Strabo describes the Byrsa as a hill of moderate height in the middle of the city, surmounted by the temple of Æsculapius; and the central position of the Hill of St. Louis, with its height, only inferior to C. Carthage and C. Camart,* have led to the hasty assumption that it must have been the citadel in question. But we learn from other sources that the Byrsa had a circuit of more than two Roman miles, and when it surrendered to Scipio, 50,000 people marched out of it, besides 900 Roman deserters, who remained and resisted to the death. A great part of the Byrsa was occupied by the temple of Æsculapius and the chapels of other deities. And yet the Hill of St. Louis has a level surface of only 700 feet square; nor can room be found in the 1725 feet between the Cothon and the hill for the 120,000 soldiers of Scipio. Still more decisive is the statement of an ancient writer,† that the Byrsa had a side common with the wall of this city, *where it overhung the sea*; and we might indeed assume that such would be the position chosen by the first settlers. Guided by such conditions, Dr. Davis has marked out an irregular quadrangle at the north-eastern part of the city, nearest to Cape Carthage, as the precinct of the Byrsa and the temple of Æsculapius; and his excavations upon this site have discovered important remains of the temple itself, and of the staircase which led up to it. Among the ruins was found a Phœnician inscription, bearing the name of *Ashmon*, the native appellation of the deity. When it is added, that repeated diggings in the Hill of St. Louis have laid bare no vestige of any Punic temple or other edifice, nor turned up a single Phœnician inscription, the question seems to be decided. Heaps of ruins may be traced down the side of the hill from the temple of Æsculapius to the sea-shore, where are still seen the remains of a sea-gate, which gave separate access to this quarter. Within the precincts of the citadel are the great rain-water cisterns, called by the Arabs the *Cisterns of the Devil*, only inferior in magnitude to the reservoirs supplied by the great aqueduct, with which they have a subterranean communication; but their Punic construction is still a disputed question. Further excavations within and around the precincts of the Byrsa have brought

* The respective heights are, C. Carthage, 395 feet; Jebel Khawi (above C. Camart), 315 feet; Hill of St. Louis, 188 feet.

† Ado Viennensis, quoted by Dr. Davis, p. 379.

to light Mosaic pavements, fragments of pottery and sculpture, and Phœnician inscriptions, in sufficient abundance to encourage the belief that more systematic efforts might reveal much of the plan of the ancient city.*

Besides the temple of Æsculapius, the sites of those of Astarte and Baal appear to have been identified. To each of these three deities a distinct quarter of the city seems to have been dedicated, and their names were given to the three streets which, as Appian informs us, led up from the Cothon to the Byrsa. Of these the most direct was the *Vicus Salutaris*, or street of Æsculapius, parallel to the sea-wall; the central, or street of Baal (*Vicus Saturni*, or *Senis*), passed through the market-place, which was adjacent to the Cothon, and skirted the eastern slope of the Hill of St. Louis; the street of Astarte (*Vicus Veneris*) made a circuit round the other side of that hill. The lines of these streets may still be traced with a tolerable approach to certainty.

These parts of the city occupy the group of hills forming the south-western prolongation of the headland of Cape Carthage. On their western slope are traces of a circus and amphitheatre; the latter memorable in Christian history as the scene of the martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas.† In the north-western angle of the city, at the village of Moalkah, are the immense reservoirs which contained the water brought a distance of fifty-two miles by the great aqueduct from Jebel Zaghwah.‡ Their number seem to have been originally twenty. There are now fourteen, placed side by side, 400 feet long by 28 wide, the depth being concealed by the earth which fills them to the spring of their vaulted coverings. Another, higher and narrower, which runs transversely to all these, was perhaps only a gallery, to give access to the cisterns. Their mode of construction was that which the Roman writers call *formacian*,§ built up of successive layers of small stones mixed with mortar, and moulded in a wooden box

* Dr. Davis gives us clearly to understand that such investigations were altogether beyond his means and opportunities. "Had our object been simply to lay bare the ruins of Carthage, this would undoubtedly have presented a very prolific field. But such was not our aim. We made no purchase of land, and simply dug with a view to find objects worthy of removal." In some cases, parts of the edifices discovered were sacrificed to the purpose of enriching our Museum, where the antiquities obtained by Dr. Davis are very imperfectly exhibited.

† Dr. Davis seems carried too far by zeal for his subject in maintaining the Punic origin of this edifice; but his arguments for ascribing the great aqueduct and cisterns to the Carthaginians deserve consideration.

‡ See the map on p. 359.

§ From *forma*, the form or mould by which the work was supported.

open at top and bottom. The prevalence of this mode of building in Africa and in Spain, where it was used in the watch-towers ascribed to Hannibal, furnishes a strong argument for the Punic origin of the cisterns, and consequently of the aqueduct which supplies them. This aqueduct is one of those magnificent works of engineering which modern smatterers in science have ascribed forsooth to ignorance of the simple law that water finds its own level! The ancients applied closed earthen pipes to the conveyance of water over ground of unequal levels; but they had no means of constructing prodigious iron tubes like those which supply Glasgow with the pure water of Loch Katrine. They understood the advantage of an equable flow of water down a gently-inclined channel, free from the friction and danger of bursting at joints and angles. Therefore they reared those structures, as picturesque as they are stupendous, which cross the Campagna of Rome, the plain of Nismes, and the peninsula of Carthage, and may be traced up to their distant sources, spanning valleys, and piercing mountains. The line of the Carthaginian aqueduct is still in sufficient preservation to be used for the supply of water to Tunis.* Where it is carried through the mountains, it is ventilated by air-shafts at about every twenty yards. Where it crosses the valleys and plain, it is supported on arches, the piers of which vary in height according to the varying surface of the ground, reaching in some places to an elevation of 125. feet. The arches vary from about 14 ft. to 20 ft. in span; the piers from 10 ft. 1 in. by 8 ft. 6 in. to 14 ft. 7 in. by 12 ft. 2 in.; the thicker being of moulded mud, and the others of masonry. Dr. Shaw describes the channel itself as "being high and broad enough for a person of ordinary size to walk in. It is vaulted above, and plastered in the inside with strong cement; which by the stream running through it is discoloured to the height of about three feet. This will sufficiently show the capacity of the channel; but, as there are several breaches in the aqueduct, sometimes for three or four miles together, I had no method to determine the velocity or angle of descent, so as to ascertain the quantity of water that might be daily conveyed to Carthage."†

* Dr. Davis speaks (in 1860) of this work as in progress under the direction of a French contractor, who was supplying the gaps in the aqueduct with iron pipes, and not scrupling to throw down some of the ancient piers to furnish materials for his work.

† Shaw's Travels, vol. i., p. 168. The whole subject of the ancient aqueducts is treated in the article *Aquæductus* in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

Beyond the city walls, but still within those which defended the peninsula, the suburb of Megara was doubtless the site of the villas and gardens of the wealthy Carthaginians. There are no remains here of public or great edifices. Traces of houses have been found upon the sea-shore, supported on piers and arches, through which the sea could beat freely; and in one of these Dr. Davis fancies that he can recognize the marine villa of Hannibal, whence the great general made his escape by sea when Cn. Servilius arrived at Carthage to demand his surrender. Overhanging *Cape Camart* is the hilly range, already more than once mentioned, of *Jebel Khavi* (the *empty mountain*), so called from the catacombs by which its interior is perforated. Numerous square apertures in the surface of the ground give access to subterraneous chambers hewn out of the limestone and slightly vaulted. Their sides present the well-known appearance of the Roman *columbaria* (dove-cotes), but with the important difference, that they are adapted to contain coffins instead of urns, the holes being about 2 feet square and 6 feet deep. For the Carthaginians, like their Semitic brethren in Asia, buried their dead out of their sight; and we have a curious record of a treaty in which Darius Hystaspis required them to abandon this custom for the Persian practice of burning their bodies. When the traveller explored these catacombs, he was struck with the remarkable absence of human remains; the niches of the *columbaria* being open and empty. Dr. Davis thus describes one of the few exceptions that he discovered:—"I was informed that the men of *Jebel Khavi* had discovered a chamber without any niches. I proceeded to examine it, and found that the niches in this columbarium were stopped up by cement, on which the marks of the hand of him that did it were distinctly seen. On one we observed a representation of the seven-branched candlestick, and on another the letters A.P.; the remaining eight were quite plain. We broke through the thin layer of cement, and found the skeleton just as it was deposited. It was coffee-colour in appearance, and crumbled to dust as soon as touched. But no other object was visible; neither ornament, nor coin, nor lamp could be discovered. In the vicinity of this we again came upon empty chambers, and occasionally we found one or two of the receptacles occupied. Upon examination, we perceived traces which proved that they had all been once tenanted, and that the fragile cement had been intentionally broken through, and the skeleton removed. The portions of the cement which still adhered to the openings led us to

this conclusion." These appearances contradict the supposition that the spoliation was, at least in the first instance, the work of the wild beasts (chiefly hyenas) which have, now their dens in the empty sepulchres. We cannot doubt that the tombs were originally made secure against their intrusion; and long before they gained an entrance, the remains would be reduced to the state of dry powder, offering no attraction to beasts of prey. It seems more probable that these sepulchres of the heathen were rifled by the Christians, who used some of them again as their own burial-places, but without the same care, except in a few cases, to fill up the openings of the niches. Meanwhile the roots of the wild fig-trees, which grow luxuriantly above, broke through the thin vaults; the hyenas found an entrance through these and other openings, and devoured the bodies last deposited, except in the niches which had been again secured. The seven-branched candlestick on one of these is certainly a Christian emblem;* and the absence of lamps and other objects, constantly found in Roman tombs, agrees with the conclusion drawn from the dimensions of the niches. Nor is the hypothesis admissible, that the catacombs were first excavated by the Christians. Extending beneath the whole surface of the group of hills and the romantic valleys of Jebel Camart, for a circuit of four miles, they correspond in magnitude to the population of Carthage, which, even just before its capture, amounted to 700,000 souls.†

Among the most interesting discoveries made during the recent excavations at Carthage are several mosaic pavements. An especially fine specimen was discovered among the ruins which are supposed to belong to the temple of Astarte, the chief goddess of the Phœnicians. This temple, restored by the Romans as that of Venus Urania or Cœlestis, is celebrated for its magnificence by several ancient writers. "After being consecrated as a Christian church by Bishop Aurelius (A.D. 425), it shared the final fall of Roman Carthage, and its ruins have been rent and torn into all sorts of forms and shapes by the present barbarous inhabitants, to whom its remains have proved a rich quarry." The splendid mosaic,

* See Revelation i. 12, 13, 20. We may connect this use of the emblem with the known fact that, when Genseric sacked Rome, he carried off to Carthage the spoils obtained by Titus from the Jewish temple, and probably the golden candlestick among them (A.D. 455). Gibbon, vol. iii., p. 291.

† "What also gives these catacombs an Oriental, and hence a Punic character, is the round holes excavated in the rock, and found in various parts on *Jebel Kharwi*. They are intended to collect water to refresh the soul, which was believed to hover over the place of sepulture of its body."—Davis, p. 489, note.

parts of which were found under these ruins and removed to the British Museum, had, when complete, four colossal heads in the corners, and eight compartments, arranged in a circle, representing—to judge from those which remain—females in the act of sacrificing; with a central circle which is now lost.* Thus the subject was evidently religious; but the chief question is, whether this and similar works found at Carthage belong to the Punic or the Roman city. We are apt to beg the question by the habit of regarding mosaic pictures as peculiarly Roman. But we are informed by Pliny that the art was invented by the Greeks; and it was not introduced at Rome till the time of Sulla. During the long period of her maritime domination, Carthage had abundant opportunities to purchase with her wealth the services of the greatest artists, with whom she was brought in contact by her alliance with the Etruscans, her relations with the Greeks of Sicily, and her commerce in the Mediterranean. At the time when the Greeks had perfected every branch of art, Rome was but just struggling into existence, “whereas Carthage had attained to a state of affluence and great power. Greeks, and emigrants from other nations, were in her employ. National and foreign artists contributed towards the embellishment of the African metropolis; and to the works of art, with which her public edifices were adorned, Virgil bears ample testimony: whilst the spoils which Scipio sent to Rome, after the city had been pillaged by his rude soldiery, and after the conflagration, in which vast treasures of precious objects must have perished, prove with what assiduity the productions of art were collected, and to what extent artistic skill was patronized by the Carthaginians.”† Nor must we forget the repeated testimonies of Greek and Roman writers, from Homer downwards, to the skill of the Phœnicians themselves in certain branches of design, and especially in woven fabrics. Of the cultivation of this art at Carthage we have an example in the gorgeous golden mantle, which Gelo dedicated to

* A detailed description is given in the work of Dr. Davis, who conjectures that the pavement was that of a chapel of Dido, which is known to have existed within the precincts of the temple of Astarte, and that the four heads were those of Proserpine and Ceres, Dido and her sister Anna. We are distinctly informed that the worship of Demeter and Persephone (Ceres and Proserpine) was introduced into Carthage from Sicily by a treaty made with Gelo of Syracuse.—*Carthage and her Remains*, chaps. x. and xi.

† Davis, p. 207. We learn from Appian that the works of art which adorned Scipio's triumph were in a great measure the plunder of other states; and Scipio restored some of them to their rightful owners.

Olympian Jove from the spoils of the battle of Himera. Now, mosaic work is just that branch of art which we might expect to be cultivated by those skilful in the other: it is a sort of tapestry in stone. Dr. Davis states that a difference may be clearly established between the levels at which Roman and Punic pavements occur at Carthage, the former being met with at depths varying from two to five or six feet, the latter never at less than ten feet. Still more striking is the fact that the Romans, in digging for the foundations of their edifices, have cut right through older pavements, as in the case of the mosaic of the temple of Astarte. The costume of the figures in this pavement are said to present a marked contrast to those of the Roman period, and a distinction is alleged in the manufacture of the work. The layer of cement, in which the supposed Punic mosaics are imbedded, is thicker and less adhesive than the Roman, being composed only of lime, and a similar difference is seen in Punic and Roman walls. Lastly, in the example now chiefly referred to, besides strata of pavement and other remains of successive constructions above it, the mosaic was found covered by a thin layer of charcoal, proving that the building to which it belonged had perished by fire.* Among the certain remnants of Punic art, the most important are the bas-reliefs which are associated with Phœnician inscriptions on the numerous tablets that have been found, not only among the ruins of Carthage, but over the whole surface of Africa Proper. They are almost exclusively religious, and full of obscure symbolical allusions to the mythology, cosmogony, and astrology of the Phœnicians. They are in the stiff hieratic style of art, bearing a considerable resemblance to the bas-reliefs of Nineveh. But that the Carthaginians, or the foreign artists in their employ, could model forms of great beauty, when free from the trammels of religious prescription, is proved by the horse and the head of Astarte on the Punic coins found in Sicily.

Such a specimen as the great mosaic may aid us in estimating the prospect of reward to systematic researches among the ruins of the Punic capital. Of the private buildings, all that we could hope to discover would be the pavements and more solid walls of the lower stories. The upper stories, of which there were often as many as six, were constructed in that "formacjan" work already described,

* We have thought it due to the great interest of the subject to give a full statement of Dr. Davis's arguments for the Punic origin of this and other mosaics; but the majority of the best authorities on art have pronounced them unquestionably Roman.

the ruins of which would cover the basement with a shapeless heap of mud, protecting the pavements from destruction; but the pillage to which the city was subjected at its fall forbids the hope of recovering those treasures of art and vestiges of domestic life which enrich the houses of Pompeii and the palaces of Nineveh. The life of Carthage cannot be reconstructed from her monuments.

Before returning to the stream of the people's history, we must give some account of that peculiar and repulsive form of religion, which had the greatest influence on their destiny. Like all ancient colonies, the Phœnician settlers in Africa carried with them the religion of their mother country, where we have already seen it corrupting the purer worship of the Israelites. Thence, however, its germs seem to be traceable still further back to the plains of Chaldæa, from whence the nation migrated to the Mediterranean. It was an elemental worship, in which an astronomical character predominated.* The supreme deity was *Baal-Hammon* (or Baal-Samon), the "Lord of Heaven," the impersonation both of the all-encompassing heaven,—which contained and gave birth to all the other powers of nature—and of the active energy of the Sun, the source of light and life. Endowed with the various attributes which the Greeks and Romans distributed among their chief divinities, Baal was identified at once with Uranus, Cronus (Saturn), Jove, Apollo, and Mars. His supremacy is shown by the constant presence of his name on the votive tablets to other deities at Carthage. Hence he received that title, too well known to the Israelites, of

"MOLOCH, horrid KING, besmeared with blood
Of human sacrifice, and parents' tears;
Though, for the noise of drums and timbrels loud,
Their children's cries unheard, that passed through fire
To his grim idol."[†]

* An elaborate account of the Phœnician religion and cosmogony is given in the alleged fragments of the native historian, Sanchuniathon of Berytus, translated into Greek by Philo Byblius, who lived in the first century after Christ, and preserved in the *Præparatio Evangelica* of Eusebius. But scholars are now almost agreed that the work of Philo was a forgery. It does not, however, follow that it may not be, in some points, a faithful account of the Phœnician mythology; but we cannot use it as an authority.

† Milton's allusion is evidently to the description given by Rabbi Simeon of the rites of the Syrian Moloch as practised at Jerusalem. "All the houses of the idols were in the city of Jerusalem, except that of Moloch, which was out of the city, in a separate place. It was a statue with the head of an ox, and the hands stretched out as a man's who opens his hands to receive something from another. It was hollow

The origin of this rite—ascribed in the spurious fragment of Sanchuniathon to Saturn's immolation of his only son by a mortal woman, to appease the wrath of his father Uranus—is to be traced to that principle, which is found more or less in all nations, that the wrath of Heaven can only be appeased by the sacrifice of life, and that, the worse the calamity to be averted, the dearer must be the victim offered. In times of national danger, it was the dreadful privilege of kings and rulers to immolate their children for their country's salvation. Thus, in the history of Moab, where the worship of Moloch was paramount, we read of Balak's despairing enquiry of Balaam:—"Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?"* And at a later crisis in the nation's history, Mesha, the king of Moab, being shut up in the fortress of Kir-haraseth by the united forces of Israel, Judah, and Edom, and having in vain tried a sally, mounted the wall with his eldest son, and there sacrificed him for a burnt-offering in full view of his own people within the town and of the besieging armies.† Such sacrifices were habitually practised at Carthage. Darius Hystaspis tried to forbid them; and their cessation was stipulated for by Gelo in the treaty which followed the battle of Himera.

In process of time, common persons, prisoners of war, and even slaves, were substituted for nobler victims; but an extreme danger, such as that of the invasion of Agathocles, was interpreted as a punishment for this laxity, and a great sacrifice was offered of 200 children of the highest rank. Of the rules for the conduct of these and the other sacred rites, which were suspended on tablets in the temples, a specimen has been discovered in an inscription which Dr. Davis characterizes as 'the gem of

within, and there were seven chapels raised before which the idol was erected. . . . He only who offered his own son went into the seventh chapel, and kissed the idol Moloch, as it is said, 'Let the men who sacrifice kiss the calves.' The child was placed before the idol, and a fire made under it till it became red hot. Then the priest took the child, and put him into the glowing hands of Moloch. But, lest the parents should hear his cries, they beat drums to drown the noise. Therefore the place was called *Tophet* (from *Thoph*, pl. *Thuppin*, drums). It was also called *Hinnom*, because of the children's cries (from the Hebrew verb, *naham*, to roar), or, as the priest said to the parents '*Yehenelah*,' i.e., 'It will be of advantage to you.'—(Comm. in *Jerem.* vii.) Such were the scenes to be witnessed at Tyre, and at her colonies, as well as in

"The pleasant valley of Hinnom, *Tophet* thence
And black *Gehenna* called, the type of hell."

* Micah vi. 7.

† 2 Kings iii. 27.

Punic epigraphy.* The document was found near the ruins of the temple of Baal, the plan of which has been satisfactorily made out. It was situated on the northern slope of the Byrsa, at the extremity of the street of Moloch (*Vicus Saturni*), which led up to it from the Forum. Its form was circular, with an extreme diameter of 200 feet. Four concentric rings, each composed of twelve detached piers, supported doubtless a dome-shaped roof, and formed three galleries around a circular chamber twenty-nine feet in diameter.† The temple was undoubtedly the chief sanctuary of Carthage. That it was the depository of archives and other important documents, we learn from the celebrated *Voyage of Hanno* round the north-west coast of Africa, the title of which expressly states that it was dedicated in the temple of Cronus. Magnificent accounts are given of the wealth deposited in this and the other Carthaginian temples. The Punic element in Roman Carthage was strong enough to revive the horrible rites of Baal; and in spite of imperial edicts, Tertullian tells us that infants were publicly sacrificed to Saturn till the proconsulship of Tiberius, who crucified the priests on the same trees under the shadow of which they had perpetrated their crimes. We learn from this allusion that the rites of Baal were practised at Carthage, as in Syria, in dense groves around his temple, the gloom of which increased the sense of mystic horror, and veiled them from the outer world. The same cruelties were still perpetrated under their shades, in spite of the example just recorded, till, at a time when Paganism was making a last convulsive effort to regain its power, the Council of Carthage petitioned the emperors Arcadius and Honorius, that the relics of idolatry, not only in the form of images, but in all places, groves, and trees whatsoever, might be utterly destroyed (A.D. 399).

The second in rank of the Phœnician deities was *Ashtoreth*, or "Astarte, queen of heaven,‡ with crescent horns," the impersonation of the Moon, as Baal was of the Sun. Like him, she was identified, in her different attributes, with various Greek and Roman divinities: with Juno, as the supreme goddess; with Mi-

* He gives a translation, with the frank acknowledgment that many points are doubtful interpretation, in *Carthage and her Remains*, pp. 296, 297.

† A passing allusion may suffice for the reference which Dr. Davis traces in the plan to the astronomical character of the worship of Baal (whom the Greeks identified with Cronus, the god of time); the circular form indicating the year (the Roman *annus*, a ring), the four rings of piers the four seasons, the twelve piers in each the months, and their total number ($12 \times 4 = 48$) the weeks in the lunar year.

‡ This title is applied to the goddess by Jeremiah, vii. 18.

nera, as the patroness of the arts; with *Ceres*, as the bounteous giver of the fruits of the earth; and, in the gross Oriental development of the like idea, with the *Venus*, misnamed heavenly, whose worship we have already seen marking the track of Phœnician colonization. From being regarded as the source of every earthly blessing—the character in which her name appears upon the Punic inscriptions—her service soon degenerated into those unutterable abominations which the Fathers, especially of the African Church, describe as coming under their own notice. The transport of her worship from Phœnicia to Carthage is supposed to be alluded to in the legend of *Dido*, who is even called by the name of *Astroarché*.

Another goddess, bearing some resemblance to *Astarte* in her attributes, is frequently mentioned on the Punic votive tablets. Her name, *Tanath*,* seems to connect her with the Persian and Armenian goddess *Tanais*. Nor is it surprising that such a deity should be honoured at Carthage, if we accept the tradition, which was derived by *Sallust* from the Punic records, that the Phœnician colonists found an Asiatic population already settled in North Africa.† Her worship would be easily adopted by the new settlers, from her resemblance to their own *Astarte*, and as a politic concession to the natives. How popular it became is proved by the occurrence of her name on the majority of the votive tablets that have been discovered at Carthage.

The third name, frequently associated with these, is that of *Ashmon*, the *Asclepius* or *Æsculapius* of the Greeks and Romans. In the fragment of the pseudo-Sanchuniathon, he is made the son of *Sydyc* (the Just), the grandson of *Cronus* and *Astarte*, and the eighth brother of the seven *Cabiri*, to whom was committed the custody of the sacred books and mysteries. The attributes which he had in common with *Æsculapius*, as the Healer, appear to have formed but one aspect of his wider character as the protector and defence of men; and it was in that character that his temple formed the stronghold and citadel of Carthage. It may be doubted whether it was so from the beginning, and whether his worship was not first introduced, or at least brought into prominence, at the time of some great national calamity.

* The name seems to be preserved in that of *Tunis*, a city sacred to her, as *Sicra Veneria* was to the same goddess under her Roman appellation. The name of the goddess may perhaps also be traced in that of the river *Tanais*, and her worship in the time of the *Tauric Artemis* in the Crimea. She has also been identified with the *Artemis Anaitis* of the Lydians.

† This tradition will be presently noticed more particularly.

The votive tablets discovered at Carthage prove that the aid of Ashmon was invoked in seasons of personal and family danger, and it is interesting to find among his devotees some of the greatest names in Carthaginian history—though we cannot identify the individuals who dedicated the tablets—*Hanno*, the son of Akbar, and a son of *Hannibal*. His temple, the site of which has already claimed our notice, was rebuilt when Carthage was re-peopled by Augustus, and became one of the chief ornaments of the Roman city.

To these divinities must be added *Melcareth* or *Melcarth*, the tutelary deity of Carthage, as of the mother city.* Like Ashmon, he has on the votive inscriptions a rank secondary to that of Baal and Astarte; and the exploits ascribed to him by the Phœnician traditions are those of an adventurous demigod and benefactor to mankind, like Hercules, with whom he was identified by the Greeks. Melcarth was the inventor of the Tyrian purple, by seeing the stain on the mouth of a dog that had fed on the shell-fish which yield the colour.† He too was the great navigator, who first tempted the dangers of the Atlantic, and brought home tin from the Cassiterides. His chief seat was at Tyre, and his worship was the connecting link between that great metropolis and all her colonies. We read of victorious Carthaginian generals sending the tithe of their booty to the temple of Hercules at Tyre; and we have evidence of the piety with which the relation was acknowledged, in the aid sent by Carthage to Tyre during the siege by Nebuchadnezzar, and in her reception of the fugitives from the mother city on the eve of its capture by Alexander. In that renowned temple Herodotus saw two pillars, the one of the purest gold, the other of a stone resembling emerald, which emitted an extraordinary brilliancy in the night.‡ Second only to this in fame and splendour, was his temple at Gades, where the demigod was said to have been buried. In the latter temple there was certainly no statue, nor is there distinct mention of one at Tyre. At Carthage we read of the priest of Melcarth,

* This character is indicated by his name, according to the commonly-accepted etymology of Bochart, *Melech-Cartha*, i. e. *King of the City*. Dr. Davis prefers *Melech-Ereth*, i. e. *King of Earth or the Land*, marking his power as complementary to that of Baal and Astarte, the king and queen of heaven, and also designating him as lord of the Phœnician fatherland. The same writer regards the Phœnician religion as based on the conception of a tripartite deity, represented by the sun, moon, and stars (the emblem of the triangle, Δ , occurs on Punian bas-reliefs), with Melcarth uniting them all. Some of the classical writers confound this deity with Melch.

† Herod. ii. 44.

clothed in all the pomp of an embroidered purple robe, garlands, and a crown of gold, ministering with bare feet and shaven head, and preserving the sacred fire which had been transported from the mother city. But we have no mention of a temple of the god; for the whole city appears to have been regarded as his temple. It seems, indeed, to have been long before the Phœnicians admitted visible forms of any of their deities. The name of this divinity is preserved in that of Hamilcar.* None of the other Punic deities are important enough to demand a separate notice. Hero-worship seems to have been practised at Carthage, for a tablet has been found with the inscription "Baal-Hanno."

The votive and other tablets so often referred to present an important collection of materials for the study of the Phœnician language. Besides those discovered in the strictly Punic ruins, many have been preserved by the use of the materials of the ancient city in the Roman edifices. No less than a hundred were disinterred by Dr. Davis, who also purchased for our government a large collection of Punic, Numidian, and Libyan inscriptions found in the interior. Other Phœnician inscriptions are scattered through the museums of Europe. Several of these are bi-lingual, in Punic and Latin, at once confirming the statements of the African fathers, that the Carthaginian was still a living language under the Roman empire, and holding out the prospect of the complete deciphering of the inscriptions. The successful efforts already made show what results may be obtained from sources apparently trivial. The Roman comedian Plautus, who flourished at the time of the Second Punic War, wrote a play entitled *Pœnulus*. A *Carthaginian*, Hanno, is made to speak in an unintelligible dialect, which was assumed to be a mere gibberish, like that put by Aristophanes into the mouth of the Persian ambassador at Athens. The great Scaliger, guided by the testimony of Augustin and Jerome to the resemblance of Punic and Hebrew, conjectured that this unknown tongue was nothing else than Punic, a view confirmed by later Hebrew scholars. That their interpretations of the passage are but partly satisfactory is not wonderful, when we consider the chances against the purity of Plautus's Punic. With the help of bi-lingual inscriptions, and the proper names on the Phœnician coins, the alphabet has not only been deciphered, but proved to be identical with the Hebrew alphabet

* The name is that of Melcarth, with the definite article prefixed, which Gesenius interprets as the [gift] of Melcarth.

in its most ancient form. "We are now," says Dr. Davis, "in a position, with the assistance of a moderate knowledge of Hebrew and the other cognate languages, to translate, and that with a great degree of certainty, any Phœnician inscription. The real difficulties still encountered consist in the similarity of letters, and in the various forms of the same letter, as well as in the non-separation of words, which was a universal practice in composition among the Carthaginians and among the Phœnicians in Asia."*

Such are the materials we now possess for a knowledge of the city and people that almost succeeded in crushing Rome. It remains to review the course of their history down to the commencement of the great conflict in which, as Livy says, the victors were the nearer to destruction. The slender remnants of the native Phœnician records, preserved by Josephus and Justin, are insufficient to dispel the mythical obscurity in which the genius of Virgil has shrouded the origin of Carthage. Indeed the story so familiar to the readers of the *Æneid* is, in its main points, but an amplification of the Phœnician traditions.† The outlines of the well-known story need only be glanced at. In the course of the long confusion which followed the brilliant reign of Hiram at Tyre, a sacerdotal dynasty of kings was founded by Ethbaal, the father of Jezebel.‡ His grandson, who is variously called Belus or Agenor or Mutgo, left a son and daughter, Pygmalion and Dido, or Elissa.§ Dido was married to her uncle Acerbas or Sichæus, a priest of Melcarth, whom Pygmalion murdered for the sake of his enormous wealth. But the king's crime was in vain, for Dido escaped with the treasures, and was accompanied in her flight by several malcontents belonging to noble Tyrian families. After touching at Cyprus, where eighty maidens were carried off, to provide her followers with wives, her fleet sailed to the gulf so often referred to on the coast of Africa, where the citadel called Byrsa was built on the ground purchased from the outwitted natives. The new colony was rapidly increased by the addition of settlers from Utica and

* A collection of ninety Punic inscriptions has been published by the Trustees of the British Museum, under the editorship of Mr. Vaux. The inscriptions have been first transcribed into the Hebrew character, and then translated into Latin.

† It seems not unreasonable to suppose that Virgil would have some means of becoming acquainted with those Punic books, of which we have already seen that Sallust made use.

‡ See p. 347.

§ This is no doubt her genuine Phœnician name, being one of the numerous proper names derived from *El* (*God*). It is used three or four times by Virgil, and is adopted by Pope in the line—

"Eliza, stretch'd upon the funeral pyre."

the other Phœnician cities around. More land was purchased from the natives at the price of an annual tribute, and the city of Carthage was built; omens of its future greatness being derived from the heads, first of a bull, and then of a horse, which were turned up in digging for the foundations.* At length the Libyan king, Hiarbas, threatened the rising state with war, and summoned ten Carthaginian deputies to hear his condition of peace, the hand of Dido in marriage. Fearing to incense the queen, the deputies at first told her that Hiarbas wanted some one to instruct his people in the rudiments of civilization; but where—they asked—would a Carthaginian be found to trust himself among the barbarians? Dido reproved them for the doubt, declaring that all, from the highest to the lowest, ought to be ready to sacrifice even life itself for such an object. When she had thus committed herself, the deputies told the terms they really bore, and the queen, though lamenting her fate, and calling upon the name of her lost husband, accepted the sacrifice she had herself imposed. She asked for three months to prepare herself. At the end of that time she proclaimed a great sacrifice, to propitiate Acerbas towards her new nuptials. After slaying hecatombs of victims at the foot of an immense pyre, she ascended it herself, and declaring to the people that she was going to her husband, as they had desired, she plunged a sword into her breast. Her vacant throne was left unfilled, and she was ever after worshipped at Carthage as a goddess. Such is the legend of Josephus, Justin, and the other annalists. Virgil has altered the catastrophe to suit his poem. It is in vain to inquire whether Dido is anything more than a mythical personage, representing one of the many aspects of Astarte.†.

There is, however, a singular agreement in the traditions to the effect that the colony which founded Carthage was sent out from Tyre about the time which answers to that of Dido in the native annals, namely the ninth century B.C. The common date is B.C. 878: that of Josephus, computed from the building of Solomon's temple, B.C. 862.‡ But there are other traditions, which give the

* We have already seen that the image of Baal had the head of a bull, and that the horse was the symbol borne on the coins of Carthage.

† Another and an etymological legend ascribed the foundation of Carthage to Tyrian colonists led by Azorus and Carchedon, the *hero eponymus* of the city. Dido is also represented as the daughter of Carchedon, and both her name and that of the city are given in the form *Carthagena*.

‡ Other dates are B.C. 852, 845, 825, 818, 814, 793. One statement, which places the foundation of Rome and Carthage about the same time, seems to have been invented for the sake of the coincidence

city a much higher antiquity; and even the popular legend recognises the different dates of the Byrsa and the city of Carthage. It seems incredible that such a site should have remained unoccupied for centuries after the first Phœnician settlements on the coast, especially by the neighbouring city of Utica.* The best scholars believe that the merchants of Utica and the mother city united to establish a fort or *factory* (the Bozrah or Byrsa) which, strengthened by immigration from the neighbouring cities, and probably reinforced by a new colony from Tyre, grew into the city called GREAT CARTHAGE.*

The tax or tribute to the natives, mentioned in the legend as the price of the site of Carthage, continued to be paid down to a late period of her history,—a proof of regard for justice, which may be set against Livy's alliterative denunciation of "perfidia plus quam Punica." These natives, the *Maxyes*, were a branch of the great Berber race, which was spread—then as now—over the whole of North Africa between the chain of the Atlas and the sea. They were of Asiatic origin, and belonged—like the Phœnicians—to the Semitic family.† They supplanted, and drove back into the interior the African races of the Libyans and Gætulians. Sallust has preserved a curious tradition, which was translated to him from the Punic books of King Hiempsal, of the immigration of these new settlers from Asia. They formed, he says, a portion of the army, composed of various races, which Hercules led abroad to seek adventures. When the hero died in Spain, his followers were scattered, and bodies of them, consisting of Medes, Persians, and Armenians, were transported by their ships to the northern shores of Africa. Here the Medes and Armenians, mingling with the Libyans near the shores of the Western Ocean, founded the nation of the Mauri or Mauretanians; the Persians, mixing with the more warlike Gætulians of the centre, became the ancestors of the roving Numidians, and established the most powerful of the native kingdoms, Numidia, the scene of that famous war which the historian related.

* The title of *Magna Carthago* not only described the importance of the city, but distinguished it from its colony of *Carthago Nova* in Spain.

† Their dialects are included under the general name of the *Amazig*. (See Latham, *Elements of Comparative Philology*, p. 540.) The tradition preserved by Sallust, tracing the origin of these peoples to an immigration of *Medes* and *Persians*, with Armenians, would seem to make them of Aryan descent. But the tradition can only be recorded as pointing to the Asiatic origin of these tribes, not the particular race to which they belonged, any more than we can accept Sallust's etymological identification of the *Mauri* (Moors) with the *Medi* (Medes), or his specific connection of the Persians with the Numidians.—(Sallust, *Jugurtha*, c. 17, 18.)

The true cause of the distinction between the Mauretanians and the Numidians seems to have been geographical. The former settled in the north-western angle of Africa, where a wide region is left between the chain of the Atlas and the shores of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, watered by considerable rivers, around which lie fertile plains. This district, clearly defined on the east by the river Malva (*Mulwia*), still preserves, in the names of *Morocco* and the *Moors*, the appellation of the old inhabitants, who became a settled agricultural people within its limits, while their brethren, in the country now called Algeria, pent within a narrower and less fertile country, on the terraces which descend from the Atlas to the sea, continued their old mode of life as wandering herdsmen, and hence were called *Numidæ*, that is, Nomads.* The two great tribes of this race, between the Malva and the Tusca (*Wady Zain*), which formed the western boundary of the Carthaginian territory, were the Massæsylii and the Massylii. Kindred tribes extended eastward to the coasts of the Syrtes, under various names, and it was with branches of the same race that the Greek settlers in Cyrenaica came into contact. Thus the various divisions of the great Berber stock were spread over the north-western and northern coast, from the south-western extremity of the Atlas to the confines of Egypt. Behind them, in the interior, lay the aboriginal African races, whose proximity to the Mediterranean shores corresponds roughly with the approach of the Great Desert (*Sahara*), along the margin of which they led a hard and precarious life.

Hence the Libyan population preponderated along the eastern division of the coast, except in Cyrenaica, while the fertile terraces of the Atlas invited many of the Numidians to the pursuit of agriculture; and this was still more the case with the Libyans† who inhabited the rich plains of Zeugitana and Byzacium, between the Carthaginian Gulf and the Lesser Syrtis. But before the foundation of Carthage, there had grown up in these plains a still more settled and civilized people, the Libyphœnicians,‡ sprung

* In using the common maps of ancient Africa, the reader must remember that the provinces of *Mauretania Cæsariensis* and *Sitifensis* formed originally a part of Numidia; and that the original Mauretania is represented by *Mauretania Tingitana* only.

† So the people are called, but they were doubtless of the Berber race.

‡ Such seems to be the original and proper meaning of this name; but it came to be used in another sense for "the Phœnicians in Libya;" and in this sense it was applied to the cities along the African coast, including both the old Phœnician settlements and the Punic colonies of Carthage herself.

from the intermixture of the Libyans either with wanderers from the older Phœnician colonies, or, as some suppose, with a still older Canaanitish population, akin to the Phœnicians. These Libyphœnicians seem to have been the chief occupiers of the lands along the course of the river Bagradas. It was with them that the new Punic settlers first came in contact. Their intercourse was rendered easy by the partial community of blood and language; and the purely commercial Phœnicians were content to pay a rent for the undisturbed possession of their peninsula, and to derive subsistence from the industry of the native cultivators, while, in pursuit of foreign wealth, they found themselves involved by their peculiar position in wider foreign enterprizes. It was not till they were strengthened by their successes abroad, that they became conquerors at home. The rent for the soil of Carthage continued to be paid for four hundred years, down to about B.C. 450. But meanwhile, inroads were made upon the native territories by the system of sending out poor citizens as emigrants. At length the whole territory of Zeugitana and Byzacium was absorbed into the demesne of the republic, the lands being tilled partly by the slaves of the rich proprietors, and partly by the original possessors—Libyans and Libyphœnicians—who were reduced to a condition like that of the Fellahs in Egypt. Now, instead of receiving tribute from the Carthaginians, they paid a tax of the fourth part of the produce of the soil, and they recruited the Punic armies by a system of compulsory levies. The Nomads, who roamed on the confines of the cultivated lands, were restrained by chains of forts, and continually driven back further into the interior, till many of their tribes submitted, and furnished the magnificent Numidian cavalry to the Carthaginian armies. These conquered Libyans and Nomads are respectively “the subject towns and tribes” of which we read in the Punic treaties. The immense resources which Carthago derived from her Libyan subjects may be judged of from the fact, that, within the narrowest limits of her territory (between the Tusca and the Triton), in the last period of her decline, she still possessed three hundred tributary cities. The contrast has been often drawn between the position of Carthage, as the absolute despot of her subject cities, which were bound to her by no tie of kindred or common interest, and that of Rome, gradually extending the rights of citizenship to her Latin and Italian allies, who yielded at last a willing obedience, founded on the common ties of blood and language.

Like her dominion over the natives, the supremacy of Carthage over the older Phœnician colonies appears to have been the fruit of her success as the champion of the Phœnician race in the western seas; nay, in this character she even took precedence of the mother city. The first treaty with Rome (B.C. 509) speaks in general terms of Carthage and her allies, implying—it would seem—that her relation to the other Phœnician colonies in Africa was that of a first among equals. The second (B.C. 348) is made by “the Carthaginians, Tyrians, Uticenses, and their allies,” a designation from which we may safely infer that Utica now stood alone as the equal ally of Carthage among the African colonies of Tyre.* We have no historical account of this process of subjection, whether Carthage forced it upon the other cities, or whether they submitted to it as the best means of common defence; but the result was their reduction to the condition of tributaries, sharing however with Carthage the privilege of equal laws and the right of intermarriage. They were exempt from the arbitrary exactions and levies, to which the Libyan cities were subjected, their contributions both of men and money being fixed, though at a very large amount. The Lesser Leptis, for example, paid a tribute of a talent every day. This seems to have been the chief hardship that these Phœnician cities suffered; for we derive no real information from the vague declamations of the Roman writers respecting the oppression exercised by Carthage towards her allies. The very principle of self-interest, which governed the policy of a commercial aristocracy, was opposed to that wanton injustice which is perpetrated in the mere pride of power; and it says much for the character of her rule, that the Phœnician cities remained faithful to her in the worst crisis of the Second Punic War, and only deserted her in the Third, when no other course was left, except to share her ruin. Utica alone was urged by rivalry to side with the Romans at an early period, and she was rewarded by succeeding to Carthage as the capital of Africa.

The Phœnician cities thus subjected to Carthage included the settlements along the whole coast of Africa, not only to the Straits, but beyond them on the Atlantic shores. We possess a most interesting record of Punic maritime enterprize on the Atlantic

* Utica maintained this position to the last, perhaps from the reverence due by Carthage to a city which was in part her metropolis. Polybius contrasts the position of the Uticans with that of the subject Libyans, at the same time telling us that the latter enjoyed their own laws.

coast of Africa in the "Periplus" of Hanno, who sailed from Carthage with 30,000 colonists, and planted settlements as far south at least as *C. Blanco*, the extremity of the Lesser Atlas.* In the other direction, south-east of Carthage, the western shore of the Lesser Syrtis was studded so thickly with Carthaginian trading settlements, as to obtain the name of *Emporia* (the Factories); and along the sandy shore between the Syrtes the rule of Carthage extended over several lesser towns besides the three Phœnician colonies of Leptis Magna, *Cea*, and Abrotonun, which gave the region the name it still bears of the Tripolis (*Tripoly*).

This was the only part of the continent upon which Carthage came into contact with another civilized community, the Greeks of Cyrenaica. The Punic and Hellenic races, severed by the sandy desert, waged a long war for a frontier little more than nominal, which the self-devotion ascribed to the brothers Philæni, in the legend more than once referred to, succeeded in fixing in its natural position at the bottom of the Great Syrtis.

Very different was that other conflict with the Hellenic race, which had its first great crisis in the battle of Himera. The position of Carthage in the western Mediterranean, surrounded by the energetic maritime powers of the Tyrrhenians, the Phocæans of Massalia, and the Greeks of Sicily, left her no alternative between aggrandizement and extinction; and the necessity of self-defence placed her at the head of the African Phœnicians in a league against her rivals, which soon became aggressive. The proximity of Sicily and Sardinia invited settlements which might command the great highways of maritime intercourse; and we have doubtful accounts of enterprizes in both those islands in the early part of the sixth century, B.C. But it was the second half of that century, about 200 years after the foundation of Rome, that formed the great epoch of Carthaginian advancement. A family sprang up, whose members bear the most illustrious names that henceforth adorn the annals of the city. Its founder was Mago, to whom Justin ascribes the settlement of military discipline at home, and the commencement of the Carthaginian empire abroad. He must have been about contemporary with Cyrus and Cambyzes. It was during this period that the Carthaginians, in alliance with the Tyrrhenians, secured the naval pre-

* The account of Hanno's voyage was dedicated, as we have seen, in the temple of Baal, and we have the Greek translation. Unfortunately there is no certain evidence to identify the voyager with any one in particular of the many Carthaginians who bore the name of Hanno.

ponderance in the western Mediterranean, and fought the great battle already mentioned with the Phocæans off Alalia (*Aleria*) in Corsica. Mago was succeeded by his two sons, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. In a war waged with the object of getting rid of the tribute to the natives, the Africans were still strong enough to defeat the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal fell in battle in Sardinia, after a career in which he had been the military chief of Carthage eleven times, and had triumphed four times over her enemies. His brother Hamilcar seems to have completed the conquest of Sardinia, which is named as a possession of Carthage in the first treaty with Rome (B.C. 509), and was esteemed as the choicest of her foreign possessions. Colonies founded at Caralis (*Cagliari*)* and Sulci, and garrisoned by mercenaries, restrained the natives, some of whom retired into the interior, while others—like the Libyans in Africa—cultivated the lands from which Carthage derived large supplies of corn. The island was also a great emporium for the trade of Carthage with the west. Corsica was subdued much later, its sterile soil and rocky shores offering but slight attractions. In B.C. 450 it was still in the possession of the Tyrrhenians; but by the time of the Punic Wars it had become a province of Carthage. So likewise had all the islands of the western Mediterranean, including that group which, occupied at first by commercial factories, supplied the Carthaginian armies with the famous slingers, whose skill gave to the islands the name of *Baleares*.† The fisheries of these islands were an important source of wealth to Carthage, and they formed a military outpost in the war which she was continually waging with the Massaliots. In Spain, the progress of the Carthaginians had its base in the hold which the Phœnician colonies had already gained, and was carried on partly by traffic with those colonies, and partly by the foundation of new settlements. Both classes of cities seem to have accepted the supremacy of Carthage, and we find her sending help to the Gaditanians against the natives. The working of the silver mines of Andalusia must have required a certain acquisition of territory in the interior; but it was not till after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia by the First Punic War, that any general con-

* A remarkable Punic inscription has been found at Cagliari.

† From the Greek *βάλλω*, to hurl. The name of *Port Mahon* (Mago), in Minorca, still preserves the memory of the Carthaginian occupation; and this name of a Carthaginian magnate has become the title of a British nobleman, whose ancestor made the great conquest of Minorca, which diplomacy surrendered. To make the coincidence more curious, the name of Mago is as conspicuous in the literature of Carthage as Lord Mahon's in that of England.

quest was attempted. It was then that Hamilcar Barca conceived the project of founding in Spain a new empire, which might last even should Carthage fall, and his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, built the city of New Carthage (*Cartagena*).

Sicily remains to be noticed—one of the earliest scenes of Carthaginian enterprize, and her great battle-field with the Greeks and Romans. We have seen that, while Carthage was still in her infancy, the Greek colonies drove the older Phœnician settlers to the western extremity of the island, where they held the cities of Motya, Panormus, and Soloeis. The Phœnicians kept possession also of Malta, and the smaller islands between Sicily and Africa. Thus placed in communication with Carthage, they looked to her for protection against the Greeks. Such was the state of things when Hamilcar, the son of Mago, acting probably on an understanding with Xerxes, led into Sicily that immense host, the various nations of which prove the extent to which the Carthaginian power had now grown.* His defeat and death at Himera, on the same day as the battle of Salamis, put an end for the present to further Punic conquests in Sicily; but the two sons of Mago left descendants well fitted to carry on his policy; Himilco, Hanno, and Gisco, the sons of Hamilcar; and Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Sapho, the sons of Hasdrubal. The scene of their exploits was probably in Africa; and the war in Sicily was not renewed till the time of the Athenian expedition, when the Egestans looked for aid to Carthage, as well as Athens. Hannibal, the son of Gisco, and grandson of Hamilcar, sent over to Sicily with a great army, stormed Selinus and Himera, and offered 3000 prisoners from the latter city as a sacrifice on the spot where his grandfather had fallen (B.C. 409). Another great expedition, three years later, under Himilco, the son of Hanno, was decimated by a pestilence; and, in further efforts, the Carthaginians found their match in Dionysius of Syracuse. A war of nearly ten years had the effect of reducing nearly all the other states of Sicily to insignificance, and leaving the fate of the island to be decided by the rival powers of Syracuse and Carthage. The tide of war rolled to and fro from west to east, and from east to west, engulfing the great cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. Thrice in the course of the fourth century, the Hellenic power was confined within the walls of Syracuse; but as often were the Punic forces repulsed by Dionysius, Timoleon, and Aga-

* See Vol. I., p. 433.

thocles.* Meanwhile the decline of the Etruscans left the Carthaginians masters of the sea; and when Pyrrhus made a last effort to provide Syracuse with a fleet, he confessed his failure by sailing away with that fleet to Italy, and left the Greeks apparently for the fourth time at the mercy of their inveterate foes (B.C. 278).† To tell how they were rescued by the power of Rome, only to find that they had become subject to new, though worthier and more congenial masters, brings us back to the current of our story. “

It is needless to recite the abundant testimonies to the wealth and military resources which Carthage derived from her wide dominion when she was drawn into her great conflict with Rome; but it still remains for us to compare the political condition of these two great republics. The constitution of Carthage is peculiarly interesting as the best example of the development of a Semitic state, without those peculiar influences which make the Hebrew polity an exceptional case, and also as the earliest pattern of a republic, whose moving spirit was commercial wealth. In its constitution, as in its religion, the colony was originally a copy of the mother city. We have seen that the Phœnician cities were governed by kings down to and beyond the time of the Macedonian conquest; but the annals of Tyre furnish instances in which the regal government was supplanted by a peculiar magistracy, the Judges, of whom we shall have presently more to say. The like change was permanently effected at Carthage in the earliest period of her recorded history. After the legend of Dido, no more kings are met with in her annals, though some of her greatest men were suspected of affecting royalty. About half a century before the First Punic War, the Carthaginian polity attracted the especial notice of Aristotle, who describes it as having changed from a monarchy to an aristocracy, or to a democracy inclining towards oligarchy. Before this change, the Punic, like all the other patriarchal monarchies, possessed a Council of Elders, which exercised a great check upon the king,‡ to whose principal functions they succeeded. At Carthage, as at Sparta and Rome, the royal office, instead of being entirely abolished, was replaced by a pair of chief magistrates, whose name of *Suffetes*, that is *Judges* (the Hebrew *Shofetim*), indicates their main functions. They presided over the Council of Elders, which, including them, con-

* B.C. 394, 338, 309. See Vol. I., pp. 560, 562; and Vol. II., p. 122.

† See p. 319.

‡ In the legend of Dido, these elders, representing the wish of the people, force the queen to consent to the marriage with Hiarbas.

sisted of thirty members,* all of whom were elected annually by the whole body of citizens from their chief houses. But the ancient military functions of the king were entrusted to a single general, whose power the Roman writers express by calling him *dictator*; so that, as Isocrates says, the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home, but a monarchical government in the field. The general was appointed by the Council of Elders, and instead of being elected annually, like the Suffetes, he seems to have held office as long as his services were useful to the state, or acceptable to the party which had the ascendant for the time being. His movements were, however, watched—it probably depended on his own character how far they were controlled—by a deputation from the Elders, who filled the subordinate commands; and his great powers were held under an enormous personal responsibility. Torture and crucifixion were common penalties of failure; and the defeated general often anticipated his certain fate on the field of his lost battle, like Hamilcar at Himera.

The court to which the generals were thus subjected formed one of the most curious features of the Carthaginian commonwealth. It was a council of One Hundred (more exactly 104), which is sometimes called the Senate, and sometimes the Order of Judges. Aristotle likens this body to the Spartan Ephors; and in fact it grew up, as an addition to the established constitution, to represent the aristocratical party, in opposition to the monarchical element in the old constitution and to the dangerous power of the house of Mago. Its constitution and functions are obscure; but thus much seems clear, that it was virtually self-elected, and that its members practically held office for an indefinite period. It secured the concentration of administrative functions by means of the Pentarchies, or committees of five, and its power came to override all the other authorities of the state. The Council of Elders had only the initiative in the measures on which the Senate decided. The body of citizens, though nominally the ultimate source of power, were reduced to an inaction more complete even than at Sparta; and, gained over by corruption and by the banquets given in their clubs, they became the mere tools of the factions of the great nobles. For never was a commonwealth divided by a bitterer party spirit than Carthage; and the cruel punishments inflicted on her

* Mövers has attempted to show that the Punic citizens, like the Roman, were distributed into 3 tribes, 30 curiæ, and 300 gentes, and that the 30 elders were the heads of the curiæ. (*Die Phönizier*, vol. ii. pt. i. pp. 483—499.) We read sometimes of a smaller Council of Ten, perhaps a committee of the Thirty.

unsuccessful generals, which are often cited as proofs of popular injustice, were the measure of the triumph of either faction over its hated rivals. The bitterest party spirit, however, seldom tempts an oligarchy, except in rare individual cases, to sacrifice the substantial gains common to the order. Each party in turn enriched its more needy members by making them governors and collectors of taxes in the subject cities. Both were so firmly united against all democratic encroachments, and all attempts of personal ambition, that, as Aristotle observes, Carthage had never succumbed to a despotic usurpation, or a successful revolution. Only two such attempts are recorded to have been made before the Punic Wars. The most formidable of these was that of Hanno, which Aristotle compares with the treason of Pausanias at Sparta. As Justin tells the tale, Hanno, having formed a scheme for usurping the regal power, prepared a public feast on the occasion of his daughter's wedding, and invited the senators to a separate banquet in his own house, intending to mix poison with their wine. But the scheme was betrayed by his servants; the senators declined the invitation, but, unwilling to make a public attack on so powerful a citizen, they simply passed a sumptuary law against public marriage festivals. Hanno, well knowing that only the opportunity was wanted for his ruin, bribed 20,000 slaves, and arranged a massacre of the senators. Once more betrayed, he was driven to open war. Establishing himself in a fort, he invited the Africans to revolt. He was taken prisoner, and condemned to death, with all his family. "The sentence was executed with the characteristic cruelty of Punic punishments. With his eyes put out, and his hands and legs broken—as though, says the historian, to exact the penalty of his crime from each member that had aided its perpetration—his body, torn with scourges, was fixed upon the cross. The other example, in the treason and punishment of Bomilcar, during the invasion of Agathocles, has already been related.* It was not till the sufferings of the state during the Punic Wars had lowered the prestige of the ruling aristocracy, that the democratic opposition acquired any considerable power; and in the perilous condition resulting from the Second Punic War, the great Hannibal saw that the only hope of safety lay in a more popular government. By carrying a law, that no member of the Senate of One Hundred might hold office for two years in succession, he broke down the exclusive character of that stronghold of the oligarchy. But it was too late, if indeed the character of the people had ever

* See p. 123.

made it possible, to introduce the Hellenic principle of self-government. The people proved slaves to the system of corruption, by which they had so long been humoured; and in the last days of the republic they had degenerated into a lawless mob, in which boys were conspicuous as ringleaders. The essential character of the Carthaginian constitution, for the long period of its undisturbed duration, is well summed up by Dr. Mommsen as "a government of capitalists, such as would naturally arise in a civic community which had no opulent middle class, but consisted on the one hand of a city rabble, without property, and living from hand to mouth, and on the other of great merchants, planters, and noble governors."

The power of capital, and the means by which it was fostered, are more conspicuous at Carthage than in any other ancient nation. Her commercial magnates cultivated the soil with the same attention as the simpler Roman nobles, except that the former depended chiefly on slave-labour, which the latter scarcely began to use till after the Punic Wars. In the science of agriculture, indeed, they were the teachers of the Romans, who received from them important farming implements, besides that work of Mago on agriculture, which is the oldest known treatise on the art.* It was a maxim of Carthaginian husbandry, that no man should possess more land than he could properly manage. To the wealth created by tillage was added that derived from the horses, oxen, sheep, and goats, which were tended for the nobles of Carthage by her nomad subjects; while the tribes on the confines of the Great Desert were employed to bring in by the great caravan routes the ivory, gems, and slaves of those inner regions of Africa, of which our own generation has only been slowly recovering the knowledge.†

These resources, added to the gains of her foreign commerce, produced an immense amount of private wealth and public revenue. Carthage was the great mart of the ancient world for precious stones. The treasures laid up in the temples were enormous. Gold was freely used in bucklers and works of art, which were

* In the treatise of Varro, *de Re Rustica*, a threshing-sledge, such as that used from time immemorial in the East, is called *Panicum plostellum*, that is, the Punic cart.

† Our limits do not permit to discuss the deeply-interesting question of the ancient knowledge of Central Africa. It is enough to say here that the geographical system of Ptolemy, who wrote in the second century of our era, lays down with considerable accuracy regions which are only now being filled up on our maps, including the basins and sources of the Niger and the Nile, and the intervening regions; and there is no doubt that much of the information thus exhibited was derived from Punic sources.

carried about even in the Punic camps.* Of the common use of silver plate in the houses of the nobles, we have an evidence in the sarcasm said to have been uttered by certain Carthaginian ambassadors, that no men lived on better terms with one another than the Romans, for at all the entertainments given them they had supped off the same silver.† Polybius calls Carthage, in the last days of her decline, the wealthiest city of the world, and in her highest prosperity her revenues were said to approach those of the Persian Kings. "But it was not merely the sum total of its revenues that evinced the superiority of the financial administration of Carthage. The economical principles of a later and more advanced epoch are found by us in Carthage alone of all the more considerable states of antiquity. Mention is made of loans from foreign states, and in the monetary system we find, along with gold and silver bars (and also gold and silver coins primarily intended for the Sicilian commerce) a token-money having no intrinsic value—a sort of currency not used elsewhere in antiquity. In fact, if government had resolved itself into a mere matter of business, never would any state have solved the problem more brilliantly than Carthage."‡

Had these financial resources been combined with a sound military organization, Carthage might have seemed invulnerable. Her command of the sea, indeed, preserved her long in safety, for the Phœnicians refused Cambyse's aid of their fleet against their old colonists. It was when they had to meet the Greeks and Romans in Sicily and Africa, that the inherent weakness of their army,—already partly shown in the rebellion of the Libyans—became fully manifest. Their fatal error was their unwillingness to render that personal service, by which alone a commercial state can defend its wealth. Not that they were destitute of high martial qualities. In such emergencies as the invasions of Agathocles and Scipio, they could raise an army of 40,000 heavy infantry, with 1000 cavalry and 2000 war-chariots, from Carthage itself; and their ordinary civic force was enough to prove what they could have done, had not their wealth tempted them to dependence upon mercenaries. The indisposition to personal service grew up gradually against the wishes

* Such a shield, taken in Spain, was suspended over the door of the Capitol at Rome.—(Plin. *H. N.* xxxv. 4.)

† Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. 50. Pliny states that Africanus exhibited in his triumph over Carthage, more than 4000 pounds weight of silver, and that after the exhaustion of the Third Punic War.

‡ Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. §. 20.

of the government. In the earlier age, when the conquest of Sicily was an object of patriotic ardour, the citizens needed rather to be discouraged in the too free exposure of their lives. The nucleus of the infantry was the sacred band of 2500 citizens, chosen, for their wealth and courage, to form the body-guard of the general, and distinguished by their costly equipments. The cavalry attracted the wealthy citizens both at Carthage and among the Libyphœnician allies. But even these select corps ceased to be maintained in the Second Punic War. In the army of Spain, consisting of 15,000 men, there was not a single Carthaginian foot-soldier, and only one body of 450 horse consisted in part of Libyphœnicians. The officers of course were Carthaginians; and besides these posts, honorary rewards were offered as an inducement to personal service; a citizen being allowed to wear as many rings as he had served campaigns.* But the bulk of the army was recruited from the native Africans, and from the other peoples of the Carthaginian empire. Heeren has observed that, as the Persian army united nearly all the nations of the East, so the Punic had representatives from all the West; and had Xerxes penetrated as far as Sicily, the junction of the two forces "would have presented the remarkable exhibition of a muster of nearly all the varieties of the human species at that time known."† The bulk of the infantry and of the heavy cavalry consisted of the subject Libyan farmers, who were armed with long lances. The chief light-armed troops were the Iberians of Spain, with their cut-and-thrust swords and white linen breast plates, and the naked Gauls from the Gulf of Lyons, armed with their huge broad-swords. But the most celebrated troops were the slingers from the Balearic Islands, and the light cavalry, called by the Romans Numidian, but really supplied by all the nomad tribes from the Pillars of Hercules to the confines of Cyrenaica. Mounted without a saddle on small active horses, so well trained as not even to need the rush-halter which formed their only bridle; equipped with a lion-skin for dress and bed, and with a piece of elephant-hide for a shield; rapid alike in the charge, the flight, the rally; they were a sort of Carthaginian cossacks, with whom the Greeks and Romans had no troops light enough to contend. Besides these forces, peculiarly their own, the wars in Sicily brought into the Carthaginian armies mercenaries both of the Greek and Italian races, especially Campanians, to whom Hanni-

* Hence the rings of the Roman knights slain at Cannæ, which Hannibal sent to Carthage, would be an emphatic proof of the greatness of the victory.

† See the enumeration of the forces of Hamilcar at Himæra.—(Vol. I, p. 433.)

bal added the active mountaineers of Liguria. The army was provided with a large number of war chariots, the use of which was so characteristic of the kindred of the Phœnicians in northern Canaan;* but by the time of the wars with Rome, the chariots were superseded to a great degree by elephants. The Carthaginians are said to have owed to their campaigns against Pyrrhus the idea of training these beasts for war; and they kept up the supply by their inland trade, and by contributions of elephants as tribute from their subjects. The provision made within the fortifications for the stabling of the elephants and horses, and for a standing camp, has been described above. The garrison of the city, amounting to 20,000 foot and 4000 horse, was composed entirely of mercenaries, for the citizens would not submit to the tedium of garrison service. The total ordinary force which the city could depend on raising in case of war is estimated at 100,000 men; but an army composed like that of Carthage might be increased to any amount, so long as her empire remained unbroken and her mercenaries faithful.

Meanwhile, as Polybius observes, the confusion of nations and languages in the motley host formed an obstacle to conspiracies and mutiny, but rendered discipline peculiarly difficult, and increased the danger when its bonds were broken. The constant ascendancy which Hannibal maintained over his troops is justly cited, even by Livy, as a conspicuous proof of his military genius. In the citizen armies of a free state, whatever the class from which they may be recruited, the sense of serving one's country is at once a bond of discipline and a source of strength. But armies like that of Carthage could have no enthusiasm for the cause in which they fought, and the natural attachment of the soldier for his general was turned to distrust and hatred by the cruelty and bad faith with which they were habitually sacrificed. A striking example is furnished by Hamilcar's desertion of his soldiers in Sicily (B.C. 396). The power of levying recruits rapidly and almost to any number induced in the Carthaginians that recklessness in the expenditure of their soldiers' lives, which our own age had supposed to be the characteristic military vice of Napoleon, till later experience has shown how successfully the despot Many can imitate the despot One. On the other hand, the time required to levy these forces left Carthage peculiarly helpless in case of a sudden invasion; and her fate was sealed when this weakness was discovered by her enemies. Nor was her danger less if her mercenaries, driven to mutiny through defeat or provocation, succeeded in obtaining

* This fact is familiar to us from the Books of Joshua and Judges.

an independent footing on her territory, or if disaffection spread among her Libyan allies. She was more than once brought to the brink of ruin by mutinies such as that provoked by the conduct of Hamilcar, and that which, as we shall presently see, followed the First Punic War. The earlier military history of Carthage is characterised by reliance on the mere numbers which enabled her to effect conquests, such as that of Sicily, without any conspicuous generalship. It was not till the time of her adversity that other qualities appeared in the family of Barca, to give Carthage one of the proudest places in the military annals of the world.

Another source of danger to her African empire was the unfortified condition of the subject cities, a state in which Carthage insisted on their remaining, as her military system did not permit of their occupation by trustworthy garrisons.* With her own peninsula almost impregvably fortified, she relied on her naval power for her outer line of defence. The wide extent of her maritime enterprises in seas which were already occupied by the Tyrrhenians, the Phocæans and their Massaliot colonists, and the Greeks of Sicily, must have required from a very early time the protection of a war marine; and we have already seen the provision made in the plan of the city for docks and arsenals. Carthage first appears as a great naval power, as the ally of the Tyrrhenians and the enemy of the Greeks in the battle of Alalia; and from that period to the outbreak of the Punic Wars, her maritime supremacy had been steadily increasing. In her Sicilian campaigns we find her sending out navies of 150 and 200 ships; but at the climax of her maritime power, the great sea-fight with Regulus was fought by a fleet of 350 ships, carrying 150,000 men (B.C. 256). The triremes, which she originally used in common with the Greeks, were afterwards superseded by larger ships, which were generally quinqueremes, but the "great ammirals" had sometimes as many as seven banks of oars.† The same

* The result of this exposed condition of the African cities has been already seen in the rapid progress of Agathocles.

† The particular vessel referred to, the flag-ship in the battle with Duilius, had been taken from Pyrrhus. Among the Greeks, quadriremes and quinqueremes are said to have been first used by Dionysius of Syracuse, which agrees with the story of their Carthaginian origin, though others claimed the invention. The Greek kings of the period after Alexander had a passion for immense ships, of 12, 20, 30, and even 40 banks of oars—floating palaces rather than vessels. One of the most celebrated of these was that built by Archimedes for Hiero, who presented it to the King of Egypt.

class of vessels was adopted during the First Punic War by the Romans, who built their first quinqueremes on the model of a Carthaginian ship that had been wrecked on the coast of Bruttium. The regular crew of a quinquereme was 420, of whom 120 were fighting men and 300 rowers, the latter being public slaves. Kept constantly on board, and perpetually exercised, they were rapid in performing the manœuvres directed by their bold and skilful commanders. But there was nothing in the naval prestige of the Carthaginians which could not be emulated by rivals so fertile in courage and resources as the Romans; and when the latter were once provided with a fleet, the former felt the fatal want of a land army. "That Rome could only be seriously attacked in Italy, and Carthage only in Libya, no one could fail to see: as little could any one fail to perceive that Carthage could not in the long run escape from such an attack. Fleets were not yet, in those times of the infancy of navigation, a permanent heirloom of nations, but could be fitted out wherever there were trees, iron, and water. It was clear, and had been several times tested in Africa itself, that even powerful maritime states were not able to prevent a weaker enemy from landing. When Agathocles had shown the way thither, a Roman general could follow the same course; and while in Italy the entrance of an invading army simply began the war, the same event in Libya put an end to it by changing it into a siege, in which, unless some special accident should intervene, even the most obstinate and heroic courage must finally succumb." *

Such was the state which now stood committed to an internecine conflict with the other great republic of the west. Such a position seems to have been quite opposed to the traditional policy of Carthage, which had rather been to strengthen herself against the Greeks by alliances with Rome, just as formerly with the Tyrrhenians. Enough has been already said of the treaties of B.C. 509, B.C. 348, and B.C. 306, by which, at the slight cost of acknowledging the unquestioned superiority of Carthage in the African seas, Rome obtained protection for her commerce against the Greek pirates, and the opportunity of subduing the Etruscans and Italians before she was committed to a still more formidable contest. Let Italy be Roman, provided that Sicily be Punic: such was the spirit of the Carthaginian policy, manifested by the

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. pp. 26, 27. The same chapter contains an admirable comparison of the constitution, resources, empire, and policy of Rome and Carthage.

congratulations sent to Rome, together with costly offerings, on the conclusion of the First Samnite War (B.C. 342). We have seen how the rivalry, innate in the relative position of the two republics, and left to its natural action by the extinction of the Etruscan and Syracusan powers, was clearly manifested in the affair of Tarentum, and how the aid voted by the Romans to the Mamertines of Rhegium proved the spark that kindled the conflagration of the Punic Wars.

The FIRST PUNIC WAR began in B.C. 264 and lasted till B.C. 241, a period of four-and-twenty years. In three campaigns the Romans made themselves masters of all Sicily, except the maritime fortresses at the western extremity, Eryx* and Pañormus. Hamilcar annoyed them by frequent sallies. Meanwhile the Carthaginian navy ravaged the coasts of Italy, exacting contributions from the allies of Rome, and paralysing her commerce (B.C. 261). It became manifest that Sicily could only be held, nay Italy itself protected, by the creation of a fleet powerful enough to cope with the mistress of the seas. The statement is absurd, that the Romans now built a fleet for the first time; but their actual navy was utterly worthless against that of Carthage, both in numbers and class of ships. We know something of the gravity of the problem for even the first of naval powers to reconstruct its navy; but Rome had at the same time to raise hers from insignificance. The alternative of calling in the aid of the Syracusans and Massaliots was wisely rejected, and it was resolved at once to build a fleet of 120 ships of war.† A Carthaginian quinquereme, which had been wrecked on the Bruttian shore, was taken for a model; the recently acquired forest of Silo furnished ample supplies of pitch and timber; and sailors were levied from the commercial marine of the Italian and Grecian cities.‡ To these incredible exertions sixty days sufficed for the building of the 120 ships: the rowers were meanwhile practised on scaffolds erected in imitation of the benches: and by the spring of B.C. 260, the fleet was ready to put to sea. The energy which prepared it is almost less surprising than the boldness of leading such a fleet of green wood and raw sailors against such foes as the Carthaginians.

* In the sixth year of the war (B.C. 259) Hamilcar transferred the inhabitants of Eryx to Drepanum, as more easily defensible by sea.

† Of these 100 were quinqueremes and the rest triremes; but another account makes them all quinqueremes.

‡ The Roman name for sailors (*socii navales*) preserves the memory of their being at first raised chiefly from the allies.

The practical ingenuity of the Romans was evinced by a contrivance for neutralizing the better seamanship of the enemy, and preserving on the sea the superiority of their land force. They returned to the ancient tactics of converting the decks into a battle-field for the soldiers, by the help of a long boarding bridge, hinged up against the mast, in the fore-part of the ship. If the first shock of an enemy could only be avoided, the bridge was let fall over the prow or either bow, and fixed to the hostile deck by a long spike which projected from its end: its width permitted the boarders to pass two abreast, and its sides were defended by bulwarks. The consul Cn. Scipio first led out a squadron of seventeen ships for a *coup-de-main* upon Lipara, only to be taken prisoner with his whole force; but the remainder of the fleet, while sailing along the coast of Italy, surprised and captured a Carthaginian squadron more than equal to that which Scipio had lost, and, with fortune thus retrieved, entered the harbour of Messana. Here the command was taken by the consul C. Duilius, who boldly sailed out to meet the Carthaginian fleet, which was advancing under Hannibal from Panormus. In the battle of MYLÆ (*Milazzo*), the Carthaginians, coming up in disorder against a foe whose bad sailing excited their contempt, found their ships grappled one by one and carried by the boarders. They saved only half their fleet by a disgraceful flight; but their loss of fourteen ships sunk and thirty-one taken—among the latter the seven-banked flag-ship of the admiral—was but a slight measure of the victory of Duilius. He was received at Rome with the honours due to the man who had given a promise of the issue of the conflict by breaking the prestige of Punic supremacy on the seas; and a column was erected in the Forum, ornamented with the beaks of the captured ships.* In a single day, which reaped the fruit of the efforts of a single year, Rome stood forth before the world in her new character as a naval power of the first rank (B.C. 260).

Instead of prematurely imitating the enterprise of Agathocles, the Romans now directed all their energies to securing their maritime power by the conquest of Sardinia. But their desultory attacks on its coasts from the naval station which they established at Aleria in Corsica made less impression than the energy of Hamilcar in Italy. While his sallies kept the Romans occupied in the field, his emissaries gained over the smaller towns, and the presence of both consuls could scarcely secure the ground

* An ancient copy of the inscription on this *Columna Rostrata*, preserved in the Capitoline Museum, forms one of the precious monuments of the old Latin language.

already won. After another great sea-fight off Tyndaris, not far from Mylæ, in which both sides claimed the victory, the Romans obtained the Lipari Islands and Malta (B.C. 257).^{*} But the following year brought on a crisis in the war, and witnessed the appearance of its great hero on the Roman side (for, as we shall soon see, the Carthaginians had theirs too), M. Atilius Regulus. Already distinguished in his former consulship by his conquest of the Salentines (B.C. 267), Regulus was a yeoman noble of the same class and habits as Cincinnatus, Curius, and Fabricius. In the midst of his victorious career in Africa, he is said to have petitioned the Senate for his recal, because the farm which he was wont to till with his own hands was going to ruin in his absence, and his family was reduced to actual want. The time was now come when the Romans thought they might strike the decisive blow in Italy. In the ninth year of the war (B.C. 256) a fleet of 330 ships, manned by 100,000 sailors, embarked an army of 40,000 men, under Regulus and his colleague L. Manlius Vulso, at the mouth of the river Himera (*Satso*), on the south coast of Sicily. The Carthaginian admiral, who was watching the coast with a fleet of 350 ships, as if to secure his prey, suffered the embarkation to be accomplished, and then drew up in line of battle, with his left resting on the coast at Ecnomus. The action which ensued is celebrated in naval history as the first example of the manœuvre of "breaking the line."[†] The Roman fleet bore down upon the enemy arranged in the shape of a wedge, with the consuls' two ships at the apex, the horse-transports in tow between the extremities of the two oblique lines, and a fourth reserve squadron bringing up the rear. The Carthaginian admirals showed their well-known skill in meeting this novel form of attack. Their centre gave way before the advanced squadron, commanded by the consuls; the right wing made a circuit out in the open sea, and took the Roman reserve in the rear; while the left wing attacked the vessels that were towing the horse-trans-

^{*} The Roman commander was the consul C. Atilius Regulus Serranus, not to be confounded with the great M. Atilius Regulus, who was consul in the following year with L. Manlius Vulso. Serranus was also consul with the same L. Manlius Vulso in B.C. 250, and was foiled in an attack on Lilybæum.

[†] It is not meant that the tactics of Regulus were precisely the same as those devised by Mr. Clerk of Eldin and executed by Rodney and Nelson, the main object of which was to double with the attacking fleet upon a portion of the enemy's line cut off from the rest. But the resemblance consisted in Regulus's piercing the extended Punic line by bringing an overwhelming force to bear on a single point. His main purpose appears to have been to force the line in such a manner as to carry his transports safely through.

ports, and forced them, thus encumbered, towards the shore. But this manœuvre left the Carthaginian centre too weak to resist the best ships of the Romans, and the consuls, victorious in this quarter, returned to the relief of their two rear divisions. The Carthaginian weather squadron availed itself of the open sea to retire before this superior force; but while their left were following up the advantage they had at first gained, they found themselves surrounded by the united Roman fleet, and overwhelmed by means of the dreaded boarding-bridges. Twenty-four ships were sunk on each side; but the Carthaginians had sixty-four taken. They retreated to the Gulf of Carthage, to defend their shores against the anticipated descent.

Their object was frustrated by the Roman consuls, who made for the eastern coast of the *Daklah*,* and landed at the fine harbour of Aspis, or Clupea, that is, the Shield (now *Aklibiah*). An entrenched camp having been formed to protect the ships, the army of invasion ravaged the country to such purpose as soon to send 20,000 captives as slaves to Rome, besides an immense booty. So secure seemed the footing gained in Africa, that the consul Manlius was recalled with a large portion of the army, leaving Regulus with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. The enemy did their best to justify this confidence; their large army retired from the plains suited to their cavalry and elephants, and they were easily defeated in the wooded defiles, with the loss of 15,000 killed, and 5000 men and 18 elephants taken. This victory made Regulus master of the open country. The towns submitted, as they had before submitted to Agathocles, and he was soon established at Tunis, only ten miles from Carthage. The Carthaginians were shut up in the city, while the nomads threw off their allegiance and laid waste the country. The proud Phœnician republic was now reduced to sue for peace; but the prouder Roman consul would grant no milder terms than the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, the surrender of the Punic fleet, and the reduction of Carthage to the position of an inferior ally, bound, like the Greek maritime cities of Italy, to furnish ships for the Roman navy. Such proposals inspired the courage of despair, and their arrogance was soon avenged.

While Regulus lay inactive in his winter quarters, the Carthaginians prepared for one of those mighty efforts, of which they were capable in extremity. The return of Hamilcar from Sicily,

* The peninsula terminated by *C. Bon*, which divides the Gulf of Carthage from the Mediterranean.

with the troops hardened in his long irregular warfare, furnished a nucleus for a new army; and fresh bands of nomad horse were raised by the power of gold. By a curious resemblance to the fortunes of Syracuse, when assailed by the Athenians, the Carthaginians found a leader in the person of the Lacedæmonian Xanthippus, a captain of Greek mercenaries. He formed the plan of overwhelming the Romans before they could receive succours from Italy; and Regulus, who had neglected even to secure his communication with Clupea, marched down from his entrenched camp on the hill of Rhades to accept battle in the plain of Tunis. On such ground the 4000 cavalry and 100 elephants of the Carthaginians, handled by the skill of Xanthippus, secured them a complete victory. Barely 2000 Romans, probably of the cavalry and light-armed troops, escaped to Clupea, while the legions, formed into square, were selling their lives dearly on the battle-field. Only 500 were taken alive, with Regulus himself (B.C. 255). Though dismayed by the catastrophe to such a degree as to abandon all further designs on Africa, the first care of the Romans was as usual to rescue the survivors. A fleet of 350 sail was at once despatched for Clupea, and its voyage was signalized by a battle off the Hermæan promontory (*C. Bon*), in which the Carthaginians lost 114 ships. But even this victory did not encourage the Romans to maintain the post they held on the African shore; and after relieving the little force which was on the point of surrendering, they evacuated Clupea and returned home. The haste with which they put to sea, in spite of warnings from the naval captains, led to the crowning disaster of the campaign, and three-fourths of the fleet were cast away by a fearful storm, which strewed the coast for miles about Camarina with wrecks and corpses. Thus ended the tenth year and the second act of the First Punic War (B.C. 255).

The Carthaginians now resumed the offensive, while at Rome the conduct of the war was thrown into the hands of the party which had opposed the African expedition. Thus the field of battle was again transferred to Sicily. Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, landed at Lilybæum with a large army, and no less than 140 elephants, a species of force which had now inspired the Romans with terror. While their army lay inactive before Lilybæum, exertions like those which had built their former fleet produced 220 ships in the space of three months, and these, added to the 80 that had survived the wreck, captured Panormus, which became as important a stronghold for the Romans as it had been

for the Carthaginians. Its fall was followed by that of all the ports on the north coast of Sicily, except Thermæ (B.C. 254). But this fleet soon shared the fate of its predecessor by a storm which overtook it, on its return from plundering the African coast, off the Lucanian promontory, which still bears the name of the ill-fated pilot of Æneas;* 150 ships were wrecked; and the senate, as if yielding to the will of the gods, desisted from these great efforts, and resolved only to keep up a fleet of 60 sail for the defence of the coasts of Italy, and for maintaining communication with Sicily (B.C. 253).

Roman superstition might easily have believed that fortune was propitiated by the sacrifice. The fall of Thermæ (B.C. 252) was followed by a victory under the walls of Panormus, which once more freed the Romans from their terror of the elephants. The consul C. Cæcilius Metellus stationed his light-armed troops in the moat to gall the beasts with missiles as they were brought up to the attack. Some tumbled into the moat; others charged back upon their own troops: men and elephants rushed *pêle-mêle* to the shore; and before the fugitives could be embarked, 20,000 men were slain and 120 elephants were captured. Thirteen Carthaginian generals and 104 elephants adorned the triumph which Metellus celebrated, as proconsul, for the greatest victory yet gained in Sicily; and the Romans took courage to build a fleet of 200 ships to prosecute the siege of Drepanum and Lilybæum. The Carthaginians, once more shut up within these fortresses, sent an embassy to Rome to ask for an exchange of prisoners, and, if possible, to procure peace (B.C. 250).

This is the occasion which the annalists have adorned with the well-known story of the heroic constancy of Regulus. He was permitted to accompany the ambassadors to Rome, on his word to return if their mission should prove fruitless. What he had seen of Carthaginian severity in his captivity of five years, might justify the hope that he would do his best to plead the cause of the ambassadors, but they who thought so knew not the power of stern Roman patriotism. When his reluctance, first to enter the city because he was a Carthaginian slave, and then to speak in the senate of which he had ceased to be a member, was at length overcome, he denounced not only the proposed peace, but even the exchange of prisoners. Seeing the senate hesitate to send him back to a cruel death, he told them that their care for his life was useless, for the Carthaginians had already given him a slow poison to make

* Palinurum Promontorium, *C. Palinuro*.

the matter sure. Finally, he refused to listen to the argument that he was not bound by a promise exacted to his own destruction; and he returned with the envoys, who bore back the utter rejection of their proposals by the senate. The cruel tortures by which the Carthaginians wreaked their disappointment upon Regulus are variously related, and it is needless to repeat the familiar tales of his being placed in a barrel lined with iron spikes, or of his exposure to the burning sun with his eyelids cut off. Doubt is thrown even upon the reality of his mission to Rome by the various dates assigned to it; and recent historians have supposed the story of his fate to have been invented as an excuse for the horrible cruelties which the family of Regulus inflicted on the captive Carthaginian generals, Hamilcar and Bostar, on a vague report or surmise of his fate. That severity of judgment, which is a natural reaction from the extreme laudation of Roman virtue, seems to have governed the selection among the parts of a story which it would be safer to treat as altogether uncertain; but, at all events, a people must have had a lofty ideal of good faith to invent the heroism ascribed to Regulus. .

The war was resumed by a great attack upon Lilybæum, the port which now alone linked Sicily to Africa. Both consuls proceeded to form the first regular siege that Rome had undertaken, and it lasted to the end of the war. Their fleet forced an entrance into the harbour, but failed to keep out a relieving squadron of the Carthaginians; while, on the land side, the skill and courage of Himilco repulsed all assaults, and the siege became a blockade. Its second year was signalized by a great disaster to the Roman fleet under the consul P. Claudius Pulcher, who planned a surprise of the Carthaginian fleet at Drepanum, and gave battle in defiance of the augurs. When told that the sacred chickens would not eat—"Let them drink," said he—and had them thrown into the sea. The signal skill of the Carthaginian admiral aided the offended deities to punish Claudius by a defeat, in which 93 ships were lost, with the best of the Roman legions. The battle of Drepanum is remarkable as the only great naval victory gained over the Romans by an enemy who till this war had held the empire of the sea. Its result was to relieve the siege of Lilybæum, in the port of which the 30 Roman vessels that had escaped were now blockaded by the Carthaginian vice-admiral Carthalo. Nor was this all. The other consul, L. Junius, who had been sent with 120 ships of war to escort a convoy of 800 transports to Lilybæum, committed the error of sending forward a large part of his

transports along the south coast without support. Carthalo skillfully interposed between the two divisions of the fleet, and forced them to take shelter in the unsafe roadsteads of Gela and Camarina, where they were dashed to pieces by a great storm. The consul Claudius, recalled to Rome, and bidden to name a dictator, showed the untamed insolence of his race by nominating his freedman's son, M. Claudius Glicia; but the senate annulled the appointment, and chose M. Atilius Calatinus, the first dictator who ever waged war out of Italy (B.C. 249).

The pause which now ensued in the great conflict of the West, permits us to cast a glance towards the distant regions of the East, in order to mark an event fraught with results in the history of the world. In B.C. 250 the Parthian chief Arsaces poured down with his hordes of horsemen from the south-eastern shores of the Caspian into the oriental provinces of the Hellenic kingdom of Syria, and founded the Parthian empire on the banks of the Tigris. We reserve its history till it comes into contact with the Romans.

The war in Sicily now languished for the space of six years (B.C. 248—243). Its seventeenth year found the Romans in the same position that they had held in the third, but exhausted by the loss of four great fleets, three of them with armies on board, besides the army that had perished in Africa. The census of the year 247 B.C. showed a roll of 251,222 citizens, being a decrease of 40,000, or about 15 per cent., in five years. The Carthaginians, if less exhausted, seemed weary of the war, and made no efforts to finish it by calling out their reserves from their own dockyards and the teeming myriads of Africa. As soon as they saw the Roman fleet destroyed, they suffered their own to fall into decay, and both parties were content with a petty warfare.

But this very interval of stagnation produced the two great men who were destined to throw a lustre upon the last period of Carthage as brilliant as that of the lightning from which they took their name.* In the year in which the census just quoted was taken at Rome, HAMILCAR BARCA was appointed the general of Carthage in Sicily, and in the same year his son HANNIBAL was born (B.C. 247). Though armed with no force adequate to take advantage of the crisis, he had the genius to make a new use of the resources at his disposal. "He knew well that his mercenaries were as indif-

* *Barca*, the surname of Hamilcar and his descendants, the Barcide family, signifies *lightning*. The same appellation had long before been borne by *Barak*, the judge of Israel.

ferent to Carthage as to Rome; and that he had to expect from his government not Phœnician or Libyan conscripts, but at the utmost permission to save his country with his troops in his own way, provided it cost nothing. But he knew himself also, and he knew men. His mercenaries cared nothing for Carthage; but a true general is able to substitute his own person for his country in the affections of his soldiers; and such an one was this young commander."* He established himself in a fortified position on Mount Hercta (*M. Pellegrino*), overlooking Panormus, permitting his soldiers to bring their wives and children within the fortress. Thence he perpetually annoyed the Roman garrison of that city and the forces blockading Lilybæum; while his cruisers, by ravaging the rich coasts of Italy as far as Cumæ, kept the enemy in alarm at home, and procured him supplies independently of Carthage. Having for three years repulsed all the assaults of the enemy upon the hill of Hercta, he transferred his garrison to the stronger position of Mount Eryx, which he wrested from the Romans, who had held it as a constant menace over the Punic port of Drepanum (B.C. 244). Here he maintained himself, in spite of a defeat he suffered from the consul Fundanius (B.C. 243); but while he was thus preserving Sicily, all was lost by the apathy of the government and the energy of a party among the Romans.

The Senate, indeed, seemed to be paralysed by the want of progress in Sicily, and the insults inflicted on the coasts of Italy. Their continued inaction would soon have permitted Hamilcar to organize his forces for great offensive blows; but irregular patriotism supplied the failures of the state. The united efforts of wealthy citizens fitted out privateers, which retaliated on the coast of Africa, and even burnt the ancient city of Hippo. These successes encouraged fresh efforts; and history offers no parallel to the presentation to a government, by means of a private subscription, of a fleet of 200 ships of war, manned by 60,000 sailors (B.C. 242). The effort took Carthage completely by surprise. While the consul Lutatius Catulus swept Hamilcar's cruisers from the sea and blockaded Drepanum and Lilybæum more closely than ever, the Punic government only succeeded by the ensuing spring in sending to sea a fleet inadequately manned and encumbered with supplies for the threatened cities. Their hope of effecting a landing, and then putting their ships into a fit state for action, was doomed to disappointment. Amidst the group of

islands called the *Ægates*,* they encountered the Roman fleet under the prætor P. Valerius, Catulus being disabled by a wound. The ability of the prætor and the enthusiasm of his sailors might easily have prevailed over an enemy far better equipped; but the Punic fleet was totally unprepared for the encounter; 50 ships were sunk, and 70 were carried by the victors into the port of Lilybæum; and the only resource of the Carthaginians for repairing the disaster was the crucifixion of the admiral whose defeat they had ensured.

With far greater wisdom they gave Hamilcar the sad reward of his seven years' heroic efforts in full powers to treat for peace. That great man knew how to save the honour of his country, while submitting to inevitable necessity. Sicily, practically lost by the event of the last sea-fight, was finally surrendered; but Hamilcar resolutely resisted the demand of Catulus, that he should capitulate at discretion by laying down his arms, and generously refused to surrender the Roman deserters to certain death; so he was suffered to ransom his followers at a moderate rate. The Roman prisoners were given up without ransom; and Carthage engaged to pay a war contribution, which was raised by subsequent negotiation to 3200 talents, one-third at once, and the remainder in ten yearly instalments. The penalty of defeat—a penalty assuredly not excessive—being thus confessed, the two republics formed an alliance on equal terms of mutual respect for their independence, territories and sovereign rights, each engaging to form no separate league with the other's allies, nor to meddle with those allies by recruiting or by war. We shall soon see how shamefully these last stipulations—so vital for states constituted like these sovereign republics—were violated by the Romans.

Meanwhile there were not wanting indications of the spirit which had prompted Regulus to demand the complete submission of Carthage, and which foresaw that the contest could only be ended by her political extinction. But the time was not yet come to renew the war with such an object against such a general as Hamilcar. The popular assembly, which at first refused to ratify the treaty, was persuaded to be content for the present with the great gain of Sicily; and a commission was sent to the island with power to settle all details. That the amendment which added the cession of all the islands between Sicily and Italy was a perfidious preparation for the attack soon made upon

* The battle sometimes takes its name from the chief island of the group, *Ægusa*, the modern *Favignana*.

Sardinia seems a too ingenious refinement; but the final position of Rome is accurately expressed by Dr. Mommsen:—"Her acquiescence in a gain far less than had at first been demanded, and indeed offered, as well as the energetic opposition which the peace encountered in Rome, very clearly indicate the indecisive and superficial character of the victory, and of the peace."* And, if the Romans were dissatisfied at their victory, the indignation of Hamilcar at the defeat of Carthage—for he himself came out of the war unconquered—gave a pledge of the speedy renewal of the contest.

While the war thus left behind, as what would be called in current language its moral effects, the proof that Carthage might, and the conviction that she must be conquered, it gave as its present gain the fair island of Sicily, which now entered into its natural union with Italy, while its fertile plains, its mineral and agricultural wealth, its splendid harbours, and its ancient cities, were added to the resources of the Roman empire. This first acquisition beyond the limits of Italy was constituted, with the exception of the eastern part, which formed the kingdom of Hiero, into the first of the Roman provinces (B.C. 241).† It seems a strange contrast to this great success to read of the revolt of Falerii, the Etruscan city which had so long before been taken by Camillus. The war lasted but six days; and the frequent rebellions of the Faliscans were ended by the destruction of their city. The census of the same year gave the result of 251,000 citizens for military service, a number practically the same as it had been five years before. The conclusion of the First Punic War coincides within one year with the epoch in the literary culture of the Romans marked by the first exhibition of tragedy by Livius Andronicus.

* The same historian has an admirable discussion of the conduct of the war by the Romans, showing how great were the deficiencies with which they entered upon it, how much they had to learn in its course, and how their success was due to the fact, that their enormous errors were counterbalanced by the still greater errors of their opponents.

† The acquisition of this province, and soon afterwards of Sardinia, demanded a new system of administration. They seem at first to have been governed, like the several divisions of Italy, by *questors*, as subordinate magistrates, dependent on the consuls. But in a short time they were found to require chief magistrates of their own—those vice-consuls who were called *prætors*. One of these was sent out annually from Rome to each of the new provinces; and for this purpose the number of *prætors* was increased from two to four (B.C. 227). The provincial *prætor* united in himself all the chief military, judicial, and civil functions, except control over the finances, which were managed, as at Rome, by one or more *questors*, directly responsible to the senate. But the *questor* in no way trenching upon the authority of the *prætor*, in whose household he was regarded as holding the position of a son.

CHAPTER XXV.

INTERVAL IN THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE

B.C. 240 TO B.C. 219

"As when two black clouds,
 With heaven's artillery fraught, come rattling on
 Over the Caspian, then stand front to front,
 Hovering a space, till winds the signal blow
 To join their dark encounter in mid air,
 So frowned the mighty combatants."—MILTON.

WAR OF CARTHAGE WITH HER MERCENARIES—THE ROMANS SEIZE SARDINIA—DEVOTION OF HANNIBAL TO AVENGE HIS COUNTRY—AFFAIRS OF ROME IN ITALY—WARS WITH THE BOII AND LIGURIANS—THE TEMPLE OF JANUS SHUT—AGRARIAN LAW OF FLAMINIUS—ILLYRIAN WARS—IMPRESSION MADE IN MACEDONIA AND GREECE—CELTIC WARS—THE GAULS PASS THE ALPS—BATTLE OF TELAMON—CONQUEST OF THE BOII AND INSUBRES—ROMAN ITALY EXTENDED TO THE ALPS—COLONIES AND ROADS—AFFAIRS OF CARTHAGE—THE HOUSE OF BARCA AND THE PARTY OF HANNO—HAMILCAR IN SPAIN—KINGDOM OF THE BARCIDES—HASDRUBAL'S TREATY WITH ROME—HANNIBAL—HIS RUPTURE WITH ROME—CAPTURE OF SAGUNTUM—FRUITLESS EMBASSIES—ROME DECLARES WAR AGAINST CARTHAGE—PREPARATIONS OF HANNIBAL

THE twenty-four years of the First Punic War were succeeded by an interval almost of the same length before the Second. While those grounds of quarrel were accumulating, which led to the decisive contest, and while the great leader who was destined to shake the Roman empire to its foundation, before yielding to its victory, was preparing for his brilliant but luckless career, Italy was extended to its natural boundaries by the conquest of the great Gallic province between the Apennines and the Alps. This conquest, however, was preceded by events which formed a sequel to the First Punic War, and secured advantages for Rome far exceeding those stipulated by the treaty. Since the Roman fleet had commanded the sea, Hamilcar had been unable to continue the payment of his mercenaries from his own resources; and on the conclusion of the peace he asked for remittances from Carthage to settle the arrears. The answer was that he might send the troops to Africa, to be there paid off and disbanded. It was in vain that, foreseeing the consequences of "Punic faith," he sent over the troops in small detachments: the bureaucracy of Carthage waited till they were all collected in one army, and drove that army into mutiny by chaffering about the amount of their pay. The whole body of Libyan mercenaries joined in the

revolt, which spread from city to city, till Carthage stood alone amidst an insurgent population, her lands laid waste on every side, her chief citizens outraged and murdered, and the city itself besieged by the Libyans. Her own army, commanded by a blundering general, only marched out of the walls to be defeated. It seemed as if she had but survived the invasions of Agathocles and Regulus, to be overwhelmed by the surrounding barbarism which she had controlled for six hundred years, like a city buried by the drifting sands of the Sahara. In this emergency the government turned to Hamilcar, who succeeded after three years in putting an end to a contest, the character of which is denoted by its name of the "Inexpiable War" (B.C. 238).

Rome seized the opportunity to perpetrate an act of perfidy scarcely paralleled in all history. In all that directly concerned the war, indeed, she took care to make an elaborate show of good faith, forbidding all dealings of Italian mariners with the insurgents,* and even relaxing the treaty so as to permit Carthage to raise recruits in Italy. Utica, hard pressed by Hamilcar, applied in vain to Rome for aid; but that the refusal was dictated by policy rather than good faith, was soon proved by the very different reception of an overture from the mercenaries in Sardinia. The conduct pursued towards the Mamertines of Messina was repeated in this still more flagrant case; and the long-coveted island was eagerly accepted (B.C. 238). The Carthaginians, then in the very crisis of the Libyan war, were helpless against the wrong; but the revolt was no sooner crushed than they sent an embassy to Rome to claim back the province. The recriminatory pleas of wrongs inflicted on Italian traders were not enough to form a decent veil for the naked assertion of might against right, which was enforced by a declaration of war. Carthage, unable to take up the challenge, found herself obliged to sue for peace, as if she had done the wrong, and finally to purchase it by the payment of 1200 talents for the expenses of Rome's warlike preparations. Corsica, on which the Etruscans had probably no longer a hold, went with Sardinia as its natural dependency, and both were erected into the second of the Roman provinces, and placed, like Sicily, under the government of a prætor (B.C. 237).† For a

* When Hamilcar, however, imprisoned some sea captains whom he caught trafficking with the rebels, the senate obtained their release from the Carthaginian government.

† The natural characteristics and previous history of these islands are scarcely important enough to demand a place in our narrative. All necessary information will be found in the standard classical dictionaries. The population of both islands

long time, however, their possession of the islands was restricted to a military occupation of their coasts, which secured the supremacy of Rome in the Tyrrhene seas. The fertile plains of Sardinia were left uncultivated by its rude inhabitants,—a mixed race, addicted to thieving and lying—who made perpetual war upon the Romans from the highlands of the interior; and the rocky island of Corsica was peopled only by mountain robbers, who remained untamed down to the period of the empire.

The enquirer anxious to trace the hand of God in the course of human history must generally be content to look at the great issues of events in the firm assurance that those issues include that just retribution for each separate action, which the Supreme Judge keeps in His own hand. But there are times when the veil is lifted, revealing the action of that great law which provides, in the natural sequence of events, a punishment for every crime. The seizure of Sardinia was the means of raising to a climax the indignation of Hamilcar, and of pledging his greater son to exact its penalty. Viewed in the light of the event, there is not a more impressive scene in history, than that which Livy records indeed as a rumour, but which is too true to nature to be doubted. Hamilcar, who viewed his recent victory over the Libyans and his influence as commander-in-chief as but the first steps in a course of policy which should restore his country by the destruction of her rival, already saw in the young Hannibal an heir worthy of his great designs. The boy, now nine years old, was brought by his father to the altars of those dread deities, to whom other sons had so often passed through the fire, to be devoted to a work which claimed the agonizing endurance of a long life; and at those altars he swore his well-kept oath of undying hatred to the Romans. Thus pledged, he accompanied his father to Spain, where the genius of Hamilcar saw the means of organizing a new power, which might strengthen Carthage to renew the struggle, or enable him to renew it should the government of Carthage hold back. is at this period that the history

was very mixed, the basis being apparently the Tyrrhene Pelasgian in Corsica, and Iberian in Sardinia. Corsica was celebrated for its wax and honey, but a bitter taste was apt to be given to the latter from the yew trees that abounded in the island. Sardinia was famous for its silver-mines and its wool, and in later times it became one of the chief granaries of Rome. The peculiar plant which was said to excite those who ate of it to the convulsive laughter which has become proverbial under the name of "sardonic," is certainly not now to be found in the island. Mention has already been made of the colonization of Corsica by the Greeks, who called it *Cyrrós*, and of the Phœnician settlements in Sardinia.

of Carthage acquires an entirely new character from the ascendancy of the house of Barca, and their conflict with the old aristocracy; but our attention is first claimed briefly by the events taking place in Italy.

The possessions of Rome beyond the Apennines were as yet confined to the district between the rivers *Æsis* and *Rubico*, from which they had extirpated the Senonian Gauls. The Boii and other Celtic tribes held the centre of the great northern plain, between the Ligurians on the west and the various Illyrian tribes in the east and round the head of the Adriatic. The relations of Rome with all these peoples were still unsettled; and it was fortunate for them that hostilities were only resumed on a large scale in the last year of the war with Carthage (B.C. 241). The Boii invited fresh hordes of their Gallic countrymen across the Alps; and the Romans were glad to gain time by inviting their envoys to state their demands at Rome. Meanwhile the two bodies of Celts quarrelled among themselves; and the invaders returned after a great battle, which left the Boii an easy conquest to the Romans, who were content with a cession of territory (B.C. 236). A contest with the Ligurians, which had begun in B.C. 241, was also ended in this year; and, after the suppression of revolts in Corsica and Sardinia, the temple of Janus was closed, for the second time in the history of Rome (B.C. 235).

Fresh hostilities soon broke out with the indomitable mountaineers of Liguria, and with the Corsicans and Sardinians, who were said to be instigated by the emissaries of Carthage; but no incident demands mention—except the Agrarian law of the tribune C. Flaminius (B.C. 232)—till the outbreak of the war with the Illyrian pirates on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Content with the repulse of Pyrrhus, the Romans had not yet been tempted across that sea, to mingle in the conflicts of the Macedonians and the Achæan and the Ætolian leagues, even though the Acarnanians had sought their aid upon the plea that they alone of all the Greeks had taken no part in the expedition against Troy (B.C. 239). But the case was altered, when the Illyrians, who were encouraged by Macedonia to prey upon Greek commerce, began to turn their Liburnian* galleys against the vessels which Roman citizens fitted out from Brundisium. An embassy was sent to Scodra, the capital of Illyricum; and, when the King Agron replied that his subjects considered piracy a lawful trade, he was told

* This was the name given to a peculiar class of swift vessels with two banks of oars, large fleets of which were maintained by the Illyrians expressly for piracy.

that Rome would make it her business to teach the Illyrians better law. The threat was avenged by the murder of the envoys on their way home, and satisfaction was refused for the outrage. A strong fleet and army were forthwith sent to Apollonia; the pirate vessels were swept from the seas, and their fortresses on the coast were demolished. Teuta, the widow of King Agron, was forced to relinquish her hold upon Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia; and these states, already so famous in Greek history, accepted the sovereignty of Rome by a tie somewhat similar to our own recent protectorate of the Ionian islands.* With the best naval stations in the upper Adriatic, Rome had gained a footing in Greece, and a vantage-ground for future action against Macedonia; while the Greeks accepted their liberation from the pirates with mingled shame and admiration. In the persons of the first envoys whom they had ever sent to Greece, the Romans were admitted to the Eleusinian mysteries and the Isthmian games (B.C. 229—8). A few years later, Demetrius of Pharos,—who as general of Queen Teuta had aided the Romans by the surrender of Corcyra, and had received a great part of her dominions as the reward of his treason—ventured to revive piracy for his own benefit. But the death of Antigonus Gonatas deprived him of the protection of Macedonia (B.C. 221); and the Romans, though at war in Gaul, and expecting the attack of Hannibal, sent an army against him under the consul L. Æmilius Paulus, who took his island of Pharos, and expelled him from his dominions (B.C. 219). Philip, the new king of Macedonia, was too young to resent this attack upon his ally; nor did he assume a position of hostility towards Rome, till the worst pressure of the Second Punic War was passed.

Meanwhile the Celtic war in Italy was renewed by a great confederacy of all the Cisalpine Gauls, with the exception of the Veneti and Cenomani. Reinforcements were again invited from beyond the Alps;† and, before the Romans had time to meet the danger, a host of 50,000 foot-soldiers, and 20,000 on horseback or in chariots, passed the Apennines into Etruria. The two consular

* The form of government adopted seems to have been that of a military præfect, who was regarded as the lieutenant of the consuls, like the *præfectus pro legato* of the Balearic Islands.

† These were chiefly from the upper valley of the Rhone (the *Valais*). It is very interesting to meet for the first time on this occasion with the name *Germani* in the Capitoline Fasti. But there is no sufficient ground for believing that these *Germani* were a Teutonic people; for the name is certainly of Celtic origin, and may have been applied in this instance to a Celtic tribe.

armies, hastily summoned from Ariminum and Sardinia, arrived only just in time to gain a decisive battle at Telamon, which might have had a different issue, had not the Gauls sacrificed a first advantage in their eagerness for plunder. They left 40,000 men dead upon the field, and 10,000 were taken prisoners with their king. The consul C. Atilius Regulus fell in the battle (B.C. 225). The fruit of this victory was the submission of the Boii, and the conquest of the half of Cisalpine Gaul south of the Po (*Gallia Cispadana*, B.C. 224):

In the following year, the consul C. Flaminius crossed the Po, to carry on the war against the Insubrians. The enterprize was hazardous; and after Flaminius had been once allowed to retreat from a false position, he found himself compelled to give battle to the whole force of the Gauls, cut off from his base, and with only the uncertain friendship of the Cenomani to secure his retreat in case of a disaster. But the legions cut their way through the enemy, and repaired by their valour the error of the consul (B.C. 223). Another critical battle, in which the victory apparently gained by the Celts was again wrested from them by the obstinate valour of the Romans, decided the issue of the war; and the resistance of the Insubrians was terminated by the fall of their capital Mediolanum (*Milan*) and their last stronghold of Comum (*Como*). These cities were taken by the consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio; while his colleague, M. Claudius Marcellus, gained the greater honour of the *spolia opima*—the third and last—by slaying the Gallic King Viridomarus with his own hand (B.C. 222).

A victory over the Illyrians of the Istrian peninsula, in the following year, linked these new acquisitions with the conquests of the Romans in Illyria. And now, for the first time in history, the whole peninsula and its adjacent islands were united, from the barrier of the Alps to the sea which divides Sicily from Africa (B.C. 221). The people of Cisalpine Gaul had become either the subjects or dependent allies of the Romans, except some few tribes which were allowed to remain undisturbed for the present in the valleys of the Alps and other parts beyond the Po. To the south of the river, the Celtic tribes began from this time to undergo a process of slow but sure extinction, only surviving as serfs of the colonists to whom their lands were assigned. The country was commanded by fortresses and colonies, and penetrated by the great Flaminian Road, the first that had been constructed across the Apennines. Passing from Rome to Ariminum, it linked

together the opposite shores of Italy; and was continued from Ariminum through the new fortresses of Mutina (*Modena*), and of Placentia (*Piacenza*), which commanded the passage of the Po, to Mediolanum (*Milan*), whence branches were ultimately carried to the chief towns of Gallia Cisalpina. The censor Flaminius, from whom the road received its name, adorned Rome itself with the Flaminian circus (B.C. 220). The census of this year made the civil population 270,213, an increase of about 20,000 in twenty years. Rome seemed to have entered fully upon the great work of Italian consolidation, when she was roused by the worst alarm of war she had yet heard. In the very year of her conquest of Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal took the command of the Carthaginian army in Spain (B.C. 221).

The peace concluded twenty years before had left Carthage in a position as precarious as it was humiliating. It was not merely that she had lost the rich revenues of Sicily and the monopoly of her ancient lines of commerce: she had seen Rome take up a position of readiness to make a descent at any moment upon Africa; while the reluctance with which the treaty had been ratified, and the subsequent seizure of Sardinia, proved that the will would not be wanting for the final attack. Nor was there much consolation to be found in the state of the government at home. The old money-worshipping aristocracy, who in the crisis of the war had withheld the means of victory, and the careless waiters upon the course of events, knew no better policy than to harp upon the necessity of peace. These had the ascendant in the Council of Elders, the Hundred, and the boards of government. But the urgent danger called into prominence another party, of which we have as yet scarcely heard, though it had doubtless been growing into prominence. The popular instinct, which so often seizes the truth which rulers keep at bay, saw their only hope in war and their only saviour in Hamilcar. The chief leader of the party in the senate was Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of Hamilcar. The aristocratic and peace party was led by Hanno, who by some unknown achievements had been called the Great, but whose sluggish incompetence had reduced the affairs of the republic to a state too low to be retrieved even by Hamilcar's efforts. He guided the councils of his party from the beginning of the First Punic War to the end of the Second, never relaxing his bitter enmity to the house of Barca. When the senate were compelled in their extremity to call for the services of Hamilcar against the Libyans, they joined Hanno with him in the command; and,

though the indignant soldiers sent the unpopular leader home, Hamilcar consented to receive him back as a colleague.

The Libyan war brought out by a new and severe test the corrupt incompetency of the aristocracy, who even dared to impeach Hamilcar for having provoked the revolt by promising his troops their pay; and the seizure of Sardinia showed what might be expected from the Romans. A change of government was inevitable, but the popular party had to avoid giving any pretext for Roman intervention. As the Roman writers are hostile to the Barcine party, we have no fair account of the reform that was effected; but their very abuse of "the revolutionary clubs of the most wicked men," proves that the people had become a real power in the state. All we know for certain is that, without any great formal change in the constitution, Hanno was deposed from his command, and Hamilcar appointed commander-in-chief for an unlimited period. He could only be recalled by a vote of the popular assembly, and meanwhile his position was independent of the governing boards. Accordingly we find his successors making treaties by their own authority, and receiving embassies like the senate.* His successor was to be appointed by the army, subject to the confirmation of the popular assembly. His position was apparently distinguished from that of the military dictators to whom the people have so often committed their liberties by the absence of political power; and we can only account for the acquiescence of the nobles in such an appointment by their supposing that African warfare could furnish him no great scope for mischief.

What then were his real powers to save or to destroy the state? To the latter question there is an answer unparalleled in history. The privileges of the nobles were treated by the Barcine party with unexampled respect, and the people had no liberties to lose. Unwilling to commit the treason of usurping a tyranny, he had no basis of an honest popular feeling on which to build. Besides creating the resources with which to save his country in war, he had to waste a part of them in satisfying a populace hitherto governed only by corruption. Nor was he better able to rely on the materials for an army. The citizens who had followed him to the field in the Libyan war, had fought on that; as in former emergencies, only for self-preservation; and all that he could expect from that class was a supply of able and devoted officers of the popular party. And after all, a moment's reverse, a change

* The position of the Barcine family towards Carthage is compared by Mommsen to that of the princes of the House of Orange towards the States-General of Holland.

of feeling in the fickle multitude, or their corruption by the gold of the rich nobles, might place him at the mercy of his opponents. He well knew that the government was as incapable of preparing for the inevitable war with deliberate care and patriotic self-sacrifice, as of resolving to begin it at the right moment or conducting it when begun, but that they were quite capable of giving up the advisers of war on the first demand from Rome, as Hanno afterwards proposed to give up Hannibal.

If Carthage was to be saved, it must be by resources from without, and yet not by foreign aid. The inspiration of genius guided Hannibal to the solution of the problem. Like the great adventurer of modern times, who planned the conquest of the East in order to return and take Europe in the rear,* but with a less selfish object, Hamilcar sought for money, recruits, and a field of action, in the yet undeveloped resources of the great peninsula of Spain. His political enemies, and the Roman writers who repeat their calumnies, saw no further than the scheme of erecting a kingdom for his family; but the fidelity of that family to Carthage is a sufficient answer to the charge. Whether his plan was that which was executed by Hannibal, of marching into Italy from Spain, in the hope of bringing back the conquest of Rome as his claim to his country's gratitude, or whether the power acquired in Spain was to be first used for a reform in the government of Carthage, he himself perhaps hardly knew. Though his age was little above thirty, he is said to have felt a presentiment that he was not fated to see his schemes accomplished, and he took with him his "lion's brood," Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago, to train up under his own eye and in his own camp, as soldiers worthy to complete the work.†

His secret was well kept from the jealous government. Soon after finishing the Libyan war, he marched westward, with his fleet under Hasdrubal attending him along the coast, and with a strong force of elephants, as if against the Moors. His real aim was first discovered to the Senate by the news that he was in Spain, fighting against the natives, while a part of his forces, left in Africa under Hasdrubal, crushed a fresh rebellion of the nomads,

* See Napoleon's account of the views with which he sailed for Egypt, in Villemain's *Souvenirs Contemporains*.

† Livy represents Hannibal as first sent for by Hasdrubal after his father's death; but Hamilcar would scarcely leave his family at Carthage in what would amount to the position of hostages, and we know that Hannibal commanded the army under Hasdrubal's administration. The incredibly malignant insinuation ascribed to Hanno on this occasion suggests that here, as elsewhere, the historian was drawing on his imagination for his facts.—(Livy. xxi. 3.)

so that he could not be charged with leaving Africa undefended. Admiration of his enterprise, and hope for their own cause from its result, would be sufficient motives with the people to secure him from recal, and many an adventurous spirit would hasten to join him. Of the details of his operations we have no account; but their result was the conquest of a large portion of the peninsula, and the subjection, by war or negotiation; of many of the native tribes, whom he trained to form an army. The traces left in the next generation of his government in Spain forced from even such a bitter enemy as Cato the tribute of admiration—that no king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar Barca. His further plans appear to have been just ripe for execution when he fell, in the flower of his age, in battle against the Vettones (B.C. 229).

Hasdrubal, who succeeded to his father-in-law's command during the minority of Hannibal, postponed the war with Rome as the inheritance of its sworn champion, and devoted his great political genius to the consolidation of what might now be truly called the Barcine kingdom in Spain. He drew the bonds with the native tribes closer by conciliation and hospitality to their chieftains; and founded the city of New Carthage in the most convenient position and on the most splendid harbour of the coast, looking both to Italy and Africa. His moderation seems to have assured the Romans against any danger from the side of Spain, if indeed they could have believed that Carthage would venture on an aggressive war, and that not by sea but from so distant a base, divided from Italy by the Pyrenees and Alps and the wild tribes between them. They affected to be satisfied with the explanation that the conquest of Spain had been undertaken to procure means for paying the contributions due under the treaty. Meanwhile they constituted themselves, on the shores of the Iberian as of the Adriatic sea, the protectors of the Greek communities, the chief of which were Emporiæ (*Ampurias*) at the foot of the Pyrenees, and Zacynthus or Saguntum (*Murviedro*) south of the Ebro. With this hold upon the peninsula in case of future operations, they chose for the present to make a treaty with Hasdrubal, by which the river Iberus (*Ebro*) was made the limit of the two empires, and the independence of Saguntum was secured (B.C. 226).

Hasdrubal was assassinated by a native after an administration of eight years; and the acclamations of the camp, which hailed HANNIBAL his successor, were ratified by the unanimous voice of the Carthaginian people, drowning the remonstrances of Hanno (B.C. 221). At the age of twenty-six, he was already trained to a per-

sonal courage and endurance, which surpassed that of the hardest veteran, and practised in that knowledge of war which made him the greatest general of antiquity. But his character will appear better from his career than from the brilliant picture which Livy draws of his virtues, only to draw over it the black shadow of his crimes.* He was one of those devoted men, whose lives take their complexion from the one object of their destiny; and that object was at least the salvation of his country: for the student of this period of history must never forget that Carthage had reached that crisis at which aggrandisement was the only means of self-defence; and her sole protection against the impending invasion of Africa was to anticipate it by herself invading Rome. To have perceived and acted on this truth was the great merit of the Barcines.

It is no exaggeration of Livy's rhetoric that Hannibal assumed the command in Spain with the feeling that Italy was his province. The still unfinished Celtic war seemed to combine with the Macedonian quarrel about Demetrius of Pharos to present an opportunity for attacking Rome, whose usual good fortune relieved her of these embarrassments just before the war began. The two campaigns in which he completed the subjection of the tribes south of the Ebro are represented by Livy as a stealthy approach towards Saguntum in search of a pretext for attack, but the treaty of Hasdrubal was not likely to weigh on a conscience bound by the oath imposed by Hamilcar. A real ground of hesitation was found in the ascendancy of the peace party at Carthage, whither the Roman envoys, rudely repulsed by Hannibal, carried their complaints, instead of being provoked to war. It was equally in vain that Hannibal goaded on the Saguntines to give him a pretext for hostilities; and he found one at last in their pretended aggressions on a tribe allied with Carthage.

The siege of Saguntum was commenced in the spring of B.C. 219, and while the Romans were wasting their time in the war with Demetrius of Pharos, the city defended itself for eight months with a desperation only paralleled by other Spanish sieges down to that of Zaragoza. Its cruel fate was the usual, though horrible consequence of such a resistance; for never do the worst passions of human nature ride so triumphant over every whisper of mercy as in a city stormed after a long siege, and the horrors of Badajoz make us slow to judge the Carthaginians for those of

* Hannibal's relentless hatred of the Romans no more implies personal malignity of character than the injunction of Nelson to his midshipmen to hate a Frenchman like the devil.

Saguntum. The fall of the Iberian city involved that of the stronghold of aristocracy at Carthage. The popular enthusiasm, kindled by the first news of war, was roused to a flame by the distribution of the booty. During the siege, the Romans had sent an embassy to Hannibal, who referred them to Carthage. There they addressed the Senate as being no party to the attack on Saguntum, and demanded that Hannibal should be given up. Hanno, who alone ventured to advise compliance, was heard with the silence of personal respect; but he was only answered by the complaint that the speech of the Roman ambassador had been less hostile, and the Romans were admonished to prefer the old alliance of Carthage to their recent league with Saguntum. The news of the city's fall reached Rome just as the envoys returned. Wonder at Punic audacity, regret at the waste of the forces of the republic in petty wars, and shame at having permitted the catastrophe, all contributed to a panic fear. Their fancy saw Hannibal already past the Ebro, leading after him all the nations of Iberia, and stirring up the tribes of Gaul. A war with all the world was to be waged in Italy and before the walls of Rome. But the alarm soon took the turn of decisive action; the course to be pursued was indicated by the allotment of provinces to the newly elected consuls—Spain to P. Cornelius Scipio, and Africa with Sicily to Tiberius Sempronius: and war against Carthage was voted by the comitia.

In the spring of B.C. 218, a last embassy was sent to Carthage, to ask simply whether the act of Hannibal was that of the state, and if so, to make the solemn declaration of war. The only answer was a bold defence of the justice of the act. Upon this, Fabius, the chief of the ambassadors, gathering up the bosom of his toga as if he held something in its folds, said: "Here we carry for you peace and war: take which you please." With equal resolution, though in a suppressed voice, the senators replied: "Give which you like;" and when Fabius, shaking out the fold, exclaimed, "I give you war," they accepted it with one voice, and pledged themselves to carry it on in the same spirit. From Carthage the ambassadors passed over into Spain, to try if the tribes could be detached from the Carthaginian cause. After some success beyond the Ebro, they met with a decisive repulse from the Volcians; the reply of whose aged chieftain, even if it be invented by the rhetoric of Livy, gives a true expression of the feelings natural to the native peoples. He asked them how they dared offer the alliance of a state which had betrayed Saguntum



more foully than Carthage had destroyed it, and bad them seek allies where its fate had not been heard of. The watchword was adopted by the other tribes, and the ambassadors retired into Gaul, where they were equally unsuccessful in preparing an opposition to the passage of Hannibal. It was only at Massilia that they rested from the alarms inspired by the armed councils of the Celts.

Hannibal had meanwhile returned from the smoking ruins of Saguntum to New Carthage, where he spent the winter in preparing at once for the invasion of Italy, and for the defence of Spain and Africa, for he was the general-in-chief of Carthage at home as well as abroad. He had an army of 120,000 foot, 16,000 horse, and 58 elephants, and a fleet of 32 quinqueremes manned and 18 not manned, besides the reserves of ships and elephants at Carthage. But the quality of his troops differed widely from that of the common Punic armies. Discarding all mercenaries, he trusted to the Libyans and Iberians who, trained under his own eyes, found a substitute for the impulse of patriotism in attachment to their general. As a sign of his confidence and a preparation for the long campaigns that lay before them in a distant land, he gave them leave of absence for the winter; and he secured the devotion of the Libyans by a promise of the Carthaginian franchise as the reward of victory. He allotted 20,000 men to the defence of Africa, the passage of the Straits especially being secured by a strong force. In Spain he left 12,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, with the bulk of the navy, under his brother Hasdrubal; and he placed in the fortress of Saguntum the hostages whom he took from the natives for the fidelity of their troops. All that he required of the home government was to send out 20 quinqueremes and 1000 soldiers to ravage the coasts of Italy, and, if possible, to station 25 ships at Lilybæum. His own course was to execute the plan inherited from his father—a direct invasion of Italy. A moderate force thrown on any point of the Italian coast would have had no hope of success amidst allies now more firmly bound to Rome than when they had stood faithful to her against Pyrrhus. But Rome might be approached through the recently subjugated and still faithless tribes of Gaul, who, it has been observed, were to Hannibal what Poland was to Napoleon, in his very similar Russian campaign. Treaties were concluded with the Insubrians and Boii; and, if Hannibal could force his way through the untamed savages between the Pyrenees and the Alps, he reckoned on finding, as he descended into Italy, both guides and reinforcements.

• CHAPTER XXVI.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. B.C. 218 TO B.C. 201.

“In parte operis mei licet mihi præfari bellum maxime omnium memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum; quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium atque roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico consuebant bello: et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculo fuerint qui vicerunt.”

CHARACTER OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR—ITS THREE PERIODS AND THREE SCENES, ITALY, SPAIN, AND AFRICA—*FIRST PERIOD*—MARCH OF HANNIBAL THROUGH SPAIN AND GAUL—MOVEMENTS OF THE CONSUL SCIPIO—HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS—BATTLES OF THE TICINUS AND THE TREBIA—HANNIBAL IN ETRURIA—BATTLE OF THE TRASIMENE LAKE—FABIUS MAXIMUS MADE DICTATOR, “QUI CUNCTANDO RES-
TITUIT REM”—HANNIBAL IN APULIA—CNEIUS SCIPIO IN SPAIN—*THIRD CAMPAIGN*—BATTLE OF CANNE—ROMAN FORTITUDE—REVOLT OF CAPUA—CARTHAGINIAN WINTER-
QUARTERS—*SECOND PERIOD*—HANNIBAL'S FIRST DEFEAT, AT NOLA—HIS RE-
PULSE FROM AND CAPTURE OF TARENTUM—ROMAN SUCCESS IN CARDINIA AND
SPAIN—SICILIAN WAR—DEATH OF HIERO—REVOLUTION AND REVOLT OF SYRACUSE—
HIS SIEGE AND CAPTURE—DEATH OF ARCHIMEDES—DEATH OF THE TWO SCIPIOS IN
SPAIN—HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ROME—HIS RETREAT—RECOVERY OF CAPUA AND
TARENTUM—DEFEAT AND DEATH OF MARCELLUS—HANNIBAL MARCHES TO AID HAN-
NIBAL—HIS DEFEAT AND DEATH AT THE METAURUS—*THIRD PERIOD*. P. COR-
NELIUS SCIPIO—HIS CONQUEST OF SPAIN—HIS JOURNEY TO AFRICA—HIS ELECTION
TO THE CONSULSHIP—INVASION OF AFRICA—DEFEAT OF THE CARTHAGINIANS—
LEAGUE WITH MASINISSA—HANNIBAL'S RIVAL FROM ITALY—BATTLE OF ZAMA—
CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

Though more than twenty centuries have passed since the second war between Rome and Carthage, and the world has witnessed, and still witnesses, conflicts compared with which its mere magnitude and the very principles at issue were insignificant, it is still in many respects “the most memorable of all wars ever waged.” It displayed to the world two of its greatest generals, one perhaps the greatest of all, except him who never made a mistake in war and never lost a gun. It bequeathed to the students of the art of war every form of example and of warning, and left to free states in every age the far nobler lessons of effort, self-sacrifice, long-endurance, and confidence amidst desperate fortunes. Above all, it decided the future destiny of the world, whether the nations should become the slaves of a commercial oligarchy and of oriental superstitions, or be united under the laws of a free state, which even as a conqueror respected their liberties, in readiness to receive the truth that should make them free indeed.

Nor is the Roman historian less discriminating in the prominence he assigns to the Carthaginian leader: for it was not so much a war between two republics as between the genius of Hannibal and the resources of the Roman people. As we watch the great captain's course, Carthage remains altogether in the background, grudgingly contributing a few supplies, but more discouragements through the intrigues of Hanno and his party, and utterly failing in the extreme crisis, when Hannibal was compelled to fall back upon her resources. The nearest parallel in history is the position of General Buonaparte, at about the same age, during his first campaign in Italy: but a brilliant issue relieved the latter in a few months from the anxieties which Hannibal endured for fifteen years. Accordingly it is his steps that the historian follows, and his alternations of success and reverse mark out the three periods into which the eighteen years of the war are naturally divided. Three campaigns conducted him in triumph from New Carthage to the field of Cannæ (B.C. 218—216). Then came the first check: the tide seemed to turn in favour of the Romans: but Hannibal held his ground in Italy with various fortune for ten years, till the successes of Scipio, and the fatal battle of the Metaurus, cut him off from his true military base in Spain (B.C. 215—206). At length he was called back to meet the danger, to avert which he had begun the war,—the invasion of Africa by a general who knew how to avoid the errors of Agathocles and Regulus. The election of Scipio to the consulship marks the beginning of the last period of the war, which was concluded five years later by his triumph for the victory of Zama (B.C. 205—201). And the war has three scenes, as well as three periods,—Italy, Spain, and Africa—besides the episode of the Syracusan war consequent upon the death of Hiero. It is especially important to keep an eye fixed upon the events in Spain, for it was their early occupation of that base of Hannibal's operations, that alone enabled the Scipios to sow the seeds of victory which they reaped on the field of Zama.

In the spring of B.C. 218, Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, Africans and Iberians, in the proportion of about two to one, and with 37 elephants. The passage of the Ebro placed him beyond the limits of the Barcinæ kingdom, among the wild tribes of Catalonia, ever renowned for their fierce independence, and inclined, if to either party, to the Romans. The four months and fourth part of his army, exhausted in subduing them, were not deemed a cost

too great for making Spain secure; and he left, besides, 11,000 men under Hanno to guard the newly-conquered province. The intricate passes of the Pyrenees gave many of the Spaniards the opportunity of desertion; but, so far from regretting this weeding of his forces, Hannibal is said to have sent back a large part of his army, as a contradiction to the presentiment that few were destined to return. He entered Gaul with a picked force of 50,000 horse and 9000 foot, and marched without serious opposition to the Rhone, reaching it opposite to Avignon about the end of July.

It was here for the first time that he met with even the show of resistance from the Romans. Their councils had been wavering and their forces wasted in petty enterprizes, as if Carthage had been thoroughly subdued, and the time for action everywhere left at their disposal. While making a new enemy in Macedonia, they had neglected to crush the Celts and make themselves masters of the Alps, or to resist the growth of the Barcide power in Spain—at least, if not before, by sending a force adequate to save Saguntum, and failing that by seizing the country between the Pyrenees and Ebro—or to anticipate the crisis by employing their fleet of 220 sail to strike a decisive blow in Africa. Even when the allotment of the provinces to the new consuls had indicated the proper course of action, it was not followed up with any vigour. The repeated rumours that Hannibal had passed the Ebro filled the Romans with a vague alarm, and reduced their policy almost to the defensive. The consul Sempronius remained in Sicily, while his colleague Scipio waited to quell some disturbances in Cisalpine Gaul. It was about the end of June when Scipio landed at Massilia on his voyage to Spain, and learned that Hannibal was in full march towards the Rhone. He postponed all else to the object of disputing the passage of the river, and made arrangements for that purpose with the friendly Gallie tribes, who were under the influence of the Massaliots. The consul himself was still at Massilia, deliberating on the best way of guarding the passage, when Hannibal, reaching the river, found the left bank occupied only by the Gauls, whom he outflanked by sending a detachment across on rafts two days' march higher up, and easily forced the passage. Scipio, first enlightened by a cavalry reconnaissance, hastened up the river only to find that Hannibal was three days' march beyond the river. He now resolved to sail back to Pisa and aid his colleague to meet the invader in Cisalpine Gaul; but after all his blunders he took a step which contributed mainly to

save the state, by sending the bulk of his army into his allotted province of Spain under his brother Cneius, thus providing occupation for Hasdrubal, and checking the flow of Hannibal's supplies and reinforcements.

Two passes then led across the Alps from the banks of the lower Rhone, for the coast-road through the *Riviera*—to say nothing of resistance from the Massaliots—would have placed Hannibal far from his expected allies in Cisalpine Gaul. The one by the Cottian Alps (*Mt. Genève*), though lower and more direct, led through the more difficult country into the territory of the savage Taurini (round *Turin*), who were the enemies of the Insubrians. Besides these reasons for the rejection of that route, the easier though higher pass of the Graian Alps (*Little Mt. St. Bernard*) was the ordinary and well-known route from Gaul to Italy, and it is now almost universally agreed that this route was Hannibal's. But the passage of light-armed hordes of Celts, though they doubtless suffered terribly in their migrations across the Alps, was a very different task from the transit of a great army, with baggage, cavalry, and elephants, at a season when the autumn snows were falling, and resisted by the mountaineers, against whom they had to fight their way to the very summit of the pass.* The descent, though free from enemies, was still more dangerous, and in one spot on the banks of the Doria, where the avalanches glide along an almost vertical slope, it required the labour of three days to make the road practicable for the elephants. It was about the middle of September when the shattered army rested in the plain of Ivrea, amongst the friendly people of the Salassians. Since the passage of the Pyrenees the army had lost more than half its force,

* It seems equally unnecessary to trouble the reader with the arguments upon a question which may now be considered settled, or, in these days of Alpine travel, to dwell on the details of the passage. Livy's rhetorical embellishments probably bear much the same proportion to the truth as David's picture of Napoleon on his impossibly-poised charger to the grey-coated traveller toiling up the rocky steps on his mule. After all that has been done to smoothen the passage, a personal knowledge of the ground gives an idea of the achievement such as no words could convey to one who has never crossed the Alps—but the traveller must not forget the contrast, so beautifully drawn by Rogers, between "the path of pleasure" which modern engineering has "flung like a silver zone" round mountains and along ravines, and the pathless chasms through which

• "The Cæthaginian, on his way to Rome
Entered their fastnesses. Trampling the snows
The war-horse reared, and the towered elephant
Upraised his trunk into the murky sky,
Then tumbled headlong, swallowed up and lost,
He and his rider."

and numbered only 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. Military critics have censured an enterprise achieved at such an enormous sacrifice; but a first experiment is always costly, and the boldness which carried Hannibal through the unknown dangers of mountains, rivers, and barbarian tribes must have had an ample reward when he felt that he had kept his early oath and realized his father's projects by his very presence on the soil of Italy. "The unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannæ."

In reverting to the obvious parallel of Napoleon's passage of the Alps, we ought not to overlook the resemblance to Wellington's invasion of the peninsula in the smallness of the army led by each against the forces of an empire. Out of the 700,000 fighting men who formed the levy of Italy, no army was prepared to fall upon the exhausted troops. The last barrier of the Alps had been yielded, like those of the Ebro, the Pyrenees, and the Rhone. Hannibal had time to rest his forces, to capture the hostile city of Turin, and to gain over by threats or promises all the Celtic and Ligurian tribes of Piedmont, before he was called upon to measure his strength with Scipio. The consul, with a force of less than 20,000 men,* so far from being able to guard the Alpine passes, had been fully occupied in keeping down risings among the Gauls; and now, in the midst of insurgent tribes, he had to check the advance of the Carthaginian. It was while marching up the left bank of the Po that his advanced guard encountered that of Hannibal in a plain beyond the Ticinus (*Ticino*). A skirmish, in which both generals took part, proved the superiority of the Numidian horse; and Scipio, severely wounded, owed his life to the courage of his son Publius, a youth of seventeen, who afterwards saved the state itself.

The great military talents by which Scipio atoned for his previous errors now extricated his army from destruction. While Hannibal was preparing for a pitched battle, with the advantages of a plain for his cavalry and elephants, and a broad river in the enemy's rear, Scipio retreated across both the Ticino and the Po, and took up a station under the walls of Placentia. Thence, refusing the battle offered by Hannibal, he fell back upon a strong position on the hills on the right bank of the Trebia (*Trebbia*), a

* This was an army stationed in Cisalpine Gaul under two pretors, of which Scipio had taken the command.

confluent of the Po, dry in summer, but forming a rapid torrent in the winter, which had now set in. Here he was joined by his colleague Sempronius, who had returned by sea from Lilybæum to Ariminum, whence he had marched to Placentia. Cisalpine Gaul was now in open insurrection, but the united consular armies, numbering 40,000 men, were so posted as to compel Hannibal to try an attack on their front with his inferior force, or to trust himself in winter quarters to the doubtful fidelity of the Gauls. They had only to hold the position so well taken by Scipio.

It was the misfortune of Rome's double magistracy that, when both consuls were present in the field, the incompetency or jealousy of the less able often ruined the common cause. Owing to Scipio's wound, the command had devolved upon Sempronius, whose year of office was just expiring. Eager for distinction, he could not withstand the provocations by which Hannibal tried to bring on a battle. His cavalry was sent out to protect the friendly villages round Placentia from the ravages of the Punic horse, and a first success encouraged bolder skirmishes. In one of these, on a rainy winter day, the Roman horse and light infantry were enticed by the flying Numidians across the swollen Trebia, when suddenly they came upon the entire Punic army drawn up in battle array. The whole Roman force hurried across the river to support their vanguard, with no time to make preparations or take food. The skirmishers in their front and the cavalry on their wings were soon overwhelmed by the Punic elephants and horse; but the infantry, which had already gained some advantage, still stood firm, though outflanked on both sides. The battle was decided by the charge of the Carthaginian Sacred Band,* 2000 strong, under Hannibal's brother Mago, upon the flank and rear of the Romans. The main body of 10,000 infantry, however, succeeded in cutting its way through the confused masses of the enemy to the fortress of Placentia, where they were joined by other bands which had escaped to the camp unpursued. The obstinate courage that saved so large a portion of the army was some mitigation of a disaster which gave Hannibal all Northern Italy. His own army suffered severely from diseases contracted by exposure to the weather, and he lost all his elephants but one. Retiring into winter quarters, he enlisted large bodies of the insurgent Gauls, who now declared everywhere in his favour; and his operations in the early spring gave him large reinforcements from the hardy mountaineers of

* See p. 401.

Liguria. The remains of the Roman army passed the winter shut up in the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona.

The Romans were not yet seriously alarmed. The new consuls took the field with armies of the usual complement of four legions, to command the western and eastern roads from the north, and, after securing the passes of the Apennines, to effect a junction in Gaul. Flaminius advanced to Arretium (*Arezzo*), and Servilius to Ariminum (*Rimini*). Meanwhile Hannibal had made one of those rapid changes of base which form so striking a feature of his mode of warfare. Knowing that Rome was only really vulnerable at the heart and on the condition of shaking the fidelity of the Italians, he resolved to advance into Etruria (B.C. 217). At the beginning of spring he crossed the Apennines by the line of the Macra, and descended to the lower Arno, while Flaminius was watching the upper course of the latter stream. The early spring rains and melted snows had so flooded the marshes about Pisa, that for four days' march the soldiers had not a dry spot on which to rest, except the piles of baggage and the bodies of the beasts of burthen that fell dead. Men and horses were decimated by various diseases, and Hannibal himself lost an eye by ophthalmia. But he achieved his purpose, and, marching up the Arno, rested at Fiesulæ (*Fiesole*).

The consul Flaminius was a party leader, whose appointment to the conduct of the war was a political demonstration of popular favour. What was worse, he fancied himself a soldier as well as a demagogue, though his successes against the Insubrians in his former consulship (B.C. 223) had been gained by his soldiers as much over the errors of their general as over the enemy. In his eagerness to anticipate any interference from the Senate, he had hastened from Rome before the commencement of his year of office.* But he had made no good use of the time, and was still waiting at Arretium for the roads to become practicable, when the Carthaginian army arrived at Fiesulæ. He had better have waited still, to give his colleague time to join him from Ariminum; but he was possessed by the one idea of proving that the popular choice had fallen on the right leader. Any inducement that might still be wanting was supplied, when Hannibal marched past him on the road to Perugia, his Gauls laying waste the rich valley of the Chiana. Flaminius broke up from Arretium and followed the Carthaginian army beyond Cortona, where the road passed through

* At this time the consuls entered on their office upon the Ides, the 15th day, of March. It was in B.C. 153 that their term of office first began on the 1st of January.

a defile of the Apennines round the north-western angle of the Trasimene lake (*Lago di Perugia*). The hills, sweeping round in a large segment of a circle, enclose a plain, the only outlet towards Perugia being through a narrow marshy pass, and thence over the crest of a woody hill, now surmounted by the village of Tuoro. This was the spot which Hannibal chose to waylay his rash opponent. His best infantry, drawn up on the last-named hill, barred the outlet from the pass: his light-armed troops lined the crests of the arc of mountains, and the cavalry were placed in ambush near the entrance to the plain. While the early morning mist from the lake covered the dangers which the consul was too careless to suspect or examine, the Roman column marched into the pass, which was instantly closed behind by the Punic cavalry. Flaminius was drawing up his army to attack the only troops he saw—those on Mt. Tuoro—when he was assaulted on every side. It was rather a massacre than a battle. Those in the rear were driven into the lake by the Numidian horse and the Gallic broadswords; the centre was cut to pieces in the pass, and the consul himself slain; while the vanguard of 6000 men proved the might of the Roman legions by cutting their way through to an Etruscan village on a hill. Here they were surrounded by the victorious army, and surrendered to Maharbal the next day. The Romans left 15,000 men slain upon the field, and as many were taken prisoners. The loss of Hannibal was only 1500, mostly of the light-armed Gauls. The rivulet which that day ran blood into the lake still preserves the terrible name of *Sanguinetto*. To crown the disaster, and to show how it might have been averted by a few days' patience, the advanced guard of 4000 cavalry, whom Servilius had sent forward to assure his colleague of his own approach, were captured or cut to pieces.

Rome found herself once more, as in ancient days, with Etruria in the possession of an enemy, and her own line of defence upon the Tiber. The bridges were broken down, and the defence of the city was entrusted to QUINTUS FABIUS MAXIMUS as dictator. An army of reserve was formed, and the fleet recalled, for the defence of the city, while two new legions were raised for service in the field. But Hannibal was too good a soldier to risk a premature attack on Rome, till he had gained over some of her allies. With this view he dismissed the Italian prisoners without ransom, as he had dismissed those taken at the Trebia, detaining only the Roman citizens. Nor would he waste time against the strong position in which the consul Servilius rested upon the northern

fortresses. He crossed the Umbrian Apennines—failing in an attempt by the way to surprise the fortress of Spoletium (*Spoletto*)—and having laid waste the Roman farms which were scattered over Picenum, he rested on the Adriatic coast to refresh and reorganize his army. The abundance of captured Roman arms enabled him to adopt the important measure of equipping his Libyan infantry in the Roman fashion, and the inaction of the enemy allowed him a full month to exercise his soldiers in the use of their new arms. No proof of military genius could be greater than the successful adoption of a new system of tactics in the middle of a campaign. But the main object of his march across Italy had failed. None of all the Sabelian communities, which had withstood Rome for so many years, wavered in their allegiance, and he marched as far as Luceria without receiving the submission of a single city. Their fidelity was nothing short of a pledge of ultimate victory for Rome; and she had now a general who knew at least how to wait for it without risking the common safety.

While deriving abundant supplies from the rich plains of Apulia, Hannibal found that his march was watched and his flank threatened from the heights above by the dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. Having united the new levy of two legions with the army of Servilius, Fabius had entered on that strategic policy which gained for him the surname of the *Linggerer* (Cunctator),

“Whose wise delay restored the Roman state.”

A firm adherent of the old policy and old habits of the Roman nobles, cautious both by age and temperament, and a warm opponent of the late consul Flaminius, he had resolved to be drawn by no temptation into the possibility of losing a pitched battle. The presence of an unbroken army, always dogging his steps and harassing his march, must keep back the Carthaginian from any decisive enterprise; and, however surely this excess of caution enabled Hannibal to calculate his adversary's movements, he dared not treat him with contempt. Opposed to such a general, Hannibal could only make the most of his opportunities for injuring the Romans, and tempting the faith of their allies. He recrossed the Apennines, through Samnium, into Campania, where, besides the plunder of the rich plains, he hoped to find friends in Capua. It seemed as if the caution of Fabius was to reap its reward in the opportunity of striking a blow at once safe and decisive. Still watching the Carthaginians from the heights, unmoved at their ravages of the richest possessions of the Roman allies, he closed

the passages of the Apennines against their retreat. The hope of an insurrection in Capua having failed, Hannibal was retiring from the ravaged country, when he found Fabius impreguably posted at Casilinum (the modern *Capua*). On the left bank of the Vultur-nus, the city itself was strongly garrisoned; the dictator's main body was posted on the heights above the right bank; and 4000 men blocked the road, beside the river at their feet. Hannibal extricated his army by one of those ludicrous stratagems which success redeems from appearing puerile.* Tying lighted faggots to the horns of a number of oxen, he caused his light-armed troops to drive them over the lower heights. The troops posted on the road, thinking that the Carthaginian army was slipping off between them and Fabius, made a hasty movement to the right. The light-armed Ligurians and Gauls knew how to keep them occupied while Hannibal passed in full march along the open road; and the following morning he drew off his skirmishers, who had inflicted greater loss than they had suffered. He then made a wide circuit through the Apennines, and returned to Apulia laden with booty, but without gaining any adherents from the mountain tribes. Here he formed an entrenched camp at Gerunium, not far from Luceria, and prepared to winter. His soldiers were scattered in detachments, ravaging the country, and bringing in stores, when M. Minucius Felix, who, as master of the horse, commanded in the dictator's absence, deemed the opportunity favourable for bolder tactics. Forming a camp near that of the enemy, he intercepted their supplies, and engaged in some successful skirmishes even with Hannibal himself. The popular party in Rome, uniting with the proprietors who had suffered by Hannibal's ravages, now broke out into complaints against the inaction of Fabius; and Minucius was associated with him in the dictatorship. If Fabius had really carried caution to excess—as seems to have been the fact—Minucius soon proved how much easier it was to fall into the opposite error; and the succour of his aged colleague alone saved him from destruction in a battle he had imprudently risked. It is quite true that Rome owed her salvation rather to the firmness with which her confederacy was now consolidated, than to the delays of Fabius; but every lost battle provoked the danger of a revolution.

Even the failure of Minucius did not remove the impatience of


* One is reminded of the ingenious trick of the great Lord Dundonald, who escaped from an enemy of overwhelming force by setting a light afloat, while he bore up on another tack.

the Fabian tactics felt now by the Senate as well as the people. The former decided to raise an army such as the republic had never possessed before; the latter resolved to place a man of their own at its head. Eight legions were levied, each exceeding the usual strength by one-fifth, with a proportionate increase in the auxiliaries, besides another legion, which was sent to operate in Cisalpine Gaul, in the hope of withdrawing the Celts from Hannibal to defend their homes. The Senate would have nominated a dictator; but the unpopularity of Fabius had extended to his office; and all the efforts of the aristocratic party could only carry one of their candidates for the consulship, L. Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Demetrius of Pharos, whose military experience, it was vainly hoped, would be a check upon the incapacity of his popular colleague, the coarse and insolent demagogue C. Terentius Varro, the same who had moved the association of Minucius with Fabius in the dictatorship. The disappointment of that hope in the ensuing campaign is one of the most memorable events in the history of the world. •

Hannibal opened his third campaign late in the spring of B.C. 216 by marching from Gerunium in search of supplies, across the river Aufidus (*Ofanto*), into the plain of Canusium (*Canosa*). Below this city, at a little distance from the right bank of the river, the Romans had established great magazines in the citadel of Cannæ, hitherto, as Florus calls it, “an obscure Apulian town”; and the late consuls, who had wintered with the army since Fabius had laid down his office, were unable to save this important post. Hannibal established himself in a camp on the right bank of the Aufidus, resting upon Cannæ, while the new consuls, who had marched into Apulia, with the purpose of satisfying the universal feeling at Rome, and finishing the war by a decisive battle, encamped about five miles above him. Their army amounted to 80,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, half of the former and two-thirds of the latter being Romans. Hannibal’s infantry were only 40,000, but he had 10,000 cavalry, whose quality vastly increased their superiority to the Roman horse. For this force nothing could be more favourable than the level plain of Apulia; and a battle alone could extricate Hannibal from the danger of having his supplies cut off by an enemy nearly twice his strength, and possessed of Luceria and other fortresses. The same consideration allowed the consuls to choose their own time and opportunity; and Æmilius took all his measures to check the foraging along both banks of the river, and force Hannibal to come out and attack him

on his own ground. Urged by Varro to approach nearer to the enemy, he constructed two camps, the larger on the right bank, above the Punic position, the smaller nearly opposite it on the left bank, about a mile both from it and the larger Roman camp. By an ancient but pernicious custom, when the consuls were together in the field, they commanded on alternate days: and when the turn came to Varro, he resolved to attack at any hazard.

The difficulties which have been felt respecting the scene of the battle, involving even an uncertainty on which bank of the river it was fought, seem to have been cleared up by the researches of Swinburne upon the spot.* The sites of Canusium and Cannæ are close to the right bank, on the spurs of a range of hills which leave a level space of only about half a mile in breadth; but on



- A First Camp of the Romans
- B The Lesser Camp
- C The Smaller Camp
- D Camp of Hannibal
- E Scene of the Battle
- F Citadel of Cannæ
- G Canusium
- H Bridge of Canusium
- K The Outlet

PLAN OF CANNÆ.

the left bank, a flat peninsula is enclosed by a great bend of the river. This plain seems to have been selected by Varro as a fit spot to receive the attack of Hannibal, or else to cross the river and storm the Punic camp, which lay directly opposite. At the dawn of a summer's day,† the consuls marched out of the greater camp, leaving there 10,000 men to fall upon the rear of the Carthaginians, and secure the victory already deemed certain. They crossed the river, and formed a junction with the division in the lesser camp. The united army was then drawn up on the level peninsula with its right resting on the river, and its left reaching

* Swinburne's *Travels*, vol. i. pp. 167—172.

† Nonnally, the 2nd of August; but, as the Roman calendar was already in confusion, from causes which have been explained, the true date appears to have been in June.

out into the plain beyond. A better position could hardly have been chosen to suit Hannibal's inferiority in infantry, and to give his cavalry free scope for action; and the error was made worse by crowding together the legions, which were commanded by the proconsul Servilius, in files unusually deep. The cavalry held their accustomed position on the two wings; the right being assigned to Æmilius, with the Roman horse; while Varro, with the stronger cavalry of the allies, took his post upon the left, apparently with the hope of encountering Hannibal in person. The Carthaginian, who had likewise crossed the river, placed his heavy horse under Hasdrubal on the left, with the design of crushing the weaker cavalry of the enemy, and his Numidians on the right. Between them were ranged the infantry, in a convex crescent; the Libyans—who had now for the first time to try the Roman tactics they had learnt—being drawn back on the wings, and the Celtic and Iberian troops pushed forward to bear the brunt of the fight. The battle began almost simultaneously along the whole line. On the Roman left, the allied cavalry beat off the repeated charges of the Numidians: in the centre, the legions routed the Iberians and Gauls; but the Roman cavalry on the right, against whom the chief attack of Hannibal was directed, gave way before the Carthaginian heavy horse, and were cut down, or driven back across the river, or scattered over the plain. With a scanty remnant, himself already wounded, Æmilius flew to the support of the infantry, who were following up their advantage in the centre. But as the dense column penetrated the enemy's line, the Libyan infantry, who had as yet been scarcely engaged, wheeled round, and attacked them on both flanks with their own weapons. Meanwhile Hasdrubal, passing with his victorious squadrons behind the mass of the combatants on foot, broke the horse of Varro, already hard pressed by the Numidian cavalry. Then leaving the latter to pursue the fugitives, he charged upon the rear of the crowded Roman infantry. Flight was impossible and resistance vain. No quarter was given; and the history of war scarcely affords an example of so complete a massacre. Seventy thousand men were left dead upon the field, including two-thirds of the chief officers, eighty Romans of senatorial rank, the proconsul Servilius, and, above all, the consul Æmilius Paulus, who had already sacrificed more than life itself to the duty of obeying his headstrong colleague. A few resolute men vindicated the might of the Roman legions, as at the Trebia and the Trasimene lake, by cutting their way through the field,

and recrossing the river to Canusium. The 10,000 who had been left in the larger camp to reap the expected victory, were carried away captives like the gleanings of the slaughter. Hannibal's loss of 6000 men fell, as usual, chiefly upon the Gauls.

The consul Varro, escaping to Venusia by the speed of his horse, with only about seventy horsemen, survived to prove how constancy can retrieve disgrace and atone for error.* He repaired to the post of duty at Canusium, where the relics of the army had been rallied by the military tribunes, Appius Claudius Pulcher and P. Cornelius Scipio, and the latter had for the second time given promise of his high destiny to save the state, by preventing the young nobles in the camp from leaving Italy in despair. By great exertions, two legions were gathered at Canusium. As usual with the survivors of a disgraceful rout, they were condemned to serve in disgrace and without pay. The prætor, M. Claudius Marcellus, the slayer of the Gallic king Viridumarus, postponed his brilliant career in Sicily to take command of this army and to inflict the first great blow on Hannibal, and Varro was recalled to Rome. His reception there forms one of the most striking examples of the heroic endurance and dignified forbearance of the old Roman character. Its true meaning has been well set forth by Mommsen :—“ The headlong fall of the Roman power was owing, not to the fault of Fabius or Varro, but to the distrust between the governors and the governed,—to the variance between the Senate and the citizens. If the deliverance and revival of the state were still possible, the work had to begin with the re-establishment of unity and of confidence at home. To have perceived this, and, what is of more importance, to have done it, and done it with an abstinence from all recriminations, however justly provoked, constitutes the glorious and imperishable honour of the Roman Senate. When Varro—alone of all the generals who had commanded in the battle—returned to Rome, and the Roman senators met him at the gate, and thanked him that he had not despaired of the salvation of his country, this was no empty phraseology concealing under sounding words their real vexation, nor was it bitter mockery over a poor wretch; it was the conclusion of peace between the government and the

* It is passing strange to find even Christian writers sneering at defeated generals for consenting to survive their disgrace. Apart from all moral and religious arguments, there is profound wisdom in the saying of the greatest and perhaps the least pitied victim of these cruel taunts, that the man who lays despairing hands upon himself wilfully renounces the chances of the future.

governed." The continued employment of Varro in posts of trust during the remainder of the war was a proof of the sincerity of the salutation.

Meanwhile the Senate and people needed all the fortitude that the Romans ever boasted. The disaster of Cannæ proved the signal for that revolt of the allies which Hannibal had so long expected; and nearly all the peoples of Lower Italy rose against Rome. Capua, the greatest city of Southern Italy, opened her gates to Hannibal; but the aristocratic party, true to its old connection with Rome, forced him to measures more befitting a conqueror than a liberator. One of the leading citizens was carried off prisoner to Carthage for his advocacy of the Roman alliance. The Greek cities of the coast, the ancient enemies of Carthage, and now held by Roman garrisons, showed no disposition to revolt; but Croton and Locri were compelled to surrender to the united attacks of the Carthaginians and Bruttians. The fortresses in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium still gave the Romans a hold upon the revolted districts, and the Latinized communities of Central Italy proved how closely they were bound to Rome. This state of things vindicates the political wisdom of what has often been deemed Hannibal's military error in not advancing to Rome immediately after the battle of Cannæ. Besides, he had other combinations to perfect before he was prepared to strike the decisive blow. He had to keep his eye upon the East, the South, the West,—Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and Spain. The news of the battle of Cannæ decided the youthful Philip V. of Macedon to listen to the proposals of Demetrius of Pharos, and promise the Carthaginians that aid in Italy, which, if rendered a little sooner, must have crushed Rome between her enemies advancing from the East and West. In Sicily, the death of Hiero changed a steadfast ally into a fresh enemy of Rome, and endangered the position of the Roman fleet at Lilybæum. At Carthage, the news of the victory gave a complete triumph to the Barcine party. Some aid had indeed been rendered by naval operations on the coasts of Italy, and by the presence of a squadron at the Ægates, watching the Romans at Lilybæum and guarding against a descent on Africa; but the influence of the peace party had kept back the reinforcements and money of which Hannibal was now in urgent need. The Senate no longer hesitated to replenish his military chest, and to send him new forces, including 4000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants.

Such aid was the more necessary as the operations of the

Romans in Spain had endangered Hannibal's chief base. Cneius Scipio, sent as we have seen by his brother Publius to Spain with the bulk of the consular army, had defeated Hanno both by land and sea, and made himself master of most of the country from the Pyrenees to the Ebro (B.C. 218). Publius himself had followed with an army of 8000 men, his *imperium* being prolonged at the expiration of his consulship (B.C. 217). The brothers had carried the war beyond the Ebro, and inflicted a severe defeat on Hasdrubal, when he attempted to cross the river and carry reinforcements to Hannibal, about the time of the battle of Cannæ. The Celtiberians, the most powerful tribe in Central Spain, had declared in favour of the Romans; and, while the Scipios held the sea and the Pyrenees, their allies of Massilia commanded the way round the Gallie coast.

These events in Spain were of vital consequence to the ultimate issue of the war; but as yet their influence was remote, and Rome seemed likely to be crushed in the meantime. The disaster of Cannæ did not stand alone. The effort to make a diversion in Gaul had completely failed, and the legion sent into that country had perished in an ambush, with its general Postumus, the consul-elect. From the valley of the Po to the plains of Sicily, the empire of Rome seemed escaping from her grasp. It was then that the wondrous tenacity of an ancient aristocracy proved its power to become the nucleus of hope and effort; and the people, who had so lately shouted for Flaminius and Varro, looked up again to the aged senators like Fabius. The families which had lost relatives in the fight—and scarcely one in Rome had not—submitted to the limitation of their mourning to thirty days, that the rites of the gods of joy might not be interrupted at the vintage-season. Every nerve was strained to raise another army. To exclude all appearance of negotiation, the Senate not only declined the offer of Hannibal to admit his prisoners to ransom, but his envoy was not admitted within the city. All the men of military age were called out; the serfs of their creditors, and even the prisoners for crime, were armed; and 8000 slaves were purchased by the state, and enrolled as soldiers. The whole city resounded with the manufacture of new arms; and to supply the present want, the spoils were taken down from the temples. The Latin cities were summoned to bring out their whole force; but the Senate, as the guardian of Rome's honour as well as safety, refused to compromise its dignity by supplying the places of its lost members from the Latin nobles; and the frightful gaps made

at Cannæ were filled up, by Roman citizens. Such was the attitude in which Rome awaited the advance of Hannibal; while the two legions rallied from the wreck of Cannæ kept the field under a general who knew how to venture beyond the cautious delays of Fabius, without the rashness of a Flaminius or Varro,—Marcus Claudius Marcellus.

It was this revival of Roman energy, far more than the enervating influence of Capua on the Carthaginians, that made the winter of B.C. 216—5 the turning point of the Second Punic War. No contrast is more striking than that between the position of Carthage and of Rome towards a victorious invader; and if the Carthaginians, though at once shut up within their walls, had been able to repulse Agathocles and Regulus, Hannibal had the example of Pyrrhus before him to prove the folly of a sudden advance upon Rome through a hostile country. His very success in breaking up the Italian confederacy in the south, while the centre remained faithful to Rome, gave him interests to defend, a frontier to protect, and fortresses to take or mask, while the obstinate resistance, not only of the Greek cities, but of isolated towns, like Potentia among the Bruttii, taught him how far he was from being master even of his own half of Italy. His new allies were not yet the Sabelians who had shaken the power of Rome to its foundations. Unused to war, except as they furnished contingents to the Roman armies; kept down by the Roman fortresses, but prosperous under the Roman government; they had lost both national animosity and military ardour. The Punic general had still to depend mainly on his own army of about 40,000 men, a force far too small to hold his new acquisitions and to begin a vigorous attack on Roman Italy.

His military genius at once seized on the first step to be taken, the securing a strategic capital for his half of the peninsula, in a city only second to Rome itself; and, if possible, the obtaining of a port in Campania, to communicate with Carthage. So he hastened from the field of Cannæ to Capua, without even waiting to storm the camp at Canusium, and was received at that city with open gates, though not without conditions which proved that the Capuans had no intention of investing him with a military tyranny such as Pyrrhus had exercised over Tarentum, for he was not to call the citizens to arms without their consent. More than this, his designs upon the Campanian ports were frustrated by the energy of the commander who now handled the small Roman army. Marcellus at once proved his qualities as a captain by

breaking up from the camp at Canusium, and following Hannibal to Teanum Sidicinum, in Northern Campania, where he was joined by reinforcements hastily sent from Rome, while the dictator, M. Junius Pera, followed with the newly raised levies. Marcellus was thus separated from Hannibal by the Volturnus; but it was not his object to remain on the defensive. Advancing to Casilinum, and learning that Capua had already fallen, he threw a garrison into Neapolis, which, with the other great port of Cumæ and the hill fortress of Nuceria, had remained faithful to the Romans; and then, keeping along the heights to avoid the superior forces of the enemy, he hastened to Nola, where the two parties were still debating on resistance or surrender. He not only secured the fortress, but repulsed an attack made by Hannibal in person, an omen of a greater success which was soon to follow. After this the Punic army went into winter quarters at Capua, the most luxurious city of Italy, after three years of incessant exposure in the field. Such a scene of repose after such exertions could not but be most injurious to discipline; but its effects have been enormously exaggerated by the rhetorical historians who wished to give at once an easy and striking account of Hannibal's subsequent reverses. The ensuing campaign proves that his army had lost little of its efficiency.

Nor was the capacity of Hannibal overclouded by the novelty of his position, any more than he was dazzled by success. His genius, like Napoleon's in the campaign of 1814, shone with its greatest brilliancy in the defensive war to which the Romans had at last found the means of reducing him; but his temper began to show symptoms of yielding to the pressure of anxiety. He opened the new season by reducing some of the Campanian towns which had hitherto resisted him, and treated their senates with a severity not likely to aid his cause. Meanwhile, three Roman armies took the field, under the two consuls—Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who had been master of the horse in the preceding year, and the veteran Q. Fabius Maximus—and under M. Claudius Marcellus as proconsul, with the design of enclosing Hannibal. Fabius watched the right bank of the Volturnus; Marcellus occupied his old ground on the hills about Nola; and Gracchus, establishing himself on the coast, protected Cumæ from an attack of the Campanians, and repulsed a renewed attempt upon the town by Hannibal himself. A fourth army was posted at Luceria, under the prætor M. Valerius, at once to watch for any attempt from Macedonia upon the eastern coast, and to co-operate

with Marcellus in chastising the revolted Samnites and Lucanians, whose complaints began to make Hannibal uneasy. To restore his communications with Apulia, he made a vehement attack on Marcellus, under the walls of Nola. The victory of the proconsul, following on his previous repulse of Hannibal from the same place, inflicted the first great blow on the prestige of Carthaginian invincibility. Hannibal was obliged to pass on into Apulia, whither he was closely followed by Marcellus.

All hopes of resuming his career of victory now depended upon reinforcements from Carthage and Spain; from Macedonia and Syracuse; and the interest of the war is for a time transferred to those countries. Had the impulse given by the news of Cannæ continued to work at Carthage, her resources would have sufficed for all the wants of Hannibal; but after the safe transport of 4000 Africans to Locri had proved that the way was open for the admission of any number of troops into Italy, the peace party regained its ascendancy in the Punic Senate, and Hannibal was mocked with the reply to his prayers for help, that his victories rendered it superfluous. Of Macedonia, which will claim attention at a later period, it is enough now to say that Philip's courage failed him, and he did only just enough to draw upon himself an offensive war. With equal vigour the Romans turned upon the Carthaginians in Spain and their new allies at Syracuse, effectually intercepting aid from those quarters, as will presently be related. Thus Hannibal was again left to his own resources. His head-quarters were at Arpi in Apulia, where he was confronted by Græchus, now proconsul, while Marcellus and Fabius Maximus, who had been again elected to the consulship, still held Campania, and were preparing to recover Capua. Hastening to Campania, Hannibal arrived in time to protect the capital, but he was unable to save Casilinum. Tiberius Græchus had successful encounters with the second Carthaginian army of Hanno, which held the country of the Bruttii; and in one of these near Beneventum he gave an earnest of his family's championship of liberty, by conferring freedom and the Roman franchise on the slaves who had mainly contributed to win the battle.

Meanwhile both parties were anxiously watching the movements in Sicily and Macedonia. All the ports of Bruttii were in Hannibal's possession, with the important exception of Rhegium. Established firmly in that fortress and in Messina, the Romans preserved the link between Italy and Sicily, and they had reinforced Tarentum and Brundisium in view of the expected attempt

from Macedonia. For the like reason, it became of vital consequence to Hannibal to obtain one of these ports. Foiled in an attack upon Tarentum (B.C. 214), he remained in its neighbourhood the whole of the following year, carrying on an irregular defensive warfare, and more and more losing his hold upon the Italians (B.C. 213). The resistance of Tarentum was at length overcome, not by the force of the Punic arms, but by the foolish passion of the authorities at Rome. The intrigues of Hannibal's agents were successful with the hostages who had been taken for the fidelity of the Greek cities, and those of Tarentum and Thurii attempted to escape. They were recaptured and put to death. The exasperated Tarentines formed a plot, which the negligence of the Roman governor gave them the opportunity to carry out. Hannibal was admitted into Tarentum: the citadel alone was saved, and the necessity of reinforcing its garrison entailed the loss of Metapontum, while Thurii and Heraclea followed the example of Tarentum (B.C. 212). Fortunately for the Romans, their decisive victory in Sicily enabled them to take new measures to prevent the Macedonian king from using the door thus opened into Italy; and the calamity which at the same time befel them in Spain was too remote to be at all of equal consequence. It is time to cast a look at the great events which had meanwhile occurred on those secondary theatres of the war.

SPAIN, as we have seen, had been entered by a Roman army shortly after Hannibal had left it, and it is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of Scipio's decision, not to withdraw for the defence of Italy the army destined to attack Hannibal's real base. We have seen how he followed his brother Cneius into Spain, and how the country within the Ebro was overrun, and the passes of the Pyrenees secured; how successes were gained beyond that river, and Hasdrubal himself defeated in the attempt to lead to Italy the succours so much needed by his brother. It is important to understand the relations of the natives to the combatants, and this first, of the many occasions on which Spain has been the theatre of the conflicts of mighty nations for empire, presents an opportunity for fixing the place of the peninsula in the history of the world. The character of the Spaniards has exhibited in every age a remarkable assemblage of qualities corresponding to the mixture of its population. The position of the peninsula has laid it open to the influx of various races, who entered partly across the chain of the Pyrenees, by which it is almost severed from Europe; partly across the narrow straits, which rather link than separate it

from Africa; and partly by way of the Mediterranean and the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic group. No distinct traces, however, are left of any peopling of the peninsula by way of the sea, as distinct from that by the Straits, and the Iberian population of the islands seems to have spread from, rather than to, the mainland. With regard to the other routes, ethnographers have frequently been misled by the common tendency to regard water as making a more decided severance than mountains between nations, especially when they belong to what it has pleased the formal geographers to call different quarters of the world.* From this point of view, it has been usual to assume that the Iberians—the most characteristic element of the Spanish population, and those from whom the country derived its Greek name of *Iberia* †—were also the aborigines, and that the Celts—who are found mingled with them—were later immigrants from beyond the Alps. But, as Niebuhr perceived, with his usual sagacity, the opposite was in all probability the actual process. In all ages of recorded history, Spain has proved practically more accessible by the Straits than by the Pyrenees. It is a most significant fact that the Vandals, who at first poured down upon the Roman Empire from the North, nevertheless entered Spain from the South, and the course both of that and the Moorish invasion guides us to the movements that preceded the historic age. As from the period when the compact civilization of the province—almost more Roman than Italy itself—was no longer able to resist the barbarian deluge, so probably before the first beginnings of civilization opposite waves encountered one another as they swept from north to south over the surface of the peninsula. The parallel seems to hold good, even with respect to the general dividing line between the two floods of population. The *Sierra*

* Another example of the working of this fallacy is seen in the common notion that Egypt belongs to Africa rather than Asia. In the outset of our work we insisted on the merely formal and therefore misleading nature of the division of the great tripartite continent of the eastern hemisphere. In the light of physical geography, it is much more natural to see in the basin of the Mediterranean one principal division, lying between the Alps and their eastern prolongations on the north, and the Atlas and Desert on the south.

† The Greeks also called it (like Italy) by the name of *Hesperia* (the land of the Evening Star), a specific application of their generic poetical name for the west of Europe. The Roman *Hispania*, the native *España*, and our *Spain*—properly *Span*, or *Sapan*—is supposed by some to be of Punic, by others of Iberian derivation. W. von Humboldt connects it with the Basque *españa*, a border, or edge, as the margin of Europe towards the ocean. His work entitled *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens*, Berlin, 1821, is an invaluable authority.

Morena, which so long separated the Moors of Andalusia from the Goths of the rest of the peninsula, appears also to have been the great boundary between the Iberians and the Celts. But in the one case, as in the other, the stronger intrusive races of the south pressed beyond the boundary, and formed the great nation of the Celtiberians, between the Sierra Morena and the Ebro, while the pure Celts—as has been their fate in other lands—were pressed back into the mountains and corners of the peninsula,—the hills of Cantabria on the north, the highlands about the upper courses of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Minho, and the peninsula of the Algarves in the south of Portugal, which retained the name of Celticé.

It is, of course, not safe to lay too much stress on the mere names applied to countries, and that after the completion of the changes of which the cause is to be sought; but Herodotus's use of the name *Celticé*, not only for the whole west of Europe, but specifically for Spain, is a strong argument for the view, that the original Celtic population of Gaul extended also beyond the Pyrenees. Whether the Celts there displaced an older aboriginal race is a question as to which we have no evidence; but various indications tend to prove that they were in their turn displaced by the Iberians, and did not force in themselves among them. The positions they occupied in historic times were those of a conquered, not a conquering race; while the Iberians, so far from retiring before the Celts, were able to intrude upon the latter in their own Gallic country, where they formed the chief element in the population of Aquitania and Languedoc.

It must not be forgotten that under the generic name of Iberians the ancient writers include many tribes differing very conspicuously from each other. The Turduli and Turdetani of Andalusia probably received a large portion of Phœnician blood: the Celtiberians of the centre attest by their very name the admixture of a Celtic element, though the Iberian predominated: it was in the great valley of the Ebro and between that river and the Pyrenees that the pure Iberians had their principal seat in historic times;*

* The *Iberi* are the people about the *Iberus*, just as the *Indi* (or *Sindi*) are the people about the *Indus* (or *Sind*): but the question remains, whether the people took their name from the river, or conversely. If we admit the former as the sounder view, and accept the theory of the original Celtic population of Spain, we may derive the name from the Celtic *aber*, *water*; and so add the Iberians to the long list of peoples whose appellation is to be sought in another language than their own. The resemblance of name to the Iberians of the Caucasus can only be considered accidental. The Celtic origin of the very name of the Iberians would, if established,

and hence they spread to the northern side of the Pyrenees. Strabo expressly states that the earlier Greek writers applied the name of Iberia to the whole of the great isthmus between the gulfs of Biscay and Lyons, as far east as the Rhone; and the northern limit may be fixed at the Garonne. The descendants of the ancient Iberians are still found in the *Basque* population of these regions, preserving to this day the language and character of their forefathers. The Iberian character, indeed, appears in the general type of the modern Spaniard; but the Spanish language is a mere branch of the Latin, with subordinate elements derived from the Celtic, Iberian, Gothic, and Arabic.

The Basque or Biscayan language has been investigated with great zeal by modern philologists, one of whom pronounces it equal, in the way of philological importance and interest, to any two other languages of the world.* This interest arises in great measure from the mystery that surrounds the affinities of the language, and that mystery involves the origin of the Iberian race. The isolated position of the Basque among languages is just what we might have expected from the relation of the Spanish peninsula to the mass of Europe, severed from which by a great mountain chain it juts out at the extreme west into the speechless ocean; while even within this isolated domain the ancient dialect has been submerged for two thousand years beneath the language of the Roman conquerors, and so too for fifteen hundred years in the adjoining provinces of Gaul. Corsica and Sardinia had indeed an Iberian population; but their original languages are almost entirely lost. Nor has comparative philology discovered any other family near enough to the Basque to afford a safe basis of comparison; and the language itself never attracted any considerable attention, till a knowledge of it was required by linguistic and ethnical investigations. The Biscayans themselves, like the patriotic Celtic amateurs, have studied their own language, as Dr. Latham remarks, "with more zeal than criticism." The same writer sums up the comparison of the Basque with the languages of Europe in the observation that, excluding a few words obviously of later introduction, as "spirit," "angel," and so forth, "with the Latin there is no Bask word in common: nor

go far to counterbalance the evidence for the prior antiquity of the Iberians from the prevailing names of tribes (Latham, p. 680); besides that such evidence seems as irrelevant as it would be to infer, on similar grounds, the priority of the Saxons to the Celts in England.

* Latham, *Elements of Comparative Philology*, chap. lxxx. p. 675.

yet with the Greek: nor yet with the German: nor yet with the Keltic: nor yet with the Skipitar:* there is nothing, in short, like anything in Southern, Central, or Western Europe." Only with the Finnish and the Slavonic dialects do we find some few words in common;† a basis far too narrow to support the theory built upon them, that the Iberians were the remains of an original Ugrian population, which was spread over Western Europe—like the Turanian which we have traced in Southern Asia—before the immigrations of the Celts, the Germans, the Sarmatians, and the Pelasgians from Asia. That such a race did once people the extreme west, as well as the other parts of the world beyond the range of primeval civilization, is highly probable from analogy; but we must look elsewhere for the origin of the Iberians. On the side of Africa more plausible resemblances have been traced to the Berber dialects, and still more to the Coptic.‡ Though these resemblances are still but scanty, they are the most that comparative philology can furnish; and, so far as they go, they agree with the tradition of an Asiatic population of Northern Africa; for experience shows that such a population would extend itself into Spain. At the most, the resemblance is insufficient to guide to a decision as to whether the Basque belongs to the Semitic or the Aryan family; while its grammar seems to be, rather of that agglutinative form which is characteristic of the Turanian languages. Perhaps the hypothesis most nearly accounting for the facts is that of the immigration by way of North Africa and the Straits of an oriental race whose language had not yet passed beyond the agglutinative stage. A more accurate knowledge of the languages and races of the earth may reveal resemblances yet unknown.§

* That is, the Albanian of Northern Greece, which is derived from the ancient Illyrian.

† These are so few that it may be interesting to cite them. The words signifying *God, thunder, night, and rain*, are in the Basque, *juineo, turmoi, gau,* and *uri* or *euri*, and in various Finnish or Ugrian dialects, *jen, du rnes, gi* or *ji,* and *jor*. Again the words signifying *lake, river, and ice* are in the Basque, *aintzira, erro* (?), and *lei*, and in the Slavonic, *czero, v'ka,* and *led*. Such are the scanty materials from which an hypothesis of a nation's origin has been constructed.

‡ A close likeness in such primitive words as numerals is always held to be a strong proof of the affinity of languages. There is a striking example of such a resemblance between the Basque *bat, sei, and zazpi*, and the Coptic *onot, soou, and shashp*, the respective words signifying *one, six, and seven*.

§ The following passage presents a curious proof of the great uncertainty of this problem, and indicates the wide fields which still lie open to philological and ethnical speculations:—"With the present tendency of certain opinions among the naturalists, opinions which recent speculations upon recent facts have led to favour the

It is much easier to describe the character of the ancient Iberians; for this has been perpetuated more widely than their language in the whole Spanish nation. The resemblance has been admirably traced by Dr. Arnold:—"The grave dress, the temperance and sobriety, the unyielding spirit, the extreme indolence, the perseverance in guerilla warfare, and the remarkable absence of the highest military qualities, ascribed by the Greek and Roman writers to the ancient Iberians, are all more or less characteristic of the Spaniards of modern times. The courtesy and gallantry of the Spaniard to women has also come down to him from his Iberian ancestors: in the eyes of the Greeks, it was an argument of an imperfect civilization, that among the Iberians the bridegroom gave, instead of receiving a dowry; that daughters sometimes inherited, to the exclusion of sons, and, thus becoming the heads of the family, gave portions to their brothers, that they might be provided with suitable wives. In another point, the great difference between the people of the south of Europe and those of the Teutonic stock was remarked also in Iberia: the Iberians were ignorant, but not simple-hearted; on the contrary, they were cunning and mischievous, with habits of robbery almost indomitable—fond of brigandage, though incapable of the great combinations of war."* The incapacity here referred to arose, not so much from a want of military genius, or even from that mixture of self-sufficiency and instability of which our own times have had full experience, as from the disunion of the several tribes—and not merely their disunion, but the mutual exasperation which has made them the helpless victims of foreign foes, or the still more helpless dependents of foreign friends, whom they have afterwards requited with ingratitude and hatred. It is only when driven to bay behind the walls of cities that they have shewn the matchless endurance which have made the sieges of Saguntum and Numantia, Gerona and Zaragoza, equally memorable in ancient and modern history. In Condé's "History of the Arabs," a general, in his despatch to the Caliph, says of the Spaniards, "On horseback they are eagles; in the defence of their towns, lions; but in the field they are women."

claims of the genus *homo* to a high antiquity, it is scarcely superfluous to say a little upon a question even more transcendental than the Fin hypothesis. They suggest the possibility of certain outlying members of our kind having belonged to certain continents now under water. One of these, or a part of one, was in the parts beyond Spain. If so, the Bask area may be the remains of a vast Atlantic system, of which Madeira and the Azores are fragments, belonging to the miocene period."—Latham, *Elements of Comparative Philology*, p. 688.

* Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. iii. pp. 396, 397.

Such a people counted for but little in the contest between the Carthaginians and the Romans; except to hamper the movements of both by attempts to gain their almost valueless adhesion. The result was an irregular war, the incidents of which are extremely difficult to trace. The natives were upon the whole disposed to regard the Romans as deliverers; and the genius of the two Scipios, supported by the full army who became veterans under their command, secured a decisive superiority. The city of Tarraco (*Tarragona*), with its new harbours and fortifications, formed a base between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, and went far to counterbalance the Punic possession of New Carthage (B.C. 216). In the fourth year of the war the Scipios advanced into Andalusia, and gained two brilliant victories at Illiturgi and Intibili (B.C. 215). The capture of Saguntum in the next campaign revenged the great disaster with which the war had begun, and gave the Romans a second fortress, between the Ebro and New Carthage (B.C. 214). Nor were the operations of the Scipios confined to Spain. Reversing the process by which Hannibal had attacked Italy, they prepared to attack Africa by way of Spain; and their first step was to secure an ally among the native princes. It is on this occasion that we first meet with the names of SYPHAX and MASINISSA, who bore so conspicuous a part in the last period of the war. The great nation of the Numidians, extending from the river Malva on the west to the Ampsaga on the east, was divided into the two tribes of the Massæsylii and the Massylii, the former occupying the western and larger division, which corresponded to the modern provinces of Oran and Algiers; the latter the eastern division, or the province of Constantine. Syphax was the king of the Massæsylians; the king of the Massylians was Gala, father of the more renowned Masinissa. The natural rivalry between princes ruling over two hordes of the same untamed barbarians, and each covetous of the other's dominions, made it easy for the Carthaginians and Romans to enlist them in their quarrels. Syphax was gained over to the side of the Romans, and what he might have done, had they been able to support him with an army, was shewn by the successes he achieved for a time with his own troops officered by Romans. The Libyan farmers shewed their usual readiness to desert Carthage at the first alarm of an invasion; and Hasdrubal himself was recalled from Spain to put down their disaffection, while Gala was incited to make war upon his rival. His son Masinissa now began, at the age of twenty-five, the long career which only terminated with his ninetieth

year. Marching against Syphax with an overwhelming force, he defeated him and compelled him to sue for peace, while Hasdrubal inflicted on the Libyans the wonted revenge of Carthage against her revolted subjects.

His departure had left the Scipios to become the undisputed masters of the peninsula, and to mature their schemes for carrying the war into Africa. But all was changed when Hasdrubal returned from Africa flushed with victory, followed by large reinforcements under his brother Mago* and Hasdrubal the son of Gisco. To meet their overpowering numbers, the Scipios fell back upon the natives, and took 20,000 Celtiberians into their pay. The faithlessness of these allies, combined with the fatal error of dividing their forces, proved the ruin of the Romans. Hasdrubal Barca, who was opposed to Cneius Scipio, bribed the Celtiberians to leave the Roman camp, and Scipio was forced to retreat. A far worse disaster befel the larger body of the Roman forces under Publius Scipio. Attacked by the united armies of the other Hasdrubal and Mago, he was in danger of being completely surrounded by the arrival of a body of Spanish auxiliaries. His bold resolution to break out of the net by crushing this advancing force was frustrated by the pursuit of the Numidian horse under Masinissa. While the Romans, thus cut off from their camp, and already engaged with the Iberians in front, turned to meet the charges of the light horse, time was given for the Punic infantry to come up: the Romans were overpowered by numbers, and their resistance ceased with the fall of their general, who might solace his last moments with the thought that his son had already given promise of being his avenger. Cneius Scipio, who had meanwhile retreated in good order before Hasdrubal, now found himself assailed by the three Punic armies, while the terrible Numidian cavalry cut off his communications and supplies. He took up a position on a hill, to sell his own and his soldiers' lives as dearly as possible. The only survivors of the slaughter were a small body who cut their way through the enemy under C. Marcius. They were joined beyond the Ebro by a division of the army of P. Scipio, which, left in charge of the camp, had been brought off in safety by the legate Titus Fonteius. The army thus rallied, supported by the garrisons in Hither Spain,† called C. Marcius to the command; and his experience and energy made good the

* Mago had carried the news of the battle of Cannæ to Carthage.

† This was the name always given to the division of Spain nearest to the continent, between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

line of the Ebro. But all was lost beyond that river, and few of the garrisons had time to retreat. So long, however, as the Ebro and Pyrenees were held by the Romans, the main object of the Spanish war was secured by preventing reinforcements from passing over into Italy; and the new generals whom the Carthaginian Senate had associated with Hasdrubal did their best to aid the Roman cause by their mutual dissensions. Time was thus given till the arrival of the conqueror, destined to retrieve the disaster in Spain, which was meanwhile balanced by the brilliant success of Marcellus in Sicily (B.C. 212).

Nowhere had the Romans seemed more secure at the beginning of the war. It would have been madness in the Sicilians to aid their ancient enemies, who would have become far worse masters than the Romans; and Syracuse, which alone retained its independence, was governed by Hiero, the long-tried friend of Rome. But the youthful successor of an aged sovereign is naturally tempted by mere novelty, and incited by counsellors who have long been kept in the back-ground, to try a new line of policy; and there of course survived an Anti-Roman party among the restless Syracusans. The death of Hiero took place just at the crisis when the battle of Cannæ had weakened the prestige of Rome. His son Gelo was already dead, and his grandson Hieronymus, a boy of fifteen, entered into relations with Carthage. For this cause, as well as for the tyrannical spirit which he manifested thus early, he was assassinated after a reign of only thirteen months (B.C. 215). The republic was nominally restored; but in reality the city was the prey of contending factions, among whom the captains of the foreign mercenaries held the balance. The emissaries of Hannibal, Hippocrates and Epicydes, made the most of the confusion; but the citizens had already taken alarm at the force which had been prepared to act under Marcellus against Hieronymus; and Hippocrates and Epicydes, driven from Syracuse, found refuge at Leontini. Meanwhile Marcellus, after his successes against Hannibal in Italy, had been elected to the consulship, in order to resume his interrupted expedition to Sicily (B.C. 214). His first act was to storm Leontini, and to put to death 2000 Roman deserters. Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had escaped to Herbesus, were admitted into Syracuse by their partisans. By a dexterous use of the example of Leontini, they deterred the citizens from attempting a reconciliation with Rome. The magistrates, who were in favour of peace, were put to death, and the gates were closed against Marcellus.

The consul now invested the city both by sea and land. His chief attacks were made from the sea against the quarter of Achradina; but he was opposed by a master-spirit, whose name shines among the brightest in the history of human intellect, the mathematician and natural philosopher ARCHIMEDES,—the Newton of the ancient world, as Pythagoras was its Copernicus. It is long since our attention has been claimed; amidst the contests of republics and the rise and fall of empires, by the purer triumphs gained in the field of science,—where freedom ever reigns supreme, or is only questioned, to cover those who would fetter it with speedy confusion and shame. Born about the year 287 B.C., Archimedes had reached the age of seventy-five, when he was numbered among the “Martyrs of Science.” An early residence in Egypt had made him acquainted with the science which flourished at Alexandria under the patronage of the Ptolemies and the teaching of the successors of Euclid, who died about four years after the birth of Archimedes. He was not only the greatest mathematician of the ancient world, but in pure geometry he was the greatest inventor of any age. His discoveries in the measurement of curved lines—that is, their approximate reduction to straight lines of equal length—and in relation to the surfaces and volumes of the sphere, cylinder, and cone, are astonishing triumphs of the genius that could make them without the aid of the modern analysis—an instrument which, in fact, borrows its first principles from the geometrical reasoning of Archimedes. One of the most striking proofs of his genius was given by a demonstration, that it is possible to assign a number greater than that of the grains of sand which would fill the sphere of the fixed stars. • This work,* which he addressed to Gelo, the son of Hiero, in reply to the ignorant assertion of some persons, that the sands on the sea-shore at Syracuse were infinite in number, involves the principles both of the method of logarithms and of the infinitesimal calculus. Nor was Archimedes less supreme in the province of applied mathematics. “His theory of the lever was the foundation of statics till the discovery of the composition and resolution of forces in the time of Newton, and no essential addition was made to the principles of the equilibrium of fluids and floating

* Its title is *Ὁ Ψαμμίτης*, or *Arenarius*. Another curious example of such problems is the easy demonstration that, among a certain large number of human beings—say the population of London,—there are at least two who have precisely the same number of hairs upon their heads.

bodies established by him till the publication of Stevin's researches on the pressure of fluids in A.D. 1608.* His discovery of the method of determining specific gravities by immersion in a fluid, though probably known to almost every reader, is a fact in the history of the world too important to be passed over with a mere allusion. An artist, to whom Hiero had entrusted a certain weight of gold to make a crown, was suspected of having substituted for a portion of the gold an equal weight of silver. As the latter metal is lighter than the former, the exchange would of course increase the total bulk; but how was this to be ascertained in the case of such an object as a crown, without destroying all its elaborate workmanship, and perhaps only casting shame on the suspicion? Revolving the problem incessantly in his mind, Archimedes happened to plunge into a bath which, being too full, overflowed. The solution flashed upon him, and he ran home through the streets, naked as he was, shouting out the ever-memorable "Heureka! Heureka!—I have found it out! I have found it out!"† The simple fact, that a body plunged in water displaces a portion of the fluid equal to its own bulk, for the first time suggested to the prepared mind of the philosopher the inference, that the bulk of the immersed body might be determined by measuring the displaced fluid, and then that by weighing both, in the case of any body to be experimented upon, a general standard might be fixed for all specific gravities. It was doubtless by subsequent investigation that Archimedes arrived at the more elegant method, which is demonstrated in his treatise on *Hydrostatics*, of determining the weight of the displaced water indirectly by the loss of weight which its upward pressure causes to the immersed body.

It was by such applications of science to practical affairs that Archimedes excited, in his own and succeeding ages, an admiration which naturally led to some exaggeration of the facts themselves. Thus the story, that he set fire to the Roman ships by means of the solar rays reflected to a focus from a concave system of mirrors, has always been eagerly discussed; and Buffon took the trouble to prove its possibility by igniting wood at a distance of 150 feet by means of a concave system of 148 plane mirrors. The argument of Gibbon, that such a surprising feat could hardly have been invented had it not really been performed, is more plausible than sound; for, when the experiment had once been witnessed on

* Prof. Donkin, s. v. *Archimedes*, in the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, an article to which the reader is referred for further information.

† Εὕρηκα, εὕρηκα.

a small scale, it was easy to imagine its performance on a large one. From the purely historical point of view, the question is settled by the silence of Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, who dwell with admiration on the mechanical devices by which Archimedes destroyed or counteracted all the engines of Marcellus, and compelled him to convert the siege into a blockade, after eight months of fruitless assaults. In the history of naval architecture, Archimedes was destined to a posthumous fame far surpassing that which he achieved by the immense ship he constructed for Hiero. That vessel is said to have been launched by the pressure of the screw; and the ingenious application of the same mechanical power to the raising of water, known as the "Screw of Archimedes," had been in use above 2000 years, before the simple idea of its converse application—by using a floating screw to *drive away*, instead of *dram*, the particles of water, the reaction of which would drive forward the vessel to which the screw was fixed—revolutionized the modern naval and commercial marines. Meanwhile, in the defence of Syracuse against the Romans, the genius of Archimedes anticipated the time when sieges would depend more on engineering science than on brute force.

The time thus gained enabled the Carthaginians to send a powerful army to the aid of Syracuse. Landing at Heraclea Minoa, Himilco made himself master of Agrigentum (B.C. 213). The severity of the Romans in punishing the revolt of Enna drove most of the smaller cities into the arms of Carthage. The position of Marcellus was becoming critical, when the escalade of a part of the walls, which had been left unguarded during a festival, made him master of the suburb of Epipolæ, with the quarters of Neapolis and Tyché. The Romans had thus secured a strong position within the walls, when the united armies of Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to the relief of the city. They encamped in the valley of the Anapus; and its pestilential marshes, which had more than once saved the city from a besieging army, now proved fatal to one that came to its succour. The pestilence carried off nearly all the Africans, with their general Himilco. Hippocrates, too, fell a victim, and the surviving Sicilians dispersed to their several cities. Bomilcar, who commanded the Carthaginian fleet, retreated rather than risk a battle with the Romans, who now completed the investment of the city by sea. Epicydes, in despair, made his escape to Agrigentum; and the citizens were already opening negotiations for a surrender, when the mercenaries once more murdered the magistrates. One of their captains

admitted Marcellus into the island of Ortygia, the key both to the port and city; and thereupon the citizens surrendered the remaining quarter of Achradina, relying, doubtless, on obtaining the mercy due to those who had acted under compulsion. But Marcellus preferred to indulge his soldiers after their long blockade, and to make an example to the rest of Sicily. The city was given up to pillage and massacre; and Marcellus at once embittered the humiliation of the defeat, and offended the old Roman party at home, by carrying away many of the choicest works of art. Nor could any satisfaction be obtained from the Roman Senate. Syracuse and her subject towns were reduced to the state of tributaries, and her citizens were forbidden to reside in the island of Ortygia. Archimedes was among the victims of the sack of Achradina, slain by a Roman soldier, whose questions he was too intent upon a mathematical problem to answer. Marcellus regretted his death, and honoured his remains with a stately funeral. His tomb, outside the gate of Achradina, was marked by a sphere inscribed in a cylinder, as the memorial of his most ingenious discovery; and by this token it was discovered by Cicero, overgrown with briars, when the Syracusans assured him that the monument of their most illustrious fellow-citizen no longer existed.*

Even after the loss of Syracuse, Hannibal made an effort to save Sicily by sending Mutines, an energetic leader of Numidian horse, to the support of the Carthaginian army at Agrigentum. An active guerilla warfare encouraged the smaller towns in their revolt from the Romans, and Marcellus, advancing from Syracuse to complete the conquest of the island, received a check on the river Himera. But all was undone by the jealousy of Hanno, who represented the dominant party at Carthage, towards the officer of Hannibal. By giving battle to Marcellus, in the absence of the Numidian cavalry, the Carthaginians incurred a complete defeat; and when Mutines protracted the guerilla war with signal success, Hanno deposed him from his command. Upon this Mutines opened the gates of Agrigentum to the Romans, and Hanno barely effected his escape by sea. The Punic garrison was put to the sword, the citizens were sold into slavery, and the Romans remained masters of all Sicily (B.C. 210).

Italy had meanwhile been the scene of events of the deepest interest. During the two years' indecisive war, in which Hannibal was bent on obtaining Tarentum, and the Romans on recovering

* Cicero himself relates the discovery, which took place when he was quæstor in Sicily, B.C. 75 (*Tuscul. Disput.* v. 23).

Capua, the latter acquired the fortress of Arpi in Apulia, and the submission of several towns of the Bruttians proved the weakness of Hannibal's hold on his Italian allies (B.C. 213). The capture of Tarentum enabled him to turn his attention towards Capua, now closely beset by the consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius Pulcher (B.C. 212). An eventful campaign ensued, in which the brave Tiberius Gracchus lost his life, and the brilliant successes of Hannibal were neutralized by the tenacity of the Romans. After breaking up the siege of Capua, he had spent the winter at Tarentum, the citadel of which still held out, when he was informed that Capua, invested more closely than ever by three Roman armies, was on the point of succumbing to famine (B.C. 211). Returning by forced marches into Campania, he fortified a camp at his old quarters on Mt. Tifata, overlooking the entrenchments which the Romans held stubbornly against all the assaults of the Campanian and Punic horse from within and from without.

Foiled in his attempts to bring on a decisive battle before Capua, Hannibal judged that the time had come to try an advance on Rome. With that consummate skill which governed his most audacious movements, he led his troops between the armies and fortresses of the enemy to Tibur, and thence crossing the bridge over the Anio he encamped within five miles of the city. While he laid waste the country to the very gates, and his long-dreaded presence inspired the people with the wildest alarm, the Senate set the example of confidence by offering for sale the ground on which his camp was pitched, and a purchaser was found to give its full price. In truth there was no real danger. The city was sufficiently defended by two legions, under the veteran Fabius, against the small army of Hannibal, who, in fact, did not expect to take Rome, but to draw off the pro-consular armies from Capua. Even in this he was disappointed, for the consul Fulvius alone followed him, leaving his colleague to maintain the blockade. Nor would either Fabius within the city, or Fulvius without, give him the chance of a pitched battle. He had no alternative but to retreat in the hope of saving Capua; but the retiring lion turned to crush the most adventurous of his assailants, the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, who had marched out from Rome in pursuit. Meanwhile Capua had been surrendered by those of the nobles who were left, after several had anticipated their fate by their own hands; and the city, punished with a vengeance proportioned to the harm done by its defection, was henceforth disabled from attempting a rivalry with Rome (B.C. 211).

The reduction of Capua, not by surprise or treachery, but by a two years' siege, in spite of the utmost efforts of Hannibal, was an omen of the fate of his cause among the Italians. Its effect was at once seen in their attempts to make their peace with Rome, and in the renewed confidence of the Roman government, who not only sent reinforcements to Spain, but imprudently ventured to reduce their total forces. Just when they had in Marcellus, now consul for the fourth time, a general who might have guided them on the turning tide to victory, they left him to face Hannibal with an inadequate force. His conquest of Salapia was counterbalanced by the decisive defeat of the proconsul Cn. Fulvius at Herdonia in Apulia; and, in a bloody battle of two days between Hannibal and Marcellus, each claimed the victory (B.C. 210). In the following year, while the consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus recovered several places in Lucania and Bruttium, his colleague, Q. Fabius Maximus, signalized at once his fifth consulship and the close of his long career by the recapture of Tarentum, which was surrendered by the Brutians in its garrison. The Italian Greeks were appalled by a more fearful example than that made of their brethren at Syracuse. After an indiscriminate massacre and pillage, there remained 30,000 Tarentines to be sold as slaves, and 3000 talents to be carried into the public treasury (B.C. 209). This close of the military career of the octogenarian Fabius was soon followed by the death of his more ardent rival. Elected to his fifth consulship at the age of sixty, Marcellus seemed destined to fulfil his long-cherished ambition of finishing the war. But he was surprised, with his colleague T. Quinctius Crispinus, near Venusia, by a body of Numidian horse. Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus escaped from the field only to die of his wounds. Hannibal rendered worthy honours to the remains of the ablest of his opponents (B.C. 208).

The great conflict between Rome and Carthage had now lasted full ten years; and both parties seemed ready to sink from exhaustion, unless some new events should occur to bring on a crisis. Rome, indeed, having weathered the first shock of the tempest, had by her undaunted perseverance gained more and more upon her enemy; but her finances were disorganized, her last reserve of money used up, her soldiers deep in arrears of pay; and she was almost entirely dependent on the long credit given by contractors, who cheated the state in return, and on the voluntary loans advanced by the rich, who were themselves threatened with ruin by the devastation of the country and the withdrawal of labourers and slaves from agriculture to the army. The Sabellian commu-

nities of the south, having done little harm by their defection, were now again falling off from Hannibal; but conspiracies were discovered in Etruria, and some even of the Latin states refused any longer to share the burthen of the war. Hannibal, on the other hand, was pent up in a corner of Italy, abandoned by his allies, deprived of succours by the party divisions at home, disappointed of help from Sicily and Macedonia, and doomed apparently to a like disappointment from the side of Spain through the successes of young Publius Scipio.

It was in this position of affairs that all parties were startled by the news that Hasdrubal had passed the Pyrenees, and was in full march to join his brother in Italy. His reverses in Spain had hastened his taking the very step which had been expected as the fruit of his complete establishment in that country; and we shall presently see how Scipio, in the midst of his career of victory, had failed to stop Hasdrubal's march. The winter was employed by the Romans in exertions to meet the double danger. Twenty-three legions were enrolled; exemptions from military service were annulled; and volunteers were called for. These preparations were however still incomplete, when Hasdrubal crossed the Alps at a much earlier season than Hannibal, and comparatively without difficulty, owing to the assistance purchased from the Gallie tribes. He had already been reinforced by 8000 Ligurian mercenaries, and now the Cisalpine Gauls obeyed his call to arms. The whole movement had been concerted with Hannibal, and its success depended on the junction of the two brothers, a junction which it was vital for the Romans to prevent. The consuls for the new year were C. Claudius Nero* and M. Livius Salinator. Nero, who had already been opposed, as prætor, to Hasdrubal in Spain (B.C. 212) now marched southward against Hannibal, who was advancing from the neighbourhood of Rhegium towards Apulia. A

* On the first occurrence of these names, so famous under the Republic and so infamous under the Empire, it may be well to remind the reader that, of the six Cæsars (who alone could properly be so called), all but Julius and Augustus were both *Claudii* and *Neros*, that is, of the Claudian gens and the Nero family. The fact is disguised by their being called by parts of their full names. *Tiberius* and *Caius* are common *prænomina* of the family, and the emperor who bore the latter is disguised under the nickname of *Caligula*, which is equivalent to *Little Boots*, just as if John were commonly known in English history as *Lackland*. *Claudius* bore the gentile, and *Nero* the family name. This is not the place to enter into their intricate relationships to one another and to the *Claudii Neronæ* of the republic. The reader will remember that the *Claudii* were of Sabine extraction, and in that language *Nero* is said to have signified *brave*. The *Neros* were all descended from *Tiberius Claudius Nero*, one of the four sons of the famous censor *Appius Claudius Cæcus*.

bloody conflict at Grumentum, in which Nero claimed the victory, failed to stop the progress of Hannibal, who finally halted at Canusium to await news from his brother.

The expected despatch from Hasdrubal was intercepted by Nero, who used the information with equal skill and daring. Finding that Hasdrubal appointed the rendezvous at Narnia, in Umbria, and relying on Hannibal's waiting in Apulia for the news which had thus failed him, Nero started with a picked force of 7000 men to join his colleague in the north, still leaving an army strong enough to cope with Hannibal. The consuls effected their junction at Sena Gallica (*Sinigaglia*) on the Adriatic coast, and met Hasdrubal on the banks of the Metaurus (*Metauro*). A fierce battle, in which victory long hung in suspense, was decided by a skilful movement of Nero from the right wing to the left, where Livius was hard pressed by the Spanish infantry, and Hasdrubal fell in the battle. In him and his army, Hannibal lost the only helper on whom he could confidently rely, and the only hope of a diversion or of effective succour. He was still waiting for news in his Apulian camp, when the insulting victor, returning after barely a fortnight's absence from his double march of 500 miles, flung his brother's head within the outposts. The indignation which Hannibal might have felt at such a return for the honours he had paid to the remains of *Mælius*, *Gracchus*, and *Marcellus*, was swallowed up in deeper feelings: the brother was overpowered by the patriot, as he sadly said:—"I recognize the doom of Carthage." His subsequent movements were in harmony with this gloomy confession. Abandoning Apulia and *Iuvenia*, he retired into the Bruttian peninsula, where he was driven back step by step by the disaffection of the people and the loss of the Greek cities. The possession of Rhegium, which his repeated efforts during the last two years had failed to capture, gave the Romans the command of the peninsula and the straits; and the victor of Cannæ retained nothing but a few ports from which he might re-embark for Africa. Almost any other general would have adopted this last alternative, pleading that the time had come to fly to the defence of Carthage. But Hannibal knew that a retreat to Africa was but the prelude to a blockade of Carthage; and even with the enemy in Africa, his last hope would probably still have been based on the invasion of Italy. Much less would he abandon Italy when the invasion of Africa was still remote, and while there was any hope that reverses might alarm the Carthaginian Senate into yet giving him that

support, which they in fact sent too sparingly and too late. Their apathy was, however, matched by the inactivity in which the Romans rejoiced over their victory and indulged their exhaustion.

The army was once more reduced, and a state of peace was anticipated by employing in the repayment of loans and the regulation of the disordered relations of the allies the resources and the time that ought to have been devoted to crushing Hannibal. "It forms," says Dr. Mommsen, "a brilliant proof of the strategic talent of Hannibal, as well as of the incapacity of the Roman generals now opposed to him, that after this he was still able for four years to keep the field, and that all the superiority of his opponents could not compel him either to shut himself up in fortresses or to embark."

It is time to return to Spain, the scene where the issue of the war was decided by the genius of young Publius Scipio, known in history as the elder Africanus. After the fall of the elder Publius Scipio and of his brother Cneius, the relics of their forces, rallied under C. Marcius, kept the life of the Ebro, and gave the Senate time to send thither a legion of 12,000 men, under the proprætor C. Claudius Nero, whose career in Spain gave a bright promise of his exploits in Italy. By a bold advance into Andalusia, he reduced Hasdrubal to a position in which he only avoided surrender by a gross breach of faith. But Nero had none of the political genius required to improve his military success; and he failed to obtain such a hold upon the country as might prevent the threatened expedition of Hasdrubal into Italy. In this emergency the Senate resolved to send a powerful army into Spain under a præconsul, the choice of whom was left to the popular election. But at first none was found to claim the dangerous honour. At length, when all the veteran commanders of consular and prætorian rank held back, PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO presented himself as a candidate. At the age of twenty-four* he was not yet eligible for the lowest of the curule offices, but he already filled the highest place in the favour of his fellow citizens. His exploit at the Trebia, while serving his first apprenticeship to war, had invested him with the halo of filial piety as well as heroism. Two years later, at the age of eighteen, he had filled the office of military tribune, and had saved the relics of the army of Cannæ as much by his conduct as his courage. The quality which then prevailed over the

* This is according to the account which places his birth in B.C. 234; but others make him 27 in B.C. 210.

selfish fears of the Roman nobles, and kept them to their duty, was that which forms the key to his whole brilliant life. That quality cannot be better described than in the words of Dr. Mommsen: "Publius Scipio was one who *was himself enthusiastic* and who inspired enthusiasm. He was not one of the few, who by their energy and iron will constrain the world to adopt and move in new paths for ages, or who grasp the reins of destiny for years, till its wheels roll over them. Publius Scipio gained battles and conquered countries under the instructions of the Senate; with the aid of his military laurels he took also a prominent position in Rome as a statesman; but a wide interval separates such a man from an Alexander or a Caesar. As an officer he rendered at least no greater service to his country than Marcus Marcellus; and as a politician, although not perhaps himself fully conscious of the unpatriotic and personal character of his policy, he injured his country at least as much as he benefited her by his military skill. Yet a special charm lingers around the form of that graceful hero: it is surrounded, as with a dazzling halo, by the atmosphere of serene and confident inspiration, in which Scipio, with mingled credulity and adroitness, always moved. With quite enough of enthusiasm to warm men's hearts, and enough of calculation to follow in every case the dictates of intelligence, while not leaving out of account the vulgar; not naive enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet, in secret, thoroughly persuaded that he was a man especially favoured of the gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature; raised above the people, and not less aloof from them; a man steadfast to his word and kingly in his bearing, who thought that he would humble himself by adopting the ordinary title of a king, but could never understand how the constitution of the republic should in his case be binding; so confident in his own greatness, that he knew nothing of envy or of hatred, courteously acknowledged other men's merits, and compassionately forgave other men's faults; an excellent officer, and a refined diplomatist, without presenting the offensive special stamp of either calling; uniting Hellenic culture with the fullest national feeling of a Roman; an accomplished speaker, and of graceful manners—Publius Scipio won the hearts of soldiers and of women, of his countrymen, and of the Spaniards, of his rivals in the Senate, and of his greater Carthaginian antagonist. Soon his name was on every one's lips, and his was the star which seemed destined to

bring victory and peace to his country.”* He had already been elected curule ædile in B.C. 212, though below the legal age; and, as he now presented himself to the people, in the freshness of his manly beauty, offering to pass over to the scene of his father’s and his uncle’s death, and in avenging them to save his country, he was received with an enthusiasm which communicated itself to the whole enterprise. It has, in fact, been suggested that his candidature was arranged with the Senate for the very purpose of giving popularity to the Spanish war.

Scipio arrived in Spain in the autumn of B.C. 210, with Marcus Silanus as his lieutenant: his army, united with that of Nero, numbered about 30,000 men. The fleet was commanded by his friend C. Laelius, the father of that Laelius whose devoted friendship for the younger Africanus has become so celebrated through the pen of Cicero. The Carthaginian forces in the peninsula were still under the same three generals, whose want of concert showed itself in their widely scattered positions. While Hasdrubal Barca was collecting his forces on the table-land of Castile, with a view to the passage of the Ebro and the Pyrenees, Mago was at the Straits, and Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo at the mouth of the Tagus. Scipio resolved to make an attempt upon New Carthage before either of the distant armies could come to its relief. Early in the spring of B.C. 209, his army and fleet started from Tarraco, and following the direct line along the coast, appeared before the city. Mago, a resolute commander strengthened a garrison of only 1000 Carthaginians by calling the citizens to arms, and attempted a sally, in which he was repulsed. Assailed in his turn, Mago kept the Romans at bay upon the tongue of land on the end of which the city stood. But while the attention of the garrison was thus occupied, Scipio directed his main attack from the side of the harbour, “where Neptune himself showed the way,” over a bank left dry by the ebb tide. Here the defenders had deserted the walls, to take part in the conflict on the land side: an entrance was easily effected: and Mago, seeing the city lost, surrendered the citadel. The magnificent schemes of Hannibal and his sons were annihilated in a single day by the loss of their great capital, with its ships and munitions of war, its stores of corn, and a treasure of 600 talents. Master of the persons of 10,000 captives, among whom were eighteen Carthaginian judges, Scipio rendered to the citizens their liberty on condition of obedience to

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii pp 159, 160.

Rome. The hostages of the Spanish tribes friendly to Carthage were promised liberty as soon as their people should send in their adhesion ; and in fact the fall of New Carthage was soon followed by the submission of nearly all the nations on both sides of the Ebro. To crown this brilliant success, Scipio averted, for the present, the danger he had risked for its achievement, by returning to Tarraco before Hasdrubal had time to cross the Ebro.

It seems, however, that the young general was too much dazzled by the prospect of conquering all Spain, to pay sufficient regard to the more important bearing of his operations on the war in Italy. He endangered his own communications by breaking up his fleet, in order to strengthen his army with the crews ; and he failed to prevent the departure, first of Hasdrubal and afterwards of Mago, to their brother's aid. He encountered the former at Bæcula in Andalusia ; and though Scipio claimed a hard-won victory, Hasdrubal succeeded, by the sacrifice of a portion of his army, in drawing off his best troops, with his elephants and treasure, to the north coast, whence he effected his passage into Gaul by the western passes of the Pyrenæes, to reap the fatal reward of his daring perseverance on the banks of the Metaurus. His departure left Spain an easy conquest to Scipio, though at the risk of Italy. Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago, with the aid of the light cavalry of Masinissa and of a reinforcement sent from Carthage under Hannó, kept up a desultory warfare in the interior through the campaign of B.C. 207. In the following year the Carthaginians made another of those desperate efforts by which, as we have seen in Sicily, they were in the habit of showing too late what timely exertion might have effected ; and their new army of 70,000 foot, 4000 horse, and 32 elephants, united to the forces of Hasdrubal and Mago, was totally defeated in a second battle at Bæcula, where the tactics of Scipio have been compared to those of Wellington at Salamanca. Keeping back his own Spaniards, on whom he could place no reliance, he threw the weight of his legions on the hastily raised and probably disaffected Spanish troops, who formed the bulk of the hostile army. When the battle was lost, the Spanish levies dissolved like the snow in spring ; and Hasdrubal and Mago escaped almost alone to Gades. That primeval settlement of the Phœnicians was the only spot they now held in the peninsula (B.C. 206).

This decisive victory not only left Scipio free to carry the war over into Africa, but secured him no less an auxiliary than Masinissa. Dazzled by the success of the Roman arms, and

fascinated by the personal influence of Scipio, the king of the Massylians—as he had now become by the death of his father Gala—secretly promised his aid to the Romans. The enthusiastic young victor was tempted to make a similar experiment on the rival chief of the Massæsylians. He crossed over to Africa with only two quinqueres, and spent some days at the court of Syphax, not only in the security of nomad hospitality, but in friendly intercourse with his adversary, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, who had crossed over from Gades on a like errand. The charm of Scipio's conversation proved less powerful than the beauty of Sophonisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal; and the promise of her hand determined Syphax to the side of Carthage, as its refusal was said to have been the secret cause of Masinissa's defection. The tragic end of this princess has been a favourite theme with poets and painters. Falling into the hands of Masinissa when he stormed his rival's capital, she won his heart and became his bride, but Scipio, dreading her influence over his ally, demanded her surrender as a prisoner of war, and Masinissa only saved her from the shame of being shown in the Roman triumph by sending her a bowl of poison.

The romantic excursion of Scipio to Africa had almost lost him Spain. The tribes which had reluctantly borne the Carthaginian yoke thought to expel all foreigners from their soil; and the Roman soldiers were clamorous for their pay. Scarcely had the rebellion been suppressed, and a terrible example given to the Spaniards by the sack of Illiturgi, when the illness of Scipio was seized by 8000 of his troops as the occasion for a mutiny, which his unexpected recovery enabled him promptly to suppress. The last hope of Carthage in the peninsula was at an end; and Mago, who could not long have defended Gades, was directed by the Senate to gather all the force that he had left, and to make a last effort to aid Hannibal in Italy. The sea had been laid open by Scipio's destruction of his own fleet, and the youngest son of Hamilcar sailed first to Minorea, the capital of which still bears his name, and thence in the following spring to Liguria, whose mountaineers supplied him with one more army. But his force was too weak, and Hannibal was too distant and too much reduced, for any effective operations. Beyond the sack of Genoa, all that Mago could do was to maintain a guerilla warfare for two years. At length, defeated in Cisalpine Gaul by Quintilius Varus, he embarked for Africa, but died of his wounds on the voyage, in the year before his brother's overthrow at Zama (B.C. 203).

The departure of Mago severed the last hold of Carthage upon Spain;* and Scipio so well knew how to improve his victory by his personal influence, that the natives, charmed by his generosity, humanity, and regal courtesy, would willingly have chosen him for their king. But, however eager to bend the state to his own will, Scipio was too sincere a patriot to gratify his ambition at its expense. That ambition had the one aim of finishing the war, and to this end Scipio resolved to take for his base not Spain alone, but the whole resources of the Roman empire. He returned to Italy, and offered himself as a candidate for the consulship. In spite of his being still far within the legal age, and his not having served the prætorship, he was elected by the unanimous vote of the centuries: and his sole conduct of the war was ensured by giving him for colleague the chief pontiff, P. Licinius Crassus, whose office forbade his leaving Italy. But still his object was not yet gained. The old Roman party in the Senate, headed by the venerable Fabius Maximus, were opposed to the African campaign, and adhering to the "safer policy"—always so dear to cautious mediocrity—would have been content with driving Hannibal out of Italy. Other feelings were mingled with this hesitation. It was not in human nature for the ancient senators to view without jealousy the unprecedented popularity of one who, besides being young, was imbued with the Greek learning which they distrusted and disliked. Nor does his military career seem to have inspired them with full confidence. His affable spirit was too closely allied to a laxity which allowed dangerous licence to his subordinates: and, in his eagerness to conquer Spain, he had risked a second conflagration in Italy. On the other hand, the occasion itself and the unanimous voice of the people had united to declare that the war must be finished in Africa, and that Scipio was the man to finish it. So the Senate temporized. Sicily was assigned to Scipio for his province, where he was to build a fleet and make all other preparations for passing over to Africa in the following year. The Senate withheld from the consul the usual power of making a new levy, on the pretext that his real province was sufficiently defended by the two legions

* As early as the following year (B.C. 205) the two great divisions of the peninsula made by the Ebro were constituted into the Roman provinces of *Nither* and *Further Spain* (*Hesperia Citerior* and *Hesperia Ulterior*). In the division of the provinces by Augustus, the former was known by the name of *Tarracensis*, from its capital Tarraco, and the latter was subdivided into *Bætica* (the region of the Bætis, *Guadalquivir*) and *Lusitania*, divisions which correspond roughly to *Andalusia* and *Portugal*.

already in the island; and even these were still under a stigma, for they were the relics of the army of Cannæ. The permission to enrol volunteers throughout Italy was perhaps designed as a means of ridding the land of a class whom it was difficult to bring back to order. "The African army," says Mommsen, "was, in the view of the majority of the Senate, a forlorn hope of disrated companies and volunteers, the loss of whom, in any event, the state needed not greatly to regret." The one opening left in this fence of jealousy was enough for Scipio, and the volunteer spirit of Italy rose at the call, as in the crisis of the First Punic War. Money was raised for the fleet by contributions levied on certain disaffected cities of Etruria, and on the states of Sicily; and forty days sufficed for its equipment. The recruits who flocked in from all parts of Italy were already for the most part experienced in war. The winter sufficed for all needful preparations, and at the beginning of B.C. 204, the expedition was ready to sail for Africa. At this very juncture, the only hope remaining to the Carthaginians of succour from without was cut off by the peace which was made between the Romans and Philip of Macedonia (B.C. 205).

Meanwhile Scipio had almost afforded his enemies a triumph. On his way to Sicily he had stayed to complete the reduction of Locri. This interference in a province not his own was followed by gross misconduct on the part of the officer whom he left in command there; and the citizens carried their complaints to Rome. Nor was the Senate less offended at the rumours of Scipio's almost regal style of living in Sicily, where he was said to be spending his time in the Greek gymnasia, and with the Greek artists and men of letters. A commission of inquiry was sent to Sicily; but when they saw the real state of his preparations, they flung away all distrust, and bade him in the name of the Senate to cross over into Africa.

On the side of the Carthaginians, Hannibal was still pent up in the Bruttian peninsula, unwilling to let go his last hold of Italy: Mago, in Liguria and Gaul, was too far off to influence the course of events. The defence of Africa depended on itself. The Carthaginians had obtained a powerful ally in Syphax, who had overrun the territories of Masinissa, and driven him as a fugitive to the borders of the desert. The force at Carthage itself consisted of 20,000 foot, 6000 horse, and 140 elephants, with a strong fleet in the harbour. No attempt was made to oppose the passage of Scipio, who landed in the spring of B.C.

204, at the Fair Promontory,* north of Utica. He was at once joined by Masinissa, bringing indeed no army, but a spirit and experience which were invaluable. The Libyans waited the first events of the campaign before taking a part. The Punic force proved unable to resist the Romans in the field, and after some successful cavalry skirmishes, Scipio advanced to the siege of Utica. But the approach of a great Numidian army under Syphax compelled him to retreat to a fortified camp on a promontory south of the Bagradas, where he spent the winter. This "Cornelian Camp" was Scipio's Torres Vedras.†

The spring of B.C. 203 found the proconsul in a most critical position, between the armies of Syphax and the Carthaginians; but he extricated himself in a manner equally unscrupulous and daring. Having thrown the enemy off their guard by pretending a wish to capitulate, he surprised the camp of the Numidians, whose reed huts were speedily in a blaze; and when the Carthaginians hastened to render aid, their camp was surprised in turn. Both armies fled in panic, suffering a terrible loss in the pursuit. Syphax retreated to his capital of Cirta, the almost impregnable strength of which has failed again and again in ancient and modern war. It now yielded to the assault of Lælius and Masinissa, giving Syphax as a prisoner to the Romans, and Sophonisba to the fate which has been related; while Masinissa, consoled for her loss by the kingdom of his rival, brought the united force of the Numidians to the aid of Rome.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, having been reinforced by a corps of 4000 Macedonians under Sopater, and by a body of Celtiberian mercenaries from Spain, had risked and lost a pitched battle in the plain of the Bagradas near Utica, and had gained little by a partially successful attack of their fleet on Scipio's naval camp. Once more, as in the times of Agathocles and Regulus, they were shut up within the city, and it was only the resolution of the popular party that averted the conclusion of a peace. Hannibal and Mago were recalled from Italy. The latter, as we have seen, died upon his voyage. The former, who had only been awaiting in his head-quarters at Croton the result of renewed negotiations with Philip, hastened to embark on the transports he had kept ready, and arrived safely at Leptis Parva towards the close of the year B.C. 203.

* *Pulchrum Promontorium*, probably the modern *Ras Sidr*, *Pou Shusha*, or *C. Zibebh*. (See the map on p. 359.)

† The spot retained the name of *Castra Cornelia*. It is the modern *Ghella*.

Rome was glad when he departed. For fifteen years his presence in Italy had been an incubus: for ten of those fifteen a pressing terror. The Romans computed their losses in the field at 300,000 men. Their best and bravest generals, the Scipios, Paulus, Gracchus, Marcellus, had yielded up their lives on the fields where many more had left their reputation. One man alone, of all who commanded in the beginning of the war, had come to its end with life and honour both preserved; and in his person the Romans decorated the whole state with the simple trophy of its deliverance. Of all the crowns which formed the rewards of distinguished valour, the most honourable was not the triumphal laurel of the victorious general;—not the chaplets of golden palisades, or golden turrets, or golden beaks of ships, won by the soldier who first broke into an enemy's entrenchment, or scaled the wall of a fortress, or boarded a hostile vessel;—not even the civic crown of oak leaves, the price of the precious life of a Roman citizen. Above all these in rank was the Wreath of the Blockade,* which was presented by a late-beleaguered army to the general who had broken up the siege, made of grass gathered on the spot where they had been shut up. And now, at the age of ninety, Quintus Fabius Maximus was crowned with a chaplet of the grass of Italy, as the man who had first shown how to sustain the siege of the whole country, and had lived to see it broken up; while the youngest consul Rome had ever seen was gathering in Africa the laurels which were to crown the final triumph.

The arrival of Hannibal on the coast placed the popular party at Carthage in the ascendant, and they forced a rupture of the negotiations by plundering a Roman transport fleet, and capturing a Roman envoy. Scipio avenged the outrage by devastating the valley of the Bagradas, and selling into slavery the inhabitants, to whom he had previously offered a free capitulation. Meanwhile Hannibal advanced inland from Hadrumetum on the east coast towards the upper Bagradas, where the rival generals met in the neighbourhood of Sicea Venerca (*Al-Kaff*). A personal conference ensued. Both leaders are said to have been anxious for peace, Hannibal from the conviction of its necessity, Scipio from the fear of being superseded. But we can hardly believe that either would have been content to forego the decisive conflict, and the overtures of Hannibal may have been intended to forestall the accusations of the peace party at Carthage. He was unable to obtain any better terms than these Scipio had already offered,

the cession to Rome of Spain and the Mediterranean islands, the confirmation of Masinissa in the late kingdom of Syphax, the surrender of the Carthaginian fleet, except 20 ships, and the payment of 4000 talents for the expenses of the war,—in short, the reduction of Carthage to the rank of the chief city of Africa Proper, amidst doubtful allies and disaffected subjects, stripped of all imperial and maritime power, and with Masinissa planted as a thorn in her side.

Such terms could only be accepted as the result of a crushing defeat; and the Waterloo of ancient history was fought at ZAMA, in the plain of the Upper Bagradas, on the confines of Zengitana and Byzacium.* In no great battle was there ever less of accident; in none did the issue depend more on the skill of the generals and the character of the troops. The commanders were well matched, but not so the forces at their disposal. Scipio had two veteran legions, with a proportionate number of auxiliaries, accustomed to act in the perfect unity of their well-known tactics, devoted to their leader, and borne along by his own enthusiastic faith in the destiny to which the gods had called him. Hannibal, on the other hand, had to eke out the relics of his veteran army with the African levies and the Carthaginian militia, of whom the latter suspected the fidelity of the Libyans, while the former remembered how often they had been sacrificed to save the lives of the Carthaginians. On both sides the infantry were drawn up in

* Both the exact place and time of the battle are uncertain. Zama, probably the place afterwards called Zama Regia, from being the residence of Julia, is supposed to be now represented by some ruins near *Jamaa*. The usual calculation, which fixes the date by means of a solar eclipse to October 19, B.C. 202, is scarcely trustworthy; and the sequence of events seems to imply that the battle was fought in the spring. The parallel between Zama and Waterloo is noticed by Dr. Arnold in the following terms.—“Twice has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon Bonaparte strove against England. The efforts of the first ended in Zama; those of the second in Waterloo” (*History of Rome*, vol. iii. p. 62). Sir Edward Creasy has further called attention to the remarkable parallel between the victorious generals. “Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatre of war. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy, before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen’s confidence in arms, when shaken by a series of reverses. And each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe” (*Decisive Battles*, pp. 127, 128).

three lines, with the cavalry on the wings, the Romans being in their regular order, while Hannibal placed his Africans in the first rank, the militia of Carthage in the second, and his veterans in the third. His van was covered by a formidable array of 80 elephants; but long experience had taught the Romans how little these beasts were to be dreaded, and Scipio left intervals to permit of their free passage through his lines. Their unwieldy strength was far more than counterbalanced by the transference to the Roman side of the arm in which Carthage had hitherto been strongest, the Numidian cavalry, who were now united under the command of Masinissa. It was this inequality that decided the first stage of the conflict. The charge of the elephants was spent upon the empty spaces in the Roman line; and, galled with missiles as they passed by, they were driven to the right and left among the Carthaginian cavalry, which, while thus disordered, was dispersed by the Numidians of Masinissa. Meanwhile the contest between the first lines of the infantry lasted till both were so disordered and exhausted as to fall back upon the second ranks. Then was seen the fatal defect in the composition of the Punic army. The Carthaginian militia, always unable to put out their strength till driven to bay within their walls, gave such faint support that the Libyans deemed themselves once more betrayed, and began to cut their way through the second line. Hannibal, with consummate skill, brought up his reserve to the front, forcing aside the confused masses of his first two lines to the right and left, while Scipio led forward his second and third lines to the flanks of his first, which still held its ground. Though fearfully outnumbered, the veterans of Hannibal fought like men who had so often conquered in Italy, and yielded not an inch of ground. But by this time the Roman cavalry, returning from the pursuit, surrounded the devoted band, and, by a strange revolution of fortune, a movement such as had almost annihilated the Romans at Cannæ enabled the very survivors of that fatal field to destroy their conquerors still more completely on the plain of Zama: 20,000 Carthaginians were left on the field of battle, and as many more were taken prisoners. In a word, the army was annihilated, and Hannibal himself escaped with a handful of men to Hadrumetum. His conduct of the battle elicited the warmest admiration of his young conqueror, and an interesting story is told of the courtesies exchanged between them when they met some years later at the court of Antiochus the Great at Ephesus, where Hannibal was in exile when Scipio went there as an ambassador. In

answer to an enquiry, whom he esteemed the greatest of generals, Hannibal replied, "Alexander the Great." "But who was the second?" asked Scipio. "Pyrrhus," was the tantalizing answer. "And who the third?" "Myself." Surprised at having found no place as yet, Scipio rejoined, "What then would you have said if you had conquered me at Zama?" "Then," exclaimed Hannibal, "I should have ranked myself above Alexander, above Pyrrhus, above every other general."

Such feelings of admiration may have mingled with the generous impulses and the motives of sound policy which induced Scipio to grant tolerable terms of peace. He was too wise to drive Carthage to despair, while the Numidians were still recent allies, and the Libyans had not declared decidedly for Rome; with the internal strength of the city as yet untried, and above all with such a general as Hannibal. He has been accused of hurrying on the peace, for fear of leaving a successor to reap the honours of the war; but the glory of his victory placed him above the danger of an immediate recall, and the resistance offered to the younger Scipio, when Carthage was in her extremity, proved the wisdom of not provoking such resistance now. But we cannot doubt that the noble mind of Scipio was swayed by higher motives, which the better part of the Senate would comprehend and share. The insolent pride, which regards the destruction of a foe as the natural consequence of his defeat, is as short-sighted as it is insensate. It has been condemned by all true statesmen, from the time of him who protested against putting out one of the eyes of Greece, to those who had in our own times to decide the fate of France. "Is it to be supposed," exclaims the eloquent German historian, "that one so generous, unprejudiced, and intelligent as Scipio, should not have asked himself of what benefit it could be to his country, now that the political power of the Carthaginian city was annihilated, utterly to destroy that primitive seat of commerce and of agriculture, and wickedly to overthrow one of the main pillars of the then existing civilization? The time had not yet come when the first men of Rome lent themselves to demolish the civilization of their neighbours, and frivolously fancied that they could wash away from themselves the eternal infamy of the nation by shedding an idle tear."

Nor was the magnanimity of Hannibal less conspicuous in submitting to the fate of the vanquished. The peace party at Carthage left to him the odium of the negotiation. He saw that it was impossible to resist terms which would disable Carthage from

becoming again the rival of Rome, and himself from renewing the great Carthage enterprise. The stake had been played and lost, and the forfeit was enough to satisfy even the revenge of Rome. Carthage was placed so completely at her feet, that no attempt was made to improve the opportunity of the great Eastern wars, and resistance was only roused at length when the doom of the city was pronounced. Besides the conditions already prescribed in favour of Rome and Masinissa, and the increase of the pecuniary demand to an annual contribution of 200 talents (nearly £50,000), the Carthaginians bound themselves to make no war upon Rome or her allies beyond the limits of Africa, and not to go to war even in Africa itself without the permission of the Romans. Thus she was restricted within the limits of her original territory in Zeugitana and Byzacium, with the settlements on the coast of Tripolis, hemmed in on the land side by Masinissa's Numidian hordes,* shut out from the Mediterranean by Rome, and reduced to a condition little more than tributary. The peace was ratified in B.C. 201, and with this closing year of a century Carthage virtually disappears from the history of the world, until our attention is recalled to the brief episode of her destruction.

The military career of Hannibal in his country's service was closed, when—like Wellington and Napoleon—he was but 45 years old; and, if he was not destined, like the former, to influence the policy of a long peace won by victory, neither did he die, like the latter, in distant exile, till he had made more than one effort to retrieve the fortunes of his country. The vast influence he had won in spite of his defeat—confessed by his opponents when they left the peace negotiations in his hands—and the power acquired by the popular party through the obvious incapacity of the nobles, enabled him to commence an internal reform as a new basis of political power for Carthage. We have already noticed the nature of this reform, and its inevitable failure through the hopeless corruption of the people; but his political ascendancy seems to have lasted during the nine years that he remained at Carthage. Meanwhile, it is no discredit to the enthusiastic patriot and the enemy devoted by a life-long vow, if he did what he could to encourage the foes of Rome, though the details of such intrigues are recorded only by his enemies. It was no fault of Hannibal, but a striking example

* It should be remembered that the Numidian kingdom of Masinissa did not merely lie, like the Numidia of the maps, to the west of the Carthaginian territory (Africa Propria), but swept round it on the south, to the Lesser Syrtis, and still further eastward, below Tripolis.

of the providential dispensation by which the course of events is ordered, that the kings of Macedonia and Syria reserved their attacks till Rome could deal with them singly. At length, when Antiochus the Great was on the point of engaging in his war with Rome, the Anti-Barcine faction at Carthage denounced Hannibal as an abettor of the Syrian king. Cn. Servilius was sent as ambassador to Carthage, openly to demand an explanation, but secretly to obtain the surrender of Hannibal, or even, as is alleged by some, his assassination. Hannibal remained all day at his post in the Senate and Forum and took part in the discussion, but at nightfall he rode off to his marine villa, where in a hidden bay he had ships always ready to put to sea, and left the ambassador to carry back to Rome the alarming news of his escape. He was received with open arms by Antiochus at Ephesus (B.C. 195), and arranged a plan of campaign, in which his military genius and his steadfast enmity to Rome were equally conspicuous; but, as we shall see in the following chapter, only so much of it was adopted as involved Hannibal in his last defeat, fighting at sea against Rome aided by the ships of Carthage. When the rejection of his advice produced the foreseen result, and Antiochus was overthrown by the Scipios at Magnesia (B.C. 190), the surrender of Hannibal was made one of the conditions of peace. Once more he fled to the court of Prusias of Bithynia; but the Romans could feel no security while their dreaded enemy still lived, and T. Quinctius Flaminius was sent to demand his surrender or death. Hannibal's house was beset by assassins, and he chose death by taking poison. "He had long been prepared to do so," adds a Roman, "for he knew the Romans and the faith of kings. The year of his death is uncertain; probably he died in the latter half of B.C. 183, at the age of 76. When he was born, Rome was contending with doubtful success for the possession of Sicily; he had lived long enough to see the West wholly subdued, and to fight his own last battle with the Romans against the vessels of his native city, which had itself become Roman; and he was constrained at last to remain a mere spectator, while Rome overpowered the East as the tempest overpowers the ship that has no one at the helm, and to feel that he alone was the pilot that could have weathered the storm. There was left to him no further hope to be disappointed when he died; but he had honestly, through fifty years of struggle, kept the oath he had sworn when a boy."* His great adversary Scipio died, probably in the same year, in voluntary exile.

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 282.

At Rome the peace was celebrated with rejoicings not yet free from the dash of bitterness infused by the survival of their great enemy, whose supreme personal influence in the contest their own writers justly mark by calling it the *Hannibalic*, as well as the Second Punic War. Its result was to make the great rival of Rome her vassal, and the warlike Africans, who had formed the chief military strength of Carthage, her allies;—to transfer from the Phœnician to the Latin republic the dominion of the seas and the empire of the West, where Spain and the islands were provinces of Rome and Massilia her close ally;—and to foreshadow the great conflict with the East, of which a beginning had been made in the fitful hostilities with Macedonia. Meanwhile much had still to be done in Italy itself. The tribes of Cisalpine Gaul had to be reduced to a state which should make it impossible for them to assist another invader, and the Sabellian and Greek states, which had for a time been seduced to the side of Hannibal, had to be Latinized more and more by the confiscation of their lands, the imposition of Latin customs, and the foundation of Latin colonies. In the ten years following the second Punic war, colonies were planted at Venusia, Narnia, Cosa, Sipontum, Croton, Salernum, and other places; and some of the maritime cities of the south received Latin names; thus, Thurii became Copia, and Vibo Valentia. It was slower work to restore the ruined cities and to fill up the blanks in the population and in the culture of the land, caused by the fifteen years during which Italy had been the theatre of the war. The extent to which the country suffered from its inveterate sore of brigandage is attested by the condemnation in one year of 7000 robbers in Apulia alone. Finally, the old simple habits of the Latin rural population and of the yeomen, burgesses of Rome had been completely undermined. But time was required to decide how far these evils would affect the stability of the republic, and what would be the issue of the brilliant prospect of foreign conquest opened by the victory over Carthage. For the present there was enough to fill the minds of men, from the highest to the lowest, as they shared or witnessed the triumphal procession of the young conqueror to the Capitol, to thank the gods to whom he never ceased to give the glory of his exploits.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE MACEDONIAN AND ASIATIC WARS.
B.C. 220 TO B.C. 187.

"After this shall he [the king of the north] turn his face unto the Jews, and shall take many: but a prince for his own behalf shall cause the reproach offered by him to cease; without his own reproach, he shall cause it to turn upon him. Then he shall turn his face toward the fort of his own land: but he shall stumble and fall, and not be found."—*Daniel* xi. 18, 19.

ACCESSION OF PHILIP V.—STATE OF MACEDONIA AND GREECE—PHILIP'S PART IN THE SOCIAL WAR—HIS ALLIANCE WITH CARTHAGE—FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR—ANTI-MACEDONIAN LEAGUE—ATTALUS AND THE RHODIANS—AFFAIRS OF EGYPT—PEACE WITH PHILIP—RENEWED MACEDONIAN INTRIGUES—ALLIANCE OF PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT—VIEWS OF ROME REGARDING THE EAST—EMBASSY TO EGYPT, ANTIOCHUS, AND PHILIP—THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR—TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS—PHILIP LOSES NORTHERN GREECE—THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE JOINS THE ROMANS—PROPOSALS FOR PEACE—BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALE—PEACE WITH PHILIP—THE FREEDOM OF GREECE PROCLAIMED BY FLAMININUS—HIS TRIUMPH—DISCONTENT OF THE ÆTOLIANS—THEIR INTRIGUES WITH ANTIOCHUS—REVIEW OF THE SYRIAN KINGDOM—WARS WITH EGYPT FOR COELE SYRIA AND PALESTINE—INVASION OF AND WARS WITH THE PARTHIANS—AFFAIRS OF ASIA MINOR—ACCESSION OF ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT—HIS WARLIKE VIGOUR—REVOLT OF MEDIA AND PERSIA SUPPRESSED—HIS WAR WITH EGYPT AND DEFEAT AT RAPHIA—WARS IN ASIA MINOR AND WITH THE PARTHIANS—DEATH OF PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR—ALLIANCE OF ANTIOCHUS AND PHILIP—CONQUEST OF CILICIA, COELE-SYRIA, AND PALESTINE—ATTACK ON ATTALUS, THE RHODIANS, AND THE GREEK CITIES OF ASIA MINOR—SUCCESSSES OF ANTIOCHUS ON THE HELLESPONT—HE CROSSES OVER INTO EUROPE AND OCCUPIES THRACE—PROTESTS OF THE ROMANS—FLIGHT OF HANNIBAL TO ANTIOCHUS—HE PREPARES FOR WAR—THE ÆTOLIANS SEIZE DEMETRIAS AND DECLARE WAR WITH ROME—ANTIOCHUS LANDS IN GREECE—BEGINNING OF THE ASIATIC WARS—ATTITUDE OF MACEDONIA AND THE GREEKS—DEFEAT OF ANTIOCHUS AT THERMOPYLE—GREECE AGAIN SUBJECT TO ROME—REDUCTION OF THE ÆTOLIANS—MARITIME CAMPAIGN—ROMAN EXPEDITION TO ASIA—BATTLE OF MAGNÉSIA—FALL OF THE SYRIAN EMPIRE—WAR WITH THE GALATIANS—THE KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS—SETTLEMENT OF ASIA AND GREECE—THE ÆTOLIANS AGAIN SUBDUED—PHILIP AND THE ACHÆANS—DEATH OF ANTIOCHUS.

THE peace with Carthage had scarcely lasted for a year, when the consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, on behalf of the Senate, moved in the assembly of the centuries a declaration of war against Philip V. of Macedonia, on account of his attacks upon the allies of Rome in the East. Under this able prince, who had ascended the throne in B.C. 220, at the age of seventeen, Macedonia had acquired a position which marked her as the one among all the Hellenistic states best fitted to set bounds to the advance of Rome towards the East. Alone of all the kingdoms which had arisen out of the disruption of Alexander's empire, she had preserved much of the native Macedonian vigour and of the compact military organization by which that empire had been acquired; and the establishment of her monarchy on a more despotic basis, at the

expense of the great chieftains, had helped to consolidate her power for war. By the vigour of Antigonus Gonatas and his successors, the country had recovered surprisingly from the effect of the great Gallic invasion, and the garrisons on the frontier were strong enough to protect her from the Celtic and Illyrian barbarians. In Greece, though no longer wielding the supremacy she had possessed before the rise of the Ætolian and Achaean Leagues, she held the balance between those confederacies, and had still a dominion of her own over large portions of the peninsula. Thessaly and Magnesia were entirely hers, with the central states of Locris, Phocis, and Doris; and among other positions elsewhere, she held the three great fortresses of Corinth, Chalcis in Eubœa, and Demetrias in Magnesia, which were known as "the three fetters of the Greeks." While Sparta had fallen under the yoke of tyrants, and Athens was content to barter freedom for the enjoyments of literature and philosophy, the remnants of Hellenic vigour were found chiefly among the northern states, most of which were subject to Macedonia. However inferior in magnitude and external splendour to the kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, she surpassed the former in the compactness of her strength, while she was as much above the latter in force as below it in devotion to literature and science. The Macedonian monarchy, in short, had more of the vigour of the Roman republic than all the Oriental kingdoms put together; and, if Philip could have obtained the position of his great namesake, as the head of a united Hellas, or even if he had made the timely decision to give an energetic support to Hannibal, it would seem as if the course of history might have been changed. How little such a change would have benefited the world, must at once be felt by any one who considers the absence of all congenial elements between Macedonia and Carthage, and the evil effects of destroying the Latinism now established in Italy.

The course pursued by Philip from the beginning of his reign precluded any such disastrous experiment. A Macedonian alliance had long been a cherished scheme of the Barcine family; and, had Antigonus Doson lived, it might probably have been made in time to turn the fortune of the Second Punic War. But Philip's attention was diverted from the West by the prospect of becoming the arbiter of Greece. The great defeat of Aratus and the Achæans by the Ætolians led the former to seek his aid, and for three years he was so entirely occupied by the Social War,* as

* See p. 117.

not to interfere even when the Romans conquered and expelled his ally Demetrius of Pharos.* But that active chieftain, finding refuge at the Macedonian court, used all his influence to induce Philip to begin war with the Romans; and the king's disposition to the enterprise appears to have been a motive for the peace which he concluded with the Ætolians (B.C. 217). There was wanting, however, the mutual confidence, which would have placed Philip in the position of general of the Greeks for the war with Rome. He knew not how to solve the problem of transforming himself from the oppressor into the champion of Greece. When at length the news of Cannæ decided him to form an alliance with Carthage, and he promised to make a descent on the eastern coast of Italy, his first enterprise, against Apollonia, was abandoned with a ridiculous precipitancy, on a false alarm of the approach of the Roman fleet (B.C. 216). A reason, or excuse, for further delay arose out of the capture by the Roman fleet of the envoys he sent into Italy to ratify the treaty with Hannibal, and the Romans used the interval in strengthening Brundisium, as the key of the Adriatic (B.C. 215). Fearing to encounter their fleet with his light Illyrian transports, Philip at length preferred his own immediate interest to keeping faith with Hannibal, and renewed the attack on the Roman possessions in Epirus. This was the signal for the FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR (B.C. 214). The Senate met the provocation by assuming the offensive; and a fleet despatched from Brundisium recaptured Oricum, reinforced Apollonia, and stormed the camp of Philip, who thereupon suspended active measures.

But it was not the policy of Rome to suffer him to rest. The capture of Tarentum by Hannibal created a fresh necessity for providing against an invasion from Macedonia; and the odium created by Philip's arbitrary conduct, and especially by his murder of Aratus, gave the opportunity for consolidating a new league against him (B.C. 213). It was now that the Romans chose their part between the two great Hellenic confederacies, on the application of the Ætolians for aid against Philip. Laevinus, the admiral of the Adriatic fleet, appeared at the assembly of the Ætolians, and promised them the long-coveted possession of Acarnania as the price of their alliance with Rome. The league was joined by all the states not united with the Achæans,—Athens, Sparta, Messene, Elis; and for the first time the Romans came into contact with the Asiatic kingdoms by the accession of

* See p. 420.

Attalus, king of Pergamus, to the anti-Macedonian confederacy. It was well for them that Antiochus the Great, occupied with his rivalry against Egypt, and with the disorders in his Eastern provinces, showed a hesitation in coming to the aid of Philip, like that of the latter in helping Hannibal; while Ptolemy IV. of Egypt adhered to the alliance formed by his grandfather with the Republic.* This league was formed in the same year in which the Romans gained their great success at Syracuse (B.C. 212). The object of the Romans—that of finding full occupation for Philip at home—was accomplished at the cost of the desolation of Greece by a purposeless war; the alliance of Attalus enabled them to assail the eastern coast, just as their Adriatic fleet commanded the western; and while these bonds were drawn round Hellas herself, citizens of Hellenic states were sold into slavery. The Ætolians at length awoke to the curse which their foreign alliance had brought upon the land, and, being at the same time hard pressed by the Achæans, they concluded a separate peace with Philip (B.C. 206). The Romans, who were now preparing for the invasion of Africa, instead of resenting their desertion, followed their example; and so ended the First Macedonian War (B.C. 205).

It soon appeared that Philip had accepted the peace from motives of convenience rather than good faith. While pursuing his aggrandizement in Greece and the Ægean, he did not scruple to attack both Attalus and the Rhodians, who still maintained the independence they had secured under the successors of Alexander, and had made an alliance with the Romans. At the same time he entered into closer relations with Antiochus the Great; and the designs of the Syrian and Macedonian kings on Egypt, upon the death of Ptolemy IV. Philopator, became so evident, that the guardians of his infant son, Ptolemy V. Epiphanes, placed the young king under the protection of the Roman Senate. All was thus prepared for the interference of Rome in the East, which Antiochus and Philip ought long before to have anticipated by effective aid to Hannibal. It was only at the last moment that Philip suffered a force of 4000 Macedonian volunteers to embark for Africa, whose presence at Zama, so soon after the conclusion of the peace, was a senseless provocation to Rome, and no real help to Carthage. He was still pursuing the war with Attalus and the Rhodians for the possession of Caria, when the peace with Carthage left Rome at liberty to succour her Eastern allies.

* See p. 336.

That is a short-sighted view of this turning-point in the history of the world, which represents the Romans as having no sooner secured the supremacy of the West, than they began to meditate, in the spirit of wanton aggression, the conquest of the East. It is one of the most remarkable points in the history of their conquests, that the same enemies, whose hesitating and divided policy secured them the victory, were always prompt to provoke the struggle; while on their part, a general policy of aggression bore, in many particular cases, more than the mere appearance of reluctance in taking up the challenge. Many of the wars of the Republic bear, in this respect, a close analogy to those by which our Indian empire has been extended. In the present case, the exhaustion of Italy was an overpowering motive for a conciliatory policy, especially as it seemed that the war must be carried on at once in Greece and Asia. But, on the other hand, if ever the principles of national honour and interest can furnish a justification for war, it was plain that Rome must repel Philip's attacks on herself and her allies. It was resolved, therefore, to prepare for war with Macedonia, and to avert it, if possible, in the East. An embassy was sent to mediate between Antiochus and Egypt. The former was permitted to pursue his designs on Syria; and M. Æmilius Lepidus was sent, as guardian of the infant king, to watch over the interests of the latter; while every effort was used to strengthen the confederacy of the Greeks with the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip. Meanwhile, the prætor, M. Valerius Lavinius, was sent with the Sicilian fleet of thirty-eight sail to the Ægean, where Philip was rapidly subduing the islands and the coast of Thrace, and so preparing to attack the dominions of Attalus. It was after the capture of Abydos,—where the defenders were slain almost to a man, and a large number of the citizens chose a voluntary death as soon as the capitulation was signed,—that Philip received the Roman envoys on their return from Egypt and Syria. He listened to their demands—that he should make war upon none of the Greek states, that he should restore the places he had taken from Ptolemy, and consent to an arbitration concerning his injuries against Attalus and the Rhodians,—only replying, with polite insolence, “that he would excuse what the envoy had said, because he was young, handsome, and a Roman.” But, while the ambassadors were still at Athens, the *casus belli* which they had sought to extract from the king was supplied by an attack made on the city by the Macedonian general, to avenge the murder of two Acarnanians for intruding upon the Eleusinian mysteries (B.C. 201).

Still the desire of the Roman people for an interval of rest found utterance through the Tribunes in the Comitia, and the motion of Sulpicius for war with Philip was at first rejected. But the dread of a new invasion of Italy prevailed, and the chief burthen of the levy was thrown on the allies. Sulpicius Galba landed at Apollonia with an army of two legions and 1000 Numidian horse, to which the spoils of Carthage enabled the Romans for the first time to add a force of elephants; and a fleet of 180 vessels was stationed at Coreyra. While the consul was detained by sickness at Apollonia, a division of the fleet sailed to the aid of Athens, under C. Claudius Cento. Finding the city secure for the present, Cento made a *coup de main* on Chalcis; and Philip hastened from Demetrias in Thessaly only in time to find his chief maritime fortress laid in ruins. He retaliated by a merciless ravaging of Attica, which was long remembered for the ruthless destruction of the sacred groves and tombs of the Attic heroes at Academus (B.C. 200).

The campaign of B.C. 199 was arduous and indecisive. A combined invasion of Macedonia involved the Romans in great risks, and their victory at the pass of Eordæa was followed by their retreat to the coast. The aid of Antiochus might now have enabled Philip to assume the offensive, but his first movements in Asia Minor were checked by the demand of the Romans that he should retire from the dominions of Attalus. Trusting, however, to his support, Philip advanced into Illyria, down the course of the Aous (*Viosa* or *Βούσσα*), which falls into the sea by Apollonia, and occupied the pass between the mountains of Æropus and Asnaus (B.C. 198). While the hostile armies confronted each other in this position, the consul T. QUINCTIUS FLAMINIVS arrived to assume his command. He was a young man of thirty, belonging to that new generation who, with the Greek culture, had assumed a large share of Greek versatility, at the expense, as the opposite party alleged, of the old Roman integrity. "A skilful officer and a better diplomatist, he was in many respects admirably adapted for the management of the troubled affairs of Greece. Yet it would perhaps have been better, both for Rome and for Greece, if the choice had fallen on one less full of Hellenic sympathies, and if the general despatched thither had been a man who would neither have been bribed by delicate flattery nor stung by pungent sarcasm; who would not, amidst literary and artistic reminiscences, have overlooked the pitiful condition of the constitutions of the Hellenic states; and who, while treating Hellas according to its deserts,

would have spared the Romans the trouble of striving after unattainable ideals."* The consul found the position of the king too strong to be carried, even with the reinforcements he had brought, and both armies lay encamped for forty days. Meanwhile Philip sought an interview with Flaminius to treat of peace. The king offered to restore his conquests and give satisfaction for his injuries to the Hellenic states: but the negotiation was shipwrecked on the demand of the consul, that Thessaly should become a portion of free Hellas. At length the treachery of some Epirote nobles discovered to the Roman a pass by which he was enabled to turn Philip's position, while attacking him in front, and the king was compelled to retreat with a loss of 2000 men. He abandoned Epirus and Thessaly, destroying all the towns except the fortresses, and fell back to the pass of Tempe, to defend the entrance into Macedonia. All northern Greece now lay open to the Romans, and the states hastened to make their submission, except the Acarnanians, who remained faithful to Philip. Flaminius now directed all his energies against the south, where the Achæans were still neutral, and Macedonia held the strong fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth. The formation of the siege of Cenchrea by sea, on the one side of the isthmus, by the united forces of the Romans, Attalus, and the Rhodians, and the appearance of a Roman fleet in the Gulf of Corinth, on the other, decided the Achæans, who had hitherto been unwilling to join the foreign invaders. They took part in the siege of Corinth, which was promised by Flaminius as the price of their adhesion; but the Macedonian governor of Chalcis not only raised the siege, but seized Argos. Philip handed over this city to Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, who took the bribe, but betrayed the briber by adhering to the Romans.

During the winter, Philip tried the effect of another personal interview with Flaminius, in which the king showed that the Romans were the only adversaries whom he deemed worth consideration. His proposals were referred to the Senate, who at once dismissed the envoys, when they were not prepared to surrender all the fortresses beyond the limits of Macedonia. Upon this, Philip collected all his resources for a decisive effort. Flaminius, however, was the first to open the campaign. While his fleet besieged the Acarnanians in Leucas, the fall of Thebes by stratagem forced the Boeotians to join the Romans, and cut off the communication between the Macedonian garrisons in Corinth and

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 240.

Chalcis. While the proconsul advanced along the coast, supported by his fleet, Philip, eager to meet him, passed through the vale of Tempe into Thessaly. The armies met unexpectedly on the hill of CYNOSCEPHALÆ (the *Dog's Heads*), near Scotussa; and the encounter of the vanguards was converted by the eagerness of the Macedonian troops into a pitched battle, before Philip had time to set his forces in array. The right division of the phalanx, coming up in good time under his own command, charged down the hill upon the Roman legions, and bore down all resistance; but the left division, thrown into confusion by the haste with which Nicænor brought it up to support the king, was easily defeated, and its broken ranks were trampled down by the Roman elephants, the very force on which the Macedonians had been accustomed to rely. Thus far success and failure had been equally divided; but at this crisis a Roman officer collected twenty cohorts from the victorious wing, and led them against the right phalanx of the Macedonians, which was now far advanced in the pursuit. Defenceless against an attack in the rear, the phalanx was broken, and the battle was decided. The carnage, always great in a dense column, was aggravated by the Romans not understanding the Macedonian sign of surrender; 8000 were killed and 5000 taken prisoners, at the cost of only 700 Roman lives. Philip, escaping to Larissa, burned his papers and evacuated Thessaly. The Acarnanians, who had meanwhile lost Leucas, now at length abandoned his hopeless cause, and it did not need the defeats which his forces suffered in Caria and elsewhere, to make the victory of Cynoscephalæ decisive (B.C. 197). The terms of peace were dictated by the wonted moderation of Rome and the sympathy of Flaminius with his courteous antagonist, rather than by the savage resentment of the Ætolians. Flaminius told them that it was not the custom of Rome to annihilate the vanquished; they might do it if they felt strong enough. The kingdom of the Philips was left as a barrier against Celtic barbarism, and a check upon Hellenic disunion; but the supremacy which it had held in Greece for 140 years* was finally abolished, and the Macedonian garrisons were everywhere withdrawn. As in the case of Carthage, the king was forbidden to make war without the consent of Rome; his military force was limited to an army of 5000 men, a fleet of five decked vessels, and no elephants; and a contribution of 1000 talents was imposed for the charges of the war. Finally, the successor of

* Since the battle of Chæroneia (B.C. 338—197).

Alexander was bound to contribute a contingent to the forces of the Republic, which had seemed an easy conquest to his great ancestor's arms little more than a century before (B.C. 196).

It is a striking instance, and almost the last, of the traditional moderation of the Romans, that they took none of the territorial spoils of Philip for themselves. The influence of the young generation, whose minds were moulded by Hellenic culture,—and perhaps, too, the general prevalence of that sentiment towards Greece, as the mother of freedom and civilization, which has still survived long ages of degeneracy,—may be traced in the resolution to give liberty to all the Grecian states. Again and again had that liberty been proclaimed by the Macedonian and Asiatic princes, when each meant that Greece should serve none but himself; and when at last it was no longer offered in mockery, it found a disunited and unwarlike people, incapable alike of enjoying and defending it. But the melancholy with which the historian reverts to the disappointment did not cloud the spirits of those who in good faith gave and received the boon. The enthusiasm of sympathy, with which the liberator of a foreign land has been welcomed in our own day, may help us to understand the outburst of gratitude from the liberated people themselves, which welcomed the reading of the proclamation of freedom by Flamininus at the Isthmian Games: his very life was endangered by the press that crowded to touch his garment, or to see his face (B.C. 196). And yet the Greeks were reminded that the gift was bestowed by the policy of a calculating friend, when the cruel tyrant Nabis, having been subdued by the arms of Flamininus, was permitted still to rule in Sparta, as a check upon the Achæans; for the freedom which a foreign ally bestows is always maimed of its choicest part. Other instances might be cited in the final settlement of Greece; but, in truth, the failure of the experiment was due, not to the reserve of those who gave, but to the degeneracy of those who were unfit to use the gift. Some such misgiving seems to have been present to the mind of Flamininus himself, when, after two years spent in the settlement of the country, he reassembled the deputies of the Greek states at Corinth, and exhorted them to a wise and moderate use of their recovered freedom. The only recompense he asked for Rome was the restoration of the Italian captives, whom Hannibal had sold into slavery to Greeks. Finally, he withdrew the garrisons from Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth, “the three fetters of Greece,” and returned after an absence of five years to Rome, where the admiration of the Senate and

people for his work was displayed in a three days' triumph, surpassing Scipio's in magnificence (B.C. 194).

The most recent historian of Rome maintains that the course so much admired, was a mistake, for which Rome soon suffered. "The war with Antiochus," he says, "would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but for the military blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin—for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious generosity."*

There was in particular, then as in later ages, one element of unsoundness in the edifice of Grecian nationality, the presence of races only partially trained in Hellenic civilization, and yet possessing great influence through their military prowess. Such have been the Albanians in modern, the Ætolians in ancient times. In settling the affairs of Greece, Flamininus had not hesitated to prefer the superior political organization of the states of the Achaean league to the claims of the Ætolians as earlier allies of Rome. The confederacy of the former was enlarged by all Philip's possessions in the Peloponnesus, particularly Corinth; while the latter were only suffered to add to their league the petty states of Phocis and Locris, instead of Thessaly and Acarnania, which they claimed as the reward of "their victory at Cynoscephalæ,"—a boast by which they constantly provoked the jealousy of the Romans. Their discontent was the source of the intrigues which hastened on the inevitable war with Antiochus the Great.

The reign of that ambitious prince forms the turning-point in the annals of the Great Kingdom of Syria, or, as it was not unfrequently called under the earlier Seleucidae, of Asia. He ascended the throne exactly a century after the death of Alexander, an interval marked by but few events of importance in the annals of the kingdom. An outline has already been given of the history of Syria down to the death of the founder of the dynasty, Seleucus Nicator, in B.C. 280.† His son, ANTIOCHUS I. SOTER (the Preserver), was chiefly occupied, during his reign of twenty years, in wars with Antiochus, King of Pergamus, and with the Gauls in Asia Minor, and he fell in battle with the latter in B.C. 261. His son, ANTIOCHUS II., surnamed THEOS (*God*),‡ by the gratitude of

* Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 252.

† Chap. XVII. p. 90.

‡ It should be remembered that the high-sounding epithets of the Syrian and Egyptian kings, descriptive of all kinds of magnificence and social virtue, were either assumed by themselves or conferred by flatterers, and sometimes they were so

the Milesians for his delivering their city from the tyrant Timarchus, began that long series of wars with Egypt for the possession of Cœle-Syria, which after lasting several reigns were only ended by the interference of Rome, and the vicissitudes of which we need not trace.* The effect of the first war, made by Antiochus Theos upon Ptolemy Philadelphus, was so to weaken Syria as to leave her comparatively defenceless against the inroad of the Parthians under Arsaces, who rent from the kingdom the provinces east of the Tigris (B.C. 250), while the rebellious satrap Theodotus established the kingdom of Bactria. Antiochus now made peace with Ptolemy, and married his daughter Berenice, divorcing his former wife Laodice. When, on the death of Ptolemy (B.C. 247), he recalled Laodice, her sense of the insult that had been put upon her was so inveterate, that she contrived the murder of Antiochus, together with Berenice and their son (B.C. 246). SELEUCUS II., CALLINICUS (the *Glorious Victor*), the son of Antiochus and Laodice, no sooner succeeded to the throne, than his dominions were invaded by Ptolemy III., Euergetes, to avenge his sister's death; and Seleucus remained inactive while the king of Egypt advanced as far as the Tigris. But, when the invader was recalled by disturbances at home, Seleucus had little difficulty in recovering the conquered provinces. His next war was with his brother, Antiochus Hierax (the *Hawk*), who attempted to found an independent kingdom in Asia Minor; and it was only after a contest of several years that Antiochus was defeated and fled to Ptolemy. Having thus secured the West, Seleucus aimed at recovering the lost provinces in the East: and his decisive defeat by Arsaces (probably Arsaces II., surnamed Tiridates), was ever after celebrated by the Parthians as the true establishment of their independence. If it be true that Seleucus was taken prisoner in a second expedition and retained in captivity for several years by Arsaces, we can easily understand the increase of power which Attalus I. of Pergamus obtained in Asia Minor. In this case, too, Seleucus strove to repair his losses, and it appears to have been while he was thus engaged that he was killed by a fall from his horse, after a troubled reign of twenty years (B.C. 226).

ludicrously inappropriate as to provoke a satiric parody, as when Antiochus IV. *Epiphanes* (the *Illustrious*, was nicknamed *Epimanes* (the *Madman*).

* It is usually supposed that these are the wars alluded to in the eleventh chapter of the Book of Daniel, "the king of the north" being the Syrian king, and "the king of the south" the Egyptian.

Seleucus Callinicus left two sons, Seleucus and Antiochus. The former, SELEUCUS III., is said to have been surnamed CERANUS (the *Thunderbolt*) in derision of his weakness both of body and of mind; and, after a reign of only three years, he was murdered by two of his officers (B.C. 223). Of a very different temper was ANTIOCHUS III. THE GREAT, who was only in his fifteenth year when he succeeded his brother, and reigned for 36 years (B.C. 223—187). In the beginning of his reign, he earned his surname by the magnitude of his enterprizes and efforts, though he was not in every case rewarded with commensurate success. He proved his military talents in the war against the rebellious brothers Molo and Alexander, the satraps of Media and Persia (B.C. 220). He next renewed the old contest with Egypt for the possession of Cœle-Syria and Palestine, and was forced to cede those provinces to Ptolemy Philopator, as the result of his decisive defeat at Raphia, near Gaza, in the same year in which the battle of the Trasimene Lake was fought (B.C. 217).

Meanwhile, Achaus, the governor of Asia Minor, had raised the standard of independence; but after an obstinate resistance he was defeated and taken at Sardis, and put to death by Antiochus (B.C. 214). This success in the West encouraged Antiochus, like his father, to attempt the reconquest of the East, and with greater appearance at least of success. But a seven years' war (B.C. 212—205) only resulted in his acknowledgment of the independence of the Parthian monarchy (B.C. 205). The same year witnessed not only the crisis of the Hannibalic War, but the death of Ptolemy Philopator; and the opportunity offered by the latter event effectually withdrew Antiochus from direct participation in the great conflict. The league which he made with Philip, instead of being a well-concerted plan for the exclusion of the Romans from Asia, was only intended to leave him at liberty to pursue his designs against Egypt, while Philip bore the brunt of the war with Attalus and the Romans. During the crisis of the Macedonian War, he prosecuted a vigorous attack upon Cilicia, Cœle-Syria, and Palestine, while the Romans hesitated to engage in a new contest to protect the dominions of their youthful ward. At length a decisive victory over the Egyptians at Panium, the hill whence the Jordan rises, was followed by a peace which gave the coveted provinces to Antiochus, while the youthful Ptolemy was betrothed to Cleopatra, the daughter of the Syrian king (B.C. 198). It must not be forgotten that the transference of these provinces from Egypt, which had constantly pursued a tolerant policy towards

the Jews, led afterwards to the furious persecution of that people by Antiochus Epiphanes, and their successful revolt under the Maccabees.

The time seemed now arrived for Antiochus to fly to the aid of Philip, before he should be crushed by the Romans; but the Syrian king still clung to the nearer and dearer object of extending his power over the whole of Asia Minor, where his armies had meanwhile not been inactive. As early as B.C. 199—8, Attalus had complained to the Romans of his aggressions on Pergamus; and now he collected a great army at Sardis, while his fleet advanced along the southern shores of Asia Minor, so that he was brought into collision both with Attalus and the Rhodians, the allies of Rome. We have seen how his advance in the former quarter was checked by the mandate of the Roman envoys; in the latter the Rhodian republic trusted to their own energetic action. They named the Chelidonian islands off Lycia—the old division between the Greek and Persian waters—as the point beyond which the passage of the king's fleet would be regarded as a declaration of war; nor, when Antiochus disregarded the menace, did they shrink from making good their word; and the news of the battle of Cynoscephalæ arrived in good time for their encouragement. A maritime war ensued along the whole western coast of Asia Minor up to the Hellespont; and, though the Rhodians succeeded in protecting the chief cities of Caria, and Antiochus was repelled from some important places by the resistance of the inhabitants, he became master of several others, and among the rest of Abydos on the Hellespont. Even the conquest of his ally Philip was in the first instance favourable to his progress; for the hesitating policy of the Romans suffered him to occupy the places vacated by the Macedonian garrisons (B.C. 187).

In the following year Antiochus crossed the Hellespont, took Sestos, and began to rebuild Lysimachia, the old capital of Lysimachus in Thrace. In reply to the remonstrances of Flaminius, he abjured all schemes of European conquest, but asserted his clear right to the dominions won from Lysimachus by his ancestor Seleucus; but the discussion was broken off by the return of the king to Syria on a rumour of the death of Ptolemy (B.C. 196). The ensuing year found him again in Thrace, organizing the country as a satrapy for his son Seleucus. Still the Romans were content with diplomatic interference; and Flaminius, to whose province the matter belonged, preoccupied with the work of restoring liberty to Greece and with the conviction that an Asiatic

war would be impolitic, suffered Antiochus to acquire a position in which he might suddenly stand forth as the head of the Hellenic race.

The designs of the king could no longer be mistaken when he received Hannibal at his court at Ephesus; and from that time forward he made active preparations for war with Rome. To strengthen his position in Asia, he completed the marriage already arranged between his daughter and Ptolemy; he gave another daughter to Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia; and offered another to Eumenes II., King of Pergamus, with the restoration of the cities taken from him, if he would renounce the alliance of Rome. The Greek cities were tempted by promises of liberty or only nominal recognition of his supremacy; the Galatians won by liberal presents; and the wild Pisidians reduced by force. Hannibal obtained the king's consent to a plan for invading Africa at the head of a powerful force, and thence passing over again into Italy, while the Romans were occupied with the formidable insurrection that had broken out in Spain. In Greece itself, which was to be the chief theatre of the war, Antiochus hoped for the support of Philip, and he knew that he could rely on that of the Ætolians.

In fact, no sooner had Flaminius taken his departure from Greece, than this people began to intrigue against the Romans. To their discontent with the recent settlement they added the arrogant claim to be the arbiters of Greece, as they had been the victors at Cynoscephalæ. While assuring Philip that he was expected by all Hellas as its liberator, they encouraged the disaffected with promises of the King's speedy arrival. After enticing Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, to commence a rising, which was put down by Philopœmen with the forces of the Achaean League, they next formed a plot to murder Nabis and seize the city. The tyrant was killed at a review, and the Ætolian troops effected their entrance; but the citizens rose and cut them off, and Sparta joined the Achaean League, her adhesion being hastened by the appearance of a Roman fleet off Gythium. The Ætolians were more successful in their attempt to surprise Demetrias, which they wished to offer to Antiochus as the base of his operations in Greece, and Chalcis was only saved by the arrival of Flaminius, who had persuaded the Senate that war had become inevitable. It was first declared by the Ætolians, whose general replied to the demand of Flaminius for a copy of their manifesto, that he would deliver it on the banks of the Tiber. Antiochus could now delay no longer. Though his disposable force con-

sisted only of 10,000 infantry, 500 horse, 6 elephants, and 40 ships of war, he crossed from the Hellespont to the Pagasæan Bay, and established his head-quarters at Demetrias; while a Roman army of about 25,000 men landed at Apollonia under the prætor Marcus Bæbius. Thus began the great though brief Asiatic War (B.C. 192).

The scheme of concerted action, by which alone success was probable, entirely broke down. The jealousy of common natures towards a great man, added to the old rivalries of faction, not only kept the Carthaginian nobles from consenting to Hannibal's renewal of the African War, but enabled them to persuade Antiochus and his court to keep the illustrious refugee in that shade, out of which his merits still shone brightly. Eumenes and the Rhodians, and the chief Greek cities of Asia, not only resisted all the solicitations of Antiochus, but took an active part with Rome; and even Egypt offered to do the same. But the worst disappointment was the course adopted by Philip, who, looking upon Antiochus as lately a faithless ally and now a rival in Thrace, and having against him certain other grounds of offence,* willingly supplied his military contingent to the Romans, in accordance with the treaty. The Achaean League, representing nearly all that was left of national spirit in Greece, was steadfast to the cause of Rome, and so were the Thessalians and Athenians. The Ætolians, who had saluted Antiochus as "Captain-General of Greece," could only bring the adhesion of the Boeotians, Eleians, and Messenians to support the title; while his promises of the countless hosts of Asia had dwindled to a force barely equal to a single Roman legion with its auxiliaries. Nor did the activity of Antiochus supply what he wanted in numbers. By appearing first in the field he was indeed enabled to occupy Thermopylae, to take the fortress of Chalcis, and some towns in Thessaly; but, on the advance of a small Roman force, he retired to spend the winter in pleasure at Chalcis. No reinforcements appeared from Asia, and the king's little army only received an addition of 4000 men from the Ætolians, while the Romans collected an army of about 40,000 at Apollonia, under their able and resolute consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio.

The brief campaign of B.C. 191 was opened by the advance of the Romans into Thessaly, where they recaptured the towns taken by Antiochus, and fixed their head-quarters at Larissa.

* For example, in marching through Thessaly, Antiochus had ostentatiously buried the bones which still lay exposed on the battle-field of Cynoscephalæ.

The commonest prudence would now have dictated the abandonment of an enterprise which had hopelessly failed; but Antiochus preferred to entrench himself at Thermopylæ, and await the arrival of reinforcements from Asia. It seems as if history were parodying one of its own most brilliant chapters, when it shews us the fickle Asiatic king established in the position once held by Leonidas, and overwhelmed there by the legions of the West. The very path over the mountains, which had conducted the Persians to the rear of the pass, was now turned to the same use by a Roman detachment under a leader of whom we shall soon have more to say, Marcus Porcius Cato. Its defence had been entrusted to the Ætolians; but half their force had marched off to Hieraclea, and the other half made only the feeblest resistance. Surrounded in the narrow pass, Antiochus might perhaps, though unworthy, have had the honour of a death like that of Leonidas, had he stayed to share the fate of his army; but he escaped with 500 men to Chaleis, and sailed thence to Ephesus. Greece lay once more at the disposal of the Romans; and the Ætolians, who alone attempted a resistance at Napyæctus, were admitted to a capitulation through the influence of Flamininus. There could now no longer be any hesitation about the necessity of carrying the war into Asia; and before the winter set in, the Romans and their allies gained the command of the Ægean by a great naval victory over the fleet of Antiochus, at Cyssus on the coast of Ionia. The presence of six Punic ships in the Roman fleet affords a most striking proof of the humiliation of Carthage, and of the hopelessness of Hannibal's attempt to rouse her against Rome.* The beaten fleet of Antiochus retired to the harbour of Ephesus.

This success was followed up by the acquisition of allies among the Asiatic Greeks, the most important gain being that of Smyrna. Meanwhile Antiochus was roused, too late, to make those preparations for keeping the Romans out of Asia, which ought to have supported his own expedition into Europe. The fleet at Ephesus was raised to a force which enabled its admiral Polyxenidas to gain a victory over the Rhodian squadron which had been left at Samos to observe him, while the Roman admiral Caius Livius was absent at the Hellespont, preparing for the passage of the army by the reduction of Sestos and Abydos; but the return of the

* These ships were probably a contingent sent in accordance with the treaty of peace; though we have no distinct mention of such an article. Or they may have been required and furnished as a pledge that the Carthaginian government was clear of participation in the schemes of Hannibal.

main fleet reduced Polyxenidas again to the defensive. A more formidable effort was made on the southern coast of Asia Minor by the collection of a naval force from Lycia, Syria, and Phœnicia, under the command of Hannibal, whose plan was to form a junction with the squadron at Ephesus, when the united fleets, having swept the Roman and Rhodian fleets from the Ægean, would have sailed for the Hellespont, to prevent the crossing of the Romans into Asia. The scheme resembled that of Napoleon to obtain the command of the English Channel for the transit of his invading army; and it was foiled as decisively as that was at Trafalgar. After long detention by westerly winds, Hannibal encountered the enemy at the mouth of the Eurymedon, a scene famous for the double victory of Cimón. The practised seamanship of the Rhodians prevailed against superior numbers, and Hannibal's defeat was embittered by the reflection that, himself in the service of a foreign prince, he had encountered the ships of his country fighting on the side of Rome. Even the remnant of his fleet was prevented from entering the Ægean by the position which the victors took up, off Patara. Finally, just about the time when the Roman land army reached the Hellespont, and the ships of Attalus had been detached from Samos to its support, a last effort was made by Polyxenidas against the fleet thus weakened. The last sea-fight of the war took place at the promontory of Myonnesus.* The Romans broke the enemy's line, and cut off the left wing, sinking or capturing 42 ships; and the victory was recorded at Rome by an inscription in Saturnian verse, which told how the Romans "had settled the mighty strife and subdued the kings." It is well worth observing that, in all this maritime campaign, the Romans displayed consummate seamanship and were by no means indebted for all their success to the invaluable aid of the Rhodians, who were at this time the best mariners in the world.

But it was on the land that this first and decisive conflict between Rome and Asia had to be decided. Antiochus opened the campaign by ravaging the territory of Pergamus, while his son Seleucus laid siege to the city, with the hope of crushing his chief Asiatic enemy before the arrival of the Romans. But the unsteadiness of his Gallic mercenaries and the vigour of Eumenes compelled the raising of the siege, and Antiochus retired to Sardis to collect his forces. The precipitancy of his advance into Greece

* The action was fought nominally the 23rd of December, but, according to the corrected calendar about August, B.C. 190.

was now matched by his reckless abandonment of Thrace, without even drawing off his garrisons or destroying his magazines. It would doubtless have been imprudent to have risked his newly levied Asiatics beyond the Hellespont; but by placing them on its bank to defend the passage, and holding Lysimachia as an advanced post, he might have protracted the campaign so as to force the Romans to winter in Thrace, in the midst of his own country, and far from their supplies.

It was about the time when these preliminary campaigns by sea and land were decided, that the Roman army reached the Hellespont. The consul in command was Lucius Scipio, who is distinguished from his brother Publius by the title of Asiaticus, which he gained in this war. But he had none of his brother's genius; and he only obtained the provinces of Greece and Asia by the association of Africanus with him, nominally as legate, the charm of whose name called to arms 5000 of the veterans who had followed him in Spain and Africa. In the spring of B.C. 190 the Scipios arrived in Greece, to take command of the army of Glabrio, which was destined for the campaign in Asia. A delay occasioned by the resistance of the Ætolians to the severe terms imposed on them by the Senate was ended by a six months' armistice; and the army pursued its march through Thrace, where Philip secured them supplies, and peace with the barbarous tribes. They reached the Hellespont in the autumn, about the time of the battle of Myonesus. The strait which had been crossed by Darius and Xerxes, in the fruitless enterprize of extending Asiatic despotism into Europe, and by Alexander on the mission of shattering that despotism at its seat and founding Hellenic civilization on its ruins, was now passed by the Roman legions to fulfil the final destiny of the ancient world, its union under an empire founded on well-ordered law and government. Instead of resisting their passage, Antiochus sent an embassy to offer terms which, Scipio replied, might have been accepted under the walls of Lysimachia, but not now, "when the steed felt the bit and knew its rider." Nothing would suffice, short of the whole expenses of the war and the cession of Asia Minor. The king knew neither how to submit nor how to protract the war by falling back upon his resources and awaiting the ensuing spring. He staked all upon one great battle, which was fought in the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia, at the northern foot of Sipylus, the mountain which overhangs Smyrna on the other side. The Romans eagerly accepted the challenge, though their general had been left behind ill at Elæa,

and their force was far less than half the enemy's, including 5000 volunteers from Macedonia, Pergamus, and the Achæan league. But the king's army of 80,000 men, including 12,000 cavalry, was one of those mingled Asiatic hosts which had so often been scattered by the Greek and Macedonian phalanx, and which on that day did not even need the shock of the Roman legions to disperse them. There was indeed a phalanx on the side of Antiochus, but he cooped it up in a narrow space with double files thirty-two deep, in the middle of his second line between the Gallic and Cappadocian infantry, which again were flanked by the heavy cavalry called *Cataphractæ*, or cuirassiers. The front line was formed by the light-armed infantry, the war-chariots, and the mounted archers, among whom were to be seen Arabs upon dromedaries; and the fifty-four elephants were placed between the two divisions. The Romans adopted their usual mode of battle; but the protection afforded by the river enabled them to weaken their cavalry on the left wing, and to strengthen the right, which was led by Eumenes, who won the chief honours of the day. He began the battle by advancing his archers and slingers with orders to aim at the horses of the war-chariots and at the camels. Both turned about and carried confusion into the ranks of the cuirassiers behind them, while Eumenes led a charge of 3000 Roman horse upon the Gauls and Cappadocians, whose flight was imitated by the already disordered cavalry. The rout of the left wing was now complete, and the phalanx was uncovered on that side. Beset in front and flank by the victorious horse, it was compelled to suspend its advance against the Roman legions, and to form front both ways. Its great depth favoured the manœuvre, and the support of the heavy cavalry from the other wing might have enabled it long to hold its ground. But they were already far from the scene of action: under the command of Antiochus himself, they had driven in the weakened wing of cavalry; and with his usual aptitude for doing everything in the wrong time and place, the king was attacking the Roman camp, while his phalanx was assailed by the enemy's whole force. With its crowded ranks decimated by the archers and slingers—for the legions were still held in reserve—it was slowly retiring in good order, when the elephants, galled by the missiles, burst in among the ranks, and the broken phalanx joined in the headlong flight. The carnage which raged among its dense masses was only increased by a desperate effort to defend the camp. Considering that the army of Antiochus was annihilated by the impetuosity of the attack with-

out the legions being over engaged, we can readily believe that the Asiatics lost 50,000 men, at a cost to the Romans of only 24 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers.

As the battle of Magnesia was the last, in ancient history, of those unequal conflicts, in which oriental armies yielded like unsubstantial shows to the might of disciplined freedom, so it sealed the fate of the last of the great oriental empires; for the kingdom left to the heirs of Seleucus was only strong enough to indulge them in the luxuries of Antioch and the malignant satisfaction of persecuting the Jews. All resistance ceased in Asia Minor; that great peninsula was ceded as far as the Taurus and the Hælys, with whatever remained nominally to Antiochus in Thrace; and, with characteristic levity, he thanked the Romans for relieving him of the government of too large a kingdom. The peace was not finally ratified for two years (B.C. 188); and meanwhile the king had to bear the cost of the occupation of Asia Minor, amounting to 3000 talents, nearly £750,000; and the treaty of peace imposed on him, besides, a war-contribution of 15,000 Euboic talents, about £5,000,000. "With the day of Magnesia, Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never perhaps did a great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidæ under this Antiochus the Great. He himself was soon afterwards slain by the indignant inhabitants of Elymais at the head of the Persian Gulf, on occasion of the plundering of a temple of Bel, with the treasures of which he had sought to replenish his empty coffers" (B.C. 187).

Lucius Scipio Asiaticus, in retiring at the expiration of his consulship (B.C. 189), still left his successor, Cneius Manlius Vulso, work to do and laurels to win in the subjugation of the allies of Antiochus. The petty princes of Phrygia soon submitted to the power and exactions of the new lords of Western Asia; but the powerful Celtic tribes of Galatia made a stand in the fastnesses of Mount Olympus. Here, however, they were reached by the Roman slingers and archers, and after the flower of the cantons of the Tolisto and Tectosages had been slain or taken prisoners, the remnant found a refuge with the Trocmi beyond the Hælys. That river, fixed by the treaty with Antiochus as the eastern limit of Roman power in Asia, was respected as the present terminus of their conquests, without putting a bound to their influence. Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, was admitted to their alliance, at the intercession of his brother-in-law Eumenes, on paying a mitigated penalty of 300 talents; and the satraps of the

Greater and Lesser Armenia exchanged their allegiance to Antiochus for the friendship of Rome. The satrapy of Pontus, which became, as we have seen, an independent state during the last years of the Persian rule, was now held by Mithridates IV., the father-in-law of Antiochus. It was not till two generations later, that Mithridates V. formed an alliance with the Romans and aided them in the third Punic War; and a century had still to elapse from the death of Antiochus, before Mithridates the Great renewed the enterprise of seeking in Greece a battle-field for the sovereignty of Asia (B.C. 87). Of the states to the west of the Halys, Prusias was left in possession of Bithynia; but his dependence upon Rome was soon proved by his shameful betrayal of Hannibal: and the Gauls were bound to remain within their own territories. The exemption thus secured to the Greek cities from the contributions which they had been obliged to pay the barbarians won their warmest gratitude to Rome. These cities received their freedom, except where it could only have been granted at the expense of Eumenes, who consented, however, to grant special privileges to those which were still bound to pay him tribute. For the rest, this prince was justly rewarded for his sufferings and services by the apportionment of the greater part of the territories ceded by Antiochus to the aggrandizement of his kingdom. Pergamus became the most powerful state of Western Asia, including nearly the whole of Asia Minor up to the Halys and the Taurus, except Bithynia and Galatia on the one side, and on the other Lycia and the greater part of Caria, which went to recompense the fidelity of the Rhodians; and to these Asiatic possessions were added, in Europe, the Thracian Chersonese and the city of Lysimachia. Secure of having in the dynasty of the Attalids devoted allies, who were now as able as they always had been willing to keep a check upon Antiochus on the one hand and Philip on the other, the Romans were able to retire from Asia. Their last acts evinced their firm determination neither to interfere with any state beyond the Taurus, nor to acquire transmarine possessions by means of their fleet. "The Romans," says Mommsen, "brought nothing home from the East but honour and gold, which were, even at this period, usually conjoined in the practical shape assumed by the address of thanks—the golden chaplet." Even the honour of their arms was placed in peril by the losses which they suffered from the attacks of the barbarians on their homeward march through Thrace, under the proconsul Manlius, after the ratification of the treaty with Antiochus (B.C. 188).

A policy precisely similar guided their settlement of the affairs of Greece. When the consul Manlius passed over into Asia, his colleague, M. Fulvius Nobilior, landed at Apollonia to coerce the Ætolians, who had flagrantly violated the armistice made with Scipio (B.C. 189). A single campaign reduced them to complete submission; and, besides the payment of a large contribution, they lost a great part of their possessions, including the port of Ambracia and the island of Cephallenia; but the latter, with the neighbouring island of Samé, had to be reduced by force. These islands and Zacynthus were retained by the Romans, to strengthen the hold which Coreyra already gave them of the Adriatic. With this exception, and their slip of territory on the Illyrian coast, they resolved not to be tempted over the seas which divided Italy from Greece; and all the other gains of the recent war were divided between Philip and the Achæans. But even their policy of moderation was carried out in such a manner as to offend both these allies, and to sow the seeds of future disagreement. The Macedonian king, who had not only resisted the temptations of Antiochus, but had fought against the Ætolians and smoothed the passage of the legions through Thrace, saw a rival planted in that country in a spirit of manifest suspicion. The Achæans reluctantly gave up the island of Zacynthus and their claims upon Ægina, and were humiliated by being advised to confine themselves to the Peloponnesus. The patriot party chafed at finding themselves not only subject to Roman intervention, but invoking it by their utter inability to keep their own confederacy in order. The accession of Sparta to the league, and the enforced inclusion of Messene, which had prayed to be admitted to the Roman alliance as an independent state, revived ancient national antipathies. Sparta broke out into open revolt, and suffered severe punishment as a conquered city, even the institutions of Lysurgus being superseded by the Achæan laws (B.C. 188). The Roman Senate, constantly appealed to as arbiters in these disputes, showed a reluctance to interfere, which was partly founded on the frivolous weakness displayed by the envoys; and it has been well observed that, instead of their carrying strife to Greece, it was the Greeks that carried their dissensions to Rome. The revolt of Messene, in B.C. 183, led to the death of Philopœmen, who was taken prisoner and compelled to swallow poison in his dungeon. His death was amply avenged, and his remains interred with heroic honours at Megalopolis, the urn containing his ashes being carried by the historian Polybius.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE SUBJUGATION OF GREECE. B.C. 187 TO B.C. 146.

“He who hath bent him o’er the dead
 Ere the first day of death is fled,
 The first dark day, of nothingness,
 The last of danger and distress—

* * * *

Some moments, aye, one treacherous hour,
 He still might doubt the tyrant’s power ;
 Such is the aspect of this shore ;
 ’Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.”

DISCONTENT OF PHILIP—HIS RENEWED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—HIS SONS DEMETRIUS AND PERSEUS—MURDER OF DEMETRIUS—DEATH OF PHILIP—HIS CHARACTER—ACCESSION OF PERSEUS—HIS PREPARATIONS AGAINST ROME—BARBARIAN ALLIANCES—STATE OF HELLENIC FEELING—THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR—INDECISIVE CAMPAIGNS—THE ROMAN GENERALS INCOMPETENT: THEIR ARMIES DISORGANIZED—Q. MARCIUS PHILIPPUS—INVASION OF MACEDONIA—THE ARMIES AT TEMPE—LUCIUS ÆMILIUS PAULUS ELECTED CONSUL—HIS CHARACTER—DECISIVE BATTLE OF PYDNE—FINAL DESTRUCTION OF THE MACEDONIAN PHALANX—CAPTURE AND FATE OF PERSEUS—SETTLEMENT OF MACEDONIA—NEW RELATIONS OF ROME TO THE HELLENIC STATES—PERSEUS AND THE RHODIANS—AFFAIRS OF SYRIA AND EGYPT—ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES AND THE ROMAN ENVOY—HOW TO CIRCUMSCRIBE A CIRCLE ABOUT A KING—ROMAN ALLIANCE WITH THE MACCABEES—POLICY OF ROME TOWARDS FOREIGN STATES—SETTLEMENT OF GREECE—PATRIOT AND ROMAN PARTIES—EXECUTIONS AND DEPORTATIONS—THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE—LYCORTAS AND CALLICRATES—DEPORTATION OF 1000 ACHÆANS—THE HISTORIAN POLYBIUS—DEVASTATION OF EPIRUS—TRIUMPH AND DEATH OF ÆMILIUS—THE ADELPHI OF TERENCE—QUARREL OF ATHENS AND OROPUS—EMBASSY OF THE PHILOSOPHERS TO ROME—OROPUS, SPARTA, AND THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE—RETURN OF THE ACHÆAN EXILES—ANDRISCUS, THE MACEDONIAN PRETENDER—ROMAN COMMISSIONERS IN GREECE—RIOTS AT CORINTH—WAR WITH THE ACHÆANS—SACK OF CORINTH BY MUMMIUS—GREECE BECOMES THE ROMAN PROVINCE OF ACHAIA.

WHILE the Romans were contending in the East with Philip and Antiochus, they had been compelled to meet resistance and insurrection in the West. It will be convenient, however, to reserve the little that need be said of the Gallic, Ligurian, and Spanish wars, with the more important subject of the internal history of Rome, till we have traced the brief closing chapters of the contest of the Latin with the Hellenic and Phœnician nations. Macedonia and Carthage were in a very similar position towards Rome; too deeply humiliated ever to be fully trusted; and exposed by that humiliation to constant aggressions and complaints from their more favoured neighbours; out of which some pretext of necessity must inevitably arise for putting an end to their embarrassing existence. The fate of Macedonia involved that of Greece, where the Roman settlement had left the smouldering embers of discontent, which internal discord was ready to fan into a flame.

Philip, whose warm support of the Romans in the late war had doubtless been confirmed by resentment against Antiochus, not unmingled with the hope of recovering the ancient possessions of Macedonia in Thrace, saw the kingdom of Lysimachus revived in favour of the Attalids, the greatest enemies of his house. His occupation of the conquests of Antiochus in Northern Greece, which had been bestowed upon him by the Romans, was resisted by the Thessalians. He was continually denounced in the diet of the Greek confederations, and the perpetual complaints made against him at Rome were followed by decisions which gave him numerous causes for resentment. But he had the power of dissembling what he was resolved no longer to endure, and his only reply to the taunts of his enemies was, in the words of the poet, "our last sun is not yet set." Meanwhile he was aided in keeping on good terms with the republic by his younger son Demetrius, who, having been sent as a hostage to Rome, entered warmly into the views of the philo-Hellenic party. But when Philip was informed by the Senate that they forgave his provocations for his son's sake, he began to view the latter with suspicion, and his elder son Perseus found means to give his jealousy a fatal issue. Demetrius, who had returned to Macedonia, was accused of being a party to the intrigues which were constantly on foot to form a Roman party; and appearances at least were so much against him, that he meditated flight to Rome. This intention, made known to Philip, acquired the character of a plot from an intercepted letter of Flaminius; and the father ordered the execution of his son. The deed was scarcely done, when Philip discovered the intrigues of Perseus, whose punishment he was meditating, when he died, overwhelmed with remorse and disappointment, in the fifty-ninth year of his age and the forty-second of his reign.

"Philip V. was a genuine king, in the best and worst sense of the term. A strong desire to rule in person and unaided was the fundamental trait of his character; he was proud of his people, but he was no less proud of other gifts, and he had reason to be so. He not only showed the valour of a soldier and the eye of a general, but he displayed a high spirit in the conduct of public affairs whenever his Macedonian sense of honour was offended. Full of intelligence and wit, he won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain, and especially of those who were ablest and most refined, such as Flaminius and Scipio: he was a pleasant boon companion, and, not by virtue of his rank alone, a dangerous wooer. But he was at the same time one of the most arrogant and flagitious

characters which that shameless age produced. He was in the habit of saying that he feared none save the gods; but it seemed almost as if his gods were those to whom his admiral Diæarchus regularly offered sacrifice—Ungodliness and Lawlessness. The lives of his advisers and of the promoters of his schemes possessed no sacredness in his eyes; and it is quoted as one of his maxims of state, that whoever puts to death the father must also kill the sons.* His career was a striking illustration of the accidents of a despotic monarchy. Having first by his selfish neglect shipwrecked the enterprize of Hannibal, his great talents were unable to preserve his own from the same ruin through the like faults in Antiochus. Passion robbed him of the offered distinction of becoming the leader of the Greeks; and the prince who, as a mere boy, seemed able to set a limit to the advance of Roman conquest, lived to be borne upon its tide as a zealous vassal, and died vainly meditating how to turn it back (B.C. 179).

His son PERSEUS, the last king of Macedonia, was of a character altogether different. Succeeding to the throne at the age of thirty-one, and with a military reputation early gained in the war against the Romans, he brought to the execution of his father's last schemes that self-discipline in which Philip had been most deficient; while, free from the weaker vices of Philip's more genial character, he inherited all his arrogance and unscrupulousness. His stately person and carriage, and his accomplishment in all manly exercises, were worthy of a royal captain; and he was persevering in the formation of elaborate plans. But when the time of action came, he wanted the genius and versatility of his father; and the care with which he amassed treasures for his campaigns was neutralized by his reluctance to part with them on the greatest emergency. "It is a characteristic circumstance," says Mommsen, "that after defeat the father first hastened to destroy the papers in his cabinet that might compromise him, whereas the son took his treasure-chests and embarked."

Macedonia had been far more humiliated than weakened during the reign of Philip. She still formed a compact territory, rich in agriculture, mines, and commerce; and the eighteen years that had elapsed since the peace with Rome had renewed her resources under Philip's constant care. An army of 30,000 men, with the means of paying 10,000 mercenaries, and immense provisions of corn and arms, formed the nucleus of a formidable force, if only other powers could be brought into a new coalition against Rome.

* Mommsen, vol. ii. pp. 224-5.

But all such schemes failed both in Carthage and in Asia; and the plot to murder Eumenes at Delphi, on his return from Rome in B.C. 172, would have been fruitless had it succeeded. The attempts to gain over the barbarians on the north prospered better. Perseus secured allies among the Illyrians, and among the powerful Odrysians on the Lower Danube. Philip had previously formed a scheme for pouring down into Italy over the Eastern Alps a torrent of barbarians from beyond the left bank of the Middle Danube, but the whole horde was destroyed by the resistance of the Dardani (in Servia); and the fortress of Aquileia, at the head of the Gulf of Trieste, seems to have been built about this time to protect the eastern frontier.

Throughout the Hellenic world, in Asia as well as Europe, the sentiment of discontent against the foreign power of Rome, and against Eumenes as its instrument, led the national party to look with hope towards Perseus. He was received with favour at Delphi, where he used the pretext of a religious vow to display his army before the eyes of the Greeks, and his proclamations were posted in various cities, inviting refugees to come to Macedonia. The whole Rhodian fleet escorted his Syrian bride from Antioch; envoys from the disaffected cities of Thrace and Asia held secret conferences with Macedonian officers, and Perseus made alliances with the Byzantines, the Ætoliens, and some of the Bœotians. So prudently, however, did the king conduct all his intrigues, that it was not till the seventh year of his reign, after Eumenes had appeared at Rome to prefer a long list of accusations against Perseus, that the Senate resolved upon the Third and last Macedonian War (B.C. 172).

From this moment, Perseus began to show that irresolution in action which contrasted so strangely with his long and patient preparations. The winter, which ought to have been spent in securing a position in Greece, was wasted in discussing the Roman declaration of war, through the medium of Q. Marcius Philippus, who had connections of hospitality with Perseus, while the Roman envoys were busy among the Greeks. Among the Achæans, even the patriot party held firm to their alliance: their influence was predominant among the Thessalians; and even the Ætoliens had a general devoted to the Romans. The fourth great confederacy, that of the Bœotians, was divided, and its disruption—upon the demand of the Roman envoy, that each of the cities should declare in his presence what part they took—was attended with open hostilities. Coronea and Haliartus, which had formed alliances with

Perseus, were besieged by the united force of the other cities, led by the Roman envoy, Publius Lentulus. On the breaking out of the war, all the Greeks of Asia Minor, who had shown friendly dispositions to Perseus, and even Byzantium, declared in favour of the Romans; and the only substantial aid that the king received was from Cotys, the chieftain of the Odrysians. Though thus left alone, he was able to bring into the field an army of 43,000 men, of whom 21,000 were soldiers of the phalanx, and 4000 Macedonian and Thracian cavalry.

Early in the spring of B.C. 171, the consul P. Licinius Crassus landed at Apollonia, and found himself in command of between 30,000 and 40,000 Italians, and 10,000 auxiliaries, among whom the most important were the troops of Attalus and the Numidian cavalry. The fleet had already appeared in the *Ægean* under C. Lucretius. It numbered only forty ships, as the treaty had prohibited the Macedonian king from maintaining a navy to oppose it; but it carried 10,000 troops, 2000 of whom were at once despatched to garrison Larissa, in preparation for the campaign in Thessaly. The first collision occurred in the neighbourhood of that city. Crassus proved utterly incompetent as a commander, and the superiority of the Macedonian and Thracian horse gave an easy victory to Perseus. He forthwith proposed a peace, which the Romans at once rejected, both because it was their rule not to negotiate after a reverse, and because the instant revolt of Greece would have followed such a confession of defeat.

This result was in fact imminent, had Perseus known how to improve his advantage, the news of which flew through Greece while Crassus was leading his army up and down in Thessaly. But a check which the king received in a second cavalry engagement was made an excuse for retiring into Macedonia, thereby of course resigning the hope of calling the Hellenic patriots to arms. The Romans used the opportunity to subdue the Macedonian garrisons in Thessaly and the two Boeotian cities of Haliartus and Coronea, the inhabitants of which were sold into slavery, while Perseus maintained, upon the whole, the superiority in Illyria and Epirus. In the ensuing year, Perseus repulsed three several attempts of the consul, A. Hostilius Mancinus, and of the western army under Appius Claudius, to penetrate into Macedonia, and inflicted a severe defeat upon the latter in Epirus. Had his father been in his place, it would have been easy to crush the Roman army, which was utterly disorganized by the weakness of its commanders and the licence of the recent sieges (B.C. 170).

The third campaign was opened by the new consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, with a movement the boldness of which gave Perseus a still better opportunity than the inactivity of his predecessors. Resolved to penetrate at all hazards into Macedonia, Marcius left one division to face the force that guarded the pass of Tempe, and led his main army over the defiles of Olympus, which Perseus had neglected to guard, down to the coast at Heracleum. Here the consul found himself between the garrison of Tempe in his rear and the main army posted in a strong position on the little river Elpius. But Perseus, preoccupied with the one idea that the impregnable defence of Tempe had been turned, fled in alarm to Pydna, where he ordered his ships to be burnt and his treasures to be sunk in the sea. It was only when the consul's unresisted progress was stopped after four days for want of supplies, that the king took courage to turn upon him. Meanwhile the surrender of Tempe saved the Romans by restoring their communications with Thessaly; and for the rest of the year the two armies confronted each other ally on the banks of the Elpius, while the Romans gained no advantage in Illyria, and failed to take Demetrias, or even to keep command of the Ægean against the light Macedonian cruisers. Thus the war had done little save to give one more illustration of that fortune of the Romans which so often saved them from their own errors through the greater errors of their antagonists. It was time that the scale should be turned by the appearance of a true Roman general, and such an one appeared in the new consul LUCIUS ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

This eminent man added to his own great merits the distinction of being the son of the gallant but unfortunate consul who fell at Cannæ, and the father of the celebrated general who finally avenged that calamity by the destruction of Carthage.* He was one of the few who combined the amenities of Greek culture with the virtues of the old nobility. Though possessed of a fortune slender enough to correspond to his name, and therefore cramped in what was now a chief means of political advancement; he would not condescend to flatter the populace, and he is emphatically distin-

* The younger Africanus was adopted by Publius Cornelius Scipio, the elder son of the elder Africanus. In accordance with the Roman custom, he received his new father's name, with that of his own *gens* affixed in the form of the derived adjective; and became P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Æmilianus. The eldest son of Paulus was adopted by the great Q. Fabius Maximus, and he became Q. Fabius Maximus Æmilianus. *Paulus* (in the English form *Paul*) signifies in Latin *Little*. It is an interesting fact in the history of Roman names, that the indifferent order of the gentile and family names first occurs in the case of the *Æmilii Pauli* or *Pauli Æmilii*.

guished by a contemporary as "one of the few Romans of that age to whom one could not offer money." Born about B.C. 230, he was prætor in B.C. 191, and only attained to the consulship in B.C. 181. In the former office he distinguished himself in the Lusitanian War; in the latter, by his conquest of seven Ligurian tribes. Thirteen years were now devoted to the education of the two sons, whose exploits so well repaid his care; and it was equally a tribute to his merit, and a confession that the state could no longer dispense with his services, when he was elected consul for the second time, in order to finish the Macedonian War. His sixty years had ripened his experience, without impairing his energy; and the army stood in the greatest need of his stern discipline. His two sons accompanied him to the theatre of war, where the younger Africanus served under his father at the same age (17) at which the elder had saved his father's life.

On arriving at Heracleum, Paulus found the two armies encamped in their old positions on the Elpius. By seizing the pass which leads over Olympus from Pythium to Dium, he turned the Macedonian position, and forced Perseus to fall back to Pydna. Here the decisive battle was fought on the 22nd of June, B.C. 168.* An accidental collision between the outposts brought on the conflict a day earlier than that fixed by Paulus. It was the last and most formidable trial of strength between the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion, and Paulus afterwards confessed that he had trembled for the issue. His vanguard was dispersed, and the legions themselves moved backwards, though in good order, till they reached the hill in front of their own camp. The phalanx, already disordered by their hasty advance, and isolated from their supports, were unable to preserve their serried ranks on the broken ground; and the Roman cohorts, pouring round their flanks and rear, searched out every gap. The cavalry, after looking on inactive for a time, caught the alarm that all was lost, and Perseus himself was the first to fly. Still the deserted phalanx fought to the last, and the select 3000 perished to a man. It seemed, says Mommsen, "as if the phalanx, which fought its last great battle at Pydna, had wished itself to perish there." No less than 20,000 men were left dead upon the field, and 11,000 were taken prisoners. The war was ended; and all Macedonia submitted in little more than a fortnight from the arrival of Paulus.

* According to the disordered Roman calendar, the 4th of September. The date is fixed by an eclipse of the moon, which was announced beforehand to the army, lest they should deem it an evil omen.

Perseus fled to the island of Samothrace, with the 3000 talents which ought long since to have been devoted to the war. A few faithful adherents followed him; but when he made the mean attempt to propitiate the enemy by putting one of them to death as the instigator of the attempt to murder Eumenes, the rest deserted him. A letter which he sent to the Roman general was returned because he designated himself King; and he then surrendered at discretion, with his children and his treasures. His pusillanimous supplications might have provoked the resentment of a man less mindful than Paulus of the mutability of fortune; but the consul received him with a courtesy worthy of the first great king who had ever been a prisoner to the Roman people. After his stately form had graced his conqueror's triumph in the following year (B.C. 171), he was released from prison at the intercession of Paulus, and died in retirement at Alba. The humiliating story of the last successor of Philip and Alexander does not need to be adorned with the fabulous accounts of cruelties and sufferings. Some say that his guards tortured him to death by depriving him of sleep: others, that he ended his life by voluntary starvation: and his son is said to have earned his living as a scrivener at Rome.

Of the only two allies of Perseus, the Illyrian king Genthius was subdued about the same time by the prætor Lucius Anicius, in a month's campaign. Illyria was parcelled out into petty states dependent upon Rome; and its piratical fleet was given to the Greeks on the Adriatic. Cotys, the king of Thrace, made his peace with Rome the more easily, as he might become a check on the increased power of Pergamum. Macedonia itself was broken up into the four republican federations of Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia, which were modelled after the pattern of the Hellenic Leagues, and paid to Rome 100 talents annually, the half of the old land-tax. This constitution lasted to the time of Augustus, though Macedonia was made a province of Rome in B.C. 146. Thus ended the kingdom of Macedonia, having survived the death of Alexander a little more than a century and a half.

The fall of Macedonia involved a new settlement of the relations of Rome to the Hellenic states. The great power blotted out from the list of nations was not only a dangerous enemy, but sometimes, as had been proved in the reign of Philip, a useful ally; and, now that it could be no longer used as a check on Greece and Asia Minor, so there was the less reason for maintaining other

powers to keep it itself in check. Hence, followed a course of action more politic than generous. The kingdom of Pergamus, after all its services to the Romans, began to feel the curb; and, when Eumenes was stopped at Brundisium by a decree of the Senate, that kings should no longer visit Rome to plead their cause in person, he learnt that "the epoch of half-powerful and half-free alliance was at an end; that of impotent subjection had begun." No better pretext could be found for this treatment than a suspicion, apparently unfounded, of secret relations between Eumenes and Perseus; but the other Asiatic ally of Rome, the Rhodian state, had done much to bring down punishment on itself. Their open manifestation of Hellenic sympathies with Perseus has been already noticed, and they did not hesitate to denounce Eumenes as the instigator of a war injurious to all the Greeks. Still they took part with Rome; but their sufferings from the loss of their commerce with Macedonia appear to have given the anti-Roman party a temporary ascendancy, or else their republican arrogance and naval power led them to presume on their services; and, at the very time when Q. Marcius was encamped within Tempe, envoys appeared both at his head-quarters and in the Senate, to say that the Rhodians would no longer tolerate hostilities so injurious to themselves. Their abject submission, with the severe punishment of the partisans of Macedonia, scarcely averted a declaration of war; and in spite of the protest of Cato against punishing allies who had committed no act of hostility, Rhodes was deprived of all its possessions on the mainland; its freedom of commerce was restrained, and a rival free port opened at Delos; and its petition for the privileges of an ally was only tardily granted in B.C. 164.

With regard to the Hellenic kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, Rome was content with the part of an umpire, which she played in a manner thoroughly characteristic. A new war had broken out for the possession of Cœle-Syria and Palestine, which had been charged with the dower of Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great, or, as the Egyptians maintained, ceded at her marriage. The notorious Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (the younger son of Antiochus the Great), who had succeeded his brother Seleucus IV. Philopator in B.C. 175, had carried on the war for three years with such success that, in the same year in which Perseus was conquered, he had already laid siege to Alexandria, and would probably have seized Egypt, under the name of guardian to his infant nephew Ptolemy VI. Philometor, when a Roman embassy appeared in his camp, headed by C. Popilius Lænas. The envoy

presented to the king the letter of the Senate, bidding him to restore all he had taken from Egypt, and to keep himself within Syria. Antiochus read the letter, and promised to consider it with his councillors. Thereupon Popilius drew a line with his staff round the spot where the king stood, and bade him decide before he crossed that line. Antiochus felt himself in the hands of the power that had quelled his father, and yielded to the demands of Rome (B.C. 168). Before turning from this quarter of the world, we must notice that the great revolt of the Jews under Mattathias, the father of the Maccabees, against the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes, broke out in this same year (B.C. 168); and that the Romans, pursuing their policy of curbing the eastern powers, made an alliance with the Jews in B.C. 161, though the death of Judas Maccabeus immediately afterwards made it fruitless for the present.*

These proceedings furnish at once a decisive proof, that the civilized states of the East had fallen under the power of Rome, and the last examples of the old Roman policy towards vanquished states. Polybius justly dates from the battle of Pydna the establishment of Rome's universal empire. "It was, in fact, the last battle in which a civilized state confronted Rome in the field on a footing of equality with her as a great power; all subsequent struggles were rebellions or wars with peoples beyond the pale of the Romano-Greek civilization—the barbarians, as they were called. The whole civilized world thenceforth recognized in the Roman Senate the supreme tribunal, whose commissioners decided in the last resort between kings and nations; and, to acquire its language and manners, foreign princes and noble youths resided in Rome. A palpable and earnest attempt to get rid of her dominion was in reality made only once—by the great Mithridates of Pontus. The battle of Pydna, moreover, marks the last occasion on which the Senate still adhered to the state maxim, that they should, if possible, hold no possessions and maintain no garrisons beyond the Italian seas, but should keep the numerous states dependent on them in order by a mere political supremacy. The aim of their policy was, that these states should neither decline into utter weakness and anarchy, as had nevertheless happened in Greece, nor emerge out of their half-free position into complete independence, as Macedonia had attempted to do, not without success.

* The details of the Maccabean revolt belong to the special department of Scriptural History. We shall have another occasion to review the whole history of Judæa under the Maccabees and Asmoneans.

Accordingly, the vanquished foe held at least an equal, often a better, position with the Roman diplomatists than the faithful ally; and, while a defeated opponent was often reinstated, those who attempted to reinstate themselves were abased—as the Ætoli-ans, the Macedonians after the Asiatic war, Rhodes, and Pergamus soon learned by experience. But not only did this part of protector soon prove as irksome to the masters as to the servants: the Roman protectorate, with its ungrateful Sisyphean toil, that continually needed to be begun afresh, showed itself to be intrinsically untenable. Indications of a change of system, and of an increasing disinclination on the part of Rome to tolerate by its side intermediate states, even in such independence as was possible for them, were very clearly given in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy after the battle of Pydna. The more and more frequent, the more and more unavoidable intervention in the internal affairs of the small Greek states, in connection with their misgovernment and their political and social anarchy,—the disarming of Macedonia, where the northern frontier at any rate required a defence different from that of mere posts,—and lastly, the introduction of the payment of land-tax to Rome from Macedonia and Illyria,—were so many symptoms of the approaching conversion of the client states into subjects of Rome.”*

The application of these principles to the states of Greece Proper was the more inevitable on account of their internal divisions. We have already seen what fierce dissensions rent even the most patriotic of the Greek confederacies—the Achæan League. The last Macedonian war had the effect, in every Grecian state, of bringing into direct antagonism a national and a Roman party; and the fall of Perseus was the signal for the triumph of the latter, with all the atrocities of the worst days of Greek factions. All who had made themselves obnoxious to the party now dominant were denounced as partisans of Perseus, and were either put to death on the charge of treason, or deported to Rome for trial. Lyciscus, the general of the Ætolian League, had 500 patriots executed by the sentence of the diet. Similar scenes were enacted in Thessaly, Bœotia, and Acarnania; nor did the loyalty of the Achæan League to the Roman alliance save it from its fate; for Rome never hesitated between generosity and opportunity. The confederacy had long been divided into a patriotic and a Roman party. Since the death of Philopœmen, in B.C. 183, the former had been led by Lycortas, the general of the League, and

* Mommsen, vol. ii. pp. 311-12.

father of the historian Polybius. He is first mentioned in B.C. 189; as one of the envoys to Rome on the collision between Sparta and the Achæan League; and, after supporting and continuing the policy of Philopœmen, he finally succeeded in bringing back Sparta and Messene into the confederacy. In B.C. 179 he distinguished himself by his firm opposition to the demand of the Romans for the restoration of all the Spartan exiles; and, during the war with Perseus, he prevailed on the Achæans to preserve neutrality. The last mention of his name is in the year of the defeat of Perseus; and this seems to have been the last year of his life. His leading opponent was Callicrates, one of those characters who, branded as traitors by the patriots of their own country, have gained the dubious eulogies of philosophical historians for their discernment in deserting the cause of freedom. He first showed his colours when, sent to Rome to support the views which Lycortas had carried in the diet against the restoration of the Spartan exiles, he did not scruple to urge upon the Senate the policy of giving active support to the Roman party in all the Hellenic states* (B.C. 179). He returned, the bearer of such letters of approval from the Senate, that the league could not refuse to elect him general. In B.C. 174, we find him again in opposition, resisting the motion of the general Xenarchus for an alliance with Perseus; and, in B.C. 168, he thwarted the proposal of Lycortas for sending aid to Egypt against Antiochus Epiphanes, by producing a letter from the preconsul Q. Marcius, commanding the League to confine itself to friendly mediation. And now, when Paulus Æmilius was settling the affairs of Greece, Callicrates seized the opportunity to denounce 1000 of the Achæan patriots for complicity with Perseus, and they were carried to Rome for trial (B.C. 167). Their removal was doubtless meant by the Romans as an act of precaution rather than of vengeance: they were distributed in honourable captivity among the Italian towns; but any attempt to escape was punished with death. They were permitted to return after seventeen years (B.C. 151). Callicrates reaped the reward of their betrayal in the hatred of his

* Mommsen says of this conduct:—"Callicrates the Achæan, who went to the senate to enlighten it as to the state of matters in Peloponnesus, and to demand a consistent and sustained intervention"—(he *did* this, but *went* to do the very opposite)—"may as a man have had somewhat less ability than his countryman Philopœmen, who was the main founder of the patriotic policy; but he was in the right." There is all the difference in the world between confessing, in the light of history, that the Greeks had lost the capacity for freedom, and lauding the traitor who used the melancholy fact as a pretext for foreign intervention.

countrymen, who deemed it a pollution to bathe with him, while the very boys threw the name of traitor in his teeth: but yet later ages have reaped unspeakable benefit from his crime. Among the exiles was the historian Polybius, whose long residence at Rome, and friendship with the younger Africanus and other leading Roman statesmen, gave him that accurate information, and that knowledge of Roman policy which combined with the love of freedom in which he had been trained, and the endowments bestowed upon him by nature, to make him the greatest of ancient historians, except Thucydides. But for the long didactic essays, into which he was led by over-anxiety to make his work instructive, he might have shared the honours of the first rank among historians.*

This deportation, of course, rendered the Achæans helpless for the present, and secured the ascendancy of Callicrates, in spite of their hatred. The Athenians were rewarded for their neutrality by the gift of the ruined city of Haliartus, in Bœotia, and of Lemnos and Delos, the latter being made a free port, as a rival to Rhodes. Amphipolis and Leucas were taken from the Ætolians and the Acarnanians, who had betrayed some sympathy with Perseus, while the Epirots, who had openly espoused his cause, felt the utmost resentment of the victors. By the command of the Senate,

* The peculiar character of the work of Polybius is indicated by its very title, which is not a *History*, but *Pragmatia* (πραγματεία), that is, an *investigation* or *essay* of the subject treated, in contrast to the *Apollonius Historias* (ιστορίαις ἀποδείξις), or *statement of information* of Herodotus. Intermediate between the two is the method of Thucydides, in which principles are connected with the facts that illustrate or suggest them, instead of being drawn out into didactic digressions. The work of Polybius, which was a continuation of the *History* of Aratus (see p. 115), consisted of forty books, and embraced the important period from the accession of Philip V. to the extinction of Hellenic independence (B.C. 220—146). As the author lived from about B.C. 204 to B.C. 122, and had the opportunity of learning the earlier events he records from eye-witnesses, both in Greece and at Rome, the work is strictly one of contemporaneous history. But his impartiality in dealing with his own times is not more remarkable than the conscientious diligence of his researches into the earlier periods which he notices by way of introduction and digression; and we have special means of judging his merits, by comparing him with the careless and one-sided rhetoric of Livy. His work has, moreover, the artistic character of unity. Its subject was the real establishment of the Roman empire, in the space of fifty-three years from the accession of Philip V. to the conquest of Perseus. This occupied the first part of his work, to which the second, relating the final subjection of Greece, may be regarded as a supplement. Unhappily we possess only the first five books entire, with fragments of the rest. Remembering that Polybius would of course write in the language of his own age, and not in that of two or three centuries earlier, it is scarcely necessary to notice the amusing objection made to his style by the Cambridge scholar, who said he never read Polybius *because it was bad Greek*.

Æmilius destroyed seventy of their towns, and sold 150,000 of the people into slavery. Paulus, who had remained in Greece to regulate these affairs with ten commissioners, returned to Rome in the autumn of B.C. 167. He brought an enormous spoil into the treasury, and celebrated a three days' triumph, the most magnificent that had ever ascended to the Capitol. A king, loaded with chains, for the first time walked before a proconsul's triumphal car, and behind it rode on horseback the two sons of Paulus, Q. Fabius Maximus and P. Cornelius Scipio. But the man, whose family had been his chief care, must have felt all this but little consolation for the loss of his two younger sons, boys of twelve and fourteen, who died, one a few days before and the other a few days later. For once, the office of the slave was superfluous, who was wont to ride behind the victor's car, to remind its occupant that he was mortal (B.C. 167). The proud name of Æmilius Paulus Macedonicus died with him in B.C. 160, owing to the adoption of his two sons into other families. His funeral games are memorable for the first exhibition of the *Adelphi* of Terence.

The final catastrophe was still prolonged for twenty years: but little remains to be told of the interval. Athens and Sparta appear as petty states, contributing indirectly to the destruction of that Hella, for the supremacy of which they once contended. The city of Solon, Themistocles, and Pericles, was reduced to dependence for the supply of her expenses on the bounty of the Ptolemies; and when that failed her, she returned to piracy, like the Greeks before the age of civilization. An expedition against Oropus in Eubœa provoked an appeal to the Roman Senate, who referred the question to the Sicyonians, and Athens was condemned to pay the enormous fine of 500 talents,—the measure, not of the injuries inflicted on Oropus, but of her presumption in taking up arms (B.C. 156). An embassy was sent to Rome to deprecate the severity of the sentence; and just five years after the passing of a law banishing all philosophers and rhetoricians, the Senate received as envoys the three chief masters of the philosophic schools of Athens, Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Carneades the founder of the third Academy. The last, in particular, charmed the leading men of Rome by his declamations, the most celebrated of which were those on Justice, which he delivered on successive days. His magnificent eulogium of Justice, on the first day, won even the sternest Romans of the old school—and among them Cato—to doubt whether they themselves had exercised the virtue towards the Greek philosophers. But when, on the

second day, the orator proceeded to answer all his former arguments, and to prove that justice was a mere conventional device for the maintenance of civil order, Cato indignantly moved the Senate to send the sophist back again to his school, and not to suffer the Roman youth to be corrupted.

The mitigation of the fine to 100 talents still left it beyond the resources of the Athenians, who seem to have taken the first opportunity of revenging themselves on Oropus (B.C. 150). This time the Oropians appealed to the Achæan League, relying less on the justice of their cause than on the corruption of the leading statesmen. So far as the transaction is intelligible, a bribe of ten talents was given to Menalcidas, the general of the league, who promised the half of it to Callicrates, for the use of his all-powerful influence. This promise he failed to keep, and Callicrates revenged himself by accusing Menalcidas, who was a Spartan, of advising the Romans to sever Sparta from the league. Menalcidas only escaped condemnation by a present to Diæus, his successor in the office of general; but Diæus—and this says something for the remnant of public virtue left among the Achæans—Diæus fell into such disgrace by the transaction that he was fain to occupy the attention of the confederacy by urging a new attack on the Spartans, on the ground that they had violated the laws of the league by a private appeal to Rome respecting a disputed boundary.

Other events had occurred to inflame and encourage the war party. In B.C. 151 the Achæan exiles had returned from Rome, having been dismissed with a sort of contemptuous mercy. After the repeated rejection of their petition for liberty, their cause was espoused by P. Scipio, as the friend of Polybius. Cato, gained over by Scipio, decided the question by a characteristic speech, thrown in when the debate was almost exhausted. "Have we nothing better to do," said he, "than to sit here all day long, debating whether a parcel of worn-out Greeks shall be carried to their graves here or in Achaia?" But when the exiles proceeded to petition the Senate for restoration to their honours, Cato told Polybius, with a smile, that he resembled Ulysses returning to the cave of the Cyclops for the hat and sash he had left behind. Of the 300 exiles who landed in Greece—for to this had their number been reduced—almost the only one who had learned the necessity of moderation was Polybius himself. They were mad enough to look with hope towards Andriscus, a low-born adventurer, who called himself Philip, and claimed the Macedonian throne as

the son of Persæus, but was defeated and taken prisoner by the prætor, Q. Metellus, after some brief success. In the same year Polybius retired from a scene where he found no good to be done, to join his friend Scipio in the Third Punic War; and Callicrates died at Rhodes, on an embassy to Rome respecting the affairs of Sparta, leaving his epitaph to be written by the traveller Pausanias, "his death being, for aught I know, a clear gain to the country" (B.C. 149).

Thus every check on the war-party was removed; and the Spartans were left no resource but an appeal to Rome. The Senate sent two commissioners, who decided that the Achæan League should give up, not only Sparta, but Corinth; that is, that they should surrender the key of Peloponnesus, together with all other cities not Achæan (B.C. 147). The sentence was received with the greatest dissatisfaction at Corinth itself: the indignation of the citizens vented itself in an attack on the Spartan residents; and the Roman commissioners themselves were endangered in the riot. After a second fruitless embassy, to demand satisfaction for this new outrage, the Senate declared war against the Achæan League, and the prætor Metellus was ordered to march into Peloponnesus. The Achæan general Critolaus proved as incompetent in the field as he had been headstrong in council. Abandoning the defence of Thermopylæ, he was overtaken and defeated at Scarpheia in Locris, he himself never again being heard of. The other leader of the war party, Diaus, succeeded him as general, and checked the progress of Metellus; but meanwhile a second Roman army landed at the Isthmus under the consul Lucius Mummius. Diaus, marching to the defence of Corinth, was utterly defeated; and the city was evacuated, not only by the Achæan troops, but by the mass of the inhabitants. Their retirement failed to save Corinth from being made one of the chief examples of that vengeance by which the Romans were wont to put a decisive end to a long conflict. Mummius gave up the undefended city to the flames, the few men in it to slaughter, and the women and children to slavery. The precious treasures of art, which had been accumulated for centuries at Corinth—one of the chief schools of sculpture and painting—became partly the playthings of the Roman soldiers, a band of whom were seen by Polybius at a game of dice or draughts on a masterpiece of Aristides, and were partly exposed for sale. Taught their value by the enormous prices at which Attalus III. eagerly bought some of them,* the consul sent

* The "*Attalici Conditiones*" of Horace, *Carm.* I. 1.

the remaining pictures to Rome, stipulating with the masters of the vessels that they should replace any that might be lost by others of equal value! It is almost an equal satire upon Roman ignorance of Greek history and the contempt into which the great names of Hellas had fallen, that the country was constituted a province under the name of that state which had, till lately, been the least influential of all the rest; while, by a curious revolution, that name recovered the predominance it had enjoyed during the heroic age. Greece became the PROVINCE OF ACHAIA, the northern limit being drawn south of Thessaly and Epirus, which were included in the new Province of Macedonia (B.C. 146).

Munnius remained for a year as proconsul, to regulate the affairs of Greece, in conjunction with ten commissioners sent from Rome (B.C. 145). The conqueror, so ignorant of art, is said to have displayed the old Roman accomplishments of equity and moderation; and Polybius, who had hastened from the ruins of Carthage to use his influence on behalf of his country, had power, as the friend of Scipio, to make his intercession respected. If we could penetrate the thoughts of such a man at witnessing, in the same year, the fate of Carthage and of his native land, we might venture on the hopeless task of writing an epitaph for the tomb of Hellenic freedom.

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CHAPTER XXIX.

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR. B.C. 150 TO B.C. 146.

“Giace l’alta Cartago : a pena i segni
 Dell’ alte sue ruine il fido serba ;
 Muoiono le città, muoiono i regni,
 Copri i fasti e le pompe arena ed erba.”—TASSO.

“Great Carthage low in ruins cold doth lie,
 Her ruins poor the herbs in height can pass ;
 So cities fall, so perish kingdoms high,
 Their pride and pomp he hid in sand and grass.”
 FAIRFAX’S *Translation*.

STATE OF CARTHAGE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS—HER PROSPERITY AND RESOURCES—HER LOYALTY TO ROME—ENCROACHMENTS OF MASINISSA—ROMAN COMMISSIONERS IN AFRICA—M. PORCIUS CATO AND P. SCIPIO NASICA—DELEND A EST CARTHAGO—HOSTILITIES WITH MASINISSA—SCIPIO IN MASINISSA’S CAMP—HIS DREAM—EMBASSIES TO ROME—DECLARATION OF WAR—THE CONSULS LAND IN AFRICA—CONFERENCE AT UTICA—THE CARTHAGINIANS GIVE UP THEIR ARMS—THE FINAL SENTENCE—RAGE AND RESISTANCE OF THE CITY—PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE—THE FIRST CAMPAIGN OPERATIONS OF CENSORINUS—SERVICES OF SCIPIO—THE SECOND CAMPAIGN—HOPES FOR CARTHAGE—NEW ALLIES—HER INTERNAL DISSENSIONS—THE TWO HASDRUBALS—SCIPIO ELECTED CONSUL—HE LANDS IN AFRICA—PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE—CAPTURE OF THE CITY—THE SEVEN DAYS’ FIGHT—DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE—THE TEARS AND TRIUMPH OF SCIPIO—LATER HISTORY OF CARTHAGE.

THE story of the last stand made by Carthage against Rome, in the agony of self-defence, is one of the briefest and most melancholy chapters in the history of the world. All the faults of character, all the crimes of policy, all the selfish arrogance of an aristocracy of wealth, seem not only to be forgiven in the pity excited by her fall, but atoned for by the absence of any provocation of her fate. And yet we must not pronounce too hastily that a blind hatred only sealed her doom. The wealth-producing power of the state survived her political extinction, and restored her to a prosperity which threatened to raise her again to political importance. Her fleet and army had been taken from her, but she still possessed her ports and walls : the sea divided her from Italy, and the resources of Africa were at her back. Thus situated, it might have been possible for her to devote herself solely to money-making, and to remain content as the vassal of Rome : no temptation might have prevailed to make the distress of Rome the opportunity of Carthage : no second family of Barca might have roused her with its thunder : this might have been possible ; but it was impossible

for Romé to believe it. Her statesmen knew what their ambition would have been, had the case of Rome and Carthage been reversed; and they believed they ought not to risk the experiment on the unlimited submissiveness of their late rival. The tongue of Cato uttered the decree of fate, as much as the voice of hatred, in the sentence, *Delenda est Carthago*, "Carthage must be destroyed."

Half a century, however, elapsed before the coming of the crisis; and it might perhaps have been delayed much longer, but for the peculiar relations in which Carthage had been left towards Masinissa. During all the wars in Macedonia and Asia, in Spain and Liguria, she had resisted the temptations of opportunity, and refused participation in the schemes of Hannibal, with equal prudence on her own account and good faith towards Rome. This policy had brought its own reward in a marvellous recovery of prosperity. While Rome was incessantly engaged in war, the commerce of the Mediterranean would naturally be conducted chiefly by the ships of Carthage; and her territory still included the luxuriant fields of Zeugitana and Byzacium. Even after the rapacity of Masinissa had stripped her of the rich towns of Emporia, she ruled over 300 subject Libyan cities, and her own population amounted to 700,000. Of the military resources still available for her defence, some idea is given by the 200,000 stand of arms and 2000 catapults which were surrendered on the first demand of the Romans; and she had still the means and energy to manufacture daily 140 shields, 300 swords, 500 spears, and 1000 missiles for catapults, and to build 120 ships of war during the siege.* Of the immense treasures, in gold, silver, precious stones, and works of art, still preserved in the temples and palaces, the Romans had ocular proof in the triumph of Scipio, who, after giving up all private property to pillage, brought home the value of £1,500,000.

The peace which concluded the Second Punic War bound Carthage to restore to Masinissa all the territory of which they had dispossessed either him or his ancestors. A far less ambitious prince might have found in such a stipulation licence for unlimited encroachment, and the clause which forbade the Carthaginians to make war in Africa without the consent of Rome might be taken as a guarantee of impunity. The Numidian prince ought to have been too well acquainted with the Republic to indulge the hope which some have ascribed to him, of setting up his throne on the

* These statistics of the resources of Carthage at the beginning of the Third Punic War are preserved by Strabo.

hill of Byrsa; at least he knew the need of caution, lest he should bring down the jealousy of Rome upon himself. His policy was, by perpetual but at first petty encroachments, not only to gain what he could from Carthage, but to goad her into a breach of the treaty which might provoke Rome to a new war, from which he trusted to obtain his full share of the spoil. Then followed the same hollow and wearisome proceedings that marked the relations of Rome during this half-century to all the protected states: embassies of complaint from the one party, and of recrimination from the other: Roman commissions sent forth to do justice or to watch for an advantage, according to the characters of their members or the policy prevalent in the Senate.

The most important of the disputes between Carthage and Masinissa related to the possession of *Emporia*, a rich district, comprising (as its name signifies) several important sea-ports on the shores of the Lesser Syrtis. The dispute had lasted about thirty years, when the Senate, which had hitherto only given a passive sanction to the encroachments of Masinissa, took more decided steps in his favour. About B.C. 161, a Roman commission decided that Carthage should give up to the Numidian king all of these towns which it still possessed, and pay him a compensation of 500 talents for their revenues since the peace. Such a decision was a vote of unlimited licence to Masinissa, who proceeded to use his privileges, not only by stripping Carthage of all her possessions west of the river Tusca, but by seizing the "Great Plain" on the upper course of the Bagradas. A new appeal was made to Rome, and a new commission sent to Africa; but, when they required as a preliminary that both parties should bind themselves beforehand to accept their decision, the Carthaginians at last took courage to refuse, and the commissioners returned to Rome. . .

But the mission had indirectly sealed the fate of Carthage. At its head had been the renowned M. Porcius Cato the Elder, commonly known as CATO THE CENSOR, whose remarkable character will claim our attention in the next chapter. The man who had the greatest weight in the Senate—the very type of old Roman ideas and prejudices—the survivor of the Hannibalic war, with all its traditions of terror and bitterness, saw in the restored prosperity of Carthage, her rich territory, her commerce and wealth, her populous and well-defended city, resources which some new Hannibal might soon direct against the Roman state. In his own mind he passed the sentence which he thenceforth never ceased to

advocate in the Senate. The forms of that assembly gave him a curious opportunity of never letting the subject rest. The votes were taken *vivâ voce*, and each member, when asked by the consul for his voice, was at liberty to add an opinion on any other question that he deemed important. So, whenever he was called upon to vote, no matter on what subject, Cato always added, "I vote, moreover, that Carthage should be destroyed." * His views met with a powerful opposition, especially from P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica,† the grandson of that Cneius Scipio who fell with the elder Publius in Spain, and the son-in-law of the elder Africanus. Scipio was as firmly attached as Cato himself to the old Roman manners, a proof of which he had given in his second consulship by inducing the Senate to order the demolition of a newly-constructed theatre. He advocated the preservation of Carthage, in order that its rivalry might form a check on the growing licentiousness of the people. No means were neglected by Cato to alarm as well as convince the Senate. Once he drew from the folds of his toga a bunch of ripe figs very early in the season, and threw them on the floor of the Senate-house. As all were admiring the fruit, he exclaimed, "Those figs were gathered but three days ago at Carthage; so close is our enemy to our walls!" When at length he died, at the age of eighty-five, he had seen the close of the first campaign of the war he had so loudly called for, and had pronounced the eulogium of the young commander who had proved himself worthy to bring it to a successful issue (B.C. 149).

While these discussions were prolonged at Rome, the events in Africa were ripening to a crisis. The conviction that nothing was to be hoped from Rome, and everything to be feared from Masinissa, put a bound to the Carthaginian policy of conciliation. The popular leaders, Hasdrubal and Carthalo, were placed at the head of the government, and their first step was to banish forty of the partisans of Masinissa, and to make the people swear never to suffer their return. They next ventured on a measure of self-defence by enrolling an army from those Numidians who still maintained their independence of Masinissa, under Ariobarzanes, the grandson of Syphax (B.C. 154). Upon this the wily Masinissa, instead of taking up arms, sent to Rome to offer his unconditional submission to any decree that might be made respecting

* "Præterea censeo, Carthaginem esse delendam."

† That is, *with the long nose*. His father, from whom he inherited his surname, and his love of legal studies, was adjudged by the senate, in B.C. 204, to be the best citizen in the state.

the disputed territory on the Bagradas; and thus gave the preparations of Carthage the colour of being directed against Rome. Envoys were sent to Africa to demand the disbanding of the troops and the destruction of the naval stores. But the excitement at Carthage was now beyond control; and a popular rising not only deterred the senate from yielding, but endangered the Roman envoys. Cato now moved the Senate to declare war; and it was resolved to do so, if the Carthaginians again refused the demand already made (B.C. 153). Meanwhile, hostilities had commenced in Africa. The Carthaginians had refused to receive the exiles whom Masinissa had sent back with a military escort under his son Gulussa. The king marched upon the city, and a great battle followed, in which the Carthaginians were worsted. After some fruitless negotiations, the Punic general Hasdrubal was forced to surrender under a convention granting all the demands of Masinissa; and his army, after passing under the yoke, was treacherously cut to pieces in its retreat (B.C. 150). These operations took place under the eye of P. Scipio Æmilianus, who, at that time a military tribune in the army of Spain, had been sent over to Masinissa to obtain a supply of elephants; and the occasion has been seized by Cicero to put into the mouth of Scipio the relation of the courtesies interchanged with the ancient friends of his family, and the dream of his own future glories which followed their discourse about the elder Africanus.*

The Carthaginians had now furnished the desired pretext by making war in Africa, contrary to the letter of the treaty, and the Romans made open preparations for hostilities. Conscious of their helplessness, the Punic senate sent an embassy to throw all the blame upon the late generals, whom they condemned to death. But the Romans were the less ready to accept the sacrifice, as a firm base was offered to them in Africa at the same moment by the unconditional submission of Utica. The Punic envoys were coldly told that their excuse was insufficient; and when they asked what would suffice, the significant reply was, that the Carthaginians knew that themselves. A second embassy, consisting of thirty principal citizens of Carthage, with unlimited powers, found that war was declared, and two consular armies were setting sail for Sicily (B.C. 149). The Senate had resolved to finish the affair in Africa, while continuing the negotiations in order to disarm resistance. The envoys were told that Carthage would be suffered to retain her municipal freedom and laws, her territory

* Cicero, *De Republica*, vi. 9, seq., commonly called the *Somnium Scipionis*.

and its property, on condition of sending 300 hostages of her noblest families to meet the consuls at Lilybæum, and obeying the further orders which they would there announce. The hostages were accordingly ready at Lilybæum to meet the consuls, who sent them on to Rome, and then told the Carthaginians that the final decision of the Senate would be announced to them in Africa. All this was but too plainly the dealing of the executioner with his victim; but the helpless Carthaginians still submitted, trusting, perhaps, that their city would at least be left to them, according to the promise of the Senate. The landing in Africa was unopposed, and provisions were supplied to the invaders. The consuls fixed their head-quarters at Utica, and there received the full Carthaginian Senate. They first called for a surrender of those armaments which they said the city no longer needed, as it would henceforth be under the protection of Rome. The mandate was complied with, and the arms already enumerated were delivered up. And now that the city seemed defenceless, with the hostile army at her gates, and her noblest youths in the hands of her implacable enemies, the one mandate to which all others were but the preface, was uttered by the consul Censorinus:—"It is the will and pleasure of the Roman Senate that Carthage should be destroyed, and that the citizens should remove to any other part of their territory, provided it be at a distance of twelve miles from the sea." There, it was implied, they might enjoy the laws and liberty, the territory and property, which the Senate had promised them, under the all-powerful protection of Rome.

When the news reached Carthage, the spirit of resistance, which had been pent up within barrier after barrier of concession—concession which, whenever made to a powerful enemy, is a fetter to the weak rather than a barrier to the strong—burst all bounds. It was one of those supreme moments in a nation's life; when—as in the case of an unarmed man struggling with a powerful murderer—the overpowering instinct of self-preservation casts aside all thoughts of submission, together with all calculations of success or failure, and all fear of being worse destroyed. "The voice of the few who counselled the acceptance of what was inevitable was, like the call of a pilot during a hurricane, drowned amidst the furious yells of the multitude, which, in its frantic rage, laid hold on the magistrates of the city who had counselled the surrender of the hostages and arms, made such of the innocent bearers of the news as had ventured to return home expiate their terrible tidings, and tore in pieces the Italians who chanced to be

sojourning in the city by way of avenging beforehand, on them at least, the destruction of its native home." This spontaneous outburst of patriotic frenzy has been well compared to the defence of Tyre against Alexander and of Jerusalem against Titus.

The event proved that the idea of resistance was not an impulse of utter madness; and the disarmed city succeeded in protracting its defence for three years. On the land side its triple wall was still unbroken, and the rocks of Cape Camart and Cape Carthage sheltered it from attack by the sea on all sides but one, which was protected by its fortified quays and harbours. There was old timber sufficient to build a fleet, and the surrendered arms might be replaced if only some time could be gained. The remnant of the Carthaginian army was still in the field under Hasdrubal, who had evaded his sentence by escaping from the city, and was now entreated to co-operate in the defence, which was committed within the city to another Hasdrubal, a grandson of Masinissa. Amidst all these preparations, a show of submission was kept up by a message to the consuls, requesting a thirty days' armistice for the despatch of an embassy to Rome. The request was of course refused; but the consuls seem to have been lulled by it into the belief that they might take possession of the city when they pleased, and they delayed their advance from Utica. Meanwhile the city resounded night and day with the labour of men and women on arms and catapults, and even the female slaves gave their long hair to furnish strings for these engines of defence. By the time the consuls moved, Carthage was in some state to receive them.

Censorinus, who was by far the abler general of the two consuls, commanded the Roman fleet, while his colleague, Manius Manilius, attacked the city on its landward side. Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander in the field, took up his station at Nopheris, on the opposite side of the lake of Tunis, to harass the besiegers, and the check which might at once have been placed upon him by the overwhelming force of the Numidian king, was suddenly withdrawn. Masinissa, after remaining aloof, apparently in discontent, died at the age of ninety soon after the commencement of the siege. After a fruitless attack from the sea at the point where the tongue of land called *Tænia* juts out, and where the wall was weakest,* Censorinus sailed into the lake of Tunis, and prepared to renew the attack on this weak angle from the *Tænia* itself. The party whom he led in person to collect timber for his engines were attacked by the active leader of light cavalry, Himilco Phaneas,

* See the Plan of Carthage, and the description of the city in Chapter XXIV.

and the consul lost 500 men before he accomplished his purpose. Two enormous battering rams were erected, and a breach was made, but it was partially filled up by the besieged in the night, and the Roman engines were disabled by a *sortie*. The assault was, however, made on the following day; but the defenders were so strongly posted on the walls and in the neighbouring houses that the storming force was compelled to retreat, and would probably have been cut to pieces-but for the reserve kept in hand by P. Scipio Æmilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. During the pause that ensued, the army of Censorinus began to suffer so severely from the pestilential marshes, that he put out again to sea, not without some loss from the fire-ships of the Carthaginians. His departure soon afterwards, to hold the Comitia, reduced the fleet to inactivity, and left the whole operations to the care of his incompetent colleague Manilius, who found enough occupation in obtaining supplies and repulsing the attacks of the enemy.

It was now that the qualities of Scipio were displayed in all their brilliancy. When the Carthaginians made a night attack upon the consul's camp, he led round a body of cavalry to the enemy's rear and forced them to retreat. When Manilius, disregarding his advice, had almost involved his army in destruction, in an expedition against Hasdrubal at Nepheris, the retreating troops were extricated by a flank attack led by Scipio. Nor was he less skilful in the diplomacy of the campaign. While the consul only deterred those chiefs who were anxious to negotiate, Scipio gained over Himilco Phancas with his light cavalry, and recovered the services of the Numidians for Rome. The dying Masinissa had left to the adopted grandson of his old friend the charge of dividing his dominions among his three sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal;* and Scipio, after discharging this duty with success, brought Gulussa and his Numidian cavalry to the aid of the Romans. The dignified simplicity of character, which he inherited from his father, preserved him from the envy which the elder Africanus had provoked. His praises were mingled with all the news that reached Rome from Africa; and Cato, who died at the close of this first year of the war, pronounced the eulogium of the rising hero in the words of Homer:

“He only is a living man, the rest are, gliding shades.”

Still another year of ill-success elapsed before the public voice

* This request ultimately led to the Jugurthine War.

called him to the command; and he departed for Rome, taking Phanceas with him, about the time when Manilius was superseded by the new consul, L. Calpurnius Piso (B.C. 148). Under him and the admiral Mancinus the siege made absolutely no progress. Preferring to subdue the African cities, before pressing the attack on Carthage, he was repulsed from Clupea, and wasted the summer in a fruitless siege of Hippo Diarrhytus, while his success in taking Neapolis was more than counterbalanced by the disgust which his breach of the capitulation excited among the Africans. The Carthaginians began to gain new allies. They were joined by Bithyas, a Numidian chieftain; they opened negotiations with the sons of Masinissa and the king of Mauretania; and they even sought, in the alliance of the Macedonian Andriscus, a shadow of the league between Hannibal and Philip. But all was overclouded by the renewed outburst of cruel treachery among themselves. Hasdrubal, the commander in the field, whether from envy of the higher post of his namesake in the city, or from whatever other motive, contrived to bring the latter into suspicion on account of his relationship to Masinissa, and having caused him to be put to death in the Senate-house, assumed the command within the city. The suspense of this campaign was intolerable to the Romans, and when Scipio, who had as yet held no higher office than that of military tribune, came forward as a candidate for the ædileship, the unanimous voice of the centuries saluted him as consul, though, in his thirty-seventh year, he was below the legal age. A special decree of the Senate assigned Africa as his province, and he sailed to the scene of his fame with his celebrated friends Lælius and Polybius.

When Scipio landed at Utica, he found the campaign of B.C. 147 already opened in such a manner that his arrival only saved a great disaster by a few hours. While Piso was absent, operating against the country towns, the admiral Mancinus thought he could strike a blow from a new quarter. With the small force at his command, he scaled the rocks below Cape Carthage, where the steep ascent had caused the defences to be neglected. They repulsed a desperate sally of the Carthaginians; and some of them entered the gates with the fugitives, but were soon thrust out again. Meanwhile their shouts of triumph had caused their comrades and the camp-followers to flock up the hill in disorder; and Mancinus found himself at nightfall perched on the cliff at the head of a force disordered and to a great extent unarmed, and cut off from supplies and reinforcements. His letter announcing

his situation had only just reached the head-quarters at Utica when Scipio arrived. After making known his presence to the besieged by means of deserters, he sailed round to the scene of action; and the first appearance of his fleet doubling Cape Carthage was enough to relieve Mancinus from a crushing attack, which the Carthaginians had renewed in the morning; and the post gained upon the hill was also secured. Having recalled the army of Piso from its desultory operations, and having restored discipline by his firmness, and cleared the camp of all hangers-on, Scipio commenced the siege in earnest. His head-quarters were fixed, as those of Manilius had been, on the isthmus uniting the peninsula of Carthage to the mainland; and his first operations were directed against the suburb of Megara. A simultaneous attack made on two points in the night had been repulsed by the courage of the defenders, when Scipio perceived a sort of fort outside the wall, and equalling it in height. From this a bridge was thrown across to the wall; a party crossed and broke down a little gate, which gave admission to the Roman army. Megara was thus taken, and not only the garrison of the suburb, but the army in the field, retreated within the fortifications of the city. Here Hasdrubal inaugurated a reign of terror by one of those fearful acts which the leaders of a desperate cause perpetrate to cut off all retreat from their followers. All the Roman prisoners taken during the war were put to death upon the walls with the most exquisite tortures, and the same fate was inflicted upon the citizens who dared to remonstrate, including several senators of Carthage.

Scipio now proceeded at once to fortify himself and to cut off all communication between the city and the mainland by means of parallel trenches three miles long, drawn across the whole width of the isthmus, with a wall towards the city, twelve feet high and six feet broad, with towers at equal intervals. The work was executed in twenty-four days, in spite of the interruptions of the enemy; but, before its completion, Bithyas forced his way out with the light cavalry to the camp at Nopheris. Thence scouring the country for supplies, he sent them in by sea, mariners being found ready, for a large reward, to make the venture when the wind blew direct into the harbour. But all the supplies thus sent were seized by Hasdrubal for the use of his 30,000 men, without regard to the suffering inhabitants. To stop these proceedings, Scipio resolved to block up the entrance to the port by a mole of stone, 96 feet broad; and the remains of this gigantic work still exist. The besieged, who at first ridiculed the attempt as impossible, answered

it by another unexpected stratagem. They were seen working night and day for two months at the inner or naval harbour, without even the deserters being able to tell what they were about. At length, just as the entrance to the port was effectually blocked up, a squadron of 50 triremes—part of the fleet of 120 which the Carthaginians had built during the siege—was seen by Scipio, from his camp upon the Isthmus, sailing out through a new channel, which had been cut from the inner harbour to the open sea. Had they known how to use their opportunity, the Roman fleet, surprised and unprepared, must have been destroyed. But the movement seems to have been made only to show the Romans that their blockade was ineffectual, and it was three days before they came out again to fight. Scipio's fleet was now ready to receive them, and though the action that ensued was indecisive, the not winning it was as fatal to the Carthaginians as a defeat, the more so as their fleet suffered much by collisions, in crowding back through the narrow passage. Many ships, unable to enter, were moored along the shore, under the protection of the missiles discharged from the quays. But the Sidonian mariners, who were now serving with the Roman fleet, contrived a plan of attack by which the ships were destroyed at their anchors; and thus the great Phœnician city, which had so long been mistress of the western seas, owed the loss of her last sea-fight and the destruction of her last navy to the seamen of her mother country.

Scipio now resolved to make himself master of the ports. The quay between them and the sea was only defended by a weak wall, which was attacked from the Tanian. But it was not till the battering engines had been once destroyed by the Carthaginians, who swam and waded through the shallow water in the night, that an entrance was effected. The Romans then built a brick rampart upon the quay, to the same height as the city wall; and posted upon it a guard of 4000 men, to harass the besieged with missiles. By this time the winter rains had set in, making the camp on the Tanian unhealthy: the city was closely invested by sea and land, and the distress was most severe within: so Scipio suspended the operations of the siege, and turned his chief attention to the reduction of the fortified camp of the Punic army at Nephesis. After a siege of some length, conducted by Lælius and Gulussa, two towers were battered down; the place was taken by Scipio in person; and of the soldiers and country people found within the fort, 70,000 were put to the sword, 10,000 were taken prisoners, and only 1000 escaped. The capture of Nephesis fol-

lowed the storming of the camp. The Carthaginians had no longer an army in the field; and the country towns submitted to the Romans.

The winter was passed in the beleaguered city amidst intense suffering from famine and disease, and from the cruel tyranny of Hasdrubal. Many contrived to steal out of the gates, and these who remained were in no condition to resist the assault which Scipio renewed with the return of spring; but Hasdrubal would suffer no capitulation. While that general succeeded in repulsing an attack made upon the gate of the Cothon, Lælius scaled the wall between the outer harbour and the city, and became master of the "Great Place," or market-place, where the soldiers plundered the temple of Apollo of the golden plates that lined its walls and the golden ornaments of the god's statue, to the value of 1000 talents. The statue itself was afterwards carried to Rome. Having with difficulty restored order, Scipio prepared for the final assault upon the Byrsa. Three streets led up the ascent from the market-place to the citadel.* Narrow and winding, like all the streets of oriental cities, they were overhung by the upper stories of the lofty houses, from which the Carthaginians poured down showers of darts upon the Roman columns. These houses had to be taken one by one; when the defenders had been driven from floor to floor of the six stories, planks had often to be laid across, to pursue them into the opposite houses; and many a combat was to be seen on these fearful bridges. The streets and houses were cumbered with the dead; and Scipio found it necessary to clear a space for action by ordering the captured houses to be burnt and their ruins levelled with the ground. Many wretches, wounded or hidden in the houses, perished in the conflagration, which wrapped in volumes of smoke the unrelenting fury of the combat, and cast its lurid glare over the scene by night. The exhausted Roman soldiers were relieved from time to time, while Scipio watched this unexampled conflict for six days and nights, allowing himself no time to sleep or eat.

On the seventh day, he had taken up his post on a lofty place, which commanded the whole view,† when a deputation appeared before him, to beg the lives of those who had taken refuge in the Byrsa. The request was granted for all except the Roman deserters; and, of that teeming population of 700,000 persons whose prosperity had excited the jealousy of Cato, a miserable remnant, 30,000

* See pp. 370-375, and the Plan of Carthage.

† Probably the *Hill of St. Louis*. See pp. 373-4.

men and 25,000 women, marched out through the burning ruins of their houses over the heaped-up corpses of their fellow-citizens. There remained the 900 Roman deserters, with Hasdrubal, his wife, and his two sons. Hopeless of mercy, they retreated to the temple of Æsculapius, the heart of the citadel. Its strength might long have defied assault; but the little garrison were exhausted with famine, watching, and despair; and some of them at least resolved to perish as a voluntary sacrifice. But no sooner was the temple set on fire, than Hasdrubal rushed forth, deserting wife, children, and followers, and came into Scipio's presence with an olive-branch in his hand. In utter scorn, the victor granted life to the abject wretch, but compelled him to prostrate himself at his feet in sight of the deserted garrison, who overwhelmed him with execrations. Above them all, the wife of Hasdrubal showed herself on the topmost story of the temple, holding a child in either hand:—"To thee, Roman," she exclaimed, "I wish nothing but prosperity; for thy acts are according to the laws of war. But I beseech thee, as well as the gods of Carthage, to punish that Hasdrubal as he deserves, for having betrayed his country, his gods, his wife and children." Then, having bitterly reviled her husband, she cut her children's throats, and threw them one after the other into the flames, into which she then leaped down herself. The like fate of the deserters completed this last and most hideous sacrifice to the Punic Moloch. The remaining captives were either sold as slaves or left to languish in prison, except some of the chief leaders. Hasdrubal and Bithyas were placed in honourable custody in Italian towns. The city was given up to pillage; only the gold, silver, votive gifts, and the works of art deposited in the temples being preserved for the state. Many of these works had been carried off as plunder from the Sicilian cities, which were now invited to reclaim their property; and, among the rest, the brazen bull of Phalaris was restored to the Agrigentines.

The Roman Senate, in spite of the opposition of Scipio Nasica, decreed that Carthage, as well as the villas of her nobles in the suburb of Megara, should be levelled with the ground; and that the ploughshare should be driven over her soil—the accustomed token of devoting the site to perpetual desolation—with a curse upon the man who should dare to cultivate or build upon it. Scipio was made the unwilling executioner of this savage doom; and the flames raged through the city for fourteen days before all her edifices were destroyed. The conqueror him-

self was too prescient, as well as too generous, to share the exultation of Rome and the army over their fallen foe; and, with tearful eyes he gave vent to the presentiments that mingled with his regret in the words of Hector:—

“The day shall surely come, when sacred Troy will fall,
And Priam, and the people of the ash-speared Priam all.”*

Such forebodings, and the remembrance of the fearful scenes in which he had been a reluctant actor, must have made his triumph—which was far more magnificent even than his father’s—as sad as that had been to the occupant of the triumphal car; but for his own conduct there was no self-reproach to embitter the universal applause. He was still reserved for another triumph over the country in which the family of his adoption had won their first laurels, and which was destined to confer upon him another name of honour.† And, after all, he was doomed, like his adoptive grandfather, to lose all his popularity by his political conduct, and to perish amidst the strongest suspicion of assassination. A Carthaginian might have believed that Baal and Astarte, Ashurim and Melcarth, took vengeance on the destroyer of their temples. A Greek would say that the gods were envious of the prosperity of a mortal whose glory trenched too nearly on their own. A believer in the moral government of the world by its true Ruler can hardly refuse to acknowledge the lesson, that even those whom He has called to be His instruments, though they have not known Him, must feel His power and will to humble those who are exalted.

The African territory, which now lay at the disposal of the Roman Senate and people, was that which had been left to Carthage, after all the encroachments of Masinissa. This was neither con-

* Homer, *Iliad*, vi. 418-9 —

“Εσσεται ἡμαρ ὅτ’ ἂν ποτ’ δλώλῃ Ἰλίου ἱρῆ,
καὶ Πρίαμος, καὶ λαὸς ἑυμέλειο Πριάμοιο.”

Pope’s translation is subjoined, though as it is even more than usually paraphrastic a literal version has been given in the text —

“Yet come it will, the day decreed by fates:
(How my heart trembles while my tongue relates!)
The day when thou, imperial Troy! must bend,
And see thy warriors fall, thy glories end.”

† The cognomen of *Nymphenus*. It should be remembered that that of *Africanus* was already his by adoptive descent before he won it again by his exploits. The hereditary transmission of these surnames of honour formed among the Romans a nobility of merit, like that which is preserved among ourselves by such titles as Mahon, St. Vincent, Camperdown, and Douro.

ferred upon their allies—as they had rewarded Attalus with the conquests from Antiochus in Asia, and Masinissa himself with the kingdom of Syphax and the Libyphœnician cities,—nor, in disappointing the ambitious hopes of the Numidian princes, did the Romans reclaim from them any part of what they had won from Carthage.* The three sons of Masinissa were left in undisturbed possession of all the African shores and highlands and half-desert plains, between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, from the boundary of Mauretania to that of Cyrenaica, except the north-eastern angle around Carthage, and a portion only of the sea-coast of Byzacium. Scipio drew a trench to the sea at Thenæ, opposite the southern point of the islands in the mouth of the Lesser Syrtis, and this boundary line left to Numidia the rich district of Emporia, besides the inner table-land of Byzacena, and the “Great Plain” about the upper course of the Bagradas. This wide Numidian kingdom was soon reunited under Micipsa by the death of his two brothers. Of its subsequent fortunes we shall have to speak presently in relating the usurpation and all of Jugurtha. We have already had occasion to notice the compliment paid to the Numidian princes, by presenting them with the books found among the spoils of Carthage, except the treatise of Hanno on Agriculture; and the literary reputation of the later kings, Hiempsal and Juba, proves that the treasure, despised by the givers, was not unworthily bestowed. Nor must it be forgotten that Rome had already been indebted to Carthage for the chief poet of that age, and the most elegant writer in her literature, the comedian Terence.†

The limited territory along the coasts of Zeugitana and Byzacium, which formed the latest possessions of Carthage, was erected into the province of AFRICA, a name borrowed from the Carthaginians, and capable of indefinite extension.‡ The pro-

* This is distinctly stated by Sallust:—“*igitur bello Jugurthino pleraque ex Punicis oppida, et fins Karthaginiensium quos norissime habuerant, populus Romanus per magistratus adiustrabat. Gætulorum magna pars et Numide usque ad flumen Mulcha si Jugurtha erant.*”—(Jug. 19.) Of Mauretania the Romans knew nothing till the war with Jugurtha.

† Born at Carthage in B.C. 195, he was either by birth or purchase the slave of the Roman senator P. Terentius Lucanus, from whom, on his manumission, he received the name of P. Terentius Afer. He became intimate with Scipio and Lælius. His plays are reproductions of the Greek comedies of Menander. The first of them, the *Andria*, was brought out in B.C. 166, and he died in B.C. 159.

‡ The name of *Africa* seems to have been unknown to the Greeks till they adopted it from the Romans, and it was long before even the latter used it to replace the Greek name of *Libya* for the whole continent.

vince was placed under a prætor, whose seat of government was at Utica; and this most ancient Phœnician colony was rewarded for her early adhesion to Rome with part of the lands, of her always envied rival. The other towns which had taken part with Rome, such as Hadrumetum, Leptis Parva, Thapsus, Acholla, and a few others, were made free cities; while of those that had adhered to Carthage, some were destroyed, and their lands added to the public domain of Rome (*ager publicus*) and let on lease to occupiers (*possessores*); while the rest, whose lands were equally forfeit in law, were allowed to retain them for the present, paying a fixed annual tribute, (*stipendium*). The rich plains of Africa soon became even more important than Sicily for their supplies of corn to Rome,* and the Roman merchants found themselves in possession, through the port of Utica, of the commerce of Carthage, both with the Mediterranean and Inner Africa.

Within twenty-four years after the destruction of Carthage, the plantation of a new colony on its site, under the name of JUNONIA, was one of the measures for improving the condition of the people carried by Caius Gracchus in his first tribunate (B.C. 123). In the following year he led 6000 colonists to Africa, and it was this absence that gave the aristocratic party the opportunity to effect his ruin. His death, the year after, caused the colony to be abandoned. Julius Cæsar revived the project the year before his death (B.C. 46); and, in B.C. 19, Augustus sent out a body of 3000 colonists to found the Roman city of Carthage, which was now made the capital of Africa in place of Utica. Under the empire, it vied with Rome and Constantinople in wealth and magnitude, and as a Christian bishopric it became as conspicuous as it had been for the worship of Baal and Melcarth. Taken by Genseric in A.D. 439, it was made the capital of the Vandal kingdom of Africa. In A.D. 533 it was retaken by Belisarius, and named *Justiniana*. A little more than a century later, it fell a prey to the Arabs under Hassan, by whom it was finally destroyed (A.D. 647).

* "Quidquid de Libycis verritur areis."—Horat. *Carm.* I. 1.

CHAPTER XXX.

CONQUESTS OF ROME IN THE WEST, AND CONDITION OF THE REPUBLIC.—FROM THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE FORMATION OF THE PROVINCE OF ASIA, AND THE DEATH OF THE YOUNGER SCIPIO. B.C. 200 TO B.C. 129.

"Rome had its heroic age : the Romans knew that they had such an age, and we may believe them. Polybius saw the end of it. He saw the destruction of Carthage and the savage sack of Corinth, and the beginning of a worse time. But he has recorded his testimony that some honesty still remained."—LONG.

THE ROMAN DOMINIONS IN THE WEST—WAR IN CISALPINE GAUL—CONQUEST OF THE INSUBRES AND BOII—LIGURIAN WARS—CONDITION OF SPAIN—CONSULSHIP OF CATO—GOVERNMENT OF TIBERIUS GRAECUS—HIS TRIUMPH OVER SARDINIA—FIRST CILICIAN WAR—NUMANTIA—MARCELLUS AND LUCULLUS IN SPAIN—CRUELITIES OF GALBA—LUSITANIAN WAR—VIRIATHUS—Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS—ÆMILIANUS AND Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS—SERVILIANUS—MURDER OF VIRIATHUS—NUMANTINE WAR—MARCUS—BRUTUS SUBDUES LUSITANIA AND THE GALLICI—SCIPIO AFRICANUS IN SPAIN—SIEGE AND DESTRUCTION OF NUMANTIA—TRIUMPH OF SCIPIO—SERVILE WAR IN SICILY—ROMAN SLAVERY—LAWS AND Oration OF RUPILIUS—ATTAULUS III. BEQUEATHS PERGAMUM TO THE ROMANS—THE WAR WITH ARISTONICUS—CRASSUS IN ASIA—FORMATION OF THE PROVINCE OF ASIA—EXTENT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE—CONDITION OF THE REPUBLIC—THE NEW NOBILITY AND THE CITY RABBLE—THE NOBLES IN POSSESSION OF THE SENATE AND THE CHIEF CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICES—THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MONARCHY—SUCCESSFUL FOREIGN POLICY—INTERNAL AFFAIRS—FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION—INCREASE OF CORRUPTION—PUBLIC WORKS—THE AQUEDUCTS OF ROME—PARTY OF OPPOSITION AND REFORM—M. PORCIUS CATO—HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICE IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR—QUESTOR IN SICILY—OPPOSITION TO SCIPIO—CATO AT THERMOPYLÆ—THE PROSECUTION OF L. SCIPIO ASPATIUS—VIOLENCE OF VERGILIUS—PROSECUTION AND TRIUMPH OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS—HIS RETIREMENT AND DEATH—SCIPIO AND WELLINGTON—CENSORSHIP OF CATO—HIS VAST INFLUENCE AND ITS SMALL RESULTS—THE YOUNGER AFRICANUS—VOTED BY BALLOT AT ROME—LAWS AGAINST BRIBERY—UNPOPULARITY AND DEATH OF SCIPIO—RELIGION AND MANNERS—ROMAN LITERATURE.

The half century during which Rome was contending for empire with the Hellenic and Semitic races was occupied with an incessant conflict for the mastery of her newly-acquired dominion in the West ; and the same period—or rather the first two-thirds of the century—was signalized at home by events of the deepest interest, in which such names as Cato and the Scipios play their part. The grand result was the extension of the Roman empire over the European shores of the Mediterranean from the Pillars of Hercules to the Hellespont, the acquisition of provinces both in Africa and Asia, and the supremacy of Roman influence over the vassal kings and tribes of Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, and Numidia ; till only Mauretania remained to complete the circuit of the Mediterranean, on whose waters the ships of the Republic no longer en-

countered any enemies but pirates. It was the reaction of this brilliant career abroad that mainly determined the course of events at home, and paved the way for the fall of the Republic.

Cisalpine Gaul had to be re-conquered, and the tribes of Spain to be subdued. We have seen that a war was still in progress with the Gauls, when Hannibal's passage of the Alps roused them to a general revolt; and from that time Carthaginian influence had been predominant between the Alps and the Apennines. And now it seemed as if the last remnants of the Barcine spirit had found a refuge among the Celtic tribes. In the very year when the peace was ratified with Carthage, a certain Hamilcar united the Gauls and Ligurians in a general attack upon the fortresses which the Romans had continued to hold throughout the war (B.C. 200). Placentia was stormed and destroyed, and Cremona was besieged. It is needless to follow the ten years' contest which the Gauls maintained with the obstinacy of a last effort against the resources and discipline of Rome. The Insubrians and Cenomani—the two chief tribes on the left of the Po, in the modern Lombardy—were first defeated (B.C. 196); but the great nation of the Bœi, between the right bank of the river and the Apennines, were only subdued by P. Scipio Nasica in B.C. 191. Their subjugation was followed by the foundation of the colonies, the names of which have become so famous in medieval and modern history, Bononia (*Bologna*), Mutina (*Modena*), and Parma; and the Flaminian Road was continued through their country from Ariminum (*Rimini*) to Mediolanum (*Milan*), under the name of the Via Æmilia, by the censor M. Æmilius Lepidus (B.C. 179).

The conquest of the hardy mountaineers of Liguria* was a longer and more difficult task. In B.C. 187 the consul Lepidus, the same who has just been mentioned, marched against them with his colleague—such was the importance attached to the war—and from that period almost to the end of the century, we read of perpetual hostilities, in which the Roman generals for a long time gained no more than an occasional success, just sufficient to form the pretext for a triumph. The powerful tribe of the Apuani, in the Etruscan Apennines, eastward of the river Macra, submitted in B.C. 180, and were removed to the heart of Samnium, to the number of 40,000, while the Roman hold on their former country was made sure by colonies at Pisa (B.C. 180) and Luca (B.C. 179).† The

* See note to p. 140.

† Luca, the modern *Lucca*, was reckoned the southernmost city of the Ligurians; but it belonged to the province of Cisalpine Gaul.

Ingauni, in the Maritime Alps, west of Genoa, had been nominally subdued a year earlier (B.C. 181); but they long continued powerful enough, even by sea, to harass both the Romans and Massaliots with their piratical attacks. The armies of Rome gradually fought their way westward along the *Riviera*, till in B.C. 154 they crossed the Varus (*Var*), and for the first time came into contact with a Ligurian tribe (the Oxybii) within the limits of Transalpine Gaul. The wars in that country thirty years later, under the consul Sextius Calvinus, are again connected with triumphs over Ligurian tribes (B.C. 123-2); while the last triumph over those in Italy was won by the proconsul C. Marcius (B.C. 117). But, as always with such tribes, it was found that military roads were the most effectual instruments of subjugation, and in B.C. 109 the censor M. Æmilius Scaurus made the road along the coast from Luna (*Luni*) to Vada Sabata (*Vado*), and thence over the Apennines and down the valley of the Bormida to Dertona (*Tortona*). Strabo tells us that, after eighty years of warfare, the public officers of Rome, on their journeys through the country, could only command a space of twelve stadia (less than a mile and a half) in breadth; and the conquest of Liguria was only completed under Augustus (B.C. 14).

A far more formidable resistance had to be encountered in Spain, before the country won for Rome by the elder Scipio Africanus was finally subdued through the destruction of Numantia, the stronghold of Iberian independence, by the younger (B.C. 205-133). The Second Punic War had left the peninsula divided among a strange intermixture of elements, Celtic and Iberian, Phœnician, Hellenic, and Roman. The province within the Ebro, except the northern mountains, and the east coast as far as New Carthage, had been reduced by the arms of Rome; and the more quiet peoples of Bastica, long since brought under Phœnician culture, began to feel the influence of the Roman garrisons and of the Italian adventurers who came to work the silver mines. Here were founded the first Latin communities (except Agrigentum) beyond the limits of Italy: Italica (near *Serille*), where Scipio left the veterans of his army who, having married Spanish women, desired to remain in Spain (B.C. 205),* and the colony of Carteia, which was founded by Tiberius Gracchus in B.C. 171. The regions subject to Rome corresponded to the modern Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, or the districts between the eastern coast

* Italica was not a municipal town, but it had a market-place, and formed a kind of centre for the Latin settlers of the neighbourhood — what the Romans called *forum et conciliabulum civium Romanorum*.

and the mountains running parallel to it, and between the southern coast and the Sierra Morena. The tribes of the central table-land, especially the great nation of the Celtiberians, preserved their own forms of government, which appear to have been republican, in nominal league with the Romans, but only serving in their armies for pay, while some of them still furnished mercenaries to Carthage as late as the battle of Zama. The remote Lusitanians and Gallaecians were completely independent, and the wild Cantabrians of the northern mountains scarcely known to the Romans so much as by name. Willing as they had been to aid the enemies who came to break the yoke of Carthage, the Iberians were little disposed to bow to that of Rome. Like their modern descendants, they harassed by a constant guerilla warfare the intruders who supposed themselves masters of the country. In B.C. 195, it was found necessary to send a powerful army into Spain, under the consul M. Porcius Cato, who had served with distinction through the Second Punic War. He had already established that character for the stern Roman virtues which has made his name proverbial in history, and had decisively assumed the position of rivalry against Scipio Africanus. His treatment of the Spaniards showed none of the weakness with which he had charged that general. His artifices set tribe against tribe; some were induced to demolish their own defences: others were taken into the pay of Rome: several victories were gained in the field: multitudes of unarmed captives, who had surrendered voluntarily, were partly massacred in cold blood, and partly sold for slaves, while many put themselves to death to avoid the same fate. Cato returned to enjoy a triumph in the same year as that of Flamininus over Philip V., boasting that he had destroyed more towns than he had spent days in Spain (B.C. 194).

The readers of modern history can easily imagine the effect of such treatment on the Iberian character. After fifteen years of sullen discontent, breaking out into frequent rebellion, another method was tried by a general of a very different temper. This was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the son of the general who had fallen in battle against Hannibal, and the father of the two tribunes famous in history as "the Gracchi." He was, besides, the son-in-law of the elder and the father-in-law of the younger Scipio Africanus. Elected prætor in B.C. 181, he received, rather Spain as his province; and having brought to a successful end an obstinate war with the Celtiberians, he effected the pacification of the country by his wisdom and moderation. The natives bound

themselves to build no more towns, and the power of Rome was now established in Catalonia, Valencia, Arragon, and the eastern part of Castile (B.C. 179). The opportunity may be taken to mention another war in which Gracchus was eminently successful. In B.C. 177 he was sent, as consul, to subdue a revolt of the Sardinians, over whom he triumphed in B.C. 175, bringing back with him to Rome such a multitude of captives, that the slave-markets were glutted, and the phrase as "cheap as Sardinians" passed into a proverb.* His colleague in the consulship, C. Claudius Pulcher, subdued the people of the Istrian peninsula. The wars in Corsica (B.C. 163) and Dalmatia (B.C. 156-5) afford other examples of the numerous conflicts by which Rome had to make good her empire.

The settlement effected by Gracchus ensured comparative tranquillity to the province of Hither Spain for a quarter of a century, during which the Roman arms appear to have advanced beyond the central table-land, into the valleys of the Tagus and Douro. But, as in modern times, Lusitania proved the refuge of Iberian independence, when the armies of the Latin race had overrun most of the peninsula. Its hardy people, united with the Vettones and Vaccei, on the upper Tagus and Douro, defeated the united forces of both provinces, and carried their depredations almost to the walls of New Carthage (B.C. 154). For the first time since forty years, a Roman consul, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, was sent into Spain; and to hasten his departure, it was enacted that the consuls should enter upon their office on the 1st of January, B.C. 153.† But Nobilior was too late to avert a great defeat of the prætor Lucius Mummius, which was used by the victors as the means of rousing the central tribes to arms, and so gave the signal for the first CELTIBERIAN WAR.

Two small Celtiberian tribes had already begun to build the town of Segeda, and had refused the demands of the governor to desist, and to pay the arrears of tribute, which had not been collected for a long time, when Nobilior arrived with his army of 30,000 men. The unfinished city could offer no resistance; but the warriors escaped to the powerful tribe of the Arevaci, whom the success of the Lusitanians had prepared to take up arms; and the Romans were defeated in a great battle, with the loss of nearly 6000 citizens, on the 23rd of August. The insurgents now established their head-quarters at the famous city of NUMANTIA, near

* *Sardi venales.*

† Such was the accident that fixed that beginning of the year which, after a long struggle, has superseded the more natural epoch of the vernal equinox.

the sources of the Douro, on a hill of moderate height, the precipitous sides of which rendered walls superfluous. The ascent was by a single narrow path, which was defended by ditches and palisades.* A second victory over Nobilior before this place was followed by the surrender of Ocelis, with the Roman military chest and stores; but the Lusitanians south of the Tagus were subdued by the prætor Mummius.

M. Claudius Marcellus, the consul of the following year, achieved successes which led the Arevaci to sue for peace; but after long delay the Senate resolved on their complete subjugation (B.C. 152). But Marcellus, either from a humane policy, or in the expectation of his successor's arrival, concluded a treaty with the Arevaci, guaranteeing their independence as tributaries of Rome (B.C. 151). The new consul, L. Licinius Lucullus, gave vent to his disappointment by an attack on the neighbouring Vaccei. Their city of Cauca (*Coca*) was taken, and 20,000 inhabitants given up to the sword or to slavery, in violation of a capitulation; and this example of bad faith closed the gates of the other cities. The Romans were reduced to great distress, when Scipio Æmilianus, who was serving as a military tribune, prevailed on the people of Interacina to accept his plighted word that the army would retire in peace, on being furnished with provisions.

Meanwhile the prætor, Servius Sulpicius Galba, had met with reverses in Lusitania, and Lucullus crossed the Tagus to his aid. Both resumed operations in the spring of B.C. 150, the consul in Turdetania, the country between the Guadiana (*Anas*)† and the Straits, which the Lusitanians had invaded; the prætor on the right bank of the Tagus. Here Galba perpetrated one of the worst atrocities known in the history of war. Having induced three of the Lusitanian tribes to consent to a removal to new settlements, he collected them at his head-quarters, to the number of 7000; and then, separated into three divisions, they were disarmed, and either murdered or sold for slaves. It marked a new era in the social state of Rome, when Galba, whom Cato accused—almost as the last act of his life—was able to purchase an acquittal with the wealth acquired by his crimes. But the exasperation they called forth in Spain itself soon gathered to a head under a

* The ruins of Numantia are to be seen at *Guarray*, about a Spanish league north of Soria.

† The *Guad*, which forms the first syllable of the two great rivers of Southern Spain, is of Arabic origin, and signifies river. *Guadiana* is the *River Anas* (the ancient name), and *Guadaluquivir* = *Guad-el-Kebir*, the *Great River*.

fitting leader. The Lusitanians, who had again invaded Turdetania, had been defeated by the prætor Vetilius, and were in the act of capitulating, when VIRIATHUS, one of the few who had escaped from Galba's massacre, warned them against trusting to the faith of the Romans, and offered to lead them in a new struggle for liberty. Originally a shepherd, he had become known as a youth for the courage with which he had defended his flocks against wild beasts and robbers, and he had since gained distinction as a guerrilla chieftain. Even the Romans acknowledge his noble patriotism, and the justice of his dealings both with his followers and his enemies. He held the prætor in check for two days, while the Lusitanian army dispersed in separate bands, and then, decamping in the night, he rejoined them at an appointed rendezvous. The Roman general, hastening in pursuit, was himself slain in an ambuscade, where half his army was lost; and a reinforcement of 5000 men, hastily despatched from the Ebro, were cut to pieces on their march. "Viriathus, now recognized as lord and king of all the Lusitanians, knew how to combine the full dignity of his princely position with the homely habits of a shepherd. No badge distinguished him from the common soldier; he rose from the richly adorned marriage table of his father-in-law, the prince Astolpa in Roman Spain, without having touched the golden plate, and the sumptuous fare, lifted his bride on horseback, and rode off with her to his mountains. He never took more of the spoil than the share which he allotted to each of his comrades. The soldier recognized the general simply by his tall figure, by his striking sallies of wit, and above all by the fact that he surpassed every one of his men in temperance as well as in toil, sleeping always in full armour, and fighting in front of all in battle. It seemed as if, in that thoroughly prosaic age, one of the Homeric heroes had reappeared. The name of Viriathus resounded far and wide through Spain; and the brave nation conceived that in him at length it had found the man who was destined to break the fetters of alien domination." *

The occupation of the Romans in the Third Punic War left only the forces already in Spain to contend with Viriathus, who gained victory after victory over their incompetent generals, and decorated the tops of the Lusitanian mountains with the Roman spoils. Even when, in the year after the fall of Carthage, the conqueror's elder brother, Q. Fabius Maximus Æmilianus, was sent as consul into Spain, his two legions consisted only of recruits: and

* Mommsen, vol. iii. p. 10.

he at first met with some reverses (B.C. 145). The fruits of a more successful campaign in the following year (B.C. 144), were lost through the weakness of his successor, the prætor Quinctius; and in the same year the Numantine war broke out afresh (B.C. 143). Both the consuls of the ensuing year found full occupation in Spain; the war against Viriathus falling to the lot of Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, another adopted son of old Fabius Maximus. He penetrated into Lusitania with two legions and ten elephants, only to retreat again (B.C. 142); and the successes with which he opened the next campaign were cut short by a decisive defeat and a shameful capitulation (B.C. 141). The Senate ratified the peace which recognized Viriathus as king of Lusitania; but they armed the new consul, Q. Serrilius Cæpio, the brother of Servilianus, first with secret orders to plot against Viriathus, and then with authority to resume hostilities. Viriathus was reduced to sue for peace, which was granted only on the condition of his giving up to the Roman executioners all whom they claimed as their subjects, including his own father-in-law. This concession was followed by a demand for the surrender of the arms of the Lusitanians; and Viriathus, convinced that the treachery of Galba was about to be re-enacted, was meditating a last resistance, when his own envoys, who had been gained over by Cæpio, murdered him in his sleep (B.C. 140).

Meanwhile, in the Hisper Province, the Celtiberian war, which had died out when the attention of the Romans was diverted to Africa, had been revived by the example of Viriathus; and the new conflict, known as the NUMANTINE WAR, occupied the Roman arms for more than ten years (B.C. 143—133). The consul Q. Cæcilius Metellus, who had won the surname of Macedonicus by his successes against the pseudo-Philip Andriceus, reduced the insurgents in two campaigns, except the two cities of Numantia and Termantia. Even these were about to capitulate, when the demand for the surrender of their arms drove the people to despair (B.C. 141). The consul Q. Pompeius,* though commanding an army far more numerous than the insurgents, was defeated under the walls of both cities; and, after two campaigns, he granted the insurgents a favourable peace under the outward guise of their surrender (B.C. 140). But, on the arrival of his successor, the

* This first of the Pompeian gens who is named in Roman history was said to have been the son of a flute-player. It is convenient to use the full Roman name for the rest of the Pompeii, reserving the familiar English form for the best known of them, the rival of Cæsar.

consul Popillius Lænas, before the transaction was completed, Pompeius flatly denied the whole treaty in the face of the envoys who had come to pay the last instalment; and, after a winter spent in negotiation, the Senate resolved to prosecute the war (B.C. 138). Still, the extirpation of the rebels seemed as remote as ever. The failures of Popillius Lænas were eclipsed by the great disaster incurred by his successor, the consul C. Hostilius Mancinus, whose army, seized with a panic at a false rumour of the advance of the Vaccaei and Cantabrians to the relief of Numantia, fled by night from their entrenchments to the old camp of Nobilior at a greater distance from the city. Pursued by the Numantines, they were surrounded and forced to capitulate, a favourable treaty of peace being concluded by the hereditary influence of young Tiberius Gracchus, who was serving with the army as military tribune. When the news reached Rome, the Senate and people repeated the hollow pretence, which had been enacted nearly two centuries before in the Great Samnite war, of repudiating the treaty by the solemn surrender of the commander. The Numantines refused, like Pontius, to accept the sacrifice, and Mancinus was seen standing a whole day in his shirt, with his hands bound behind his back, and attended by the herald, between the Roman camp and the gates of Numantia (B.C. 137). His colleague Lepidus, who succeeded to the command, turned away from Numantia to co-operate with Decimus Junius Brutus, the consul of B.C. 138, who, having completed the subjugation of Iasitania in two campaigns, was pursuing that career of conquest among the Gallæci, from which he derived the surname of Callæus. But instead of shaming his honour, the proconsul Lepidus incurred a disastrous defeat before Palantia (*Palencia*), the capital of the Vaccaei (B.C. 137). His two successors saved their armies from any disaster by attempting absolutely nothing against Numantia; and the Romans at length resolved to send their best general against this petty provincial fortress.

In the year B.C. 134, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Æmilianus proceeded as consul for the second time, to finish a task which had foiled all the generals who had tried it; and that, like his great namesake, without the permission of the Senate to levy a consular army, but with a volunteer body-guard of friends and clients under his brother Q. Fabius Maximus. The disorganized army of Spain, with which he had to do his work, was reduced to discipline by his firmness, and brought to a sense of shame by his scornful treatment. Avoiding all offers of battle, Scipio spent

the summer in thus training his army and in obtaining command of the surrounding country. In the autumn he drew his forces round Numantia, where 8000 citizens were now besieged, by four Roman legions and the Numidian contingent of horse and foot, amounting in all to 60,000 men, with twelve elephants. The manner in which the actors in approaching scenes are often brought together was illustrated in the army before Numantia, where Jugurtha commanded the Numidians, and the valour of C. Marius attracted the notice of Scipio, who is said to have predicted his future greatness. Caius Gracchus too was serving in Scipio's army at the very time when his brother Tiberius met with his violent death at Rome at the hands of Scipio's kinsman.

Scipio's profound distrust of his army, and his resolution to run no needless risk, agreed with the course which the position of Numantia seems almost to have rendered necessary. For the first time in Roman history, the spade and mattock took the place of the sword and the battering-ram. The city, which was about three miles in circuit, was hemmed in with a double line of circumvallation of twice the length, with walls, towers, and ditches; and the passage of supplies by the Douro, hitherto carried on at every risk, was completely stopped. Scipio's operations during the summer had prevented the gathering in of stores; and famine soon began to press upon the garrison. A bold leader cut his way out with a small band, and tried to rouse the Celtiberians to a last effort to save their beleaguered brethren. The city of Lutia seemed about to respond to the appeal, when Scipio, warned by the Roman party in the place, appeared before its gates. Four hundred noble youths were delivered up to him as leaders of the movement; and their hands were cut off—an oriental barbarity which had become not uncommon in the Spanish wars.

Thus deprived of all hope of succour, the Numantines offered to capitulate. The reply, that they must surrender at discretion, roused all the frenzy of an Iberian defence, and their own envoys who brought it were torn to pieces. But there was no assailing enemy against whom to prove their fruitless valour: the foe that advanced from house to house was silent famine, followed by despair. It was not till the defenders had come to eat the bodies of the dead, that envoys were again sent to the Roman camp to make the required submission; and one condition only was asked for, that those who were unwilling to surrender might have leave to die. Scipio granted the space necessary to make and execute this terrible choice; and then the few gaunt survivors marched out

of the gates. Fifty of the principal citizens were reserved for the victor's triumph; the rest were sold as slaves. Numantia, razed to its foundations, added to Carthage and Corinth another terrible example, that no considerations of mercy would allow the submission of the conquered countries to remain incomplete. The siege had lasted fifteen months (B.C. 133).

All Spain was now subdued, with the exception of the Cantabrian mountaineers, and the peninsula became henceforth the most prosperous, and, next to Italy itself, the most thoroughly Roman part of the whole empire. The agricultural products of the country, especially its corn, wine, and wool, its mineral wealth, and its facilities for maritime commerce, attracted capitalists from Italy. Great towns were built, particularly in the south, and filled with a wealthy and highly cultivated Italian population. Latin became the language of both provinces, and several distinguished names were contributed by Spain to Roman literature. "To the present day, the language, the manners, and even the heathen Christianity of Spain retain a living evidence of the successful Romanizing of the peninsula."* Scipio returned to Rome to celebrate another triumph, with the new title of Numantinus (B.C. 132); and Brutus appears to have triumphed over the Lusitanians and Gallaci in the same year. The latter general had enriched himself in Spain, and the public buildings, to the erection of which part of his gains was devoted, were inscribed with verses in his praise by his friend and comrade, the poet and orator L. Attius. But Scipio had remained true to his maxims of stern integrity. For the second time he returned to Rome no richer than when he started; and Cicero tells us that, when Attalus of Pergamus sent him those presents which no one had dared even to offer to his father, Scipio informed the king that he would use his bounty in rewarding the bravest of his soldiers.

The time of the destruction of Numantia witnessed two other events, which mark it as an epoch in the history of the Roman empire. The culminating greatness of that empire, in the acquisition of the kingdom bequeathed by Attalus at his death, is contrasted with the outbreak of an incurable internal source of decay, the first of the *Servile Wars*. Like the social luxury and political corruption which marked the age, the inordinate growth of slavery was at once the fruit of conquest and the beginning of its penalty.

* Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, vol. i. p. 100.

The innate curse which the moral government of God has stamped upon the daring and impious claim of man to make property of his fellow-man—the self-working law that, like all other tyranny, it is as difficult to let go as it was unjust to acquire—becomes doubly dangerous in the case of “captives taken with the spear,” where no marked difference of race or colour or civilization places the master above the slave. And when slaves become so numerous as they had been now made by a century of foreign conquest in the three divisions of the world, the mode of their employment, their separation from the free community, and the carelessness of their masters about their welfare or their very lives, concurred to make them a persecuted and dangerous class. The abuse by which the Roman nobles and capitalists had obtained the “possession” of large tracts of public land involved the necessity of the cultivation of that land by slave-labour. In Italy, where the process was aided by the decay of the free population through the Hannibalic war, large regions were parcelled out into sheep-walks, under the care of slaves, who were made responsible for their flocks, and were left to find subsistence as they could. But a still richer field for speculation was found in Sicily, which came into the hands of the Romans devastated by centuries of war, almost like a virgin country. Its fertile plains could produce abundance of the corn, wool, wine, and other produce, for which Rome and Italy furnished an ample market; and the rich Romans and Sicilian Greeks vied with one another in working this profitable field by means of the captives whom the slave merchants bought in the camps of the great conquerors.

The condition of these slaves is thus described by the highest of living authorities on all matters connected with the constitution and social condition of the Roman republic:—“When the slaves landed in Sicily, they were kept by the dealers in slave-pens, waiting for the purchasers. The wealthy capitalists would buy whole batches at once, brand or mark the slaves like cattle, and send them off to the country to work. The young and robust were employed as shepherds, and the others in agricultural and other labour. Some worked in fetters, to prevent them running away. All of them had hard service, and their masters supplied them scantily with food and clothing. They cared little about their slaves. They worked them while they were able to work, and the losses by death were replaced by fresh purchases. This want of humanity and prudence in the masters soon produced intolerable mischief. The slaves who were employed in looking after sheep

and cattle of necessity had more freedom than those who were kept to cultivating the ground. Their masters saw little of them, and left them unprovided with food, supposing that they would be able to look after themselves and cost nothing. Many of these greedy slave-owners were Italians, some of whom probably did not reside in Sicily, but entrusted the management of their estates to overseers, and consumed the produce of their wool and the profits of their cattle either at Rome or in some of the Italian towns. These slave shepherds, an active and vigorous set of men, soon found out ways of helping themselves. They began by robbing and murdering, even in frequented places, travellers who were alone or only in small companies. They next attacked the huts of the poorer people, plundered them of their property, and, if resistance was made, murdered them. It became unsafe for travellers to move about by night, nor could people any longer safely live on their lands in the country. The shepherds got possession of huts which the occupants abandoned, and of arms of various kinds also, and thus they became bolder and more confident. They went about with clubs and spears, and the staves which were used by herdsmen, dressed in wolfskins or hogskins, and already began to make a formidable appearance. They had a great number of fierce dogs with them, and abundance of food from the milk and flesh of their beasts. The island was filled with roaming bands of plunderers, just as if the masters had allowed their slaves to do what they liked. . . . Though all the slave-owners would suffer from the depredations of these robbers, every man would be unwilling that his own slaves should be put to death when they were caught, and would claim them as fugitive labourers; and thus disputes might easily arise between the governors and the owners. The true state of the case is probably this. Slaves were bought cheap, and could be made profitable by working them hard; and thus the greediness of gain, the total want of any humane feeling in the masters, the neglect of proper discipline among the slaves, and the careless feeling of security produced by many years of prosperity, brought things gradually to such a state, that repression of the disorder was beyond the power of the masters or the governors; for the masters could not reduce such sturdy fellows to obedience on estates far removed from towns, and a Roman governor of Sicily had no army at his command.

* Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, vol. i. pp. 114—116. It is impossible to quote this important work—to which it is understood that the author has devoted the remnant of a life spent not only in the service, but to a great degree in the

A servile population in such a condition as this was ready to burst all bounds upon any special provocation; and there are always some—without staying to discuss whether the majority or the minority—among slave-owners, whose abuse of their irresponsible power constantly supplies that provocation to the utmost. Such a man was Damophilus, a wealthy and luxurious landowner of Henna, whose wife Mëgallis vied with him in scourging and maltreating their slaves, both male and female, till the wretched creatures resolved to be revenged at all hazards. They found a leader in a certain Eunöis, a Greek of Syria, the slave of another citizen of Henna, named Antigènes. This man was a juggler and a religious impostor. He pretended to have divine communications in dreams, and to have received a revelation from the Syrian goddess that he should be a king. The prophecies that came true gained him a certain degree of credit among the slaves, who overlooked his failures; and he added force to his predictions by the conjuror's trick of vomiting flames of fire from his mouth. His master used him as a privileged buffoon for the amusement of his guests, who gave him money, and begged to be remembered by him when he became a king. The counsel of this pretender gave the slaves of Damophilus faith in their success, and they marched against Henna, with Eunöis at their head spouting flames. The town was surprised and the houses sacked with all the barbarities attendant on such an insurrection. Damophilus and his wife were dragged from their country-house into the theatre: he was cut down while attempting to address the assembled slaves; and she was delivered to the women to be tortured and killed. Amidst all these horrors the daughter of Damophilus, who had been accustomed to comfort the victims of her parents' cruelties, was sent in safety to her relations at Gatana. All the citizens who fell into the hands of the slaves were put to death, except the armourers; and these were forced to make weapons for the insurgents.

Eunöis was now saluted by the slaves as king: he called himself Antiochus, and his subjects Syrians. He formed a council of the wisest of his followers, his chief adviser being Achæus, a man of sense and action, who firmly opposed all cruel outrages. The servile army amounted in a few days to 6000 armed men, and they were joined by 5000 more who had risen in another part of

regeneration of classical and all other useful learning—without the acknowledgment of profound gratitude and personal attachment to the friend under whom the present writer made his first essays in literature:—"Prima litterarum rudimenta diligenti ac moderato duci approbavit."

the island under Cleon, a Cilician. Even before this, Eunoüs had dared to meet the Roman armies in the field, and three prætors had been defeated, with the loss of their camps. The fourth, Hypsæus, who arrived from Rome about thirty days after the revolt, raised an army of 8000 men; but he was no match for the rebels, whose force had grown to 20,000 and after his defeat increased to 200,000, probably the whole slave population of the island. The war now assumed an importance second only to that of Numantia, and its conduct was entrusted to Scipio's colleague, C. Fulvius Flaccus, who seems to have done nothing (B.C. 134). His successor, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, achieved the first success in the war by taking the town of Messina, where 8000 of the rebels were killed, and all the prisoners crucified (B.C. 133). In the following year, the consul Publius Rupilius brought the war to a conclusion. The impregnable fortresses of Tauromenium (*Taormina*), on the eastern coast, and Henna, which stood on the highest hill in Sicily after Etna, were yielded to him by treachery, and all the slaves found in them were put to death with tortures, to the number of 20,000. Cleon, the second leader of the insurrection, fell in a sally from Henna; but Eunoüs, with his body-guard of 1000 men, fled to the mountain fastnesses of the island, closely pursued by the consul. When escape was seen to be impossible, his followers put one another to death; and the mock king himself was dragged from his concealment and cast into prison at Morgantia, where he died of the same loathsome disease that consumed Herod Antipas.

Rupilius remained in Sicily as proconsul to regulate the affairs of the province, with the accustomed aid of ten commissioners from Rome; and his wise ordinances, embodied in the *Lex Rupilia*, became the basis for its subsequent administration. On his return to Rome he enjoyed that sort of lesser triumph in which the victor entered the city on foot, clad in the magistrate's purple-bordered toga, instead of riding in a four-horsed chariot and wearing the gorgeous triumphal robe embroidered with gold. His hand held no sceptre, and his head was crowned with myrtle in place of the triumphal bay; and for the solemn procession to the capital, heralded by the peal of trumpets, headed by the Senate, and closed by the victorious troops, there was substituted a lighter demonstration of popular rejoicing, in which knights and plebeians marched tumultuously to the lively music of the flute. On arriving at the Capitol, the general sacrificed, not a bull, as in the triumph, but a sheep; and it seems to have been from the

victim thus offered that the ceremony received the name of an Ovation.

The same year, in which the fall of Numantia secured the Roman dominion as far as the Pillars of Hercules, witnessed the acquisition of their first province beyond the Hellespont. Attalus III. Philometor, the sixth king of Pergamus, died in B.C. 133, after a reign of five years, in which he had become remarkable for nothing but his enormous wealth and extravagance, and the murder of his relations and friends. His minister Eudemus carried to Rome a will, by which Attalus bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. The suggestion that this instrument was forged, which Sallust represents as contained in 'a vehement indictment of the Romans for fraud and oppression from the pen of Mithridates, seems beyond the range of historical criticism; * but, in any case, the disposition may be regarded as resulting from the growth of a Roman party in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and as the best means of averting a war with the certain issue of annexation. Accordingly, when Aristonicus, who was reputed to be a natural son of Eumenes II., claimed the crown and seized Leucæ (*Lefke*) on a promontory between Phœgia and the mouth of the Hermus, his usurpation was at once resisted by the Greek cities. Ephesus took the lead in fitting out a fleet; and Aristonicus, defeated in a sea-fight, fled into the interior. He soon collected a force, consisting chiefly of runaway slaves, seized Thyatira and Apollonis, between Pergamus and Sardis, and made himself master of Myndus, Colophon, and Samos. The aid given to the Greek cities by the kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia proved inadequate, and the Romans, occupied at home with the conflict begun by Gracchus, as well as with the affairs of Spain and Sicily, had as yet only sent five commissioners, of whom Scipio Nasica was one, to look after their inheritance.

On awaking to the danger, the wiser Romans would have again sent Scipio Africanus to end the war, but his political course had ruined his influence, and the command was obtained by the consul P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, who belonged to the party of the Gracchi† (B.C. 131). "Asellio, who wrote the history of this war, says that Crassus possessed five things that are most valued: he was very rich, of a very noble family, a most eloquent speaker,

* "*Simulato impio testamento.*" The passage occurs in a letter from Mithridates to Arsaces, preserved from the fourth book of Sallust's lost Histories.

† The curious contest of Crassus with his colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, for the command in Asia, is related by M. Long, vol. i. p. 205.

distinguished for his knowledge of law, and Pontifex Maximus. He was so well acquainted with Greek that he mastered the five dialects of the language, and was able when he sat in courts in Asia to answer every suitor in his own speech." The same historian relates an incident characteristic of the manner in which the Roman governors were now beginning to treat the provincials. "Crassus was preparing to besiege Leucæ, which we must suppose that Aristonicus had seized again. He wanted a large piece of timber for a battering-ram, and he wrote to a master-builder of Elea, a town friendly to the Romans, to send the larger of two pieces of timber which Crassus had seen there. The builder, knowing the purpose for which the timber was wanted, did not send the larger piece, but he sent the smaller, which he considered to be more suitable for the purpose, and it was of course more portable. Crassus summoned the man to his presence, and without any regard to the reasons which were alleged for sending the smaller piece, he ordered him to be stripped and whipped well, on the ground that the authority of a commander would be ruined if a man should not exactly obey orders, and should use his own judgment when he was not told to do so. Crassus's notions of obedience would not satisfy a wise general, who is content when he has a thing done in the best way."^{*}

Of his military operations we know nothing beyond this siege, which seems to have failed, for his great disaster took place near Leucæ. He appears to have been content to retire at the end of his year, after gathering the riches which attracted him to Asia, and to leave Aristonicus to his successor. On his way home, encumbered with baggage, he was surprised near Leucæ, utterly defeated, and slain in the pursuit. "We cannot," says Mr. Long, "add military ability to the five things which Crassus possessed." In connection with this campaign, the historians relate a curious example of Roman superstition. The statue of Apollo at Cumæ wept for four days. The haruspices, who interpreted the omen to signify that the war with Aristonicus would last four years, advised the Senate to have the statue broken and thrown into the sea; but the elders of Cumæ pleaded that the same sign had preceded the victories over Antiochus and Perseus. It was decided, on second thoughts, that the tears of the Cumæan Apollo were for Asiatic Greece, the mother-country of the colony, and he was propitiated with sacrifices and costly presents.[†]

* Long, vol. i. pp. 266-7.

† The historian may safely leave to the special enquirer into the annals of super-

The triumph of Aristonicus was cut short by the arrival of the consul M. Perperna, whose unexpected attack drove him defeated to Stratonice in Caria, where famine compelled him to surrender (B.C. 130). The death of Perperna, from sickness, at Pergamus, left the settlement of Asia and the disposal of the prisoner to his successor, Manius Aquillius (B.C. 129), and it seems that Aristonicus was carried to Rome, and there strangled in prison. The kingdom of Pergamus was forced by Aquillius, assisted by ten commissioners, into the Roman province of ASIA.* It included the three great western divisions of Mysia, Ionia, and Caria, with the Greek colonies of Æolis, Ionia, and Doris, except that a strip of coast on the south of Caria was left to Rhodes. The Thracian Chersonese, which had belonged to Pergamus, was added to the province of Macedonia. The Lesser Phrygia was included in the province, and the Greater was given to Mithridates V., king of Pontus, as the reward of his aid against Aristonicus; but upon his death in B.C. 120, the gift was resumed, and annexed to the province of Asia during the minority of his son Mithridates VI., who became the great antagonist of the Roman people. With sovereign contempt for the rights of Syria, which was now torn by a dynastic contest, Cilicia and Lycaonia were given, if we may believe Justin, to the sons of Ariarathres, king of Cappadocia, who had fallen in battle against Aristonicus. Thus at length the Romans possessed on the continent of Asia a province abounding in natural resources, and filled with rich and magnificent cities, whose Greek inhabitants, however far inferior to their European brethren in military and political renown, had always taken the lead in the refinements of civilization. The wealth which had been fostered under the peaceful government of the Attalids offered inexhaustible resources to Italian speculators and Roman governors, and the prosperity of the Asiatics survived even the ravages of the Great Mithridatic War, which threatened for a time to drive back the Romans out of Asia. Meanwhile, the acquisition of the effete kingdoms of Syria and Egypt in the East, and in

stitution that class of prodigies which were as regularly produced as they were regularly expected, and which, even if better attested than they are, have no visible bearing on the course of history." It may however be remarked, in passing, that some of them are the simplest natural phenomena. Any one who has noticed the deposit of dew on the smooth cold surface of marble or painted walls, and the like, on a sudden increase of warmth and moisture in the surrounding atmosphere, will be at no loss to understand the frequent mention of sweating and weeping statues.

* This use of the word *Asia* requires to be borne in mind in reading the New Testament, as well as the ancient historians.

the West of Numidia and the barbarous regions beyond the Alps, seemed to be only a question of time; and the formation of the province of Asia marks the epoch of Rome's dominion over the civilized world. Her empire, spreading like a vast arch over the Mediterranean basin, with one foot resting on the Atlas, and the other on the Taurus, comprised, besides Italy itself, the following provinces:—(1) SICILY, acquired in B.C. 241; (2) SARDINIA and CORSICA, B.C. 238; (3, 4) HISPANIA, CITERIOR and ULTERIOR, B.C. 205; (5) GALLIA CISALPINA, B.C. 191; (6) MACEDONIA, including Epirus, Thessaly, and Thrace, B.C. 146; (7) ILLYRICUM, probably formed about the same time; (8) ACHAEA, that is, Greece south of Epirus and Thessaly, B.C. 146; (9) AFRICA, formerly the territory of Carthage, B.C. 129; (10) ASIA, including all the richest part of Asia Minor, B.C. 129.

While Rome was thus acquiring the dominion of the civilized world, her internal state was marked by the decay of the old Roman virtues, the dissolution of the bonds of her old constitution, and the beginning of new troubles that were only to end with the fall of the Republic. This inward degeneracy was directly connected with the progress of foreign conquest, which poured a flood of wealth upon a people whose social habits had been based upon frugality and simplicity, and opened an unlimited field to speculation and rapacity. These causes of change had been partly anticipated by the working of the Roman constitution within the limits of Italy itself. The old distinctions of patricians, clients, and plebeians had vanished. With the admission of the plebeians to the higher magistracies, the increasing power of wealth to influence elections, and the custom of admitting those who had held the offices of state to the Senate, a new nobility had arisen, under the names of the Optimates, and a rabble, misnamed plebeian, had grown up by their side. The nobility were in possession of the Senate, whose initiative in legislation had grown into the dominant power in the state; and the prerogative vote of the equestrian centuries gave them the command of the Comitia Centuriata. The old equality of the Roman citizens was publicly annulled by the innovation carried by the elder Africanus, in his second consulship (B.C. 194), of assigning the front seats in the theatre to the senatorial order; and the censorship formed the great means of maintaining the powers of the nobility, so long as their vehement efforts could keep that office in their own hands. The importance of the higher magistracies was kept up by the policy of abstaining from multiplying them with the growth of the Roman

dominions, for it was only on the imperious demands of the newly-acquired provinces that they added to the two Prætors, who judged the causes of citizens and foreigners,* the four who governed the provinces of Sicily and Sardinia (B.C. 227) and the two Spain (B.C. 197). The device of prolonging the consular and prætorian commands, and committing the government of provinces to pro-consuls and proprætors, multiplied the dignities of the nobility, and gave them enlarged opportunities for gaining wealth and honour, instead of widening the circle of those who might aspire to share them. The transference of the appointment of military tribunes from the general in command to the Comitia Tributa made this military grade, like the civil magistracies, the prize of successful canvassing, and what ought to have been the promotion of the deserving soldier became the first step in the public career of a young noble. Such was the effect of this system on the efficiency of the army that, in the war with Perseus, in which the Roman military system for the first time thoroughly broke down, it was found necessary to restore to the commander the appointment of the superior officers (B.C. 171). The exclusiveness of the civil magistracies had been somewhat checked, as we have seen, by the law which forbade re-election to the same office till after the expiration of ten years (B.C. 217); and in B.C. 180 another law fixed the order in which the magistracies must be sought, and the age below which they could not be held.† But, for all this, the curule offices, and consequently the Senate, became more and more the virtual inheritance of a few great houses, and the entrance of a "new man" into the well-fenced circle was regarded as an usurpation, unless he had some close personal tie with the noble families, such as bound the Lælii to the Scipios.

Thus the old republican aristocracy, based upon the equal rights of the original citizens, was transformed into a family oligarchy, in which the old patrician houses still held the predominance, while the lesser nobles, who should have formed a natural opposition, were united with them by common interests. The change in the governing body was reflected in the character of the govern-

* The *Prætor Urbanus* and *Prætor Peregrinus*, of whom, as we have seen, the first was created in B.C. 366, the second in B.C. 246.

† This was the *Lex Annalis* of the tribune L. Villius, according to which a man might be *Quæstor* at 31 years of age; *Curule Ædile* at 37; *Prætor* at 40; *Consul* at 43. An example of this succession is given in the case of Cicero, who was always proud of having, though a *novus homo*, obtained the magistracies "in his own year." Born at the beginning of B.C. 106, he was *Quæstor* in B.C. 75, *Curule Ædile* in B.C. 69, *Prætor* in B.C. 66, and *Consul* in B.C. 63.

ment. In those external affairs which have necessarily occupied most of our attention, we have seen the dignity and moderation, the caution sometimes degenerating into sluggishness, and the marvellous energy and still more marvellous endurance when a great occasion called for great efforts, which characterize an oligarchy in general, and prove that the old Roman virtues still survived. "During the severe disciplinary period of the Sicilian war," says Mommsen, "the Roman aristocracy had gradually raised itself to the height of its new position; and, if it unconstitutionally usurped for the Senate powers which the law divided between the magistrates and Comitia alone, it vindicated the step by its certainly far from brilliant, but sure and steady pilotage of the vessel of the state during the Hannibalic storm, and showed to the world that the Roman Senate was alone able, and in many respects alone deserved, to rule the wide circle of the Italo-Hellenic states." The ascendancy of Fabius Maximus, and the jealousy shown towards a Marcellus and a Scipio, are practical illustrations of the strength and weakness of the senatorial management of foreign affairs.

- The internal administration was not only far less successful, but it seemed as if it were conducted on the very opposite principles. The arts of canvassing not only showed these nobles who could assume so lofty a mien towards kings and foreign states divested of their stern dignity, but undermined the self-respect of the citizens, whose free voices had once raised to office the worthiest of their own body. The weakened sense of responsibility, except to the public opinion of their own class, led to that military indiscipline and those outrages upon justice of which the few instances we have noticed give but a scanty sample. The vast growth of revenue from the increased public domain, the tribute of foreign subjects, the customs duties, the Spanish mines, the spoils of war—of which Antiochus and Perseus alone contributed above four millions sterling—produced no corresponding measure of financial prosperity. So vast and sudden an accession of wealth could not but be in part wasted by mismanagement, and intercepted both by the gains of lessees and by the embezzlement of officers and magistrates. And here the political and financial systems reacted upon each other. The governor or military commander in a distant province was not only subject to the temptation of indulging the passion for luxury and the state of a viceroy with all the more zest because they were new to the spirit of a Roman, but he had to acquire the means of maintaining his conse-

quence in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, and his influence in the Comitia; and proconsuls, corrupted themselves by luxury and arbitrary power, and perverted by the homage of eastern flatterers or western barbarians, returned to make their fellow-citizens more and more deserving by their corruption of the contempt with which they learnt to regard them. The prevalence at once and the impunity of official plunder are attested by the saying of Cato:—"He who steals from a citizen ends his days in chains and fetters; but he who steals from the commonwealth ends them in gold and purple."

Meanwhile the growth of the empire itself absorbed a large proportion of the new revenues in roads, bridges, aqueducts, and these other works which the Romans never performed negligently, besides the expenses of civil administration. Large sums were expended in perfecting the system of roads in Italy itself; and the public works in the capital and its neighbourhood formed some of the best uses of the public wealth. The construction of the great system of sewers which ramified beneath the city from the Cloaca Maxima,* appears to have been contracted for in B.C. 180. Six years later the streets of Rome were paved (B.C. 174). In B.C. 160, the Pomptine marshes were drained; and P. Scipio Nasica, in his consulship in the following year, set up a public *clepsydra*, or water-clock, the city of Rome having gone on for six centuries without any accurate means of knowing the time by night as well as day (B.C. 159).† But the most magnificent work of this period was the great aqueduct (*Aqua Marcia*), constructed by the Prætor Q. Marcius Rex, under the direction of the Senate, in B.C. 144. Rome had hitherto been supplied with water by only two of the fourteen aqueducts which spanned the Campagna with their long lines of arches, and of which only three still suffice to bring into the city a pure and copious stream that puts our boasted sanitary science to shame.‡

* See p. 192.

† A sun-dial (*solarium*) is said to have been brought from Greece and set up before the temple of Quirinus by the Consul L. Papirius Cursor, in B.C. 293; but being constructed for a lower latitude it was of course incorrect at Rome. A more accurate *solarium* was placed beside it by the Censor Q. Marcius Philippus, in B.C. 164.

‡ Had the Romans possessed an imperial capital on the banks of the Thames, it is as certain that they would never have converted the noble river into a brackish estuary, by drawing off from it a constant supply of muddy water, mixed with the sewage of the towns on its upper course, to be doled out for the space of half an hour each day at an enormous price,—as it is that, with the resources of modern engineering, they would have built an aqueduct from the Bala lake, or even a more distant source, if needful. Nay, stranger still, they would have found a diles wealthy and liberal enough to pay for the work, for Rome was ignorant of a water-rate.

The *Aqua Claudia* was, like the *Via Appia*, the work of the Censor Appius Claudius Pulcher, B.C. 313, and was about eleven miles long. The *Anio Vetus* was begun in B.C. 273, with the produce of the spoil taken from Pyrrhus, to bring the water of the Anio from a point above Tibur, twenty miles from Rome, by a circuit of forty-three miles. Both these channels having fallen into decay, and the water of the latter being considered unfit for drinking, the Senate entrusted to the Prætor Marcius the work of their repair and the construction of the new aqueduct, which was named after him. It began at a point thirty-six miles from Rome in a direct line; but its entire course was above sixty miles, about one-ninth of the whole length being above ground, chiefly on arches, and the rest carried through the hills by tunnels. It delivered its water at a height equal to the summit of the Capitoline hill, and sufficed for the supply of Rome till the time of Augustus, when it was repaired by Agrippa, who united with it the *Aqua Tepula* and the *Aqua Julia*, so that the three entered the city in a triple tier of channels. The two great works of the Emperor Claudius, by which alone the Marcian aqueduct was eclipsed, were similarly carried one over the other near their termination. Of the cost of the work we have no information; but we are told that the sum allotted to the sewers was nearly 250,000*l*. The reserve on which the state was obliged to fall back in B.C. 209 amounted to 4000 pounds' weight of gold, or 164,000*l*.; while in A.C. 157 the value of the precious metals in the treasury was about 860,000*l*. Such were the general results of the aristocratic government at home and abroad.

The altered spirit of the ruling class was of course not unopposed; and the type of the party of resistance and reform is to be seen in the celebrated M. Porcius Cato, who is often called Cato Major, to distinguish him from his equally famous great-grandson, Cato of Utica. Born at Tusculum, in B.C. 234, he was brought up on his father's Sabine farm, where his attachment to the hardy habits of the old yeomen-heroes was inflamed into a passion by the constant view of a neighbouring cottage, whither M. Curius Dentatus had retired after his three triumphs. There Curius had been found roasting turnips on his hearth by the Samnite ambassadors, whose costly presents he rejected, telling them that he had rather rule over those who possessed gold than possess it himself. Such was the model on which the youthful Cato formed his character; and he soon attracted the notice of a neighbour, L. Valerius Flaccus, one of the few young

patricians who lamented the altered spirit of the times, and gladly recognized one likely to stem the current. Under his patronage Cato entered public life. Of the same age as his future rival, the elder Africanus, he too was seventeen when he served his first campaign (B.C. 217);* and he passed through the whole war, from the Trasimene lake to Zama. In B.C. 204, the influence of Fabius Maximus and the party opposed to the transfer of the war to Africa obtained Cato's appointment as quaestor with Scipio in Sicily. In the ostentation and indulgence of the proconsul he found ample grounds for bitter political hostility; and on his return to Rome he vehemently accused his commander of luxury and extravagance. He was ædile in B.C. 199, and prætor in B.C. 198 when he obtained a high reputation for the justice and economy with which he governed his province of Sardinia. In B.C. 195 he was consul, with his friend L. Valerius Flaccus. His campaign in the Spanish peninsula has been already noticed; but it is worth while to mention an instance which occurred at Rome of his vehemence in the cause of republican simplicity, in his resistance to the repeal of the Oppian law of B.C. 215, that no woman should possess more than half an ounce of gold, nor wear a garment of divers colours, nor ride in a carriage within a mile of the city, except to a religious festival. After a long contest, the Roman ladies proved too strong for the consul and the two tribunes who sided with him. His last military achievement seems to have been the decisive part he took in the victory over Antiochus at Therapylæ (B.C. 191).†

The conquest of the Asiatic king was reserved, like the victory over Carthage, for his rival; but from that very conquest Cato found an opportunity to aim a heavy blow at the growing Hellenism of the party of Scipio. In B.C. 187, the two Pétellii, as tribunes of the plebs, instigated by Cato, accused the Scipios of having been bribed by Antiochus to grant him lenient terms of peace, and of having applied to their own use money received from the king for the state. Lucius Scipio was summoned to produce his accounts; but when he was about presenting them to the Senate, his brother Africanus snatched them out of his hands and tore them up, a demonstration of virtuous indignation which seems rather to have contributed to the sentence against Lucius. Condemned to pay a heavy fine, he was being dragged to prison

* Strictly speaking, Cato entered the army one year later than Scipio at the full age of seventeen. He had no part in the first campaign of the war (B.C. 218) in which Scipio saved his father's life.

† See p. 493.

by the officers of the tribune Minucius, when Africanus attempted to rescue his brother by force, and a violent conflict was only averted by the interference of the tribune Tiberius Gracchus, who released the prisoner. The success of the prosecution of Asiaticus emboldened the party of Cato to attack Africanus himself. The tribune Nævius revived the charge against him in B.C. 185, and the trial happened to come on upon the anniversary of the battle of Zama. Scipio seized the occasion to prostrate his enemies and override the law itself by an appeal to the glories of that day; and the people assembled for his trial followed him to the Capitol, to return thanks for the victory, and to pray the immortal gods to grant Rome other citizens such as him. Among the parallels that have been drawn between Scipio and Wellington, this scene has been compared to an attack made on the great duke by a London mob on the anniversary of Waterloo. The questionable taste of perpetuating the recollection of an obscure street riot may be forgiven for the sake of the contrast presented by the impassive calmness of the Briton—which those who witnessed it can never forget—with the ostentatious defiance of the law by the Roman. Nor is the contrast less striking between that more than Roman sense of duty which prevented the statesman's unpopularity from overpowering the gratitude due to the deliverer of Europe, till he lived to be the arbiter of parties and a chief pillar of the throne, and the selfish petulance which drove the conqueror of Hannibal into retirement at Liternum, where he desired to be interred under the shade of his own laurels, instead of reposing in the bosom of his ungrateful country. But let us not forget that the weaknesses of Africanus were those of the age in which he lived, and of the belief which held out no prospect of future recompense for the humiliations which his opponents could inflict. He died probably in the same year as Hannibal, B.C. 183.

The year which followed the retirement of Africanus from Rome (B.C. 184) was that of the celebrated censorship of Cato. The election itself was a contest with the Cornelian party, L. Scipio being defeated by Cato and his friend L. Valerius Flaccus; and the power of the office was used for the unflinching application of Cato's principles. L. Scipio himself was deprived of the horse which the state provided for him as a knight,* and L. Flamininus, the brother of the conqueror of Philip V., was expelled from the Senate for an act of abominable cruelty during his government in Gaul in B.C. 192. These were but specimens of the

* This case proves that a senator still retained his equestrian privileges.

manner in which Cato exercised the primary duty of the office, the revision of the roll of citizens. Nor was he less sparing in lopping off the gains of the *Publicani* (or farmers of the taxes), and exacting full value for the money paid to contractors. Public works, of paving, draining, cleansing the water-courses, and so forth, were executed with equal activity and economy. Luxury was combated in every way; the old sumptuary laws were strictly enforced, and new taxes were imposed on expensive slaves, furniture, and dress. Nor was he less severe with his tongue than with his deeds. "He publicly laid before his noble colleagues, one after another, his list of their sins, certainly without being remarkably particular as to the proofs, and certainly also with a peculiar relish in the case of those who had personally crossed or provoked him. With equal fearlessness, he reproved and publicly scolded the citizens for every new injustice and every fresh disorder." *

Such a course could not fail to raise up a host of personal foes, ready to take advantage of the jealousy always excited by a reputation for superior virtue and integrity. Cato was accused no less than twenty-four times, but he was only once condemned. The perfect consistency of his life formed an impenetrable armour; and his commanding eloquence furnished him with a ready weapon against every assailant. His ascendancy in the Senate came to be almost undisputed; and he used it on every occasion to combat what he regarded as the three great enemies of the Republic—corruption, Hellenism, and Carthage. But his war against corruption struck only at its symptoms, and left the sources of the disease untouched. The advancing tide of Hellenism so far carried even him away that he studied Greek literature in his old age, and admired the Greek historians and orators; and the final conquest of Carthage,—which he so incessantly urged and of which he lived to see the commencement,—together with the subjugation of Greece, opened new flood-gates for the irruption of that tide of foreign wealth and foreign influence which he had spent his life in vainly resisting.

The life of the cultivator of his own Sabine farm was as remarkable as that of the censor and senator at Rome. Cato held the doctrine concerning the use of capital embodied in the old Roman law, which made the usurer to be twice as bad as the thief, for the former was to make fourfold restitution, the latter only twofold. He boasted that his own property was derived solely from two sources, agriculture and frugality; and he embodied his maxims

for both in the oldest treatise on farming extant in the Roman language.* His treatment of his slaves and other cattle—for so he virtually classed them—was thoroughly characteristic of the selfish unfeeling economist, in whose religion mercy found no place. “A slave,” he says, “must either work or sleep;” the measure of sleep allowed him being just enough to enable him to work to the utmost. In place of any efforts to attach the slaves to their masters, special pains were taken to keep them at variance among themselves, for another maxim said, “So many slaves, so many foes.” As he presided at the frugal evening meal, Cato sat in judgment on the transactions of the day; and the slaves were called up in turn to receive from his own hand a certain number of stripes with a thong, according to their offences. Worn out slaves and worn out cattle were to be got rid of as they might; and the charger which had borne Cato through his Spanish campaigns was sold by him to save the state the expense of its transport to Rome. In his advancing years the growing love of gain caused him to waver in his constancy to agriculture; and, though he did not speculate in state-leases, or put out his money to usury, he invested it in commercial speculations. The model Roman farmer and patriot was as conspicuous for his avarice as the Hellenizing nobles for their prodigality; and his stern virtues are embittered by utter heartlessness. Among all the eulogies ever passed upon him, we never hear of his being loved. Amidst all his practical labours, however, he found leisure and taste for literature. Besides his treatise on farming, he composed a History of Rome from the foundation of the city to his own time, under the title of *Origines*; and he completed the work, at the age of eighty-four, the year before his death (B.C. 150).

Of the two generations that Cato saw rise up, the second had already produced the worthy successor, whose praise he lived to utter. Taking the two rivals as the patterns, the one of his destiny and the other of his character, Scipio Æmilianus emulated the greatness of the elder Africanus without his arrogance and ostentation, and imitated the stern virtues of Cato without his harshness and narrowness. The well-balanced temperament which he inherited from his father, the noble-minded Æmilius, was moulded by Greek culture, by constant intercourse with men of letters, and by his devoted friendship for the wise and gentle Ælius. To this greater moderation was added a deeper sense of how little could be done to arrest the downward course of morals and manners. How

* Cato, *de Re Rustica*.

much he feared for the future was shown when, in performing the lustration as censor, he changed the accustomed petition for the enlargement of the republic into a prayer for its preservation (B.C. 142). His efforts to imitate the severity of Cato's censorship were thwarted by his colleague, L. Mummius Achaicus, and they afterwards involved him in a prosecution. He degraded a knight, Tiberius Claudius Asellus, and deprived him of his horse, but reversed his decision on the remonstrance of Mummius. But Asellus remembered the affront, and in his tribunate he prosecuted Scipio. We are not distinctly informed either as to the charge or the result; but the five speeches in which Scipio defended himself are pronounced by Cicero to be models of pure Latin eloquence; and the orator did not spare comparisons between Asellus and the nobler animal that had caused the quarrel (B.C. 139).

In the same year Scipio was involved in a more serious political dispute, connected with a subject still agitated in constitutional states. The elections for the magistrates in the Comitia had hitherto been conducted by open voting, each citizen declaring the candidate for whom he gave his voice, and the vote in public trials (*judicia populi*) had likewise been taken openly. But in B.C. 139 the tribune Gabinius carried a law for the election of magistrates by ballot.* Cicero, who is our chief authority on this subject, wavers between his popular predilections and his zeal for his new "order." While stigmatizing the tribune as obscure and mean, he calls the ballot "the vindicator of silent liberty." He tells us that the people liked it, "for it enabled a man to put on an open face and hide his mind: it gave him the power of doing what he liked while he promised to do what he was asked." Accordingly it made the voter a match for the candidate who would either bribe, or coax, or intimidate him. It enabled a man, by a smaller amount of knavery, to defeat a greater knave.† Elsewhere he says that the ballot took away all the influence of the *Optimates*, and that so long as the people were free, they had never called for the pro-

* The successive laws, which established vote by ballot in various cases (B.C. 139, 137, 131, 119, and 107), were called *Leges Tabellariae*, from the *tabella*, or ballot-ticket, on which the vote was inscribed. Thus, in an election, was of course the name of the candidate voted for; in the enactment of a law it was *U. R.*, for the affirmative (*i. e.*, *uti rogas*, as you move) and *A.* (*i. e.*, *antiquo*, I vote for the old law) for the negative. In a public trial it was *C.* (*condemno*) for guilty, *A.* (*absolvo*) for not guilty, and *N. L.* (*non liquet*, *i. e.*, it is not clear) for a neutral verdict, answering to the Scotch *not proven*. There is a coin of the Cassian Gens, struck in honour of the proposer of the law for introducing the ballot into public trials, bearing the figure of a man who is dropping a ballot-tablet, marked with *A.*, into a panner (*cista*).

† Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, vol. i. p. 107.

tection of the ballot, and they only claimed it when they had fallen under the power of the great citizens : so ancient are the arguments with which the modern discussion of the question has made us familiar. But, in truth, the working of the system at Rome, when the Comitia had all but become the mere instrument of the factions of the nobility, affords no precedent either way for a popular constitution which is still healthful. As Mr. Long truly says, in summing up the argument : "The mischief that happened at Rome came neither from secret nor from open voting. It came from the character and condition of the people who voted, and the dishonesty of those who were candidates for office ; and so it will be always." The battle, which our own age still finds so hard, with corruption at its source in the corruptors, had long since begun at Rome. In the simpler and purer age of the republic the law interfered to check that first approach to undue influence, from which we derive our word *ambition*.* The earliest law forbade even that outward sign of "adding white to the dress," which is still unconsciously referred to when we speak of a *candidate* for office,† (B.C. 432) ; but the custom nevertheless became established. The law passed in the next century (B.C. 358) against canvassing country-people on market-days was intended to preserve the advantages of the nobles over the new men. But it was the growing corruption of the period now under review that produced the first penal enactment against bribery and corruption. By the law named from the two consuls of B.C. 181, and therefore proposed with all the authority of the Senate, a person convicted of *ambitus* was incapacitated from being a candidate for the space of ten years. But no law could exclude an evil which it required an honest state of public feeling to correct.

Two years after the enactment of the Gabinian Law, the tribune

* *Ambitus* (from *ambire*, to go about) signified originally nothing more than the solicitation of votes ; but it soon passed into the bad sense of undue influence, and the whole class of offences was embodied in the two words *ambitus* and *iniquitas* (bribery). The phrase, *buying and corruption*, with which we are but too familiar, is not precisely equivalent, for its two words describe the crime of the candidate and the effect of that crime upon the voter.

† The ordinary *toga* had the natural white colour of the wool ; and the aspirants for office added a brighter white by rubbing it with chalk (*creta*), when it became the *toga candida* and they themselves the *candidati* (*white-washed*), and canvassing is figuratively described as *creta ambitus*. The fresh white togas worn at festivals were not chalked, but either new or newly cleaned. On the other hand, the robe which had been allowed to become dirty (*toga sordida*) was worn, with the hair and the whole outward man in disorder, as the sign of dejection and forlorn misery, by persons under accusation.

L. Cassius Longinus proposed to extend the vote by ballot to state-trials before the whole people, except for that sort of constructive treason called *perduellio* (B.C. 137).^{*} This innovation touched more closely upon the security of the nobles, on whose administration in office, and especially on their misgovernment of the provinces, such public trials were the chief check. The Cassian Law was opposed by the Consul M. Æmilius Lepidus, and Scipio incurred some odium with his own party, for giving the bill a support for which his only motive could have been an honest conviction of its necessity. The appeal to the solemn judgment of the whole people, which appears in so noble a light in the legend of Horatius and the trial of Manlius, had degenerated into a party manœuvre, in which secret voting was sometimes the shelter of the judges from intimidation, and sometimes the cloak for their corruption.

In the interval between Scipio's censorship and his command in Spain, he had the opportunity of displaying his republican simplicity at the courts of Syria and Egypt. He went on an embassy, to protect the interests of Rome in those kingdoms, with a retinue of only five slaves, as a practical protest against the wonted ostentation of the nobles when employed on such missions. We shall have to record, in the next Book, the violent political crisis which affairs reached at Rome during the absence of Africanus in Spain. Though so far removed from the scene of the conflict, and connected by relationship with both parties, Scipio's vehement conservatism would not suffer him to remain neutral. Though his wife was the sister of the Gracchi, and, though Caius Gracchus was then serving under him with great distinction, the news of the murder of Tiberius called forth from Scipio no other comment than that of Athena on the fate of Ægisthus :—

“ So perish he, whoe’er he be, that does such deeds again !”

* Just as our Statute of Treasons speaks of *levying war* against the king, so *perduellio* (derived from *duellum*, the old Latin for *bellum*) signified properly the making war against the Roman people ; and it included a large number of offences tending to the injury of the state, such as the loss of a Roman army by its general. The various cases of *perduellio* were gradually merged in *maiestas*, treason against the greatness (or *maiestas*) of the state.

† The quotation derives additional force from the preceding line (Homer, *Odys.* i. 46, 47) :—

καὶ λίην κείνός γε εὐκότι κείται δέλεορ
ὥς ἀπόλιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε βέροι.

“ His death was equal to the direful deed ;
So may the man of blood be doomed to bleed.”—POPE.

The part which Scipio took on his return to Rome was consistent with the feelings he thus avowed. He did not shrink from assuming the leadership of the aristocratic party, vacated by the virtual banishment of Scipio Nasica, the slayer of Gracchus; and his vehement opposition mainly contributed to the rejection of the bill, proposed by the tribune C. Papirius Carbo and supported by C. Gracchus, to legalize the very innovation in attempting to effect which Tiberius had lost his life, the re-election of tribunes of the plebs for a second year (B.C. 131). But the discussion gave the death-blow to Scipio's popularity. Carbo asked him, before the assembled people, what he thought of the death of Gracchus, and Scipio did not hesitate to reply that he was justly slain; and when the answer was received with shouts of rage, he told the people that he had never been terrified by the war-cry of an enemy, and would not now quail before those who had only a step-mother in Italy.* The same tribune, Carbo, carried a bill for extending the ballot to the voting on the enactment of laws (B.C. 131). This year, too, furnished a proof at once of the growth of a corrupt party spirit, and of the waning influence of Scipio, in the acquittal of L. Aurelius Cotta, whom he prosecuted for extortion in a provincial government.† It is strange to read Cicero's apology for the jury, that they acquitted Cotta lest they should seem to have yielded to the weight of Scipio's character.

Meanwhile, Scipio's protection was sought by the allies, who were aggrieved by the measures of the three commissioners who had the execution of the Agrarian Law of Gracchus. At present we are only concerned with this matter so far as it affects Scipio. On his proposal, the Senate transferred the trials of all the disputes from the commissioners to the Consul C. Sempronius Tuditanus (B.C. 129), who soon after left Rome to conduct a war in Illyria, so that no legal redress could be obtained. The Senate appear to have thought of making Scipio dictator, but to have shrunk from such an experiment on the temper of the people, who began to exchange mutual recriminations with their former favourite. They loudly declared that the man whom they had twice elected consul while he was under the legal age preferred the interests of the allies to theirs, while he complained of the ungrateful

* The allusion was to the number of *libertini*, or manumitted slaves, who had obtained the franchise. Tiberius Gracchus (the father) had, in his censorship (B.C. 169), enrolled the *libertini* in the four city tribes.

† The case was one of the class which became so common in the later years of the Republic under the name of *Repetundæ*, or *Pecuniæ Repetundæ* (literally, money sought to be recovered).

return for his services to the state. He was suspected of a design to obtain by force of arms the repeal of the Agrarian Law of Gracchus; and one day, amidst the renewed invectives of the tribunes, the forum resounded with the cry of "Death to the tyrant!" But the majority of the Senate stood firm to Scipio, and that same evening they attended him in a body to his house. He retired to rest apparently in perfect health, after desiring (according to one account) that writing materials should be placed by his bedside, as he intended to compose a speech for the next day. In the morning he was found dead in his bed. The belief was general that he had met with foul play; but amidst the confused accounts that have come down to us, there is neither any clear statement that the matter was investigated at the time, nor sufficient evidence to guide us to a decision. The conqueror of Africa, Asia, and Spain was borne to his grave without the honour of a public funeral. The orations pronounced over him by his two nephews, Q. Aelius Tubero and Q. Fabius Maximus, were composed by Caius Laelius, whose devoted friendship for Africanus, and the use made of both their names in the moral and philosophical dialogues of Cicero, will preserve their fame even should warlike glory be forgotten.

When we turn from the political changes in the Roman state to the principles which governed the inner life of its citizens, we are met on every hand with the indications of Hellenic and Oriental influence. That piece of national religion, which the Greeks had long since passed, was still in the ascendant at Rome: the ceremonies of public worship were multiplied: new sacerdotal colleges were instituted: property was burdened with endowments for "pious uses:" and it was with much difficulty that arrears of taxes were exacted from the priests. The dedication of titles became so general, that a public entertainment was given twice every month in the Forum Boarium; and a collection of pence was made from house to house for the support of one of those foreign modes of worship which now began to be introduced. We have already seen how readily the Latin race adopted the systems of divination by means of the entrails of victims, the signs of the heavens, and the flight of birds, from the Etruscan and Sabellian nations. A new impulse seems to have been given to these forms of superstition by the discovery of the tomb of Numa, containing his sacred writings (B.C. 181). The rolls, which had a suspiciously fresh appearance, were found to consist either of twelve or seven books on Latin ecclesiastical law, and as many more on Greek philosophy. The latter were burnt by order of the Senate.

and the former were carefully guarded by the priests from the knowledge of the common people. The object of the imposture would seem to have been to place the code of religious worship, which was now fully elaborated, under the sanction of Numa's venerable name.

But the new relations of Rome with the East introduced a flood of foreign superstitions. Chaldean astrologers and fortune-tellers spread over all Italy; and, just at the close of the Second Punic War, the orgies of Cybele, the Phrygian Mother of the Gods, were solemnly introduced by public authority. An embassy sent to Pessinus, in Galatia, brought back the unknown stone which the priests gave them as the veritable image of the goddess, with a train of the eunuch priests themselves, whose order was continued at Rome under the name of *Galli*, with their oriental dresses, their processions to the music of flutes and cymbals, and their collections from house to house. No Roman citizen, however, was permitted to be enrolled among them (B.C. 204). This innovation was soon succeeded by the private introduction of the worship of Bacchus, which soon infected all Italy with the most abominable practices of licentiousness, private poisoning, and the falsifying of wills (B.C. 186). After 10,000 persons had been condemned, for the most part to death, in the course of seven years, the evil was as rampant as ever (B.C. 180). Meanwhile the influence of the Greek philosophy was seen in the rationalistic interpretations which were put upon the legends of the old mythology; while the more intellectual class, perceiving the arbitrary hollowness of such expositions, for the most part abandoned all religious faith. The well-known saying, "I wonder that an *haruspex* can keep his countenance in presence of an *haruspex*," is older than the time of Cicero. The decay of faith was accompanied with a rapid decline in the simplicity of the old Roman manners and in the gravity of the national character. The bonds of patriarchal discipline and morality were broken: vices of which it is a shame even to speak became common, and slaves were purchased for their gratification: and the most horrible crimes were committed in the bosom of private families. The unbounded luxury of the upper classes was accompanied by a growing distaste for labour among the lower, who were humoured by a great increase of public amusements. These were suited to the rough character of the Roman people. While the cultivated few were alone trained to enjoy the scenic representations imported from Greece, the mass of the people were gratified by the Greek

athletes, who first appeared at Rome in B.C. 186; and the same year witnessed the importation from Africa, at an enormous cost, of lions and panthers, whose slaughter in the arena feasted the eyes of the degenerate progeny of the hardy Italian and Sabine hunters. How little the Hellenic influence of the age tended to refinement in these amusements, is witnessed by a scene which occurred in B.C. 167. Some Greek flute-players appeared, as a new feature, in the triumphal games. Their music failed to please, and the people showed unbounded delight when the performers laid aside their flutes and began to box.

Meanwhile, however, literature made steady progress; but it was a literature almost entirely imitated from the Greek models, while the Greek language became the great instrument of culture among the higher classes. The Greek ANDRONICUS (called M. Livius Andronicus after the consul whose freedman he was) first exhibited a tragedy in B.C. 240, and translated the *Odyssey* in the Saturnian metre. CN. NÆVIUS, a Campanian who served in the First Punic War, wrote, besides dramas, an epic poem on that war in the Saturnian metre, introducing the popular legends of the foundation of Rome. His attacks on the great family of the Metelli brought upon him imprisonment and exile. The father of Epic poetry at Rome was Q. ENNIUS, a Greek of Rudiae in Calabria, who was brought from Sardinia by Cato in B.C. 204, and enjoyed the friendship of the elder Africanius, in whose sepulchre he was buried (B.C. 169). His great work, the "*Annals of Rome*," in eighteen books, celebrated in verse the same subject which Cato treated in prose in the "*Origines*;" and he first used the dactylic hexameter, imitated from Homer, in place of the Saturnian metre of the old Latin poets. The New Comedy of the Greeks was transferred into Latin by the Umbrian, P. MÆCIVS PLAUTUS, and the African, P. TERENTIUS AFER, of whom we have already spoken; but Terence had a less-known predecessor in Q. CÆCILIVS, who died in B.C. 168, and a successor in L. AFRANIUS, who chose his subjects from Roman instead of Greek life (B.C. 100). LUGILIUS, the greatest Roman satirist before Horace, was born in B.C. 149; and the years B.C. 142 and B.C. 139 witnessed the births of Antonius and Crassus, the two great forensic orators who preceded Cicero.

END OF VOL. II.

